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JUDGMENT
ADINYIRA (MRS), J.S.C:-
This is an appeal against the
judgment of the Court of Appeal
dated 4 February 2005 affirming
an earlier judgment of the High
Court Accra dated 1 March 2004
dismissing the action of the
plaintiff/appellant (
hereinafter plaintiff.) The
grounds of appeal are:
1.
The Court of Appeal erred in
upholding the finding made by
the learned trial
judge that the comments
submitted by the Plaintiff on
the Interim Audit Report
constituted a hearing and an
opportunity to present his side
of the case.
The
failure
by the Court of Appeal to set
aside that wrongful finding has
occasioned
the
Plaintiff
a grave miscarriage of justice.
2.
The Court of Appeal fell into
grave error in upholding the
judgment of the
trial
court which judgment was totally
against the weight of the
evidence adduced
at
the trial having regard
particularly to the unproven
allegations of misconduct
levelled
against the Plaintiff and the
trial courts own finding
amongst
others
that
the
Final Audit Report on the basis
of which the Plaintiff was
summarily
dismissed itself contained
several errors.
3.
The Court of Appeal erred when
it reached the wrongful and untenable
conclusion that having regard to
the conflict between Exhibit 'F'
the Conditions
of Service for Senior Staff and
Exhibit'
A' the Plaintiffs Letter of
Appointment
it
was not envisaged that the
Plaintiff could be covered by
the disciplinary
procedures set out in Exhibit
'F'.
On the contrary the Court of
Appeal ought
to
have held that the mere absence
of any disciplinary procedures
in the plaintiff’s letter of
appointment did not in any way
relieve the defendant Board Of
Directors which exercised final
disciplinary authority over the
plaintiff of their duty to
comply with the very procedures
the defendant had itself spelt
out in Exhibit ‘F’ for its
employees in conformity with the
rules of natural justice.
4.
The Court of Appeal erred in
upholding the finding of the
learned trial judge that the
defendant was not liable for
damages for defamation.”
FACTS OF THE CASE
The plaintiff has been in the
service of the
Defendant/respondent
(hereinafter defendant) for 13
years prior to his appointment
as the Managing Director on 1
September 2001 for a term of 5
years. He was asked to proceed
on his accrued leave in
December2002. While on his
extended leave, the Board of
Directors requested, the Auditor
General to
undertake a forensic
audit
and
management review of the
operations of the
company. According to the
plaintiff the audit exercise was
carried on without any questions
or explanation sought from him
by the auditors. He was
summarily dismissed by a letter
dated 17 June 2003 for stated
misconduct based on adverse
findings against him in the
Audit Report. Additionally the
defendant circulated the Audit
Report to the media which
published same and made adverse
comments which were defamatory
and thereby injured his
reputation. He therefore
instituted this action at the
High Court Accra claiming:
1.
A declaration that in all the
circumstances of the case the
plaintiff’s dismissal was
wrongful and unlawful;
2.
An order that the plaintiff be
paid all entitlements and
earnings for the unexpired two
and one-half years of the
contract term of five years
3.
A declaration that in all
general damages
for defamation
following the publication of
the alleged
findings
in
the electronic
and print media;
4.
An order
to
the Defendant Company
to retract
the defamatory
publications
in
the
electronic
and print media;
5.
Punitive and exemplary costs.
PARTICULARS OF WRONGFUL
DISMISSAL
“Paragraph 18
of statement of claim:
“The
Plaintiff says that the
Defendant Company did not follow
proper
procedure in dismissing the
Plaintiff in that the Defendant
Company
as
employer of the Plaintiff did
not raise any query
on the
alleged
misconduct of the Plaintiff
to allow the Plaintiff
to be
heard
in his
defence on the alleged
misconduct by the Forensic Audit
team
for
the
reasons given below:
(a) The
Plaintiff
was only asked by the Defendant
Company to comment
on a report,
which had been finalised without
any input by the Plaintiff;
(b)
The
Plaintiff only carried out approval
policies,
plans
and
programs
of the
Board
of Directors in respect of the
Home Ownership Scheme,
and
related matters
in accordance with the schedule
of duties given
him by
the
Defendant
Company
at the time of his employment;
(c)
The
Defendant Company had not by
itself on its own
at anytime
prior
to the issuance
of the letter of 17th
June 2003 conducted any disciplinary
proceedings
which
resulted in the decision to
dismiss the Plaintiff summarily
d) The Forensic Audit Team
did not give the plaintiff the
right or opportunity to be heard
on the allegations of misconduct
during the audit despite all the
available records at the
defendant company offices
showing all the allegations were
unfounded and unsustainable.
The defendant on its part denied
the plaintiff’s claim and
pleaded that the plaintiff was
heard through the comments he
submitted on the draft audit
report, The defendant pleaded
further that any publication
that was made in the media was
without malice and was in the
public interest and therefore
same was privileged.
In his statement of case to this
Court, the plaintiff’s
complaint on the breach of his
fundamental right to natural
justice was twofold. Firstly,
the defendant breached the terms
of the Senior Staff Service
Conditions regarding dismissals
and secondly they breached the
audi alterem partem rule.
For purposes of clarity, we will
begin with ground 3 of the
Notice of Appeal that touches
this first leg of complaint.
BREACH OF CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
FOR SENIOR STAFF
GROUND THREE
The Court of Appeal erred when
it reached the wrongful and untenable
conclusion that having regard to
the conflict between Exhibit 'F'
the Conditions
of Service for Senior Staff and
Exhibit'
A' the Plaintiffs Letter of
Appointment
it
was not envisaged that the
Plaintiff could be covered by
the disciplinary
procedures set out in Exhibit
'F'.
On the contrary the Court of
Appeal ought
to
have held that the mere absence
of any disciplinary procedures
in the plaintiff’s letter of
appointment did not in any way
relieve the defendant Board Of
Directors which exercised final
disciplinary authority over the
plaintiff of their duty to
comply with the very procedures
the defendant had itself spelt
out in Exhibit ‘F’ for its
employees in conformity with the
rules of natural justice.
The relevant portions of his
appointment letter, Exhibit ‘A’
on disciplinary matters are as
follows:
“For purpose of disciplinary
control, you will be responsible
to the Board of Directors.…This
appointment may be terminated by
either party giving three (3)
months notice in writing or the
payment of three (3) months
salary in lieu of such notice.
The Board, however, reserves the
right to dismiss you for stated
misconduct.”
At
the trial it was the contention
of the plaintiff that he was
covered by the Conditions of
Service for Senior Staff which
was tendered in evidence at the
trial as Exhibit ‘F’ and as such
the Board of Directors ought to
have followed the disciplinary
procedures stipulated under
Articles 42 to 47 and given him
a hearing before proceeding to
dismiss him.
Both
the trial court and the Court of
Appeal gave adequate
consideration to these
submissions. The findings
by the High Court on this issue
in her judgment were that:
" ...
.A
careful
reading of
Article
42 through to
Article
47
gives one the
impression
that those provisions are
applicable to Managers
or
employees
other
than the Managing Director that
is the Chief Executive.
For instance Article
46 gives the Chief Executive
(the Managing Director)
the
power
to appoint
a Committee of enquiry
into any
disciplinary
matter.
Nothing
is said about
how
disciplinary issues regarding
the Chief Executive
are
to
be
dealt
with.
Since he cannot appoint a
committee to deal with his own
misconduct
the
impression
that these articles are not
intended to cover
him is
reinforced.
One finds
the answer to this omission in
his letter of appointment
where
it
is
stated that the
Board will be responsible for
his disciplinary
control
and
that it reserved
the right to dismiss him for
stated misconduct. I find
as
a
fact
that
the
Plaintiffs
appointment was not subject to
Exhibit F but rather to Exhibit
A,
his
appointment
letter.”
The Court of Appeal concurred on
these findings. Akoto-Bamfo J.A.
held as follows:
“Exhibit F is the conditions of
service for the senor staff.
Therein is provided a procedure,
the appointment of a committee
of enquiry by the chief
executive whose composition
shall be 3 managers 1 of whom
not being below the grade of the
subject of the investigation
shall be the chairman; after the
investigations the report shall
be submitted to the chief
executive. That the Plaintiff
was the Chief Executive is
beyond question
having regard to the procedure
as outlined can it be argued
that the conditions
of service
applied to him? I think not....
Furthermore if he
is under
investigations
who appoints and receives the
report? If he
does,
will
he
not be
a judge
in
his
own cause?
Answers to these questions lead
to one
irresistible
conclusion
that it
was
not envisaged that the Chief Executive
be
covered
by Exhibit
'F'.
I
am
fortified
in this view by the fact that in
the interpretation section a
Chief Executive
and an
Employee were differently
defined and with two separate
headings.
If
an
Employee
includes
the Chief Executive, it is my
considered view that there would
have
been
no need for the separation.
"
The learned judge accordingly
held that
“....
Since clearly the terms in
Exhibit
'F'
(assuming they
are
applicable
the Plaintiff) seem to be in
conflict with the contents of Exhibit
'A'
the
letter
of appointment for whereas the
conditions of service as per Exhibit
'F'
set
out a procedure the letter of
appointment Exhibit 'A' did set
none.
Since
there is
a conflict it is evident that
the terms of the special contract
would
prevail.
The findings of the learned
judge that the conditions of service
for
the
senior
staff was not applicable to the
Plaintiff cannot therefore be
faulted.
I therefore feel unable to
disturb same.”
For his
part Justice Asiamah JA (as he
then was) in his concurring
judgment said:
"
....
It is manifest that it is only
the Board in
which
is vested
the
power
to exercise disciplinary
responsibility over the
appellant
in
relation
to
the
latter’s
misconduct in the execution of
his duties.....
I might at this
juncture
mention
that neither in the appointment
letter nor in Exhibit
'F'
was
provided
a specific
laid
down
procedure to be followed
in the
event
of
a
disciplinary
investigation
being conducted against a
Managing Director in the
Respondents
employ.
The Committee of enquiry's
provision in Article
46 of Exhibit
'F'
does
not
cover
the MD in any disciplinary
investigation enterprise.....
Certainly
the
Appellant
as the MD is not amenable to
Article
46....
"
We do not find any fault in the
reasoning of both the trial and
Appellate Court that from the
terms of the special contact
between the parties, the
disciplinary proceedings for the
senior staff as set out in
Exhibit ‘F’ was not applicable
to the Managing Director.
The appeal therefore fails on
this ground.
BREACH OF NATURAL JUSTICE
The second leg of concern by the
appellant was that he was not
given a hearing before he was
summarily dismissed. This is
contained in ground one of his
grounds of appeal.
GROUND ONE
The Court of Appeal erred in
upholding the finding made by
the learned trial
judge that the comments
submitted by the Plaintiff on
the Interim Audit Report
constituted a hearing and an
opportunity to present his side
of the case.
The
failure
by the Court of Appeal to set
aside that wrongful finding has
occasioned
the
Plaintiff
a grave miscarriage of justice.
It is undisputed that the
plaintiff was summarily
dismissed upon the adverse
finding made against the
plaintiff as contained in the
Final Report on Forensic Audit
Report and Management Review of
the Ghana Supply Company Limited
set up by the Auditor General.
It is the plaintiff’s evidence
that he was asked to hand over
to an interim management
committee and proceed on his
accrued leave. The leave was
later extended and in his
absence a forensic audit was
undertaken and he was never
invited to answer any queries by
the team or the Board of the
defendant company and yet he was
dismissed upon the basis of the
audit report. The defendant on
the other hand in evidence led
on its behalf claimed the
plaintiff was given a hearing
through comments the plaintiff
submitted on the draft report by
the auditor.
In considering this ground of
appeal it is worthy to note that
even in purely administrative
actions some administrative
justice is required by way of
fairness and reasonableness. It
is a Constitutional requirement
under Article23 of the 1992
Constitution that:
“Article 23.
Administrative bodies and
administrative officials shall
act fairly and reasonably and
comply with the requirements
imposed on them by law and
persons aggrieved by the
exercise of such acts and
decisions shall have the right
to seek redress before a court
or other tribunal.”
As explained by Bamford-Addo
J.S.C. `in the case of
Aboagye v. Ghana Commercial Bank
Ltd. [2001-2002] SCGLR 797 at
806:
“…. article 23 says that
administrative bodies and
officials shall act fairly. And
acting fairly implies the
application of the rules of
natural justice, which have been
elevated to constitutional
rights and are binding on all
adjudication and administrative
bodies as well as courts and
tribunals.”
Accordingly the Supreme Court
held in the Aboagye case supra
that the defendant bank, having
taken disciplinary action
against the plaintiff under the
bank’s disciplinary procedure
rules, should have followed that
procedure. The Supreme Court
concluded that there was no fair
trial as the bank failed to
apply the rules of natural
justice.
In another case of Awuni
v. West African Examinations
Council [2003-2004] SCGLR 471
the phrase “to act fairly and
reasonably” was explained by
Kpegah JSC at page 489 in his
judgment. He said:
“The phrase ‘to act fairly and
reasonably’ in my opinion
necessarily imports a duty to
observe the common law maxim of
audi alterem partem and other
principles of natural justice
which is very much part of our
jurisprudence and are implicit
in the constitutional provisions
in article 23. Because I cannot
contemplate how a person could
be said to have acted fairly and
reasonably if he did not give
notice or hearing to another who
was entitled to such notice or
hearing before taking a decision
which adversely affects his
rights; neither can I
contemplate a situation where a
person
could be said to have acted
fairly as a judge in his own
cause or give a biased and
perverse decision.”
On her part, Sophia Akuffo JSC
expounded further at page 514
thus:
“I will not venture to give a
comprehensive definition of what
is fair and reasonable, since
these qualities are dictated by
the circumstances in which the
administrative function is
performed. At the very least
however, it includes probity,
transparency, objectivity,
opportunity to be heard, legal
competence and absence of bias,
caprice or ill-will”
In the appeal before us from the
terms of the Special Contract
between the parties there was no
established disciplinary
procedure which the Board Of
Directors were obliged to follow
in respect of its Chief
Executive Officer. The issue
then is whether on the facts of
the case the Board of Directors
acted fairly and reasonably in
summarily dismissing the
plaintiff without giving him a
hearing after the final audit
report? Was the comment he was
invited to make and his
subsequent response sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of
natural justice?
Counsel for the plaintiff
submitted that:
“…considering
the circumstances of this case
the
Board
of
the
Defendant Company which was also
the disciplinary authority
should personally
have given
him a hearing and come
to its own conclusion instead of
relying
on
the
report
of the
investigative
team as a conclusive evidence of
misconduct.
It
is further submitted
that
it is the authority exercising
the disciplinary power
which
ought
to
afford the
Plaintiff
the opportunity to
be heard. Not
being the disciplinary authority
the
investigative
team could not by any stretch of
legal imagination be said to have
afforded
the
Plaintiff that opportunity to be
heard in this case.”
Counsel
however
conceded that “natural justice
does not invariably require that
the parties be entitled to an
oral hearing. It will sometimes
be fair to determine an issue on
the basis of written
representations”. He referred to
the cases of R v. Judge
Amphlett [1915] 2 KB 233; Stuart
v. Haughley Parochial Church
Council [1935]Ch 452; Board of
Education v. Rice[1911] AC 179
HL; Local Government Board v.
Arlidge [1915] AC 120 HL on
this point. Counsel however
sought to distinguish the case
of the Republic v. Ghana
Railways Corporation; ex parte
Appiah [1984-86] 1 GLR424 C.A
from the present case on the
grounds that, whereas in the
Ghana Railway Corporation case
the applicants were notified to
appear before a board of inquiry
this was not done in the present
case. He said although other
senior members were invited by
the Auditors to answer
questions, the plaintiff was
denied such an opportunity
All these points were vigorously
canvassed at the two lower
courts.
Both the trial and the appellate
courts were of the view that in
the absence of any requirement
in the service contract between
the plaintiff and the board for
the setting up of disciplinary
proceedings; what was essential
for determination is whether the
plaintiff was given an
opportunity to re-act to the
charges laid against him. We are
in agreement with this
proposition, for if the
plaintiff was given a chance to
answer to the charges even not
directly to the board or a body
set up by it; this should
satisfy the requirements of
natural justice.
It is trite law and a cardinal
principle on justice; that no
man shall be condemned unless he
has been given prior notice of
the allegation against him and a
fair opportunity to be heard.
Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th
Edition Vol.1 page 76.
The trial judge came to the
conclusion that the comments the
plaintiff made on the Draft
Forensic Audit Report amounted
to a hearing. The Court held
that:
“The Court is satisfied that the
plaintiff was able to tell his
side of the story through the
document styled “Comments by
Management” and by this process
he was heard. The defendants did
not breach the audi alterem
partem rule.”
The appellate court also came to
the same conclusion in the
following words:
“The
issue is whether the comments
made constituted a hearing.
It is settled
that
where
there are rules for a
disciplinary procedure to be
followed an
employer
who
fails to adopt the laid down
procedure stands to be mulcted
in damages
for wrongful
dismissal.
Where however, there are clearly
no
specific
disciplinary
procedures
the employer
is under a duty
to act fairly
and to comply
with
the
rules
of natural justice; that is the
Plaintiff must be given a proper
opportunity
of
making
out his case.... Indeed in the
Republic Vrs Ghana
Railway
Corporation
Ex-parte Appiah
& Anor [1981] GLR 753
it was held
that
the
principle simply meant that a
party ought to have reasonable
notice of the
case
he
has to meet and ought to be
given the opportunity to make
his statement
in
explanation
of any question or to answer any
arguments put forward against
it.
The principle does not in any
way require that there must be a
formal trial of a specific
charge akin to court
proceedings….
I am of the view that the
plaintiff was given a hearing in
the
circumstances,
for the "charges" as it were
laid in the interim report;
he
was given
a
copy,
and therefore an opportunity to
give his side of the story
which
he
did.
His comments were incorporated
into the final report which
formed
the
basis
of his
dismissal..... "
We entirely agree with this
conclusion and the appeal
accordingly fails on this
ground.
JUDGMENT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT
OF EVIDENCE
GROUND TWO
The Court of Appeal fell into
grave error in upholding the
judgment of the trial court
which judgment
was totally against the
weight of the evidence adduced
at
the trial having regard
particularly to the unproven
allegations of misconduct
leveled
against the Plaintiff and the
trial courts own finding amongst
others
that
the Final Audit Report on the
basis of which the Plaintiff was
summarily
dismissed itself contained
several errors.
One of the issues set down for
determination was whether or not
the plaintiff only carried out
decisions, policies and programs
of the defendant company Board
of Directors for which the
plaintiff has been wrongfully or
arbitrarily dismissed summarily.
It is fair to mention here that
it is a different Board of
Directors which summarily
dismissed the plaintiff.
The basis for his summary
dismissal was stated in the
dismissal letter as follows:
“MR. JUSTICE AWUKU-SAO
NO. 9. OSHIPI STREET
NORTH KANESHIE, ACCRA
Dear Mr. Awuku-Sao
SUMMARY DISMISSAL
This serves to inform you that
the Board at its meeting held on
Thursday June 12, 2003, decided
that based on the evidence of
misconduct from the report of
the investigative
team appointed by the Auditor
General to conduct a Forensic
Audit and Management Review of
the company, your services are
no longer required by the
company.
The Board’s decision is based on
the following findings against
you:
1.
You failed to adhere to the
recommendations of the External
Auditors by not using the rates
of the first valuation (February
2000) of the Management Houses
in the sale of the company
houses to Management staff and
to yourself in the Home
Ownership Scheme approved by the
Board.
2.
You failed too adhere to and did
not implement the provisions of
the Employee Assisted Home
Ownership Scheme payment system
by not making staff to pay the
70% deposit of the selling price
as required by scheme using the
Home Finance Facility.
3.
You personally authorized and
approved company money to the
tune of forty-three million
eight hundred and seventy
thousand cedis for renovation
works on your house after it had
been sold to you.
4.
You used a lower valuation rate
to sell the company property you
occupy to yourself after
renovation works had been
carried out.
5.
You failed to sell the
properties of the Management
Staff including yours at the
February 2000 valuation prices
that were however, applied in
the disposal of the properties
occupied by the middle and
junior staff.
In view of the above findings,
the Board has decided to
summarily dismiss you for
misconduct with immediate effect
in accordance with the relevant
clauses in your appointment
contract. You are advised to
hand over all properties of the
company in your possession to
the Interim Management
Committee.
We count on your cooperation in
this matter and thank you for
your services during the period
of your appointment.
Signed….”
This particular ground of appeal
was mainly against the trial
judge’s finding that the
plaintiff was guilty of
misconduct in expending the
company’s monies to renovate his
house after its sale to him, as
the trial judge found as a fact
that the plaintiff was not
guilty of the charges under 1,
4, and 5 above, as there was
evidence that he was merely
carrying out the decision of the
Board.
Counsel for the plaintiff
submitted that this particular
charge was not mentioned in the
Draft Report and so the
plaintiff had no chance to
re-act to it and therefore a
dismissal based on this charge
was unlawful. Counsel relied on
the Aboagye case supra where
Bamford-Add0 JSC said at page
183 that:
“Finally in considering the
question whether or not in any
particular case there has been a
failure of natural justice, the
fact that there was evidence to
support the charge preferred
against the plaintiff namely
negligence, is immaterial to the
determination of the issue
whether the plaintiff had not
been given a fair trial.”
What counsel failed to consider
was that in the Aboagye case the
bank was bound by its own
disciplinary rules to follow
certain procedures including a
right of being heard in person,
which they failed to do. In the
instant case there was no such
requirement in the service
contract held by the plaintiff.
At common law it is enough if
the fact upon which a person is
summarily dismissed objectively
establishes ground or cause for
dismissal. Edward Nasser &Co
ltd v. Abu- Jawdi Presbyterian
Hospital, Agogo v Boateng
[1984-86] 2 GLR 381, CA; Boateng
v Volta Aluminum Co Ltd
[1984-86] 1 GLR 733, CA.;
Lever Brothers Ghana Ltd v.
Annan [1989-90] 2 GLR 385.
These cases in effect applied
the common law principle that:
"A servant, whose conduct is
incompatible with the faithful
discharge of his duty to his
master, may be dismissed
...Dismissal is also justified
in the case of a servant ... if
his conduct has been such that
it would be injurious to the
master's business to retain
him."
[Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd
ed.), Vol. 25 page. 487, para.
938]
This principle of common law is
still followed by our Courts in
a line of modern cases and it
was recently succinctly examined
in the case of Lagudah v.
Ghana Commercial Bank
[2005-2006] SCGLR 388.
Date-Bah JSC in his judgment
commented at page 401 that:
“I am not persuaded that, in a
commercial setting, in the
absence of a contractual
provision to the contrary, an
employer is bound to comply with
the rules of natural justice. At
common law, it is enough if the
facts objectively establish
cause for dismissal.”
He also went on at page 405 to
state that:
“…. in the ordinary common law
of employment, unaffected by
public law considerations, there
is no obligation on an employer
to set up a tribunal or
committee of enquiry before he
can dismiss an employee
summarily for misconduct.
Irrespective of the procedure
which he adopts, if he
establishes facts justifying the
dismissal, that is enough.”
Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeal were of the same
view that there was sufficient
evidence on the rerecord to
justify the summary dismissal of
the plaintiff. There was
evidence that the board in 2001
approved a budget for renovation
works to be carried on the
plaintiff’s house before the
sale to him. The trial court was
of the view that:
“Even if the plaintiff had found
refuge in respect of expenses
made on the house by the
defendant after the house was
sold to him under the 2001
budget, then in the present case
he will find no such refuge. The
2002 budget did not make
provision for any such expenses
and the Board did not expressly
or by implication approve of
these expenditures per the 2002
budget. The Court is satisfied
that in allowing or approving
these expenditures the plaintiff
misconducted himself”
We find no fault with this
reasoning. We hold the view that
the plaintiff’s conduct in
allowing the company to continue
with the renovation of the house
to the tune of GH¢4,300 after
the sale to him was a gross
abuse of his office. The court
of Appeal even went further to
describe the plaintiff’s conduct
to amount to misappropriation of
the company’s money” (per
Asiamah J.A.) which merited a
dismissal despite the
arithmetical errors in the
calculation contained in the
audit report.
We will accordingly dismiss this
ground of appeal.
GROUND FOUR
The Court of Appeal erred in
upholding the finding of the
learned trial judge that the
defendant was not liable for
damages for defamation.
Under this ground it was the
contention of the plaintiff that
once the defendant has admitted
that it handed over the audit
report to the press it ought to
be held responsible for the
defamatory publication in the
media. The issue here is whether
it was proper for the defendant
to have handed the audit report
to the press. It was the view of
the Court of Appeal per Asiamah
J.A. that the defendant was a
public company and the plaintiff
a public officer and that:
“The appellant being a public
officer his conduct and
performance of his duty in
relation to the office he holds
in the respondent employ as a
public officer is a matter about
which the public has a right to
comment upon either favorably or
in an uncomplimentary manner
provided the facts constituting
the comment or publications are
true in substance and that the
comment is relevant to the
facts.”
On all the issues raised in this
appeal there had been concurrent
findings of facts by the two
lower courts that there was
evidence of misconduct by the
appellant to justify his summary
dismissal by the Board of
Directors. It is settled law
that:
“In an appeal against findings
of facts to a second appellate
court., this Court would not
interfere with the concurrent
findings of the two lower courts
unless it was established with
absolute clearness that some
blunder or error resulting in a
miscarriage of justice was
apparent in the way in which the
lower tribunals had dealt with
the facts.” Per Acquah JSC in
the case of Achoro vrs.
Akanfela [1996-97] SCGLR 207.
See also the cases of
Obrasiwa II V. Otu [1996-97]
SCGLR 618; Ntiri v. Essien
[2001-2002] SCGLR451.
We have carefully studied the
evidence and we have come to the
same conclusion that the Court
of Appeal’s findings in support
of that of the High Court was
correct. We therefore have no
reason to disturb the judgment
of the Court of Appeal. The
appeal fails and it is
accordingly dismissed.
S. O. A. ADINYIRA (MRS)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
I agree
S. A. BROBBEY
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
I agree
J. ANSAH
( JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
I
agree
J. V. M. DOTSE
( JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
I agree
ANIN
YEBOAH
( JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL:
PETER ZWENES FOR THE APPELLANT.
S. K. AMOAH FOR THE RESPONDENT.
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