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KOFI SENKYIRE v. ABOSO GOLDFIELDS [25/7/02] CA 80/2001.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

THE COURT OF APPEAL

ACCRA – GHANA

___________________________

CORAM:   BADDOO JA (PRESIDING)

ANSAH, JA.

GBADEGBE, JA.

CA/NO. 80/2001

  25TH JULY 2002

KOFI SENKYIRE                        :    PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

VRS

ABOSO GOLDFIELDS                :    DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

_____________________________________________________________________________

 

JUDGMENT

BADDOO, JA:

This is an appeal by the Appellant Company Aboso Gold Fields Ltd, hereinafter called the Defendant, against the judgment of the Circuit Court Tarkwa, presided over by his Honour Isaac Lartey-Joung dated the 15th of February 2001.

BRIEF FACTS

The brief facts of the case are that the Respondent Kofi Senkyire hereinafter called the Plaintiff, was employed as a Sampler in June 1990, by the Aboso Gold Fields Ltd, a Mining company. He was the foreman of Sampling Department of 14 men. On the 29th of March 1999, he and his men went to work at 6.30pm and closed the next day 30/3/99 at 5.30am.

In the course of their work, Kofi Senkyire collected some rock bearing gold called PYRITES or AKOKOSIKA, as sample and placed it in the sample bag.

He instructed the driver to take the other workers home and come for him later. When the driver returned for him, he still had the sample bag containing the gold bearing rock with him.

On reaching the AMS Security Gate, he got down from the vehicle and the security man asked him of his mission at that point. He explained that he was looking for one Kenneth Nukute, who incidentally was nowhere to be found.

The security man inspected the sample bag and when he found that it contained gold bearing rocks he informed Senkyire that he was under arrest for attempted stealing the sample. The Plaintiff was subsequently suspended by the Management, Two weeks later he was invited before a Committee of three to explain his conduct in carrying the sample bag containing gold bearing rocks to the Security Gate.

The committee was not satisfied with his explanation and found that he intended to steal the gold bearing rock. The Committee therefore recommended that his employment be terminated and the relevant entitlements paid to him. 

Accordingly the Plaintiff was dismissed on 5-4-99.

On the 2nd of August 1999, the Plaintiff filed a writ against the Defendant Company for the following reliefs:

a. General damages for wrongful and unlawful dismissal.

b. Payment of Salaries and entitlements form 5-4-99 to the date of judgment.

On the 15th of February 2001 the Circuit Court gave judgment for the Plaintiff for wrongful and unlawful dismissal.

The Defendant Company has appealed against this judgment to this Court.

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Two grounds of appeal were filed by the Defendant, hereby:

1. That the Honourable Circuit Court erred in holding the Defendant liable for wrongful dismissal of the Plaintiff, as no evidence was led by the Plaintiff to support his assertion.

2. That the judgment is against the weight of the evidence adduced at the trial.

MATTER FOR DETERMINATION

The judgment against the Defendant was for wrongful and unlawful dismissal. Therefore in this Court the matter for determination is whether or not the Plaintiffs contract of employment was terminated in accordance with his conditions of services.

REASONS FOR THE JUDGMENT

The learned trial judge in giving judgment for the Plaintiff said that the Committee which dealt with the matter concerning the Plaintiff did not call the Security men at the AMS gate to give evidence about the contents of the sample found with the Plaintiff and that this failure constituted and amounted to a denial of fair hearing, especially when the Plaintiff had challenged the contents presented at the hearing.

The trial Judge continued on P.42 line 24 as follows:—

“Can one say that Plaintiff by carrying the samples to the AMS gate before going to submit them to the Geologist within the premises of AGL was prejudicial to the interest of his employers? I think if he had left the premises of AG. carrying the samples, then he could have acted with malice that could be prejudicial to his employers interest”.

At P.44 paragraph 2 the learned judge continued “In addition to this flaw, the Committee rightly found that the available evidence was circumstantial and did not establish without reasonable doubt that the Plaintiff had indeed stolen or attempted to steal the alleged gold concentrate. The Committee however finally recommended the termination of the Plaintiff contrary to the findings made.

Since there was no gross misconduct proved against the Plaintiff, the dismissal was wrongful and Article 12.6 of the conditions of service was not applicable to the Plaintiff.”

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DISMISSAL

The trial judge seriously erred when he held that the conduct of the Plaintiff did not amount to gross misconduct.

In Arkhurst v. Ghana Museum And Monuments Board [1971] 2GLR 1 at P.7, Abban J (as he then was) said:

“If therefore the employee does any act incompatible with due, and faithful discharge of his duty, to his employers, the employers have every right to dispense with his service.”

In Pearce V. Forster (1886) 17 Q.B.D C.A. Lopes L.J. said at P.542,

“ If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty in the service, it is a misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That misconduct, according to my view, need not be misconduct in the carrying on of the service or the business.

It is sufficient if it is conduct which is prejudicial, or is likely to be prejudicial to the interests or to the reputation of the  master and the master will be justified not only if he discovers it at the time, but also if he discovers it afterwards, in dismissing that  servant”.

In this case, the Committee were convinced that the intentions of the Plaintiff in carrying the samples on him were malicious. On the authority of the decided cases any conduct that is likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the employer is misconduct.

To comprehend the logic behind the reasoning of the Committee, it must be recognized that the Defendant Company is engaged in the production of gold. In the gold mining industry, it is common knowledge that the raw materials are the gold bearing rocks from which the gold is extracted.

Every Galemsay operator in the Country knows this. It stands to reason therefore to conclude that gold bearing rocks on the premises of the Defendant company, must be valuable and precious commodities which the company would do its utter most to protect.

Any handling of the gold bearing rocks or concentrate sample in any unusual manner, as occurred in this case, is bound to create suspicion. And where the trust worthiness of the employee is in doubt as a result of this suspicion, the employer would find it unsafe to keep the employer in his establishment. The employer would be justified to dispense with the services of the employee. See Arkhurst Vrs. Ghana Museums and Monuments Board Supra.

The conduct of the Plaintiff created a doubt about his trustworthiness and his employers found it unsafe to keep him in the company. The law permits it.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

The next issue is, was the termination contrary to the conditions of service of the Plaintiff? Section 12.1. of the conditions of service provides as follows:

“ AGL shall in case of gross misconduct reserve the right to summarily dismiss the employee after he has had the opportunity to reply to the complaints against him”

Section 12.7 Provides for FAIR Hearing 

“An employee guilty of gross misconduct may be suspended pending investigations. AGL will give an employee whose employment is liable to be terminated full opportunity to defend himself against all charges against him.”

In accordance with these provisions the Plaintiff appeared before the Committee to explain his conduct.

The principal facts established against the Plaintiff were that he was found with gold bearing rocks at the AMS gate where he was not supposed to be at that time with the samples.

I must emphasise that though it would have been desirable to have confronted the Plaintiff with the Security man who arrested him, so as to clarify the contents of the sample bag seized from the Plaintiff, whether or not the gold concentrate was heavy or light, failure to do so, does not detract from the principal facts which were established, that the Plaintiff was found with gold bearing rocks at the security gate. 

The Committee after hearing the Plaintiff, was not satisfied with his explanation and was convinced that his intentions were malicious.

It is my considered opinion that the dismissal was not contrary to the conditions of service of the Plaintiff.

I shall therefore allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Circuit Court Tarkwa dated 19th February 2001.

S. G. BADDOO

JUSTICE OF APPEAL

GBADEGBE, JA:

The question which to my mind arises in these proceedings for our decision is whether or not the summary dismissal of the respondent who initiated the action in the court below was rightful? In my view a decision on this point would substantially dispose of the instant controversy and as such I shall in my delivery for now concern myself with the determination of this simple issue which turns on a question of mixed law and fact. In the judgment with which we are concerned in this appeal the learned trial judge of the Circuit Court decided this question in favour of the respondent and consequently proceeded to award by way of damages what he considered was the entitlement of the respondent following what he held to be a wrongful dismissal. In their complaint to us the appellant seeks to have the said decision reversed on the ground that the termination of the contract of employment was good having regard to the circumstances preceding the exercise of the power of summary dismissal by it. There is no doubt that an employer might in appropriate circumstances bring the relationship of a master and servant to an end by terminating the appointment but this power must be exercised in accordance with the conditions governing the same else the employer would be in breach of contract and liable to an action for wrongful dismissal as the relationship is essentially contractual. Writing on the subject of wrongful dismissal, the learned authors in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 16, 4th edition state in paragraph 649 at 439 as follows:

“An employer commits a breach of contract if he wrongfully dismisses an employee before the expiration of the term for which he is employed. The fact that the dismissal of the employee is otherwise than in accordance with the procedure laid down in his contract of service does not, however, in a case where the rights of the parties are regulated by contract and are unaffected by statute, normally prevent the dismissal from being effective to terminate the contract; in such a case the employee cannot claim that the contract has not been validly terminated, and his remedy is in damages

To entitle the employee to sue for damages, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely:

(1) unless the contract of service is to be construed as a contract for life employment, or as excluding any general power of dismissal on notice, the employee must have been engaged for a period fixed or determinable on notice, and dismissed before the expiration of the period if fixed, or without requisite notice, as the case may be; and (2) his dismissal must have been wrongful, that is to say without just cause or excuse on the part of the employer.”

Since in the case before us the respondent was dismissed without the requisite notice the employer is obliged to justify the dismissal, that is to say to show that on the facts it was entitled to summarily dismiss him.

It being so, I now pass to a consideration of the situations which might justify an employer to bring the relationship of master and servant to an end. Writing on this subject, the learned authors In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition volume 16 paragraphs 640 at 434 provide as follows:  “An employer has a common law right to dismiss his employee without notice on the grounds of the employee’s serious misconduct.” The said writers go further to say in paragraph 642 that   “Misconduct inconsistent with an employee’s proper discharge of the duties for which he was engaged is good cause for his dismissal, but there is no fixed rule of law defining the degree of misconduct which will justify dismissal. He may be dismissed if he is guilty of fraud or dishonesty in connection with his employer’s business, but it is not necessary that moral delinquency should be an element of the misconduct, or that the misconduct should take place during working hours.” To the above it may be said that where the employee conducts himself in a manner prejudicial to his employer’s business such that it is incompatible with the faithful discharge of his duty to his employer, he may be dismissed. See the case of Arkhurst v Ghana Museum and Monuments Board (1971) 2 GLR 1 per Abban J. (as he then was).Generally where an employee proves that the termination of his employment contract was without just cause or excuse then there is an instance of wrongful dismissal, the sort of termination which would justify an award in damages which was the head of claim on which the respondent relied in his action in the court below. Thus, in my view one has to review the evidence at our disposal to see if indeed there was any excuse or justification in the appellant to have exercised it such as to have brought the contract of employment to an end.

I have examined the evidence and attended to the submissions on behalf of the parties and I am of the view that the conduct of the respondent in not sending the sample to the geologist before alighting to collect money from a friend was one which undermined the nature of his duties to his employers and looked at in relation to what is reasonably expected of him amounted to gross misconduct in terms of section 12.1 of the Collective Agreement which has the effect of a serious offence within the contemplation of section 12.5. I think that what is important here is to consider whether having regard to the nature of the employers business which is essentially digging for minerals which are placed in the hands of its employees to be sent for analysis it is a proper discharge of the said functions when the employee without first sending the mineral sample for analysis stops on the way to collect as he claimed his money from a friend. One needs to bear in mind that the nature of the appellant’s business is such that those who are engaged to work for it must conduct themselves with the utmost honesty and in the particular facts of this case what would have happened if the respondent were not to have been intercepted by the security? I do not think that it was unreasonable for the employer to have expected the respondent to have submitted the sample before seeking to pursue his friend for his money. Again it does not seem to me that it would have imposed any very significant burden on the respondent to have been required to submit the samples before attending to his own business of collecting money from a friend. On my own having regard to the facts I think that the ordinary worker when confronted with the situation in which the respondent found himself independently of the case would have first submitted the sample. Accordingly if the matter should be decided on what is proper conduct then the respondent had done that which was contrary to the ordinary worker’s perception of good conduct which means that on the common sense view of the matter he was clearly in the wrong, a wrong which was likely to be hurtful or prejudicial to his employer’s interests and of a serious nature such as to be classified as gross misconduct. In my thinking the explanation offered by the respondent when he was arrested with the gold bearing sample was just a lame excuse for he knew that normally he should not have used the route at which the sample was found on him leading to his arrest. I have no doubt that to enable employees of the appellant to behave in the manner which has unfolded from the evidence regarding the respondent would be seriously prejudicial to the conduct of its business and accordingly an employee who so conducts himself is guilty of gross misconduct and he was afforded the opportunity to answer the complaint made against him as provided for in section 12.7 of the Collective Agreement between the parties, the employer may determine the contract of employment.. The admitted evidence reveals that the respondent was offered this opportunity before his suspension and subsequent dismissal. In fact, after the preliminary opportunity which he had to make a statement, he appeared before a Disciplinary Committee at which he had the opportunity to orally explain himself. This being the case, I think that the decision of the court below that the dismissal was wrongful is not a reasonable conclusion based on the effect of the admitted evidence. I think that the learned trial judge placed a wrong inference on the facts which were at his disposal the correct inference being that the respondent had done that which entitled his employers to summarily dismiss him. In this regard, I wish in particular to say that the learned trial judge‘s statement that there was the need to have called the security men who effected the arrest in view of the challenge of the respondent to the authenticity of the sample is a misappreciation of the nature of the challenge. I am of the thinking that if the assertion of the respondent had been that whatever was found on him when he was arrested was not a sample which he should have sent to the geologist then the need to have this proved would have arisen. But, as it were he had of admitted that it was a gold bearing sample which came into his possession in the normal course of his employment and therefore his challenge like his excuse was a feeble one which was put up by him in an attempt to be wiser after the event. Again the learned trial judge’s view that the proof of the respondent’s misconduct should have been beyond reasonable doubt is not warranted by law and in any case what other reasonable inference can one place on the respondent’s conduct other than that of wanting to pass on the sample to his friend as indeed was the finding of the disciplinary committee? The circumstances of the case in my opinion pointed only to that conclusion. This being the position clearly the respondent had conducted himself such as to bring himself within the definition of gross misconduct as provided for in section 1(g) of the collective agreement as follows: “includes but is not limited to fighting, acts of violence, gross insubordination, theft, breaches of safety rules, forgery and other acts of dishonesty.” I think that the learned trial judge misappreciated the evidence which was led by the parties on the circumstances which provoked the termination of the respondent’s service with the appellant. I also wish to note that the learned trial judge fell into error when he said that the inquiry should have taken the form of a committee of inquiry. I find no justification from the collective agreement and or in principle for such an insistence and I have no doubt that the said view which the learned trial judge took of the requirement of affording the respondent a hearing must have led him into the error which has called in question his judgment in these proceedings. Accordingly I proceed to have the same set aside and in place thereof declare that the summary dismissal which led to the action in the court below was good. It being so the having been able to prove that his termination was in accordance with the contract of employment, the award which was made in favour of the respondent is consequently set aside. The result is that the instant appeal succeeds and the judgment of the trial Circuit Court the subject matter of these proceedings is set aside and in place thereof I substitute a judgment dismissing the respondents claim as indorsed on the writ of summons initiating the action in the court below.

N. S. GBADEGBE

JUSTICE OF APPEAL

ANSAH, JA:

I agree

J. ANSAH

JUSTICE OF APPEAL

COUNSEL

vdm

 
 

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