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Courts - Jurisdiction - Land title – Plaintiffs’ title deed registered before area declared registration district – Defendant registering his title deed during pendency of action – Whether jurisdiction of court ousted – Land Title Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152) s 12.

Land title registration – Deeds – Registration of, – Respondents’ deed registered before PNDCL 152 – Whether necessary for respondents to submit deed for re-registration under PNDCL 152 – Land Title Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152).

The respondent-company sued the applicant in the circuit court for recovery of possession of the premises in dispute on the ground that it required the premises for its business. While the action was pending, the area was declared a registration district on 10 November 1990 pursuant to the Land Title Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152). In 1992 the applicant registered his lease pursuant to the said declaration. The trial court entered judgment in favour of the respondent-company, holding that its lease registered in 1986 under the Land Registry Act 1962 (Act 122) took priority over the applicant’s lease registered under PNDCL 152 and ordered the applicant to vacate the premises forthwith. The applicant appealed against the decision to the Court of Appeal and unsuccessfully applied to the circuit court for stay of execution of its order. On a repeat application in the Court of Appeal by the applicant it was argued on his behalf that upon the registration of his title in 1992, the jurisdiction of the court was ousted under s 12(1) of PNDCL 152; the appeal therefore had a good chance of success.

Held: (1) Since the respondents’ lease was registered in 1986, the registration of the applicant’s lease during the pendency of the action in 1992 could not oust the jurisdiction of the trial court.

(2) Deeds registered under the Land Registry Act 1962 (Act 122) before an area was declared a registration district under the Land Title Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152) were not required to be submitted for re-registration. The respondent-company was entitled to be issued with a certificate of title on land it duly registered in 1986.

LAMPTEY JA. On 7 December 1992, we dismissed the application of Patrick Moffact Kasser (hereinafter referred to as “Kasser”) for a stay of execution of the judgment of the Circuit Court, Accra, dated 13 October 1992 in favour of Raziel Construction Limited (hereinafter referred to as “the company”). We now give our reasons.

The company sued Kasser and claimed recovery of possession of House No C260/3 Ring Road Central, Accra. On 13 October 1992 the Circuit Court, Accra, entered judgment for Raziel against Kasser. The court made the order following:

“Defendant (Kasser) must therefore vacate forthwith to enable plaintiffs enjoy the fruits of their labour. The matter had dragged on for too long.”

Kasser was dissatisfied and aggrieved by the judgment and appealed to this court. He then applied to the trial court for a stay of execution of the judgment. The application was refused. In the circumstances, Kasser repeated the application for stay of the judgment in this court. The application was supported by an affidavit in which it was sought to show that the appeal of Kasser against the judgment of the circuit court had a good chance of success. The other ground in support of the application was that Kasser would suffer greater hardship than the company if this application for stay of execution were refused.

Before us, learned counsel for Kasser submitted that the judgment could not be supported in law. First, he contended that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the plaint of the company because the Land Title Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152) s 12(1) ousted the jurisdiction of the court.

Learned counsel for the company submitted that PNDCL 152 did not apply to the case before the court. He pointed out that the root of title of the company was a lease that was duly stamped and registered as No 4557/86 in 1986. He stated that the area of Accra where the land in dispute is situated was declared a compulsory registration area pursuant to PNDCL 152 on 10 November 1990. In his view the registered title of the company was not affected by the 10 November 1990 declaration.

We will deal first with the issue of jurisdiction. In support of his application, and for ease of reference, Kasser attached to his notice of motion, exhibit C bearing the heading, “Compulsory Land Title Registration Accra District 0.3”. This document spelt out the areas of Accra that formed the subject matter of compulsory land registration. In our opinion, paragraph 2 of exhibit C contained the answer to the submission of learned counsel for Kasser. It reads:

“As a protection against unknown and clandestine dealings in land, all previously registered deeds in the above areas are being replaced by Land Certificate (i.e. Certificates of Title) similar to those which are issued to the registered holders of title in most Commonwealth and developing countries.”

It would be seen that deeds registered before the operative date, 10 November 1990 were not required to be submitted for re-registration. The company was under the new law entitled to be issued with a Certificate of Title on the land it duly registered in 1986. That land was sufficiently and clearly identified by the site plan attached to the said lease. In our opinion, a dispute touching upon a pre-November 1990 duly registered land is one over which the courts of the land have jurisdiction.

The applicant attached a lease to his application. This lease on the face of it was duly registered in February 1992, that is to say, it was registered during the pendency of the action before the trial court and certainly not registered before the writ of summons issued. It is now sought to show that because the applicant’s lease was registered after November 1990 the fact of the registration of this other lease ousted the jurisdiction of the circuit court.

This argument is clearly and plainly misconceived. The true position is that the court must look at the dates on which the two rival documents were each duly registered, and determine whether or not it had jurisdiction. When this simple test is applied to the facts of this case it will be seen that the Circuit Court, Accra had jurisdiction. We find that ground in support of the application fails.

We do not at this stage find it necessary to discuss the evidential value of the leases put forward by each of the parties. Suffice it to state, briefly, that we note that the lease of the company was duly registered in 1986 while that of Kasser was duly registered in 1992. Prima facie, the trial judge was right in holding that the lease of the company took priority over that of Kasser.

We note in passing that the lease put in evidence by the company, apart from a detailed description of the plot of land also had attached to it a site plan. The lease of Kasser described the plot of land differently from that of the company and further had no site plan attached and or annexed to it. Briefly put, the company claimed recovery of possession of House No C260/3, Ring Road Central, Accra. Kasser on the other hand, holds a lease that described the property as “House No 14 Ring Road Central, Accra”. We do not propose to undertake an in-depth consideration of the issue raised by the differences in identification and description of the subject matter.

“14. To the best of my knowledge and belief great hardship will be caused to me if the judgment is carried out and I am thrown out before my appeal is heard as my business would have suffered an irreparable damage.”

Before us, the nature of the irreparable damage was stated to be the fact that Kasser would no longer carry on his business from the premises in dispute. For the company, it was showed that Kasser had ignored all notices to quit served on him; that he had refused to recognise the company as his landlord; that the company had commenced the action in October 1990 because the company had been given notice to quit by its landlord. The company had obtained the lease of the premises in dispute to be able to move into it at the earliest opportunity.

We are aware that the trial judge refused the application for stay of execution. The reasons for his decision have not been told us. The reasons urged to support the application as well as the arguments and submissions canvassed before us have failed to impress us. The submission based on the want of jurisdiction in the trial court is misconceived.

On the issue of registration, prima facie, the priority of title of the company over that of applicant has not been impeached. It is trite law that the successful party should enjoy the fruits of his victory. The company has pleaded that it needs the premises for its own business. Kasser has not disputed this fact. We are of the opinion that in all the circumstances greater hardship would be caused to the company if the application was granted. It is for all of the above reasons that we held the application was without merit and refused it.

Kizito Beyuo, Legal Practitioner.