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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT

OF JUSTICE FAST TRACK/AUTOMATED DIVISION SITTING AT

ACCRA ON FRIDAY THE 8TH DAY OF JUNE, 2012.

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                                                                                                            SUIT NO. AC 88/2012

 

CORAM:                    S.K.A. ASIEDU, J. SITTING AS JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT, ACCRA

 

MADAM MAUD NONGO                            -           PLAINTIFF

 VS.

 GHANA NATIONAL FIRE SERVICE       -           DEFENDANT

  

PLAINTIFF – PRESENT

DEFENDANT REPRESENTED BY EMMANUEL JIAGGEY (DO3)

 

KEN ANKU FOR ACQUAH SAMPSON FOR THE PLAINTIFF

CECIL ADADEVOR WITH TRICIA QUARTEY FOR THE DEFENDANT

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

The defendant is a statutory organization established by the Ghana National Fire Service Act of 1997 Act 537.  In the year 2010 the defendant invited public tenders for the supply of various items including sixteen thousand three hundred and thirty nine (16, 339) pairs of camouflage uniforms.  The invitation for public tender was carried in the National Dailies in 2010 as indicated by exhibits 5 and 6 herein.

The plaintiff in this suit put in a tender and having been declared successful, entered into a formal contract with the defendant for the supply of the camouflage uniforms. Upon the delivery of the uniforms, the defendant took issue with the plaintiff that the contract was for the supply of 16339 pairs of uniforms.  The plaintiff however intimated that the formal agreement entered into with the defendant was for the supply of 16339 pieces of uniforms and not 16339 pairs as contended by the defendant.  When the defendant exhibited an intention to pay for the uniforms supplied in pairs instead of in pieces, the plaintiff instituted the present action for:

 

‘i    Recovery of the sum of GH¢749,791.62 (Seven Hundred and Forty-Nine Thousand Seven Hundred and Ninety-one Ghana Cedis and Sixty Two Pesewas) being the price of a consignment of 15.514 pieces (7,757 full sets) .. Swiss made Camouflage Uniforms sold and delivered to the Defendant pursuant to contract No…………………………..

ii    Interest thereon at the prevailing Inter Bank lending rate on the date of payment from August 15, 2011 to the date of final payment.

iii.  Damages for breach of contract.

iv.  Costs’.

 

After the service of the plaintiff’s writ of summons and its accompanying statement of claim on the defendant, an Appearance was filed and later a Statement of Defence for and on behalf of the defendant.  At the application for directions stage the following issues were adopted for trial.  That is:

 

a.    ‘Whether or not the invitation for tenders by the Defendant was an invitation to treat for the supply of 16,339 pairs of camouflage uniforms by the plaintiff to the Defendant.

b.    Whether or not the insertion of the word ‘pieces’ in the contract, dated, 1st December, 2010 was inadvertent and not pursuant to the invitation for tenders by the defendant.

c.    Whether or not the delivery of 8,373 and 7,757 pieces of camouflage uniforms by the plaintiff was in accordance with the contract of 1st December, 2010.

d.    Any other issues for trial’.

 

At the trial, the plaintiff gave evidence and closed her case.  The defendant also gave evidence per a witness and announced the closure of its case.

From the pleadings and the evidence on record the court finds that the following facts are not in dispute:

1)     That the Plaintiff is a sole proprietor trading under the name and style JILD VENTURES.  This finding is supported by exhibit A which is a Certificate of Registration of Business name and also by the plaintiff’s answers under cross examination.

2)    That in the year 2010 the defendant put up an invitation for qualified members of the public to bid for the supply of various items to the defendant including 16339 pairs of camouflage uniforms.  Again this finding is supported by a publication in the Tuesday 25th  May, 2010 edition of the ‘Ghanaian Times’  Newspaper at page 18; exhibits 5 and 7 herein and Wednesday the 26th May 2010 edition of the ‘Daily Graphic’ Newspaper page 34 exhibits 6 and 8 herein.

The invitation for tenders was also addressed to the plaintiff herein by the defendant’s letter of 14th May, 2010 exhibit ‘B’ herein.

It is also not in dispute that the tender process was governed by a tender document exhibit ‘C’. The tender was for the supply of 16339 pieces of camouflage material to be delivered “two months from the day of the signing of the contract”.  The unit price was also quoted at page 49 of the tender document exhibit ‘C’ as GH¢48.33.  By the same exhibit ‘C’ at page 49 thereof, the plaintiff put in a tender to supply 16,339 pieces of camouflage uniforms from Switzerland at a price of GH¢48.33 a piece at a total cost of GH¢789,663.87.

It is also not in dispute that by exhibit ‘D’ the defendant, on the 25th November, 2010 addressed to the plaintiff, a letter titled “Notification of Award: Supply of Camouflage Uniforms’.  Exhibit ‘D’ stated in part that:

 

‘NOTIFICATION OF AWARD

SUPPLY OF CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORMS

This is to notify you that your Tender dated June 28, 2010 for Execution of the contract for the SUPPLY OF CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORMS, IFT No. NFS/010039 i.e.

I/N

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY

TOTAL PRICE

1

CAMOUFLAGE

16,339 PIECES

GH¢ 789,663.87

 

In the amount of seven hundred and eighty nine thousand, six hundred and sixty three Ghana Cedis, eighty seven pesewas (GH¢789,663.87) in accordance with the instructions to Tenderers us hereby accepted’.

 

Again exhibit ‘D’ requested the plaintiff to furnish the defendant with a Performance Bond “within 14 days of the receipt of Notification of Award of the Contract”.  As a result the plaintiff furnished a Performance Bond exhibit ‘E’ herein which she procured from Phoenix Insurance.  Exhibit ‘E’ was dated 29th November, 2010.

I find that by exhibit ‘F’ dated the 1st day of December, 2010, the defendant executed a formal contract with the plaintiff for the “Supply of 16,339 pieces of camouflage uniforms”.

There is evidence to the effect that after the execution of the contract, the plaintiff obtained a loan from the Bank and imported the camouflage uniforms.

I find from exhibit ‘2’ that the actual quantity of camouflage uniforms supplied by the plaintiff was 16,130 pieces comprising 8373 trousers and 7757 jackets.  This finding is supported also by the plaintiff’s answer in admission during cross examination.  Nevertheless, an inspection team formed by the defendant accepted the goods supplied by the plaintiff herein and wrote an acceptance report dated 7th July, 2011 received in evidence as exhibit ‘H’.

I find that after the supply of the uniforms, the defendant paired them by way of one trouser to one jacket as a result of which 7757 pairs were generated leaving 616 excess trousers.  These excess trousers of 616 were  rejected by the defendant who then wrote exhibit ‘K’ a letter dated the 7th day of July, 2011 in which the defendant requested the plaintiff to submit fresh invoices for “7,757 full sets of camouflage uniforms or 15,514 pieces at a rate of GH¢48,33 per piece. Exhibit ‘K’ also requested the plaintiff to ‘take back the 616 pieces of trousers still in the possession of the defendant”.    

I find from exhibits ‘J’, J1 and J2 that the plaintiff prepared fresh invoices as requested.  Exhibit J is dated 8th August, 2011 and exhibits J1 and J2 are both dated 8th July, 2011.  Before the submission of exhibits J1 and J2 by the plaintiff, invoice for the price of 16,130 pieces of camouflage uniforms had been forwarded to the defendant by the plaintiff per exhibit ‘3’ dated 15th June, 2011 which the defendant rejected per exhibit K supra and requested plaintiff to furnish it with fresh invoices covering 15, 514 pieces of uniforms as shown in exhibits J1 and J2.

There is evidence on record that despite directives from the Sector Minister that the defendant pays for 15, 514 pieces of uniforms as a result of which exhibits J1 and J2 were requested and furnished, the defendant was still unwilling to pay the plaintiff the cost as directed.  The plaintiff’s lawyer therefore wrote to the Minister a letter dated the 22nd August, 2011 pointing out the fact of non-compliance with the Minister’s directives by the defendant.  This is captured in exhibit ‘M’.

The court finds that the defendant’s unwillingness to pay for the goods supplied by the plaintiff which it had accepted arose from various correspondences between it and the Ministry for Interior.

I find from the evidence on record that the Fire Service Council played a major role in the non-payment of the plaintiff for the goods which she supplied and were accepted by the defendant.  There is evidence that the Fire Service Council met on the 13th July, 2011.  The defendant tendered exhibit 11 which reads as follows:

 

‘SUPPLY OF CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORM TO THE GHANA NATIONAL FIRE SERVICE

1.    In May, 2010, the Ghana National Fire Service invited tenders for the supply of various items including sixteen thousand, three hundred and thirty-nine (16,339) pairs of Camouflage Uniform.

2.    Subsequently, JILD VENTURES won the contract to supply the uniform and delivered 8,373 trousers and 7,757 jackets.

3.    The Service advertised for pairs and naturally uniforms are worn in pairs. However, the supplier along the line interpreted a word in the Contract Document  (pieces) to arrogate to itself the interpretation of ‘pieces’ to mean trousers as a piece and jacket also as a piece.

4.    By JILD’s interpretation, she would have supplied half of the consignment as pairs to kit Service personnel properly and yet claim the Cost of double. The controversy surrounding the supply therefore led to the matter being referred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Fire Service Council for possible resolution.

5.    The Council met on 13th July, 2011 and deliberated on the issue of the supply of Camouflage Uniform by JILD Ventures to the Ghana National Fire Service. Only 7,757 pairs of the supplies could be used as uniforms; whiles the remaining 616 were only trousers.  The consensus was that the Service should pay for seven thousand, seven hundred and fifty-seven (7,757) pairs of uniform at the advertised price of GH ¢48.33 per pair (Totaling GH ¢374,895.51).

6.    The outstanding balance of 8,582 pairs of uniform could be delivered by the supplier later for payment.  Should this arrangement not be acceptable to the supplier then the entire consignment delivered by the supplier should be rejected’.

In the opinion of the court the Fire Service Council fell into a grievous error when it stated, without recourse to the contract document, that “naturally uniforms are worn in pairs”.  The court can take judicial notice of the fact that whether apparel can pass for ‘uniform’ depends on the organization concerned.  For instance, when school children talk about uniforms, that expression is a reference to the accepted dress code of the particular school.  It may include a shirt, trouser, shoe/boot of a particular colour or description and many other types of apparels.

Even in the Fire Service, uniform is not necessarily a reference to a particular  shirt and trouser but it includes the cup and the boots as well as the socks and the belt and many others apparels on the dress worn sometimes with reference to the rank of the officer in question.  The defendant’s witness made admissions to this effect in his answer to the following questions:

 

‘Q:       So after you wrote exhibit 10 what happened?

A:        The supplier submitted the required invoice to us, in the cause of that the letter from the Ministry of Interior was presented at Fire Service Council meeting on the 13th July 2010 and the Council decided that payment should be made for 7,757 and that when we talk of uniform it comprises the set, up and down and not the individual jacket as one piece and the trouser as one piece.

  JUDGE:  Does the uniform include your cup?

WITNESS:  No My Lord.

JUDGE:  Is it not part of your uniform?

WITNESS:  It is part of our uniform. We even add the boots and all that’.

 

From the answers given I find that it is not entirely correct as stated by the Fire Service Council that “Uniforms are worn in pairs”.

The defendant did not contract with the plaintiff for the supply of what are “worn in pairs”. Rather the contract evidenced by exhibit ‘F’ was for the supply of 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms.  Indeed paragraphs 1 and 2 of exhibit ‘F’ states that:

‘In this Agreement words and expressions shall have the same meaning as respectively assigned to them in the Condition of Contract referred to.

1.    The following documents shall be deemed to form and be read and constructed as part of this Agreement, viz:

a.    The Tender Form and the Price Schedule submitted by the Tenderer;

b.    The Schedule of Requirements;

c.    The General Conditions of Contract; and

d.    The Purchaser’s Notification of Award’ 

 

Clearly therefore, the invitation for tender published in the various newspapers is not part of the contract documents and hence it was wrongful for the Fire Service Council to rely on the invitation to treat as constituting a contract and then say that uniforms are naturally worn in pairs. Worse still in the 21st century, where the law is held supreme, it sounds oppressive and totalitarian for the Fire Service Council to conclude as it did  that:

 

“Should this arrangement not be acceptable to the supplier then the entire consignment delivered by the supplier should be rejected”.

The general conditions of contract referred to in paragraph 1 quoted above is captured at pages 26 to 38 of exhibit ‘C’ the tender document. Paragraph 2 of the General Conditions states that “Application 2.1 these General Conditions shall apply to the extent that they are not superseded by provisions in other parts of the contracts”.  Indeed no where in the General Conditions of Contract is the word ‘pieces’ defined.  Resort in my view, must therefore be made to other sources for the meaning of the word ‘pieces’ since the same is also not defined in the Contract Document either.

The BBC English Dictionary Published by Harper Collins London 1992, page 867 states that ‘A piece of something is a portion, part or section of it’.  At the same page it is stated that “a piece of something is also an individual item of it”.  The same word is also defined in the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary by A.S. Hornby, 6th Ed. Oxford University Press, Special Price Edition (2001).  At page 877 “piece” is defined as “an amount of something that has been cut or separated from the rest of it; a standard amount of something”.  It is again stated to be “one of the bits or parts that something breaks into “or” a single item of a particular type especially one that forms part of a set.”.

Within the context of exhibit “F” the contract executed between the plaintiff and the defendant herein, the word ‘piece’ as used in the phrase “supply of 16,339 pieces of camouflage uniforms”  in my view therefore, cannot be interpreted to read ‘pairs’.  That will surely amount to re-writing the contract for the parties.  In my opinion given the context in which ‘piece’ has been used in the contract between the parties, the most appropriate meaning is that which connotes singleness or a unit of. Hence, the phrase “16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms” will imply “16,339 units of camouflage uniforms or units of camouflage uniforms which adds up to 16, 339. 

The defendant contracted with the plaintiff to supply parts of or sections of or individual items or units of uniforms that sums up in total to 16, 339.  In the view of the court it will be unconscionable for the defendant to contract with the plaintiff to supply 16, 339 pieces of uniforms at GH¢48. 33 per piece and then when it comes to paying for the commodity for the defendant to turn round to say a ‘piece’ means ‘pairs’ to enable the defendant take two pieces for the price of one piece contrary to the agreement as shown in the contract exhibit ‘F’.

The law is clearly stated in INUSAH VS. DHL WORLDWIDE EXPRESS [1992] 1 GLR 267 that:

“the general rule was that when a document containing contractual terms was signed, then in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, a party of full age and understanding was bound to the contract to which he appended his signature. In such a case it would be immaterial whether he read the document or not”.

 

In KUSI & KUSI VS. BONSU [2010] SCGLR 61, the court held that “under section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD) 323), the facts recited in a document were conclusively presumed to be true between the parties and all persons claiming through then”.

In SMITH VS. HUGHES (1871) L.R. 6 QB 597, Blackburn J. stated the law as follows:

“If whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party, and the other party upon that belief enters into a contract with him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other party’s terms”.

In the instant case, the defendant’s tender documents exhibit ‘C’ herein shows that the defendant had invited members of the public to bid for the supply of 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms.  This is clearly stated at page 44 of exhibit ‘C’.  The plaintiff put in a tender for the supply of 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms.  See page 49 of exhibit ‘C’.  Subsequently, the defendant, on 25th November, 2010 wrote a ‘notification of award – supply of camouflage uniforms” to the plaintiff evidenced by exhibit ‘D’.  Here again, the defendant indicated to the plaintiff that she was to supply 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms. Then on the 1st December, 2010 the defendant executed a formal contract with the plaintiff for the “supply of 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms”.

In my opinion the defendant has exhibited all the outward signs of agreement that the plaintiff was to supply 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms.  I hold that the defendant is bound by the contract to which it had manifestly and voluntarily expressed its assent even if its actual intentions were different.  If the defendant had in fact made a mistake by its inability to express its intentions clearly on the contract document by stating “16, 339 pieces” instead of “16, 339 pairs” the plaintiff should not be the one to suffer for it.  The defendant must bear the brunt and the consequences of its own mistake.  I hold therefore that the defendant – Ghana National Fire Service is bound to pay for all the goods supplied by the plaintiff which it had by exhibit ‘H’ accepted.

However, it appears that the plaintiff had by exhibit ‘J’ agreed to take back six hundred and sixteen (616) pieces of the trousers supplied.  The defendant is therefore liable to the plaintiff for the cost of the remainder of the goods totaling 15,514 pieces at GH¢48.33 which sums up to GH¢749,791.62.

The court will therefore enter judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant to recover cash the sum of GH¢749,791.62. The plaintiff is also entitled to recover interest on the above sum of money in view of the delay in the payment by the defendant.  The court will therefore permit the plaintiff to recover interest at the prevailing bank rate form 15th August, 2011 to the date of final payment.

The plaintiff will be awarded nominal damages as the breach of the contract relates to the delay in the payment for the goods supplied.  The plaintiff will recover in respect of damages for breach of contract the sum of GH¢5000.00 from the defendant.

Costs of GH¢5000.00 is awarded the plaintiff against the defendant.

 

 

S. K. A. ASIEDU, J.

JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT. 

 

 
 

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