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MADAM YAA ASONKO v. KWAME POKU [27/02/04] CA. NO. 53-99

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE,

THE COURT OF APPEAL,

ACCRA GHANA.

_____________________________

CIVIL APPEAL  NO. 53-99

27TH FEBRUARY, 2004

MADAM YAA ASONKO                 PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

VERSUS:

KWAME POKU                                DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

______________________________________________________________________

 

JUDGMENT

ABBAN J.A.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court, Kumasi presided over by her Honour Miss Mariama Owusu, dated 26th July, 1996.

The Appellant who was the Defendant at the Court below is alleged to have trespassed onto the respondents farm land, and persistently denied the respondent her right of possession to the said land. As a result of the said trespass, the respondent was compelled to take out a writ of summons claiming damages for trespass to respondent’s farm situate at Atwe-Nkwanta on Nyinahin Stool land and perpetual injunction restraining the Appellant and/or his agents from interfering with respondent's ownership and possession of the said farm.

In her statement of claim, the Respondent who claims to be a native of Nyinahin and  a subject of the Nyinahin stool, averred that sometime in 1968 she acquired a piece of farm land from Nyinahin stool land and cultivated cocoa on it. The land thus acquired was bounded by the farms of Kwasi Gyansah (a.k.a. J.J.Peprah) Yaw Konto, Kwame Boakye and a forest reserve at a place called Atwee Nkwanta.

Twenty years later, two men (Yaw Twumasi and Osei Kwame) trespassed onto the said land and asserted adverse title to it. The Respondent herein took action against them in the Kumasi Circuit Court for a declaration of title, recovery of possession and perpetual injunction in a suit entitled.

"Madam Yaa Asonko vrs: Yaw Twumasi and Osei Kwame in suit No. LC 229/87. The defendants to the said suit entered appearance but failed to file their statement of defence and so on the 16th November, 1988, judgment was given in favour of the Respondent.

Sometime in 23/8/90 she applied for a writ of possession and she was accordingly put into possession by the Registrar of the Circuit Court Kumasi and the two men subsequently left the farm.

The appellant herein who did not join the previous suit and was in no way a party to the said suit later trespassed onto the same farm land and persistently denied the respondent herein her right to possession of the farm in dispute.

The appellant's behaviour is therefore an affront to the processes of the honourable Circuit Court and his illegal assumption of possession of the farm constituted a trespass.

Though the Appellant was never a party to suit No. LC 29/87, his representatives Kofi Teng and Kwarteng who were found working on the land at that time were served with the writ of possession and this constituted a notice to the appellant herein of the existence of the litigation between respondent and Twumasi and Osei Kwame, but appellant never reacted to the service of the process on his agents or representatives."

The respondent took the present action against the appellant herein for Damages for trespass and perpetual injunction on 19th November 1991 at the Circuit Court, Kumasi in suit No. LC.90/91. Strangely enough the appellant never counter-claimed.

On 26th July, 1996, the Circuit Court, Kumasi presided over by her honour, Miss Mariama Owusu, Circuit Judge gave judgment for the respondent, and it is against this judgment that the appellant has appealed.

There are three (3) grounds of appeal namely (1) The learned trial judge's decision was against the weight of evidence.

(2) The learned trial Judge contradicted herself when she held the Respondent's Exhibit "A" to be the same as the land described in the plan" Exhibit 1"

(3) The learned trial judge failed to properly evaluate" Exhibit 2" the judgment from the stool Lands Boundary settlement commission or at all.

The appellant argued the ground 2 first. In his submissions, counsel for the appellant states that in her endorsement on the writ of summons, the respondent claimed damages for trespass to her "farm situate at Atwe-Nkwanta on Nyinahin stool land". The same description was given in paragraph "3 & 4 (a) of the affidavit of Moses Yaw Asare-Bediako of Okomfor-Anokye chambers Kumasi at page. 8 of the Record of Appeal and paragraph 9 of the Notice of Amendment at page 9 of the Record of Appeal and in addition she mentioned the names of the people she shared boundary with. Throughout her evidence she maintained that her land was on Nyinahin stool land. In fact even in" Exhibit 'A' i.e. LC 29/87 she maintained the same description of her farm land and mentioned the names of the same boundary owners.

The Appellant on the other hand in his amended statement of Defence described his land as being at Kwadwo Mensah Krom on Nkawia stool land bounded on all sides by Asenaso Forest Reserve, J.J. Peperah's cocoa farm, Akwasi Boahenes Cocoa farm, Yaw Konto his cocoa farm, James Manu's cocoa farm, Osei Kwame's cocoa farm and an undeveloped land covering an area of about 26.28 acres belonging to the Nkawiehene. Appellant also tendered his plan of the land "Exhibit 1".

It is the opinion of the court of appeal that the Appellant's appeal has merit and therefore must be upheld for the following reasons.

(i) where a defendant is in possession of land, a plaintiff who sues in trespass must prove that he has a better title than that of the defendant.

See the case of  Mensah vs: Ahodjo (1961) 1 GLR 297 holding (2).

The evidence on record shows that both the Appellant and the Respondent are farming on Nkawie Stool land though the Respondent is under the mistaken impression that she is on Nyinahin stool land. Her own witness (P.W.1 J.J. Peperah) also known as Kwasi Gyansah under cross-examination testified that the Respondent's land is on Nkawie stool land.

In his testimony the PW1 said he lived at Nyinahin and that he was a farmer. He went on to state that his farm is at Atwinenkwanta and that he and the respondent plus one Yaw Kontoh went to acquire the land in 1968.

In fact his land is to the left side of the respondent's land.

In cross-examination he testified that he is a native of Nyinahin as well as the Respondent whilst the appellant is from Nkawie Kuma. He admitted under cross examination that he knows there was a dispute between Nkawie and Nyinahin which said dispute had been settled. At the end of the said dispute his land and that of the respondent became Nkawie stool land after Judgment was delivered. He admitted also that it was Nkawiehene who gave him his land.

Even though the respondent claimed that she acquired the land from Nyinahinhene in 1968, Exhibit 2 shows that in 1974 by letter No. LMR. 29/33/7 dated 10th December, 1974, the Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources had referred a boundary dispute between Nkawie and Nyinahin to the stool lands Boundaries settlement Commission for settlement.

The Commission at the end of the day refused to disturb a decision of His honour Sir Francis Charles Suller Esq., (deceased) the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti describing the boundary marks for Nkawie and Nyinahin in 1913 which said decision was tested in the High Court, then at the Court of appeal and the action terminated in favour of Nkawie. Nyinahin then appealed to the Privy Council in England, but the said appeal abated when the Government of Ghana abolished appeals from Ghana Court of Appeal to the Privy Council. Reading through Exhibit 2 we are inclined to the view that the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the Consolidated cases Civil Appeal No, 85/58 is still binding on the parties since no further action has been taken after 1958.

The learned trial Judge should have adverted her mind to this fact before concluding that though the land is Nkawie stool land, people from Nyinahin can still farm on Nkawie stool land. We agree with learned counsel for the appellant that if the learned trial judge had done a proper evaluation of Exhibit 2, she would have realised that long before the grant of the land in dispute to the respondent by Nyinahin stool, the boundaries had already been decided upon and that the land in dispute fell within Nkawie stool land and that by virtue of this fact the Nyninahin stool did not have any title or interest in the disputed land to grant it to the respondent in 1968. Thus the judgment in Exhibit A was wrong and she should not have been influenced by it to give judgment in favour of Respondent.

We disagree with learned trial judge on the decision that the fact that she had already made a finding that the land in dispute is on Nkawie stool land did not affect the plaintiff's position.

In what capacity was the respondent suing the Appellant? Was she in lawful possession of the land ?

Did she have any rights as a Nyinahin subject to farm on Nkawie stool land without attorning tenancy to Nkawie stool? Could judgment no. LC 29/87 between Respondent and Osei Kwame and Twumasi operate as estoppel per rem judicatam?.

All these questions were not answered by the learned trial Judge.

In the case of Cobblah vs: Okraku it was held inter alia that a plea of estoppel per rem judicatam cannot be sustained where the land the subject-matter of a current suit is not identical with the subject-matter of a present suit, and especially where the plaintiff is not claiming as a subject of the grantor and there is no contention by the plaintiff that the stool which granted land to him is a substool to the stool grantor.

The second holding of Cobblah vs: Okraku supra states that "although the judgment in Cobblah vs: Gariba and Modua Abrahams dated 25th February 1955, affected a larger area of which the land in the present dispute forms part, it is nevertheless in admissible against the Defendant herein to establish estoppel per rem judicatam because there is not sufficient evidence that the Defendant knew of that suit nor that the subject-matter of that suit included the land in the present suit. The said judgment is however admissible as evidence of plaintiff’s possession and of active steps taken by him on previous occasions to resist attempts to violate his possession.

I find it equally strange that though the Appellant tendered Exhibit 1, a plan of his land as granted him by Nkawie stool, the learned trial judge failed to order a survey plan of the land in dispute to be made to enable her identify the land in dispute, but went on to adjudged the issues based solely on the oral evidence of the respondent..

In the case of Kobina Ababio II etc vs: Priest-in-charge, Catholic Mission, Ampenyi and ors. (1935) WACA 380 where it was contended that similar judgements tendered were inadmissible as the defendant was not a party to the suits in which those judgments were given, it was held that the previous judgments were admissible to show acts of possession as distinct from establishing estoppel or res judicata.

Now, although this action is in trespass, yet by his defence, the appellant put the respondent to strict proof of her title. Therefore to succeed, the respondent had to prove that at the date of the appellant’s entry upon the land, she the respondent, either was in possession of the said land as the person having title to it, or if not in actual physical or constructive possession thereof, that as between her and the appellant she is the person in whom was vested the right to immediate possession. It is upon this principle that the case was to have been considered by the trial court, bearing in mind that it is upon the plaintiff that the onus lies to establish those facts.   

Again in deciding this case, the Court has to bear in mind the principle established in the case of Mantse Anege Akwei vs: Mantse Kojo Ababio (1918) F.C. February 1919, 64, that as between stools, the stool whose subjects are shown to be in occupation of a particular piece of land is, in law, the owner of that particular land.

For the appellant herein, evidence was led supported by D.W.1 (the caretaker of Nkawiehene) that he (appellant) got a grant of the land in dispute in 1986 and he went into effective occupation in 1990.

From the record before us, we find as a fact that as at 1990 when the appellant went on to the land in dispute, the respondent was not in effective occupation, and has never been in effective occupation following the decision in the Mantse Anege Akwei case Nkawie stool having been adjudged the rightful owner of the land in dispute which said judgment of the court of appeal has not been upturned see Civil Appeal No. 82/58 referred to in Exh. 2 at page 50 of the record of appeal, Appellant being a subject of Nkawie stool and also having been put in possession by the said stool has a better title to the disputed land then the respondent who all these years seems to have been on the land as a trespasser. On the totality of the evidence, the Respondent failed to show that Nyinahin stool, her grantor, had a better title to the land than Nkawie stool, the Appellant's grantor. The respondent therefore failed to discharge the primary burden on her, and her action therefore fails.

This appeal succeeds and the judgment of the court below is set aside along with the consequential orders made thereunder.

The appellant is awarded costs in the sum of ¢2.5 million Cedis as against the Respondent.

(SGD.)

HENRIETTA ABBAN (MRS.)

JUSTICE OF APPEAL.

LARTEY J.A.

I agree.

F.M. LARTEY

JUSTICE OF APPEAL

ASARE KORANG J.A.

I also agree.

A. ASARE-KORANGE

JUSTICE OF APPEAL

COUNSEL

M.Y. ASARE BEDIAKO FOR RESPONDENT

A.A. SOMOA ASAMOAH FOR APPELLANT.

EAS.

 

 

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