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Law of the Sea – Maritime law -
Carriage of goods by sea – Bill
of lading - capacity to sue -
Civil Procedure - Preliminary
objection - Capacity to sue -
Quantum of damages awarded -
Damage to perishable cargo -
Contractual Obligations - Rule
17(1) of the Supreme Court
Rules, C.I. 16
HEADNOTES
The appellant brought the
refrigerated container where the
boxes of fresh yams were loaded,
and the container returned to
the Meridian Port Services at
the Tema Port on 12th
January 2010. At the Port, while
the container was undergoing a
Pre-Trip Inspection (PTI), the
reefer technician noticed that
the reefer unit of the container
had malfunctioned and sent a
message to the appellant
requesting for another
refrigerated container to
transfer the boxes of fresh
yams. The respondent says that
it later received a phone call
from the appellant informing it
that the container which had the
boxes of fresh yams loaded into
it had malfunctioned and that
the boxes of fresh yams had been
transferred into another
container. Though the respondent
through its agent sought to see
the state of the fresh yams, it
was not allowed access by the
appellant saying that the
container was in a restricted
area and out of bounds. The
appellant in a bid to avoid
paying damages for its own
negligence in supplying a faulty
container, went ahead and
shipped the consignment to the
USA at a great monetary loss to
the respondent. The consignment
on arriving in the USA was found
to have gone bad. The
respondent, upon noticing the
bad state of the yams, tried to
contact the USA branch of the
appellant company to make a
complaint but to no avail thus
compelling it to contact the
appellant to make a complaint.
Respondent was there informed to
put in a formal claim and
assured that the matter would be
resolved when the representative
returned to Ghana. The
respondent’s representative upon
arriving in Ghana made a formal
complaint to the appellant
through its solicitors, Matthews
Consult. However, despite the
demand notices and several
reminders to appellant to pay
for the loss in accordance with
international shipping
regulations and appellant’s own
terms and conditions of the
contract of carriage, it failed
to do so. The High Court gave
Judgment in favour of the
respondent.
The appellant dissatisfied with
the Judgment lodged an appeal at
the Court of Appeal, the Court
of Appeal dismissed the appeal
as lacking merit.
HELD
In conclusion, we dismiss the
appeal of the appellant. We also
dismiss the cross-appeal ground
3(iii) of the respondent’s
cross-appeal but allow ground
3(i) of the cross appeal. We
review the damages awarded by
the trial court and the Court
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Supreme Court Rules, C.I. 16
Sale of Goods Act 1962 (ACT 137)
Bills of Lading Act, 1961 (Act
42)
Hague Rules of 1924
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Fraser v. Telegraph
Constructions Co. (1872) L.R. 7
Q.B. 566
Barber v. Meyerstein (1870) L.R.
4 H. L. 317
G.W. RY. V. Bagge (1885) 15
Q.B.D. 625
The Albazero [1976] 3 AII ER 129
Leigh and Sillavan Ltd v
Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd, The
Aliakmon [1986] 2 All ER 145
East West Corporation v DKBS
1912 A/S and another [2003] 2
AII ER 700.
Utaniko Ltd v P & O Nedlloyd BV
[2003] 2 AII ER 700.
Dunlop v Lambert cases [1839] 6
CI & Fin 600
Ahenkorah v Mubarak [1972] 1 GLR
429 at 430
Norgbey v Asante [1992] 1 GLR
586 at 516
Yirenkyi v. Tarzan International
Transport [1962] 1 G.L.R. 75
Hullblyth Gh Ltd v Anglogold
Ashanti Ltd [2013] 59 G.M.J 89
Delmas Agencies Gh Ltd v Food
Distributors Int’l Ltd
[2007-2008] SCGLR 748
Attorney General v Faroe
Atlantic Co. Limited [2005-2006]
SCGLR 271
Youngdong Industries Ltd v RoRo
Services [2005-2006] SCGLR 816
Lizori Ltd v Boye & School of
Domestic Science & Catering
[2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 889,
Birim Wood Complex Ltd v Andreas
Bschor GMBH & Co. Kg [2016-2017]
1 GLR 194
Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) and
Another v. Farmex Ltd (1989-90)
GLR 266
Ekow Essuman (Deceased) Subst.
By Ruth Essuman (Mrs) Bodja
Essuman & Nana Asare Bediako and
Aboso Goldfields Limited; (Civil
Appeal
No. J4/39/2019 SC dated 11th
December 2019
Ilkin v Samuels [1963] 2 All ER
879,
Hayward and Another v Pullinger
and Partners Limited [1950] 1
All ER 581
Bressah v. Asante & Another
[1965] 1 GLR 117
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.
2009),
Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th
Edition Vol. 12 par. 1104-1114;
Murray on Contracts 5th
Edition page 753
Chitty on Contracts 13th
Edition Vol 1 pages 1601-1603.
Atkin’s Court Forms, 2nd
Edition, Volume
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
AMEGATCHER JSC:-
COUNSEL
O. K. OSAFO BUABENG FOR THE
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/APPELLANT.
EZIUCHE NWOSU FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT.
AMEGATCHER JSC:-
1.
This is a maritime dispute which
has travelled from the High
Court through the Court of
Appeal and now before the
Supreme Court. In this court,
the maritime aspect has, to a
considerable extent, been
reduced into a procedural matter
of capacity to sue and the
quantum of damages awarded for
damage to perishable cargo.
2.
The
Plaintiff/Respondent/Respondent
(hereafter referred to as the
Respondent) instituted this
matter against the
Defendant/Appellant/Appellant
(hereafter referred to as the
appellant) on 28th
June 2010, seeking the following
reliefs endorsed on the Writ of
Summons and Statement of Claim:
a.
Specific damages in the
sum of Forty – Six Thousand
Three Hundred and Fifty dollars
($46,350.00) to be paid by
Defendant to Plaintiff being the
cost of 1,030 boxes of fresh
yams, the freight, clearing and
handling charges in the USA.
b.
Interest on the said sum
of Forty-Six Thousand Three
Hundred and Fifty dollars
($46,350.00) at the commercial
bank lending rate of interest
from 1st February
2010 to and inclusive of the
final date of payment.
c.
General damages for the
inconvenience, pain, distress
and loss of customers and income
to Plaintiff resulting from not
fulfilling their contractual
obligations to their customers
because of Defendant’ negligence
and resultant damage.
d.
Cost
3.
The respondent is a limited
liability company set up under
the Companies Act and engages in
the export of non – traditional
foodstuffs to the United States
of America (USA) while the
appellant is a shipping line
based in the port of Tema,
Ghana. The respondent contends
that since 2002 it has engaged
the services of the appellant in
shipping its goods to the USA
and had so far shipped over one
hundred, 40-footer containers
through the appellant. On 5th
January 2010, respondent
contracted the appellant to ship
1,030 boxes of fresh yams in a
40-footer refrigerated container
to the USA. The appellant
brought the refrigerated
container to the respondent in
Accra on 11th January
2010, where the boxes of fresh
yams were loaded, and the
container returned to the
Meridian Port Services at the
Tema Port on 12th
January 2010. At the Port, while
the container was undergoing a
Pre-Trip Inspection (PTI), the
reefer technician noticed that
the reefer unit of the container
had malfunctioned and sent a
message to the appellant
requesting for another
refrigerated container to
transfer the boxes of fresh
yams. The respondent says that
it later received a phone call
from the appellant informing it
that the container which had the
boxes of fresh yams loaded into
it had malfunctioned and that
the boxes of fresh yams had been
transferred into another
container. Though the respondent
through its agent sought to see
the state of the fresh yams, it
was not allowed access by the
appellant saying that the
container was in a restricted
area and out of bounds.
4.
The respondent says that the
appellant in a bid to avoid
paying damages for its own
negligence in supplying a faulty
container, went ahead and
shipped the consignment to the
USA at a great monetary loss to
the respondent. The consignment
on arriving in the USA was found
to have gone bad. The
respondent, upon noticing the
bad state of the yams, tried to
contact the USA branch of the
appellant company to make a
complaint but to no avail thus
compelling it to contact the
appellant to make a complaint.
Respondent was there informed to
put in a formal claim and
assured that the matter would be
resolved when the representative
returned to Ghana. The
respondent’s representative upon
arriving in Ghana made a formal
complaint to the appellant
through its solicitors, Matthews
Consult. However, despite the
demand notices and several
reminders to appellant to pay
for the loss in accordance with
international shipping
regulations and appellant’s own
terms and conditions of the
contract of carriage, it failed
to do so.
5.
The respondent contends that the
appellant blatantly and
negligently breached the duty
owed to respondent under the
shipping contract. This was by
not shipping its 1,030 boxes of
fresh yams from Ghana to the USA
in the state in which it was
loaded onto appellant’s
refrigerated container by
respondent in Accra under the
required temperature and in good
condition. The appellant on the
other hand contends that its
duty was to supply the container
to the respondent. The
respondent was responsible for
loading and returning the
container to appellant for
shipping. The appellant,
further, says that it is not
liable for the contents,
weights, quantity nor quality of
the cargo stored in the said
containers. The appellant admits
that its attention was drawn to
the malfunctioning of the said
reefer by officials of the
Meridian Port Services, and,
therefore, supplied another
container to transfer the boxes
of fresh yams into it of which
appellant informed the
respondent. It is the
appellant’s contention that it
conducted a survey of the
condition of the said cargo in
the presence of all interested
parties including officials from
Customs Excise & Preventive
Services (CEPS) and the said
cargo was found to be fully
wholesome before same was
shipped to the USA. It further
contends that the said cargo was
cleared from the port in the USA
by the agents of the consignee
without any objection
whatsoever.
6.
The appellant further contends
that there was nothing endorsed
at the back of the bill of
lading giving any notice of any
loss or damage occasioned to the
goods at the port of discharge
in Newark, New Jersey, USA. It
also further contends that as
long as the bill of lading was
not endorsed giving notice of
any loss or damage, it forms a
prima facie evidence that the
goods were delivered in the same
condition in which it was
received by the appellant in
Ghana for shipment. The
appellant also contends that in
terms of the conditions of
carriage endorsed on the
overleaf of the bill of lading,
it is exempt from any tortious
or contractual liability from
loss or damage to goods in its
actual or constructive
possession in respect of this
contract of carriage. The
appellant further contends that
there is no evidence to show how
the yams were declared
unwholesome and destroyed upon
arrival in the USA. The
appellant maintains that at all
material times to the
institution of this action, the
respondent’s interest, risk and
title in the goods had passed
onto the named consignee: Kyewaa
LLC and, therefore, the
respondent could not maintain
this action for want of
capacity.
7.
On the 27th day of
June 2013, the High Court, Accra
presided over by Amoako Asante J
(as he then was) delivered
Judgment in favour of the
respondent. The trial court
found the appellant liable to
the respondent for the damage
caused to the yams because of
its negligent handling of the
carriage. The court entered
judgment in favour of the
respondent to recover the sum of
US$46,350.00 special damages
together with interest, “nominal
general damages of Ghc20,000.00”
and costs of Ghc5,000.00. The
appellant dissatisfied with the
Judgment of the High Court
lodged an appeal at the Court of
Appeal dated 8th July
2013. On 23rd
February 2017, the Court of
Appeal dismissed the appeal as
lacking merit. The quantum of
the general damages was,
however, reduced from GHC
20,000.00 to GHC10,000.00. The
award of special damages was
also revised to nominal damages
and the amount reduced from
US$46,350.00 to US$30,000.00.
The appellant, again,
dissatisfied with the Judgment
of the Court of Appeal lodged
this instant appeal at the
Supreme Court. The respondent,
also, dissatisfied with the same
Judgment on the issue of special
and general damages also cross
appealed.
8.
In this court, the record
reveals that after the Court of
Appeal’s findings on liability,
the appellant threw in the towel
on that leg of the claim and
limited itself to that part of
the judgment awarding the
respondent nominal damages of
US$30,000.00 and the capacity of
the respondent to institute the
action. We are, therefore called
upon to decide quantum of
damages and the capacity of the
respondent to institute the
action.
PRELIMINARY LEGAL OBJECTION:
9.
On 25th September
2019, the respondent filed a
notice of preliminary legal
objection under rule 17(1) of
the Supreme Court Rules, C.I.
16. The appellant had also given
indication of taking a similar
step in its Statement of Case.
However, at the hearing of the
appeal, no such notice had been
filed by the appellant showing
that it had abandoned the idea.
The basis of the respondent’s
legal objection was that
appellant had stated in its
Statement of Case to this court
that it had paid the judgment
debt in this appeal. However, in
the opinion of the respondent,
appellant’s calculation of the
judgment debt was wrong so there
were still outstanding payments
to be made by appellant to
respondent.
This notice, raising a
preliminary legal objection, was
frivolous to say the least. The
rules of court in operation in
the various hierarchy of the
courts have provisions for
dealing with disputes relating
to calculation of judgment
debts. Lawyers plying their
trade within the justice
delivery system are under an
obligation to familiarise
themselves with these rules so
that they can represent the
interest of their clients to the
best of their professional
ability. The preliminary
objection contemplated by rule
17(1) of C.I. 16 is a legal
objection which should be
decided by the court on the face
of the appeal record without the
need to attach exhibits to the
notice as was done in
respondent’s notice. The grounds
for the objection must also be
legal. In ordinary parlance, the
result of a successful objection
is what we call a technical
knockout. Examples of grounds
anticipated under rule 17(1) are
the filing of a notice of appeal
to this court outside the time
limit provided by the rules,
failure to obtain leave of the
court or special leave before
filing an appeal contrary to a
mandatory provision of the rules
and failure to settle records of
appeal as required by the rules.
Others are failure to follow a
mandatory provision of the rules
or order of the court relating
to the appeal, the appeal
showing no reasonable cause of
action and the absence of proper
parties in the appeal due to
failure to substitute a deceased
party. Any of these grounds may
end up in the appeal being
dismissed in limine or if the
objection is capable of remedy,
to place the appeal on hold
until the basis of the objection
is rectified.
None of the grounds contemplated
by rule 17(1) has been raised in
respondent’s notice of
preliminary objection. We find
the current notice of
preliminary objection legally
incompetent and have no
hesitation in dismissing same.
GROUND (B) OF THE NOTICE OF
APPEAL-CAPACITY OF A CONSIGNOR
TO SUE:
10.
The appellant in this ground
contends that the Court of
Appeal erred in holding that the
respondent rather than the named
consignee in the bill of lading
had the capacity to institute
this action. The appellant
argued that in accordance with
the Bills of Lading Act, 1961
(Act 42) and the Sale of Goods
Act, 1962 (Act 137), the
respondent did not have the
capacity to institute the
present suit and invited the
court to dismiss the action in
limine and allow the appeal.
Appellant’s reason being that
the subject matter of the suit
which is the cargo of yams had
at all material times to the
institution of the suit by the
respondent been passed from the
respondent to the consignee,
Kyewaa LLC. The appellant
referred to Exhibit “A” the bill
of lading, that listed the
respondent as the consignor of
the consignment of the yams and
Kyewaa LLC as the consignee. In
support of its contention, it
referred the court to section
7(1) of Act 42 supra which falls
under the part: Rights and
liabilities of consignees and
endorsees and is headed:
Consignees or Endorsees of Bill
of Lading may sue.
11.
The respondent, however,
submitted that respondent had
the capacity to institute the
action and that the company, BTL
Ltd. and the consignee, Kyewaa
LLC were owned by the same
shareholder who transacted the
business of exporting yam, gari
and smoked fish from Ghana to
the United States to sell for
profit. When in Ghana, the name
of the business is BTL and in
the US it is Kyewaa LLC where
respondent’s representative and
her daughter Ruby Chriss are the
Directors. Further, respondent’s
representative paid for the
freight and the cargo expenses
through Kyewaa LLC, the company
she runs in the US with a Bank
of America money order.
12.
The Sale of Goods Act 1962 (ACT
137) is an act which regulates
contracts in which goods are
sold and bought. The Act lays
down a few compulsory legal
rules concerned with an array of
presumptions and implied terms,
which aim at reflecting the
commercial expectations in most
agreed sales contracts. In the
absence of any contrary
agreement these terms will
govern a contract within the
Act’s remit. It can be gleaned
from the record and appellant’s
Statement of Case that appellant
relies heavily on section 61 of
the Act which deals with cost,
insurance and freight in
submitting that the respondent
did not have the capacity to
bring this suit because the risk
and title of the property had
transferred to Kyewaa LLC.
13.
We are
not attracted by the submissions
of the appellant's counsel. We
have looked at the Sale
of Goods Act within the ambit of
the facts in the appeal before
us.
The Sale of Goods Act 137 is an
Act “to codify with
amendments the law relating to
the sale and hire purchase of
goods.” By the provisions of
section 1, it is limited to
contracts whereby a
seller agrees to transfer
property in goods to
a
buyer for a consideration called
the price, consisting wholly or
partly of money.
It thus deals with the
contractual relationship between
a seller and buyer and the
responsibility, risks and title
associated with the goods in
question. Even the provisions
made in Part VII for C.I.F and
F.O.B sales referred to by
counsel for appellant in
sections 59-61 are confined to
obligations of sellers and
buyers in goods to be shipped
under contracts analogous to
those sales.
We do not think the Sale of
Goods Act has any bearing on
this appeal. There is no dispute
between a buyer and a seller on
ownership of goods or when the
risks associated with the goods
had been transferred. The appeal
before us deals with the
contractual agreement or
relationship between a carrier
(appellant) and a shipper
(respondent) and whether a
breach of contract had occurred
because of the appellant’s
negligence. On the contrary, the
Bills of Lading Act focuses on
commercial carriage of goods by
sea and the relationship between
the consignor and the carrier,
the consignor and the consignee
and the consignee and the
carrier about the carriage of
the goods and its associated
responsibilities and risks.
Section 1 of the Act makes it
clear that the provisions and
the Hague Rules of 1924 shall
apply to “the
carriage of goods by sea in
ships carrying goods from any
port in Ghana to any other port
whether in or outside Ghana.”
Section 7 relied on extensively
by counsel for the appellant
provides as follows:
“7 (1) A consignee of goods
named in a bill of lading, and
an endorsee of a bill of lading
to whom the property in the
goods mentioned in the bill
passes under the contract in
pursuance of which the
endorsement was made, shall have
transferred to and vested in
that consignee the rights, and
be subject to the same
liabilities, in respect of the
goods, as if the contract
expressed in the bill of lading
had been made with the consignee
or endorsee.
(2) Nothing in this section
shall prejudice or affect any
right of stoppage in transit or
any right to claim freight
against the original shipper or
owner, or any liability of the
consignee or endorsee by reason
or in consequence of his being a
consignee or endorsee, or of his
receipt of the goods by reason
or in consequence of the
consignment or endorsement.
Our understanding of section 7
of the Act is, first, it
acknowledges the primary
contract of carriage of goods by
sea to be between the shipper
(consignor) and carrier.
Secondly, it imposes rights and
obligations on carriers,
consignors, and consignees for
domestic and international
carriage of goods by sea. There
may be cases where a consignor
is no longer interested in or
sue for goods lost at sea
because the buyer whom the goods
have been consigned to has
discharged all obligations under
the sale to the shipper. We
cannot also turn a blind eye to
the likelihood of the common law
doctrine of privity of contracts
being applied to defeat a claim
a consignee who has paid
outright for commercial goods
may bring against a carrier for
goods damaged or destroyed by
the carrier in transit.
The Act provides a window for
consignees to sue for
compensation for loss on the
production of a bill of lading
which is consigned to it. The
Act also makes it clear that in
case of a dispute between the
consignor and consignee about
who has the right to sue to
claim for compensation for
damage to the goods, resort
would be had to when ownership
and risk in the goods would be
deemed to have passed. Further,
the Act provides a window for a
carrier to sue to claim the cost
of freight when a consignee who
has no contract with the carrier
refuses to pay for the goods. In
our opinion, these rights and
obligations do not take away or
limit the contractual right of
the consignor to sue the carrier
and enforce any rights for the
damage or loss to the goods
shipped under the primary
contract. These obligations
carefully crafted into the Act
is not surprising because since
the turn of the twentieth
century, international trade
among nations have soared
because of interdependence in
the economic sphere. The
increases in volumes of
commercial carriage of goods by
sea has compelled the
international community to find
a workable and uniform way of
addressing the rights and
obligations of the key players
in the maritime business. The
Hague Rules of 1924, which Ghana
is a signatory to, now form the
basis of national legislation in
all the world’s major trading
nations. The Hague Rules is what
Ghana has incorporated into
domestic legislation by the
passage of the Bills of Lading
Act in 1961.
14.
Bills of lading have taken such
a centre stage in carriage of
goods by sea that its legal
significance and the effect of
naming a party as a consignor or
consignee should be of interest
to us in this opinion. According
to Black’s Law Dictionary (9th
ed, 2009), a bill of lading is a
document acknowledging the
receipt of goods by a carrier or
by the shipper’s agent and the
contract for the transportation
of those goods. It is also a
document that indicates the
receipt of goods for shipment
and that is issued by a person
engaged in the business of
transporting or forwarding
goods. The practice of looking
to the bill as a contract may be
said to be uniform; and indeed,
has been adopted by Ghana’s
legislature in Section 2 of the
Bills of Lading Act, 1961 (Act
42). Case law in England and
Wales on the subject supports
the interpretation given to the
Ghana Act.
15.
In the English case of Fraser
v. Telegraph Constructions Co.
(1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 566 at 571
Blackburn J. said:
“the
Bill of Lading must be taken to
be the contract under which
goods are shipped, and until I
am told differently by a Court
of Error I shall so hold.”
16.
Lord Hatherley L.C. also
explained in the case of
Barber v. Meyerstein (1870) L.R.
4 H. L. 317 at pp. 329-330
that in the case of goods which
are at sea being transmitted
from one country to another,
there has been adopted, for the
convenience of mankind, a symbol
which is a mode of dealing with
delivery of actual possession of
property. This is the bill of
lading which is an effective
representation of ownership of
the goods, and its force does
not become extinguished until
possession, or what is
equivalent in law to possession,
has been taken on the part of
the person having a right to
demand it.
17.
It has been the position in the
development of the law of
carriage of goods by sea in the
eighteen and early nineteenth
centuries that where there is a
delivery to the carrier to
deliver to a consignee or the
goods are delivered to a carrier
to be carried without any
special contract being made, the
right to sue for a breach of
duty on the carrier’s part
appears to be in the person to
whom the goods belonged at the
time of the bailment. The
pattern then was that a
consignor can only sue a carrier
if a special contract had been
made between the two such as the
payment of the freight. Failing
that, the consignee so named on
the bill of lading is the proper
person to bring the action
against the carrier should the
goods be lost. This position
tended to support the
submissions of the appellant
that the proper person to bring
the claim against it was Kyewaa
LLC, the consignee named in the
bill of lading, because it, not
the respondent, paid for the
freight and therefore the latter
lacks the capacity to bring this
case. See Exhibit “C”.
18.
That would have been the case if
the evolution on the law of
Bills of Lading had ended there.
However, later developments in
the law of carriage of goods by
sea in the latter nineteenth and
the twentieth centuries have
proved otherwise. Thus, in the
case of G.W. RY. V. Bagge
(1885) 15 Q.B.D. 625 it was
held that where goods are
shipped in the ordinary way, and
a bill of lading is taken for
them by the shipper, without
giving any notice that he is
acting only as an agent, then
whether the consignee is named
or not, the contract is, in the
first instance, between the ship
owner and shipper himself,
although the freight be made
payable abroad by the consignee.
The principle behind the above
case is based on estoppel, which
has the effect, as between the
consignor and the carrier, of
precluding the carrier from
disputing that the consignor has
a sufficient interest in the
goods to support an action for
substantial damages for loss of
or damage to them.
19.
Dealing with the development of
this area of maritime law in the
twentieth century, three cases
stand tall. We have, therefore,
decided to discuss them because
of their legal significance. In
the case of The Albazero
[1976] 3 AII ER 129, the
plaintiffs (‘the charterers’)
chartered a vessel from the
defendants (‘the ship owners’).
A cargo of crude oil was shipped
covered by a bill of lading
issued pursuant to the
charterparty and naming the
charterers as consignees. During
the voyage, the vessel and her
cargo became a total loss. At
the time of the loss the
property in the cargo was no
longer vested in the charterers
but in the endorsees of the bill
of lading (‘The Cargo Owners’).
The charterers brought an action
in rem claiming damages against
the shipowners for the loss of
the cargo. A preliminary issue
was set down to decide whether
the charterers were entitled to
recover damages despite that, at
the time of the loss, they had
no property of interest in the
goods and had sustained no loss
or damage by reason of their
non-delivery. The House of Lords
held per Lord Diplock that an
original party to the contract
was to be treated in law as
having entered into the contract
for the benefit of all persons
who had or who might acquire an
interest in the goods before
they were lost or damaged, and
was entitled to recover, by way
of damages for breach of
contract, the actual loss
sustained by those for whose
benefit the contract had been
entered into.
20.
The Albazero was followed by
another House of Lords case of
Leigh and Sillavan Ltd v
Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd, The
Aliakmon [1986] 2 All ER 145.
In this case the buyers
agreed to buy from the sellers a
quantity of steel coils. The
steel was badly stowed on board
the shipowners’ vessel and
suffered damage during the
voyage from Korea to the United
Kingdom. During that voyage, and
after the damage had occurred
but before it was discovered,
the sellers tendered the bill of
lading to the buyers for
payment, but the buyers were
unable to make payment. The
parties then agreed to vary
their contract to provide that
the sellers would deliver the
bill of lading to the buyers to
enable them to take delivery of
the steel, that the buyers would
not, however, become the holders
of the bill of lading but would
merely take delivery as agents
for the sellers and that after
delivery the steel would be
stored to the sole order of the
sellers. When the damage to the
steel was discovered the buyers
brought an action against the
shipowners claiming damages for
breach of contract and
negligence. The trial judge
found for the buyers in
contract. On appeal by the
shipowners, the question arose
whether the buyers were entitled
to sue the shipowners in
negligence assuming they did not
have title to the steel. The
House of Lords held that the
buyer of shipped goods who had
not become the holder of the
bill of lading but who had,
under the terms of a cif or c &
f contract with the buyer,
assumed the risk of damage to
the goods was prevented by his
lack of legal ownership or
possessory title from suing the
shipowner in negligence for
damage occurring to the goods
during carriage. The fact that a
buyer under a cif or c & f
contract was the prospective
legal owner of them made no
difference to his inability to
sue in respect of damage caused
prior to his becoming the owner.
21.
The most recent decision on the
subject was delivered by the
English Court of Appeal in
East West Corporation v DKBS
1912 A/S and another: Utaniko
Ltd v P & O Nedlloyd BV [2003] 2
AII ER 700. The claimants
named a Chilean bank as the
consignee of shipped goods. The
bank did not complete payment
for the goods, but the carriers
released the goods to the bank.
The claimant sued the carriers
for the negligence in its agents
releasing the goods. The trial
court held that the claimant by
naming the bank as consignees in
the bills and by delivering such
bills to the bank for collection
of the price on their behalf
parted with all rights to
immediate possession as well as
the contractual rights of suit
to the bank. The claimants
contended that they had title to
sue in contract by virtue of
being shippers whose rights of
suit had not been extinguished.
On appeal, the English Court of
Appeal applying The Albazero
(supra), and Leigh & Sillavan
Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping (supra)
held that the claimants always
had been acting for themselves
and the bank had merely been
their agents. The claimant being
the original bailors of the
goods to the defendants under
the bill, a relationship of
bailment continued in existence
between the claimants and
defendants, despite the transfer
of the bills and contractual
rights to the banks. So, the
claimants retained the right to
immediate possession of the
goods at all material times, and
on that basis were entitled to
hold the defendants responsible
in bailment for any loss or
damage resulting from breach by
the defendants of their duty as
bailees.
22.
These twentieth century English
authorities are in tandem with
our own understanding of the
provisions of our Bills of
Lading Act (supra). We apply the
reasoning in those cases to the
facts of this case and state the
proposition that the consignor
can sue the carrier for loss of
or damage to the goods consigned
despite that the consignor at
the time of the loss did
not have the property or the
right to possession of the
goods. Our conclusion is based
on our acceptance of the
definition of consignor in the
long line of Dunlop v Lambert
cases [1839] 6 CI & Fin 600
that a consignor is a legal term
of art meaning a person who
himself or by his agents shipped
the relevant goods or at least
had an immediate right to
possession of them on shipment.
Thus, where goods are shipped in
the ordinary way, and a bill of
lading is taken for them by the
consignor or shipper, without
giving any notice that he is
acting only as an agent, then if
the consignee is named, the
contract would, in the first
instance, be between the carrier
(shipowner) and the shipper
(consignor) himself, although
the freight be made payable
abroad by the consignee.
23.
That is the scenario in the
appeal before us. We are
convinced that based on the
analysis the facts portrayed in
the evidence before the trial
court, the respondent had the
capacity to institute this
action for damages to recover
the losses incurred for the
negligence of the carrier. This
ground of appeal, therefore,
fails and is accordingly
dismissed.
GROUNDS 3(A) OF THE APPELLANT’S
NOTICE OF APPEAL-THE AWARD OF
NOMINAL DAMAGES:
24.
The appellant has argued in this
ground that the Court of Appeal
erred in awarding respondent
nominal damages of US$30,000.00
despite its finding that
respondent had failed to prove
its claim for special damages of
US$46,530.00. At page 294-295 of
the record, the Court of Appeal
held as follows:
“Even though the plaintiff
failed to prove special damages,
it is still entitled to an award
of nominal damages for the
unwholesome yams because of the
negligence of the
defendant…Nominal Damages does
not mean small damages but an
amount to be determined by the
court sufficient enough to
adequately compensate the
plaintiff for the loss of his
goods. The amount should be as
near as possible to the amount
lost or value of the goods
endorsed on the writ of
summons…. Much as we believe
plaintiff lost some yams and
deserve damages, we do not think
plaintiff has been able to
establish the amount of
US$46,530.00 as special damages.
However, we hold plaintiff is
entitled to nominal damages but
not special damages as cost for
the yams. We hereby award the
plaintiff nominal damages of
US$30,000 or its Ghana Cedi
equivalent.”
25.
In coming to this conclusion,
the Court of Appeal relied on
the High Court cases of
Ahenkorah v Mubarak [1972] 1 GLR
429 at 430 and Norgbey v
Asante [1992] 1 GLR 586 at 516.
In the Norgbey case, Acquah J
(as he then was) sitting at the
High Court, Ho also relied on
the dictum of Ollennu J (as he
then was) in
Yirenkyi v. Tarzan
International Transport [1962] 1
G.L.R. 75 at 78 and held as
follows:
“The nominal damages referred to
by Ollennu J. (as he then was)
does not mean that the claimant
should be awarded just a trivial
sum. It is called nominal
because on the face of it the
claim is being made under the
heading special damages, while
in reality he is being awarded
damages at the court’s own
discretion. For in making some
award on failure to prove the
value, the court is expected to
have regard to the pre- and
post-accident value of the
property, and the figure to be
awarded must be a reasonably
fair approximation of the
pre-damaged value of the
property.”
26.
Counsel for the respondent also
referred us to the Court of
Appeal case of Hullblyth Gh
Ltd v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd
[2013] 59 G.M.J 89 at 111-112
and this court’s decision
authored by Twum JSC in
Delmas Agencies Gh Ltd v Food
Distributors Int’l Ltd
[2007-2008] SCGLR 748 where
both courts held that
substantial nominal damages was
payable in event of failure to
prove special damages.
27.
Our own research has revealed
two other cases decided by the
Supreme Court, all incidentally
authored by Twum JSC in which a
similar legal proposition was
made.
In the case of Attorney
General v Faroe Atlantic
Co. Limited [2005-2006] SCGLR
271
Twum JSC, explaining the law on
the award of general and special
damages at page 290 of the
report made the following
statement:
“My Lords, in my view, a claim
for damages for breach of
contract will entitle the
plaintiff to nominal damages
only unless the plaintiff gives
particulars of special damage.
No particulars of general damage
are ever ordered”.
Again, in Youngdong
Industries Ltd v RoRo Services
[2005-2006] SCGLR 816 at 839
his lordship reiterated his
proposition on nominal damages
as follows:
“The
Plaintiff, as it has been
pointed out, claimed general
damages. General damage is such
as the law will presume to be
the natural or probable
consequence of the Defendant’s
act. It arises by inference of
the law and therefore need not
be proved by evidence and may be
averred generally. I accept that
the detention of the Plaintiff’s
goods between 26th
March 1994 and 29th
July 1994 when the Defendant
purported to hold them on behalf
of the original Co-Defendant
infringed the Plaintiff’s right
of possession of the goods. The
law implies general damage in
every infringement of an
absolute right. I will award the
Plaintiff nominal damages which
I assess at ¢50,000,000.00”.
In
Delmas Agencies Gh Ltd v Food
Distributors Int’l Ltd (supra)
Twum JSC
observed that where the
plaintiff has suffered a
properly quantifiable loss, he
must plead specifically his loss
and prove it strictly. Where the
plaintiff fails to prove the
measure of damages, “the law
implies general damage in every
infringement of an absolute
right. The catch is that only
nominal damages are awarded”.
28.
Later decisions of this court
delivered after Twum JSC led
hypothesis on nominal damages
made a volte-face on the
proposition that where special
damages is not proved, then the
quantum of damages to be awarded
would be nominal damages which
should be substantial. The apex
court did not follow the
reasoning behind the awards in
the earlier cases. The court,
rather, seized the opportunity
to formulate the correct
position of the law. In the case
of Lizori Ltd v Boye & School
of Domestic Science & Catering
[2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 889,
also referred to us by counsel
for the appellant, the Court of
Appeal awarded the plaintiff
Ghc10,000 being ten percent of
the whole contract sum as
nominal damages. On appeal Benin
JSC speaking on behalf of the
Court did not mince words at all
in saying that nominal damages
as the name implies must not be
huge or substantial since its
main purpose is to vindicate the
right of the successful party in
the action. The Court quoted a
passage from McGregor on Damages
(18th ed) paragraph
10-006 where the learned author
said that in England, the range
awarded for nominal damages by
the courts over the years is
between £1 and £5. The Court
then reduced the award from
Ghc10,000 to Ghc1,000.
29.
The other case is Birim Wood
Complex Ltd v Andreas Bschor
GMBH & Co. Kg [2016-2017] 1 GLR
194. In this case, in
assessing damages on appeal,
Pwamang JSC expounded the
position of the law on award of
nominal damages at page 214 as
follows:
“The settled position of the law
is that General Damages are at
large, meaning the court will
award a reasonable amount having
regard of the circumstances of
the case. A court may award
nominal damages under General
Damages where no real loss has
been occasioned by the
infringement of a right, or
award substantial damages where
actual loss has been caused to
the plaintiff.”
These later decisions are
clearly inconsistent with the
position taken earlier by this
court. Somehow, the later cases
did not cite the three cases
propounded by Twum JSC and did
not depart from them. Not
surprisingly, courts lower than
this court continued to apply
the proposition that where a
party is unable to prove special
damages but has suffered
substantial damages in tort or
in contract, substantial nominal
damages would be awarded as held
by the Court of Appeal in this
appeal. And why not? Because the
settled principle is where a
lower court is faced with two
conflicting decisions of a
higher court, the lower court
may choose which one to follow
or none. This choice is what has
bedeviled our lower courts for a
decade, majority opting for the
Twum JSC proposition. We think
this appeal has afforded us the
timeous opportunity to liberate
all courts from the shackles of
this confusion and to restate
the correct legal position in
tandem with the common law. We
find ourselves in entire
agreement with the views
expounded by our learned
brothers Benin and Pwamang
JJSC’s in
Lizori Ltd v Boye & School of
Domestic Science & Catering
and
Birim Wood Complex Ltd v Andreas
Bschor GMBH & Co. Kg
respectively (supra).
30.
A good starting point is the
distinction (if any) between
general damages and nominal
damages. According to Black's
Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009),
general damages are what the law
presumes follow from the type of
wrong or harm complained of and
need not to be specifically
claimed. In the absence of proof
of special damages, general
damages are what the law will
give a person who has suffered
actual loss or injury or has
suffered a tort or breach of
contract but
has suffered no significant
losses because of such
breach. They are usually damages
at large and can be substantial
or small (nominal) depending on
the circumstances of each case.
Types of damages which can be
classified under the broad
headline of general damages are
Nominal Damages, Substantial
Damages, Aggravated and
Parasitic Damages, Exemplary
Damages, and
Incidental/Consequential
Damages. The list is not
exhaustive. Any of these
classifications can be awarded
by the court when exercising its
jurisdiction to award general
damages depending on the facts,
evidence, and circumstances of
each case.
31.
In the case of nominal damages,
Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.
2009), explains
are a trifling or small amount
of money awarded to a plaintiff
when a breach of contract
or legal wrong is suffered but
when there is no substantial
loss or injury to be
compensated. The practical
significance of a judgment for
nominal damages is that the
plaintiff’s legal right is
vindicated, giving the
plaintiff, in, effect, a moral
victory. The judgment has the
effect of a declaration of legal
rights and may deter future
infringements or may enable the
plaintiff to obtain an
injunction to restrain a
repetition of the wrong. The
obtaining of nominal damages
will also, in many cases,
entitle a plaintiff to costs.
See Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th
Edition Vol. 12 par. 1104-1114;
Murray on Contracts 5th
Edition page 753 & 791 and
Chitty on Contracts 13th
Edition Vol 1 pages 1601-1603.
32.
Based on our research, the
correct proposition of the law
governing the award of nominal
damages as part of general
damages may be restated as
follows: Whenever a court is
exercising its jurisdiction to
award damages, it may award
special damages, if a party
pleads it and leads evidence to
specifically prove that it has
suffered that loss and expended
money as a result. Where the
party fails to prove the
specific loss by evidence but
can prove that it has suffered
an injury or loss, the law will
presume general damages, but the
classification under that head
of damage which the court should
award is substantial damages
i.e., the result of an effort at
measured compensation. On the
contrary, where a party succeeds
in proving by evidence that
there is a breach of contract or
an interference with a right but
has suffered no actual injury,
loss or damage, a court
exercising the power to award
general damages should grant the
classification known as nominal
damages. This re-statement of
the law to the extent that it
conflicts with that part of
decisions of this court in
Attorney General v Faroe
Atlantic
Co. Limited
(supra),
Youngdong Industries Ltd v RoRo
Services
(supra) and
Delmas Agencies Gh Ltd v Food
Distributors Int’l Ltd (supra)
and
all other previous decisions
on classification of nominal
damages as substantial awards
made when special damages are
not proved are overruled. This
implies that this court has
departed from that position by
virtue of
the powers vested in us by
article 129 (3) of the
Constitution.
This is a significant public
policy development because the
misdescription of damages as
nominal instead of substantial
and the award of huge sums under
wrong categorization could work
an injustice to potential
litigants who risk the danger of
having their genuine awards
reversed on appeal because of
the wrong labelling and
misapplication of the award.
33.
In this appeal, the Court of
Appeal concluded that the
respondent did not lead any
positive evidence to prove the
cost of the yams and therefore
had failed to prove special
damages. The Court, rightly in
our view, concluded that though
the respondent could not prove
special damages, the evidence
led in support of the
unwholesome yams arose from the
appellant’s negligence. The
Court, further, held that the
fact that the respondent lost
the yams would entitle it to
damages sufficient to compensate
the respondent for the loss of
the goods. However, it is the
categorization of that type of
damages as nominal damages and
the award of US$30,000.00 for
that description that the Court
of Appeal misapplied the law
resulting in the formulation of
this ground of appeal. The award
of compensation for loss or
damage cannot under any
circumstances be nominal.
Further, the award of the sum of
US$30,000.00 out of a claim for
US$46,350.00 cannot, by any
stretch of legal imagination, be
nominal. In our view, the Court
of Appeal wrongly labelled the
award of the US$30,000.00 as
nominal damages. This ought to
be corrected. While we agree
with the submission of the
appellant that US$30,000.00
awarded the respondent and
labelled as “nominal damages”
was totally wrong, we differ
from the appellant’s submission
that the respondent is not
entitled to substantial damages
for the loss of the yams carried
by the appellant to its
destination in the United States
of America. We differ because it
has been proved that the
appellant was negligent when in
the absence of respondent, it
transferred the yams into
another container and thereby
caused damage to the
respondent’s cargo of yams
resulting in loss of income or
profit. In any case, the
appellant in this appeal is not
attacking the finding on
liability but the quantum of
damages awarded as “nominal
damages”. Since we have
concluded that the respondent is
entitled to damages but the
nomenclature under which the
Court of Appeal granted damages
is erroneous, we find this
ground of appeal also
unmeritorious and same is
dismissed.
GROUNDS 3(i), (ii) and 3 (iii)
OF THE RESPONDENT’S CROSS
APPEAL-SPECIAL DAMAGES:
34.
The respondent has
cross-appealed for the sum of
US$12,637.86 being special
damages awarded by the trial
court and found by the Court of
Appeal to have been proved at
the trial but was not awarded by
the intermediate appellate
court. The amount is made up of
US$11,453.36 being freight,
clearing and handling charges
paid to the appellant and
US$1,184.50 cost of fumigation.
At page 293 of the record, the
Court of Appeal held that the
respondent was able to prove the
payment to appellant of
US$11,453.36 and cost of
fumigation of US$1,184.50
totaling US$12,637.86 but could
not prove the actual cost of the
yams it lost. However, in
awarding damages at the end of
the judgment, the Court of
Appeal stated that the
respondent is entitled to
nominal damages but not special
damages for the cost of the
yams. The Court then went ahead
to award nominal damages of
US$30,000.00 to the respondent.
It is this final order omitting
special damages earlier
acknowledged which prompted this
cross-appeal.
35.
In the case of Royal Dutch
Airlines (KLM) and Another v.
Farmex Ltd (1989-90) GLR 266,
a case cited by the parties, the
Supreme Court held as follows:
“with regard to the measure of
damages for breach of contract,
the principle adopted by the
courts was restitution ad
interregnum, thus, if the
plaintiff has suffered damage,
not too remote he must, as far
as money could do so, be
restored to the position he
would have been in, had that
particular damage not occurred.
What was needed to put the
plaintiffs in the position they
would have been in was
sufficient money to compensate
them for what they had lost.”
36.
In the case of special damages,
the law is clear that it must be
specifically proved and aimed at
compensating the affected person
for actual loss suffered. Thus,
in the case of Ekow Essuman
(Deceased) Subst. By Ruth
Essuman (Mrs) Bodja Essuman &
Nana Asare Bediako and Aboso
Goldfields Limited; (Civil
Appeal
No. J4/39/2019 SC
dated 11th December
2019; Unreported)
Gbadegbe JSC speaking on behalf
of the court expounded.
“it is observed that as the
claims are derived from a
contract and most of the heads
of damage are in respect of
specific sums of money that are
computable by arithmetic
calculation and the right
thereto arose before the
termination of the contract,
they are in their nature special
damages save the claim for
general damages for breach of
contract. In the circumstances,
better practice required such
claims to have been designated
as such and all the monetary
claims made under one relief
with particulars of the separate
amounts being provided. For
example, going by the action
herein, the amount being claimed
as cost of tailings and the
outstanding balance for haulage
and the consequential loss of
profits would have been lumped
together as a claim for special
damages.”
37.
So strict is the rule construed
that the failure of the
plaintiff may prevent him from
leading evidence at the trial on
same as was said in the cases of
Ilkin v Samuels [1963] 2 All
ER 879, 886 and Hayward
and Another v Pullinger and
Partners Limited [1950] 1 All ER
581, 582 and concurred in by
the learned authors of Atkin’s
Court Forms, 2nd Edition, Volume
32 as follows:
“Where, however, the plaintiff
claims that he has suffered
special damage, such damage must
be alleged with particulars in
his statement of claim, or he
will not be permitted to lead
evidence of it at the trial.”
38.
It is the appellant’s
contention that the respondent
did not plead special damages by
particularizing same as mandated
by law, and, therefore, is not
entitled to it as illustrated in
the case of Delmas Agency
Company Ltd v. Food Distribution
Company Ltd. (supra). The
respondent, however, contended
that it submitted Exhibit “C”
(delivery order found at pages
207-209 of the record) and
Exhibit “IC” (fumigation cost
found at page 209 of the
record), showing proof for the
payment of the freight and other
incidental costs as well as
fumigation cost. Prior to the
evidence, respondent had pleaded
the freight, clearing and
handling charges in paragraph
26(1) of its statement of claim.
Though not individually
particularized, it was lumped
together with the other heads.
Thus, the appellant was put on
notice from the commencement of
the trial that respondent
intended to make a claim for
freight, clearing and other
handling charges. Respondent was
able to supply cogent evidence
at the trial to prove the costs
involved in the freight and
other incidental cost (USD
11,453.36), fumigation cost (USD
1,184.50) without any serious
challenge from the Appellant.
39.
Thus, the learned justices of
the Court of Appeal having
reviewed the evidence and
satisfied themselves that that
leg of special damages was
proved as held by them, were
bound by law to award the sum to
the respondent or give legal
justification for not awarding
that sum. The Court of Appeal by
some oversight did not include
that leg of special damages in
its awards. We think it is an
oversight because no reasons
were given for the failure after
the court had categorically
dealt with it and found it to be
proven in its judgment. It is
the duty of this court to
correct the oversight and in the
interest of justice award that
sum to the respondent.
40.
We have taken a second look at
the total sum of US$46,350.00
claimed by the respondent in
this action. The trial court
awarded the respondent the total
sum even though at the end of
the evidence the actual special
damages proved was the
US$12,637.86. When this sum is
deducted from the original
claim, an amount of US$33,712.14
was outstanding as the possible
value of the yams. The High
Court awarded this sum as well
to the respondent. On appeal to
the Court of Appeal, the special
damages of US$33,712.14 in so
far as it represented the value
of the yams was set aside. This
is how the Court of Appeal put
it at pages 293-295 of the
record:
“The plaintiff was able to
establish the payment to Maersk
for USD11,435.36, cost of
fumigation USD1,184.50 totaling
USD12,637.86. This they deducted
from their claim of USD46, (350)
and had a balance of USD33,712,
(14) saying that is the cost of
yams. We do not think the
plaintiff by this method had
established the actual cost of
the yams she lost……Much as we
believe plaintiff lost some yams
and deserve damages, we do not
think plaintiff has been able to
establish the amount of USD46,
(350).00 as specific damages.”
41.
The Court of Appeal, then,
purported to re-assess the
damages and awarded the
respondent US$30,000.00 which it
termed, nominal damages. The
Supreme Court had some fifty
years ago in Bressah v.
Asante & Another [1965] 1 GLR
117 stated the circumstances
under which an appellate court
would interfere with an award of
damages by a lower court in the
following words:
“An appellate court would only
interfere with the quantum of
damages on the ground that the
trial judge acted upon some
wrong principle of law or that
the amount awarded was so
extremely high or so very small
as to make it an erroneous
estimate”.
42.
The Court of Appeal found that
the trial court erred when it
awarded special damages even
though there was no evidence to
back it. The Court of Appeal in
assessing its own damages was
magnanimous in awarding
respondent the sum of
US$30,000.00. If this sum is
added to the US$12,637.86
special damages proved by the
respondent, the total award in
its favour would come to
US$42,637.86 short of a little
below US$4,000.00 to make up its
total claim of US$46,350.00.
Since we have awarded the
respondent the US$12,637.86 it
proved, it is our opinion that
confirming the entire amount
awarded by the Court of Appeal
would be on the high side
especially the failure of the
respondent to lead evidence to
prove the total loss.
Accordingly, we shall review the
US$30,000.00 damages awarded by
the Court of Appeal to
US$20,000.00 substantial
damages. Having now awarded the
respondent US$12,637.86 as
special damages and US$20,000.00
substantial damages under
general damages for the loss of
the yams, we do not think the
respondent is entitled to
another award of general damages
of the Ghc10,000.00 classified
and awarded by the Court of
Appeal. This award formed the
basis of ground of appeal
3(iii). We, accordingly, set
aside the award of Ghc20,000.00
by the trial court as well as
the reviewed quantum of
Ghc10,000.00 general damages and
dismiss this ground of appeal.
43.
In conclusion, we dismiss the
appeal of the appellant. We also
dismiss the cross-appeal ground
3(iii) of the respondent’s
cross-appeal but allow ground
3(i) of the cross appeal. We
review the damages awarded by
the trial court and the Court of
Appeal to read as follows:
a.
The respondent is awarded the
sum of US$12,637.86 or its Ghana
Cedis equivalent being special
damages for freight, clearing
and handling charges including
fumigation.
b.
The respondent is awarded
general damages to the tune of
US$20,000.00 or its Ghana Cedis
equivalent as compensation for
loss suffered by it for the
damage to the yams.
c.
The sums awarded shall attract
simple interest at the
prevailing bank rate or failing
that the 91-day treasury bill
rate from 1st
February 2010 till date of
payment. For the avoidance of
doubt, the 91-day treasury bill
rate shall be the rate existing
on 27th June 2013.
d.
The respondent shall be entitled
to costs of this appeal.
N. A. AMEGATCHER
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
ANIN
YEBOAH
(CHIEF JUSTICE)
S. K. MARFUL-SAU
(JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT)
M. OWUSU (MS)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT)
I.O.
TANKO AMADU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
O. K. OSAFO BUABENG FOR THE
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/APPELLANT.
EZIUCHE NWOSU FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT. |
