Criminal law
– Conspiracy to commit Robbery
- Robbery -
Identification parade -Whether
or not the identification
parade was not regularly and
properly done according to laid
down procedure - Hearsay
evidence - Sections 23 (1) and
149 of the Criminal and Other
Offences Act, 1960 Act 29
HEADNOTES
The
complainant, a businessman, was
violently attacked at his home
at Lotto Kiosk, Adenta in Accra
by a group of about six armed
robbers. At the time of the
attack, the complainant was in
the house with his fiancé, his
daughter, his house boy, and his
driver, three of the robbers
broke through his kitchen door
with a big block and ordered him
at gun point to bring his money
and dollars. The robbers
threatened to kill him if he
didn’t give them the money.
Apart from the three robbers who
entered his premises through the
kitchen, in his evidence he
recounted that there were other
robbers on the compound because
the robbers in his kitchen were
communicating with others
outside. He was able to
recognize the first accused
person Mammoud Mohammed at the
time of the robbery and
subsequently at an
identification parade as one of
the robbers who attacked him The
Appellant upon arraignment,
pleaded not guilty, and after
trial in which the prosecution
called four witnesses , the
appellant opened his defence by
testifying whereupon, the
learned trial Judge evaluated
the case against the appellant,
convicted him and the others and
thereupon sentenced the
appellant to 40 years I.H.L
Feeling aggrieved by the
conviction and sentence of 40
years that was slapped on him,
the appellant appealed both the
conviction and sentence to the
Court of Appeal Feeling still
aggrieved by the decision of the
Court of Appeal, the appellant
yet again appealed that decision
to the Supreme Court.
HELD
We
are of the considered opinion
that even though learned counsel
for the appellant has not
specifically appealed against
sentence, the mere fact that,
this is an appeal against
conviction in a criminal case
automatically called in aid the
provisions of Section 30 (a)
(ii) of the Courts Act, Act 459,
Having taken all the prevailing
circumstances of this case into
consideration, there appears to
us, to be no justifiable and
verifiable reason why the
sentence of 40 years imposed by
the trial High Court and
confirmed by the Court of Appeal
should be disturbed. We
accordingly maintain the
sentence of 40 years I.H.L on
the appellant On the basis of
the above analysis, we are of
the considered view that no
real, genuine or substantial
grounds have been urged on us to
overturn the judgment of the
Court of Appeal. We accordingly
dismiss this appeal in its
entirety as grossly incompetent
and in its place affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeal
dated 27th March
2015.
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
CASES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
C.O.P. v
Afari and Adoo [1962] 1 GLR 483
State v Yao
Boahene [1963] 2 GLR 554
Kwashie and
Another v The Republic (1971)
GLR 448
R v Turnbull
and Others (1977) QB 224,
Adu Boahene v
The Republic [1972] 1 GLR 70 CA
BOOKS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
N.E. Amissah’s Book, “Criminal
Procedure in Ghana
The Criminal
Law Handbook 13th
Edition”
by
Bergman and Berman
Phipson on
Evidence, 15th
Edition
DELIVERING
THE LEADING JUDGMENT
DOTSE, JSC
COUNSEL
NKRABEAH
EFFAH DARTEH FOR THE APPELLANT.
ELIZABETH
SACYFIO, SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY
FOR THE RESPONDENT.
THE UNANIMOUS
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IS READ BY
DOTSE JSC, AS FOLLOWS-:
DOTSE JSC
This is an
appeal by the appellant against
the unanimous judgment of the
Court of Appeal, coram: Kanyoke
(of blessed memory), Mariama
Owusu and Cecilia Sowah (Mrs)
JJA, dated the 27th
day of March 2015 wherein an
appeal by the appellant against
the High Court decision dated
14th day of October,
2011 which convicted him among
others of the offences of
Conspiracy to commit Robbery
and
Robbery
contrary
to Sections 23 (1) and 149 of
the Criminal and Other Offences
Act, 1960 Act 29 was
dismissed by the Court of Appeal
Out of
abundance of caution, the
following are the statements of
offence and particulars of the
two counts that the appellant
was tried and convicted upon by
the High Court, presided over by
Quist J on 14th
October 2011.
COUNT ONE
STATEMENT OF
OFFENCE
Conspiracy to
Rob: Contrary to Section 23 (1)
and 149 of The Criminal Offences
Act, 1960 (Act 29)
Particulars
of Offence
(1)
Mamoud
Mohammed
(2) Ayitey Sackey (3) Richard
Boahene Quaye (4) Yintimani
Saman @PDD @ Burger (5) Ahmed
Tijani @ Charles Taylor for that
you on or about the 25th
day of February, 2008 at Adenta
Lotto Kiosk in the Greater Accra
region and within the
jurisdiction of this court did
conspire or agreed together with
a common purpose to commit crime
to wit robbery.
COUNT TWO
Robbery:
Contrary to Section 149 (1) of
the Criminal Offences Act, 1960
(Act 29)
Particulars
of Offence
(2)
Mamoud
Mohammed
(2) Ayitey Sackey (3) Richard
Boahene Quaye (4) Yintimani
Saman @PDD @ Burger (5) Ahmed
Tijani @ Charles Taylor for that
you on or about the 25th
day of February, 2008 at Adenta
Lotto Kiosk in the Greater Accra
region and within the
jurisdiction of this court did
use force and attack one Alex
Adu a businessman resident in
Adenta with cutlass and robbed
him of one lap top computer
valued at GH ˘1,500.00, 40 inch
Plasma Television set valued
GH˘4,000, six mobile phones
valued at GH˘2,300, one Sony
digital camera valued GH˘400 and
cash the sum of GH˘12,300 all
totaling GH˘20,500.
FACTS OF THE
CASE
The
complainant, Mr. Alex Adu (PWI)
a businessman, was violently
attacked at his home on
25/2/2008 at Lotto Kiosk, Adenta
in Accra by a group of about six
armed robbers. At the time of
the attack, PWI Alex Adu was in
the house with his fiancé, Janet
Otchere (PW2), his daughter, his
house boy, Atta Kwabena (PW3)
and his driver, Kwasi Adjei
@Farouk.
Three of the
robbers broke through his
kitchen door with a big block
and ordered him at gun point to
bring his money and dollars. The
robbers threatened to kill him
if he didn’t give them the
money.
PWI led the
three robbers to his boy
quarters where he collected an
amount of about 19,500.00 old
Ghana Cedis from his houseboy
Atta Kwabena (PW3) and gave it
to them. Not satisfied they
marched them back to his bedroom
where he was ordered to lie flat
on the floor whilst they took
his laptop, watches, a
television set, six mobile
phones and other electrical
equipments.
Apart
from the three robbers who
entered his premises through the
kitchen, PW1 in his evidence
recounted that there were other
robbers on the compound because
the robbers in his kitchen were
communicating with others
outside. PW1 was able to
recognize the first accused
person Mammoud Mohammed at the
time of the robbery and
subsequently at an
identification parade
as one of the robbers who
attacked him. During the
robbery they beat up the house
boy, PW3, Atta Kwabena and used
the butt of the gun to hit the
head of PW1 resulting in a cut
on his forehead which sent him
on the floor rendering him
semi-unconscious. The robbers
took PW1 for dead and left him
bleeding in a pool of blood in
the room and went about
ransacking his house.
PW1 regained
consciousness after a time and
got up from the floor, jumped
his fence wall and escaped to a
neighbour’s house. During the
robbery, the first accused
person, Mammoud Mohammed (who
is the appellant herein) and
the third accused person Richard
Boahene Quaye entered PW2 Janet
Otchere’s room and the third
accused person ordered her to
show him all the rooms in the
house. After that the third
accused person sent her to the
living room where she was
alleged to have been raped at
gunpoint. After that the first
accused person, Mammoud who was
holding a laptop he had taken
from the house, loaded stuffs of
stolen items into PW2‘s bag
which he took from the house.
The appellant was also alleged
to have entered the room of PW2,
Janet Otchere and raped her.
Janet Otchere recognized and
identified the first accused
person and the third accused
person as the ones who raped her
during the robbery. She
subsequently identified them to
the police at an identification
parade, as the ones who
committed the robbery. The
houseboy, PW3 Atta Kwabena, also
testified that during the
robbery, the second accused
person, Ayitey Sackey, climbed
and stood on the fence wall of
the house and acted as a
security for the intruders.
He also
identified the first accused
person, Mammoud and the fifth
accused person Ahmed Tijani
among the robbers who attacked
them during the robbery.
He said
during the robbery the fifth
accused person used a big stone
to break into the Kitchen door
after which the first accused
person Mammoud, broke into PW1’s
bedroom and ransacked the room.
ARRAIGNMENT,
TRIAL, CONVICTION AND SENTENCE
BY HIGH COURT
The Appellant
upon arraignment, pleaded not
guilty, and after trial in which
the prosecution called four
witnesses , the appellant opened
his defence by testifying
whereupon, the learned trial
Judge evaluated the case against
the appellant, convicted him and
the others and thereupon
sentenced the appellant to 40
years I.H.L.
Concluding the evaluation of the
summary of the evidence, this is
what the learned trial Judge
stated by way of his concluding
remarks on the offences with
which the appellant was charged.
EVALUATION OF
EVIDENCE AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
BY TRIAL HIGH COURT JUDGE
“PW1 Alex
Adu, the victim of the robbery
said on 25/2/2008 around 2 am,
three armed robbers wielding
guns violently entered his
kitchen and attached him with
the butt of a gun. He sustained
a cut on his forehead.
They took his
laptop, camera, watches, money
and other electrical gadgets.
When he fell on the floor and
was bleeding, one of the robbers
stood on him with a gun on his
head whilst two of the robbers
rushed into his bedroom and used
a six inch block to break into
his bedroom. They ransacked his
bedroom. He recognized the
first accused `person Mammoud
among the robbers who attacked
him that night.
PW2 Janet
Otchere, a fiancé of PW1 who was
at home at the time of the
robbery, testified that during
the robbery she was in her room
when she heard the robbers
shouting:-
“give me the
car keys, gun and dollars” and
her boyfried PW1 said “ I don’t
have any money on me please.”
“Two of the
robbers, the first accused
person, Mammound, and the third
accused Richard Quaye entered
her room and raped her in turns
before escaping with a lot of
stolen items. Thus if two or
more persons agree or act
together for a common purpose
such as robbery, they are guilty
of conspiracy to rob. In the
present case, during the
robbery, PW1 said the robbers
were communicating with others
outside; PWI was attacked on his
forehead with a gun by one of
the robbers, his houseboy PW3
was beaten up; the robbers stole
money and other valuables from
him at gunpoint; the second
accused person, Ayittey, stood
on the fence wall and acted as a
sentry during the robbery and
PW2, PW1’s girlfriend was raped
by the first and third accused
persons. Thus the robbers acted
together in a coordinated
fashion to rob PW1 and his
family. In
C.O.P. v
Afari and Adoo [1962] 1 GLR 483
the Supreme Court held that:
“It is rare
in conspiracy for there to be
direct evidence of the agreement
which is the gist of the crime.
This usually has to be proved by
existence of subsequent acts,
done in concert and so
indicating a previous agreement.
There is here, clear, ample and
affirmative evidence of the
conspiracy in addition to the
evidence of the completed
offence.”
In the
circumstances of the instant
case, the prosecution
established that the first,
second and third accused persons
acted together to rob PWI and
his household. The Supreme Court
in State
v Yao Boahene [1963] 2 GLR 554
held that:-
(4)
“Where
it is found that there is a
conspiracy, each conspirator
becomes the agent of the other
conspirators, any overt act
committed by any one of the
conspirators is sufficient on
the general principles of agency
to make it an act of all the
conspirators.”
INSTANCES
NARRATED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE TO
INDICATE THAT THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES PROPERLY IDENTIFIED
APPELLANT
“From the
numerous and long encounters
between the robbers and the
prosecution witnesses during the
robbery, the first second and
third accused persons
particularly exposed themselves
to the PW1, PW2 and PW3. PW1
saw and recognized the first
accused person among the robbers
on the night of the robbery. He
was able to identify him at an
identification parade at the
Police Headquarters and also in
court.”
The
concluding factual remarks of
the learned trial Judge put the
involvement and identification
of the appellant beyond doubt in
the following terms:-
“From the
totality of the evidence adduced
in this case there was
sufficient evidence on record
from the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses to
establish the identities of the
accused persons by the numerous
encounters and occurrences
between PWI, PW2, and PW3 and
the accused persons during the
robbery that occurred at Adenta
on 25/2/2008. The encounters
were prolonged enough for the
prosecution witnesses to
distinctly observe and recognize
the accused persons as the
perpetrators of the robbery. The
first, second and third accused
persons are each convicted on
both counts of the offences of
robbery levelled against them.
In passing sentence, I will be
guided by the dictum of the
Court of Appeal in
Kwashie
and Another v The Republic
(1971) GLR 448, where it
was held that:-
“2. Since the
offence was of a very grave
nature, the sentence must not
only have been punitive but it
must also have been a deterrent
or exemplary in order to mark
the disapproval of society of
such conduct…”
APPEAL OF
APPELLANT
Feeling
aggrieved by the conviction and
sentence of 40 years that was
slapped on him, the appellant
appealed both the conviction and
sentence to the Court of Appeal.
APPEAL TO
COURT OF APPEAL AND ITS
DISMISSAL
Unfortunately, the Court of
Appeal, in substance also
dismissed the appeal against
conviction and sentence as per
the following words of Kanyoke
J.A.
“According to
the trial judge, the strong
evidence adduced by the
prosecution was sufficient or
strong enough to debunk the
accused person’s plea of alibi.
He then
proceeded to narrate, analyse
and evaluate that “strong
evidence” of the prosecution and
concluded at page 454 of the ROA
just as has already been quoted
at length by the concluding
remarks of the trial Judge
referred to supra.
Continuing,
the learned Judges of the Court
of Appeal, per Kanyoke JA,
stated as follows:-
“We have
taken the trouble to very
carefully read, examine and
critically analyse, and study
the entire record of appeal
and we have come to the
inevitable conclusion that the
findings and conclusions made
by the trial Judge in the
passage quoted supra are amply
and reasonably supported by the
evidence on record. Even
though we have ruled as
inadmissible or wrongly admitted
the hearsay assertions of Markus
Tekpah contained in the evidence
of PW5- the police informant, we
are satisfied that there is
overwhelming evidence on the
record to prove beyond all
reasonable doubt the identities
of A1 and A3 as persons among
the six persons who raided the
house of PWI on 25/2/2008 at
night and stole his movable
properties with violence and at
gun point. We find and
conclude that despite the wrong
admission in evidence of that
hearsay
evidence and the failure of
the trial Judge to consider or
adequately consider the evidence
of DWI and DW2, we are
satisfied that there has been no
miscarriage of justice in the
conviction and sentence of
A1 and A2 for the offence of
conspiracy to rob and robbery
contrary to Sections 23 (1) and
149, and 149 of Act 29/60 as
amended.”
With the
above words, the Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal against
both the conviction and sentence
of the appellant by the High
Court.
APPEAL TO
SUPREME COURT
Feeling still
aggrieved by the decision of the
Court of Appeal, the appellant
yet again appealed that decision
to the Supreme Court.
In this
court, this is the Notice and
ground of appeal that was filed.
GROUNDS OF
APPEAL
-
Part of
the decision complained of
The Ruling of
the Court of Appeal dismissing
the appeal
-
Grounds
of Appeal
i.
The Court of
Appeal erred very serenity in
law in not upholding our
objections to the identification
process
-
Reliefs
being sought
To acquit and
discharge the Appellant
-
Persons
Directly Affected by the
Appeal;
STATEMENTS OF
CASE OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR BOTH
APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT
We have
apprized ourselves of the
statements of case filed by
learned Counsel for the
appellant, Nkrabeah Effah Dartey
and the learned Senior State
Attorney, Elizabeth Sackeyfio
(Mrs).
The crux of
the statement of case filed on
behalf of the appellant dealt
mainly on the issue of the
Police Identification or Lineup
that was held to identify the
appellant to the crime
simpliciter. Learned counsel for
the appellant relied on Justice
A. N.E.
Amissah’s Book, “Criminal
Procedure in Ghana” page 41,
where the learned author stated
as follows:-
41-“Wherever
it appears necessary to identify
an accused, or suspected person
by giving a potential witness
the opportunity to pick him out
from a number of persons an
identification parade is held.
The suspect is placed in a
line together with others at a
position chosen by himself.
Then the witness is brought on
the scene and asked whether he
can point out the suspect from
the line.” Emphasis supplied.
Referring
also to instruction 2 (b) of the
Police Standing Order 195 which
was also referred to by the
learned author Justice Amissah
in his book and which states as
follows:-
“The parade
shall consist of at least eight
persons as far as possible of
similar age, height, general
appearance and class of life as
the suspect. The suspect shall
be asked whether he has any
objection to any of the persons
forming the parade or to the
arrangement made…”Emphasis
Learned
Counsel for the appellant then
argued the ground of appeal
referred to supra.
Counsel for
the appellant, Nkrabeah Effah
Darteh, rightly in our view on
this point listed the following
which we have amended as the key
indicators that must be present
in any proper identification
parade or lineup as per the
relevant operating guidelines on
lineup identification.
1.
There must be the need to hold
an identification parade to
identify the suspect as a key
person in committing the crime.
2.
The suspect must have chosen
where he wants to stand in the
line or parade.
3.
There must be at least eight
persons
4.
Each of the persons must be as
nearly of the same height and of
general appearance as the
suspect.
5.
The suspect shall be asked
whether he has any objection to
the persons who have been lined
up with him to conduct the
identification.
Based on the
above indicators, learned
counsel for the appellant, then
made the following misguided
statement in his statement of
case without proof as follows:-
“Per the
requirements of the law, my
Lords, Why did the Police hold
an identification parade? Was
the Accused asked or made to
CHOOSE where he wants to stand
in the line? How many persons
were paraded? Were they of equal
height and build as the suspect?
Was the suspect given any
opportunity to agree to those he
was being paraded with?
Where can we
find answers to these mandatory
questions? Short of them, how
can we, or for that matter, the
court of competent jurisdiction
RELY on a so call
“Identification Parade” as a
“Properly held identification
parade.”
Learned
counsel for the appellant, then
made a rhetorical statement as
follows:-
“ I strongly
urge you, Supreme Court, to hold
that in a criminal trial where
appellant is facing 40 years
IHl, this roughshod is “illegal”
so called identification parade
cannot be said to be in
conformity with the law and must
therefore be shot down as null,
void and ineffectual.”
We have
combed through the record of
appeal to find whether there are
any grounds for the said
statements and conclusions.
What must be
noted is that, it is the duty of
learned counsel to try to elicit
evidence through
cross-examination especially of
the Investigator of the case who
must have conducted the
Identification or lineup.
The crux of
the complaint of learned counsel
for the appellant appears to be
two fold.
1.
That the complainant and his
girlfriend, PWI and PW2 were
given an unfair advantage by
going to visit him earlier on at
the Police Hospital.
This
particular fact had been
rendered moot by the same
learned counsel when he relied
on a statement made by Kanyoke
JA in the Court of Appeal
judgment referred to supra as
follows:-
“The learned
Judge held as a fact that even
though the PW1 and PW2 did visit
the Appellant at the Police
Hospital, it was much later
after the identification
parade.”
If indeed,
learned counsel agrees with the
above statement, then it is
consistent with common sense and
the position of the learned
Senior State Attorney in her
erudite statement of case.
This is so
because, if really the
identification parade was held
before PWI and PW2 did visit the
appellant at the Police
Hospital, then wherein lies the
collusion and the undue
advantage.
The issues
raised in this appeal resolve
around what really are the
common pretrial identification
procedures that are used to
identify culprits or suspects.
In the US for
example, three methods are
normally used to identify
suspects in a crime. These are:-
1.
Lineups -
which we call
in Ghana Identification. This
consists typically of five to
six people, in which case one is
the suspect while the others may
be other persons i.e. Police
Officers or other “decoys”
who bear a resemblance to the
suspect or fit the description
that the eye witnesses have
given to the Police.
Generally, a lineup is held by
the Police after they have made
an arrest.
2.
Showups –
This is a one on one
identification procedure, where
the eyewitness views a single
suspect perhaps at a Police
Station or sometimes at a crime
scene. Again, the Police will
generally conduct a showup after
they have identified and
arrested a possibly guilty
suspect. This procedure is not
commonly used in Ghana.
3.
Photo
Identifications:-
This procedure calls for
eyewitnesses to view
photographs, typically head
shots in a police department’s
files. This is resorted to when
the Police do not have enough
information to make an arrest.
The
eyewitnesses’s positive
identification of a suspect’s
photo is what allows the Police
to make an arrest. It should
also be noted that, quite apart
from using the above procedures
to identify a suspect, it is
also available to clear a
suspect, if for example an
eyewitness fails to make a
positive identification at a
lineup, the Police will have to
release the suspect.
Reference Pages 97-98 of the
13th
Edition of
“The
Criminal Law Handbook” by
Bergman and Berman.
These days,
there are a lot of literature on
eyewitness Identification. See
for example Elizabeth Loftus,
Eyewitness Identification
(Harvard University Press, 1960)
and Edward Geiselman, Eyewitness
Expert Testimony (Eagle
Publishers 1995).
We believe
that the provisions we have in
our statute Books i.e. Act 30
and the Police Standing Orders
which we have referred to supra
call for extensive and quick
reforms to bring it in line with
best practices worldwide.
For example,
is it still prudent to maintain
the number eight (8) to
constitute line ups? What about
the odd number five (5) as a
suggested number and also
allowing persons who generally
bear a resemblance or fit the
suspect’s resemblance other than
what is now the prevailing
practice.
This is
because in the 21st
century with the advance acts of
criminality and the widespread
and the phenomenon of high tech
nature of crime, it may be
difficult to comply with the
existing procedural rules in
Ghana, if we have to apprehend
suspects of crime.
Secondly,
when like it has happened in the
instant case the prosecution
witnesses, like PW1, especially
PW2, who was alleged to have
been sexually assaulted by the
appellant, and PW3, the houseboy
of PW1, who had a close contact
with the appellant and his
criminal gang, other methods of
identification other than a
lineup can be used for the
identification.
In such
situations, eyewitnesses who
have direct contact with the
suspects which can aid them give
sufficient information to the
Police which may aid them to
arrest suspects should be the
norm rather than the lineup
procedure.
In the
instant case, we have reviewed
the entire evidence on record.
We have also taken guidance from
both the learned trial Judge’s
narration of the facts which we
have referred to in extenso as
well as the Court of Appeal
judgment to infer that there
are indeed verifiable pieces of
other evidence on record other
than the lineup identification
to link the appellant to the
crime.
It was
therefore very disheartening to
observe that, learned counsel
for the appellant decided to put
all his eggs in one basket on an
agenda of a botched up
identification of the appellant
during the lineup procedure. We
observe that, learned counsel
did not acquit himself
creditably in the performance of
his professional duty to his
client in the write up in the
statement of case.
Counsel who
accept briefs on behalf of their
clients owe a fiduciary duty to
them in line with their oaths of
office as well as their
professional duty.
Even though
we are not satisfied with the
conduct, output and performance
of learned counsel for the
appellant, we have decided not
to press any recommendation
against him. In future, erring
Solicitors may not be so lucky
because it is our determination
to raise the professional
etiquette and standard at the
Bar.
It should
also be noted that, learned
Senior State Attorney for the
Republic, quoted the following
portion from the Court of Appeal
judgment to support the
contention that the identities
of the appellant and his other
accomplices were thoroughly
done and proven beyond doubt in
the following terms:-
“We are
satisfied that there is
overwhelming evidence on the
record to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identities
of Appellant and A1 as persons
who raided the house of PW1 on
25th February 2008
that night and stole his
moveable properties with
violence and at gun point.”
We have
verified this from the appeal
record and agree with the
learned Senior State Attorney.
There is no substance in the
contentions of learned counsel
for the appellant to the
contrary, that the appellant was
wrongly identified and linked up
with the crime.
2.
The second issue which arises
from the incoherent statement of
case of the appellant is that,
the
identification parade was not
regularly and properly done
according to laid down
procedure.
As we have
already pointed out, the onus
lies on the learned counsel for
the appellant to have elicited
evidence to the contrary that
the said identification parade
was irregular. As we have
indicated much earlier in this
judgment, there are sufficient
indications that the
identification parade complained
about had been regularly and
properly held and conducted.
For example,
learned counsel for the
appellant in an attempt to
elicit some critical information
from the Police Investigator
P.W.4 L/Cpl Frank Yeboah
cross-examined him on some
material particulars relevant to
the identification as follows:-
Q. “At
the time you took over the
investigations had A1 been
arrested?
A. Yes
My Lord
Q. You
don’t know why and how A1 was
arrested?
A. I
know why and how A1 was arrested
Q. How
was he arrested?
A. He
was arrested based on
information by the Police. The
Police went to his house and
arrested him.”
Continuing
later, this is how the further
cross-examination of learned
counsel for the appellant went
in respect of PW4.
Q.
“Are you aware that when A1 was
in hospital on admission the
previous Investigator escorted
the complainant to visit him in
hospital?
A. I
am not aware
Q. You
took the complainant to visit
the A1 in hospital
A. I
went to the hospital with the
victim Janet Otchere who alleged
that she was raped by A1.
Therefore she was to confront
the A1 with the allegation.
Q. You
did this before the
identification parade?
A. No,
the identification parade was
done earlier.
Q. You
know that Janet saw A1 at the
Police station and did not
identify him until you took her
to the hospital
A. It
is not true, she had already
identified him.
Q.
Janet at the identification
parade identified someone who
had already been in custody for
6 months?
A. I
am not aware
Q. It
was you who told Janet that
there was a robbery suspect on
admission at the hospital and
you took her to A1.
A. Not
true
Q. You
told the court, you took her
there for confrontation.
A. The
victim had already identified
the A1 at the CID Headquarters
but she had not told the Police
that she was also raped by the
Al that was why the victim was
taken to the hospital to
identify the A1.
Q. Is
it part of your Police training
that you should take a witness
to a suspect on admission for
confrontation?
A.
It is so when the suspect is in
the custody of the Police. “
From the
above cross-examination, it is
apparent that the only thing
learned counsel sought to
establish was that PW2 visited
the appellant in hospital before
the identification took place.
That fact had been debunked long
ago by the concurrent findings
of fact by the trial court and
the first appellate court, the
Court of Appeal.
Nowhere in
the cross-examination of PW4,
and of PW2 which is also
produced elsewhere in the
judgment below was there the
slightest idea or suggestion
that the number of persons on
parade during the identification
were less than eight and were
not of the same resemblance of
the appellant. It therefore
bears testimony to the fact that
there is absolutely no basis
whatsoever for the said
contention by learned counsel
for the appellant.
Indeed, when
learned counsel for the
appellant sought to unsettle PW2
during cross-examination on the
essentials of the identification
done by her, she remained
resolute, firm and forthright as
can be seen in the following
exchanges:-
Q. “Is
it not true that you have
identified other people before
in connection with this
incident?
A.
Before him, him? He was the
first person I identified.
Among the other men there he was
the very first person I
identified at the Police
headquarters.
Q. Is
it not true madam that you
identified somebody who has been
in custody for five years that
he was one of the persons?
A.
That was not at the Police
Headquarters, it was at a
different Police Station”
Emphasis
The crux of
the above is that, so far as the
appellant is concerned, his
identification had been done by
PW1, PW2, and PW3 and there was
no doubt whatsoever about his
linkage to the robbery.
Secondly, it
must be emphasized that the
prosecution witnesses had
identified the appellant earlier
at the line up at the Police
Headquarters before the visit to
the appellant at the Police
Hospital and during other
identifications which have no
bearing on the subject matter.
We have
indeed perused the statements of
case of both counsel, and we
agree with learned Senior State
Attorney for the Republic that
the principles underlying the
identification of an accused
person propounded in cases like
R v
Turnbull and Others (1977) QB
224, and Adu Boahene v
The Republic [1972] 1 GLR 70 CA
have been complied with in
this case.
See also the
quote from
Phipson
on Evidence, 15th
Edition, paragraph 14-03,
page 308 where the learned
authors write as follows:-
“It is often
important to establish the
identity of a person who a
witness testifies that he saw on
a relevant occasion. Sometimes,
the witness will testify that
he had seen the person before,
or even knew the person well and
therefore recognized the person
observed on the relevant
occasion. But if the witness did
not recognize the person he
might still testify that on some
subsequent occasion he was able
to identify a person as the
person he had initially seen on
the relevant occasion. This
subsequent occasion may have
been formal, such as an
identification parade or
informal, for instance seeing
the person in the street. In
each situation, the reliability
of the evidence of
identification will depend on
the quality of the opportunity
which the witness had to see the
person on original relevant
occasion. Where the witness
purports to have identified the
person on a subsequent occasion
the reliability of that evidence
will also depend on the quality
of the subsequent identification
process. Thus, the reliability
of visual identification
evidence will be greater if, for
instance the witness saw the
person on the relevant occasion
in good light, from close up for
considerable length of time, and
the reliability will be less, if
for instance, he was drunk when
he witnessed the incident, he
had not seen the person he knew
for a long time or felt under
pressure when asked to point
someone out on a subsequent
occasion…”
In the
instant case we are of the
considered opinion, that the
identification of the appellant
by PW1, PW2 and PW3 have been
properly done and was in
conformity with approved
procedures and best known
international practices.
SENTENCE
Section 30
(a) of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act
459) provides as follows:-
“Subject to
the provisions of this sub-part,
an appellate court may in a
criminal case
(a)
on an appeal from a conviction
or acquittal:-
(i)
reverse the finding and sentence
and acquit and discharge or
convict the accused as the case
maybe or order him to be
retried by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or commit him for
trial, or
(ii)
alter the finding,
maintaining the sentence or
with or without altering the
finding, reduce or increase
the sentence,” emphasis
We are of the
considered opinion that even
though learned counsel for the
appellant has not specifically
appealed against sentence, the
mere fact that, this is an
appeal against conviction in a
criminal case automatically
called in aid the provisions of
Section 30 (a) (ii) of the
Courts Act, Act 459,
referred to supra. Thus has
reinforced the need for this
appellate court to consider
whether to maintain,
reduce or increase
the sentence as the case may be.
We are of the
considered view that, as an
appellate court, we are
emboldened by the provisions of
Section 30 (a) (ii) of Act 459
referred to supra to do any of
the three things mentioned
supra, i.e.
i.
maintain
ii.
reduce
iii.
increase the sentence
Having taken
all the prevailing circumstances
of this case into consideration,
there appears to us, to be no
justifiable and verifiable
reason why the sentence of 40
years imposed by the trial High
Court and confirmed by the Court
of Appeal should be disturbed.
We
accordingly maintain the
sentence of 40 years I.H.L on
the appellant.
CONCLUSION
On the basis
of the above analysis, we are of
the considered view that no
real, genuine or substantial
grounds have been urged on us to
overturn the judgment of the
Court of Appeal.
We
accordingly dismiss this appeal
in its entirety as grossly
incompetent and in its place
affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeal dated 27th
March 2015.
SGD V.
J. M. DOTSE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
SGD P.
BAFFOE-BONNIE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
SGD
S. K. MARFUL-SAU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
SGD
A.M. A. DORDZIE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
SGD
N. A. AMEGATCHER
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
NKRABEAH
EFFAH DARTEH FOR THE APPELLANT.
ELIZABETH
SACYFIO, SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY
FOR THE RESPONDENT
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