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Contract - Agreement - Supply of
Goods - Dishonoured cheques -
Whether Court of Appeal erred in
law when they substituted their
judgment for that of the trial
High Court - Whether
general damages plus nominal
damages was too excessive
Whether damages awarded by
trial High Courtl was too
excessive
HEADNOTES
The respondents and their
predecessors supplied the
appellant with products from
their company under their usual
trade agreement on various
occasions spanning a period of
over thirty years. The agreement
was that the appellant was to
pay for the supplies by the
issuance of cheques to be
cleared by the 3rd
respondent ten (10) days after
each supply. Since all three
were sued jointly, they would
all be referred to simply as
‘respondents’ Between the months
of February and March 2006, some
cheques issued by the appellant
for the payment of supplies made
were dishonoured by the paying
bank. Due to disagreements
between the parties on the said
payments, the 3rd
respondent, through the 1st
and 2nd respondents,
solicited the assistance of the
Police and went to the premises
of the appellant to evacuate all
the remaining products supplied
to the appellant without the
consent or approval of the
appellant. In the course of the
evacuation of the products, the
respondents locked up the two
warehouses of the applicant
where the products were kept.
They again seized two of the
vans appellant was using to
execute his work as a
distributor. These vans were
later released to the appellant
upon the orders of the trial
court after same had been
detained for more than one
month. Not happy with the
conduct of the respondents, the
applicant took action against
them in the trial High Court it
awarded in favour of the
appellant special damages The
respondents appealed against the
decision of the trial High Court
to the Court of Appeal
substituted their judgment for
that of the trial High Court.
.
HELD
The appeal before us
therefore has merits. The orders
of the trial High Court in
respect of reliefs (d), (g) and
(h) are hereby restored. They
are to the effect that appellant
is entitled to; (d) the sum of
GH₵7,820.00 being loss of use of
the two vans for thirty-four
(34)days at GH₵230.00 per day,
(g) the sum of GH₵127,544.30
representing the total value of
stocks of drinks carted away and
(h) GH₵10,404.00 representing
the total value of empty crates
and cartons respondents took
away. Again, the GH₵80,000.00
that the trial High Court
awarded as exemplary damages
under the general damages claim
for detinue and trespass is
neither excessive nor oppressive
under the circumstances. It is
accordingly restored in place of
the GH₵5,000.00 awarded by the
Court of Appeal. The costs of
GH₵10,000.00 awarded in favour
of the appellant against the
respondents and the GH₵2,000.00
awarded in favour of the 3rd
respondent against the appellant
on its counter-claim are also
restored since there was no
appeal against same. Flowing
from the above, the appeal is
allowed.
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
GUINNESS
(GH) LIMITED v RAFSCO
DISTRIBUTION LIMITED [2007-2008]
SCGLR 151.
YIRENKYI
v TARZAN INT. TRANSPORT [1962] 1
GLR 75
AHENKORA
v MOUBARAK [1972] 2 GLR 429.
AYISI v
ASSIBEY III & Others [1964] GLR
695
MAHAMA v
KOTIA & Others [1989-90] 2 GLR
24
NICOL v
CUSTOMS, EXCISE & PREVENTIVE
SERVICES (CEPS) [1992] 1 GLR
135,
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
YAW APPAU,
JSC:
COUNSEL
BRIGHT OBENG MANU ESQ. FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/ APPELLANT
ERIC MENSAH ESQ. WITH HIM JERRY
DEI FOR THE DEFENDANTS /
APPELLANTS/
RESPONDENTS
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
YAW APPAU, JSC:
This is
an appeal against the decision
of the Court of Appeal dated 31st
January 2014. The grounds of
appeal are threefold and they
are as follows:
a)
That the learned
justices of the Court of Appeal
erred in law when they
substituted their judgment for
that of the trial High Court.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR OF LAW: Failing to make any
Order in respect of certain
reliefs granted the appellant
herein by the trial High court
and yet substituting its
judgment for that of the trial
High Court though the said
reliefs were not appealed
against by the
defendants/appellants/respondents.
b)
The learned justices
of the Court of Appeal failed to
exercise their discretion
judicially when they substituted
the award of Eighty thousand
Ghana cedis (GH₵80,000.00)
made in favour of the
plaintiff/respondent/appellant
by the learned trial judge with
Five thousand Ghana cedis (GH₵5,000.00)
as General Damages.
c)
The judgment is
against the weight of evidence.
The facts
in this case are straightforward
and not in controversy
whatsoever. The appellant, who
was the plaintiff in the trial
High Court and would be simply
referred to as ‘appellant’ in
this judgment, was the
distributor of the products of
the 3rd
defendant/appellant/respondent.
The 1st and 2nd
defendants/appellants/respondents
were staff of the 3rd
defendant/appellant/respondent.
Since all three were sued
jointly, they would all be
referred to simply as
‘respondents’ in this judgment.
The
respondents and their
predecessors supplied the
appellant with products from
their company under their usual
trade agreement on various
occasions spanning a period of
over thirty years. The agreement
was that the appellant was to
pay for the supplies by the
issuance of cheques to be
cleared by the 3rd
respondent ten (10) days after
each supply.
Between
the months of February and March
2006, some cheques issued by the
appellant for the payment of
supplies made were dishonoured
by the paying bank. Due to
disagreements between the
parties on the said payments,
the 3rd respondent,
through the 1st and 2nd
respondents, solicited the
assistance of the Police and
went to the premises of the
appellant to evacuate all the
remaining products supplied to
the appellant without the
consent or approval of the
appellant. In the course of the
evacuation of the products, the
respondents locked up the two
warehouses of the applicant
where the products were kept.
They again seized two of the
vans appellant was using to
execute his work as a
distributor. These vans were
later released to the appellant
upon the orders of the trial
court after same had been
detained for more than one
month.
Not happy
with the conduct of the
respondents, the applicant took
action against them in the trial
High Court claiming twelve (12)
reliefs. These were made up of
three (3) declaratory reliefs,
four (4) special damages
reliefs, two (2) general damages
reliefs including exemplary
damages for detinue and
trespass, interest on some of
the sums claimed, an order for
the release of the seized vans
and perpetual injunction
restraining the respondents from
interfering in the operations of
the appellant. The respondents
defended the action and 3rd
respondent counter-claimed for
the sum of ₵1,631,083,101.14
(now GH₵ 163,108.31) with
interest or, in the alternative,
the judicial sale of property
standing in the name of a Mr.
Frimpong.
The trial
High Court found for the
appellant on all the reliefs
with the exception of reliefs
(e) and (l), which had become
moot as at the close of the case
and therefore were of no moment.
Accordingly, it awarded in
favour of the appellant special
damages of GH₵7,820.00 in
respect of relief (d) and a
total of GH₵127,554.00
with regard to reliefs (g) and
(h). The total comes to GH₵135,374.00.
The trial court however, found
the special damages claim under
relief (k) unproven and in lieu
of that, awarded in appellant’s
favour what it termed ‘nominal
damages’ of GH₵5,000.00.
On the
claim for general and exemplary
damages for detinue and
trespass, the trial High Court
awarded a total of GH₵80,000.00.
In arriving at that figure, the
trial court took into
consideration the conduct of the
respondents in the unlawful
locking up of the warehouses of
the appellant, the unlawful
evacuation of appellant’s stock
of drinks, the unlawful seizure
of appellants two commercial
vans for a period of more than
thirty days and the manner in
which the whole exercise was
carried out with the assistance
of armed policemen, when there
was no need for that. The trial
High Court again granted the
respondents their counter-claim
in the sum of GH₵55, 087.29
instead of the about GH₵163,
000.00 that they prayed for
in their pleaded case.
The
respondents appealed against the
decision of the trial High Court
to the Court of Appeal on the
following grounds:
a.
The award of GHc5,
000.00 and GHc80, 000.00 as
nominal and general damages for
the same relief against the
respondent was excessive,
arbitrary and wrong in law;
b.
The trial Court’s
judgment was given per incuriam
and sinned against the law when
the court refused to follow the
Supreme Court’s decision on the
law that the issuer of a
dishonoured bill of exchange is
liable on the full value of the
dishonoured bill of exchange;
c.
The learned judge
erred when he refused to award
the full value of the cheques
dishonoured; and
d.
The judgment is
against the weight of evidence
Though
the grounds of appeal appear
four (4) as re-called above,
they are basically three.
Grounds (b) and (c) talk about
the same subject; i.e. the
amount awarded to the 3rd
respondent by the trial High
Court as the actual debt owed it
by the appellant, as prayed for
in respondents’ counter-claim.
So
strictly speaking, it was not
the whole of the judgment of the
trial High court that was on
impeachment before the Court of
Appeal but that part of the
judgment in respect of: (i) the
award of GH₵ 80,000.00 made
under reliefs (f) and (j) on
general and exemplary damages;
(ii) the award of GH₵5,000.00 as
‘nominal damages’ in lieu of
failure to prove the special
damages claim under relief (k)
and then the award of
GH₵55,087.29 to the 3rd
respondent in respect of its
counter-claim.
Respondents’ plaint with regard
to the counter-claim in their
written submissions before the
Court of Appeal was that, even
if they were not able to
establish the claim of
GH₵163,108.31 endorsed in their
counter-claim as appellant’s
total indebtedness to the 3rd
respondent, the trial court
should have ordered appellant to
pay the face value of the six
(6) cheques that appellant
admitted were dishonoured at its
instance but not the
GH₵55,087.29 the court ordered
appellant to pay. Respondents
sought refuge under the decision
of this Court in the case of
GUINNESS (GH) LIMITED v RAFSCO
DISTRIBUTION LIMITED [2007-2008]
SCGLR 151.
On the
award of GH₵80,000.00 and
GH₵5,000.00 as general and
nominal damages respectively,
the submission of the
respondents in support of their
appeal, as captured in their
written submissions filed before
the Court of Appeal was as
follows: “It is my humble
submission that since the trial
High court judge had already
awarded Special damages for loss
of income and awarded the
respondent the value of the
goods carted away by the
appellants, the amount of
GH₵80,000.00 as damages was
wholly arbitrary and excessive.”
(‘Respondent’ as used in the
above quotation referred to the
appellant herein while
‘appellants’ meant the
respondents herein).
With
regard to the ground that the
judgment of the trial High court
was against the weight of
evidence, the respondents’ main
concern was with regard to the
refusal of the trial judge to
order appellant to pay the full
value of the six (6) cheques
that were dishonoured and
tendered in evidence as exhibits
‘1A – F’, which totalled GH₵104,
627.11.
In
effect, the respondents never
appealed against the awards made
by the trial judge in favour of
the appellants under reliefs
(d), (g) and (h). Neither did
they appeal against the grant of
reliefs (a), (b) and (c) when
the trial High Court made the
findings that the conduct of the
respondents was unlawful and
constituted both trespass and
detinue. These reliefs were
therefore not a subject-matter
of the appeal; respondents
having accepted the decision of
the trial High court on same.
The Court
of Appeal, in its judgment of 31st
January, 2014, agreed with the
respondents (who were the
appellants) that it was wrong
for the trial court to award
appellant GHc5,000.00 as nominal
damages for its failure to prove
the special damages claim under
relief (k). According to the
Court of Appeal, that claim
should have been dismissed for
the failure of the appellant to
prove same.
The Court
of Appeal further held that the
amount of GH₵80,000.00 awarded
as general damages for detinue
and trespass in favour of the
appellant was excessive and
oppressive. It accordingly
reduced it to GH₵5,000.00. The
reason advanced for saying so
was that, it was wrong for the
trial court to award that
colossal amount as general
damages, having already ordered
the respondents to pay for the
value of the drinks and empty
crates carted away, in addition
to the loss of income for the
use of the two vans which were
unlawfully seized for a period
of over thirty days.
From the
judgment of the Court of Appeal,
the appeal that the 1st
appellate court said had
succeeded was in respect of the
complaint against the award of
GH₵80,000.00 and GH₵5,000.00 to
the appellant by the trial court
and then the refusal of the
trial court to order the
appellant to pay the full value
of the six (6) dishonoured
cheques. After upholding these
two grounds of appeal, which did
not touch on the decision of the
trial High Court on reliefs (a),
(b), (c), (d), (g) and (h), the
Court of Appeal strangely
concluded its judgment as
follows: “In conclusion
this appeal succeeds and it is
hereby allowed. The judgment
of the High Court appealed from
is hereby set aside and in
substitution thereof the parties
shall abide the orders and
directions hereinbefore made in
this judgment”.
{Emphasis added}
Having
made no orders with regard to
reliefs (d), (g) and (h) which
the trial court granted and
which were not appealed against,
the order of the Court of Appeal
setting aside the judgment of
the trial court and substituting
same with its own orders and
directions, appear to be out of
the ordinary. It was that
confusion created by the
concluding part of the judgment
of the Court of Appeal that gave
birth to this appeal.
Appeal to the Supreme Court
The
grounds of appeal filed in this
Court have been quoted supra and
there would be no need to repeat
them.
On ground
(a), we agree with the
appellant that it was wrong for
the Court of Appeal to say that
the judgment of the trial High
Court appealed from had been set
aside. What this statement means
is that the whole judgment of
the trial High Court has been
set aside, when there was no
appeal specifically against the
grant by the trial High Court of
reliefs (a), (b), (c), (d) (g)
and (h).
In fact,
respondents were silent on
reliefs (a), (b) and (c) which
shows that they never challenged
the trial court’s findings that
their conduct was unlawful and
constituted the torts of
trespass and detinue. Again,
they did not challenge the
orders of the trial High Court
directing them to pay the
amounts as stated in appellant’s
reliefs (d), (g) and (h), as
varied in the judgment.
The crux
of their appeal at the Court of
Appeal was that; (i) having
granted appellant special
damages under reliefs (d), (g)
and (h) for the sums stated
therein, the grant by the trial
High Court, of another
GH₵80,000.00 as general damages
plus GH₵5,000.00 as ‘nominal
damages’, was too excessive and,
(ii) It was wrong on the part of
the trial High Court to order
appellant to pay only
GH₵55,087.29 in respect of 3rd
respondent’s counter-claim
instead of the amount of
GH₵104,687.11, which is the true
value of the six (6) dishonoured
cheques issued by the appellant
to the 3rd
respondent, contrary to a
decision of this Court on a
similar matter.
Basically, the whole of the
Court of Appeal’s judgment was
centred on these three grounds
of appeal. The Court of Appeal
concluded that having failed to
prove relief (k), which was a
special damages relief, the
trial court erred in awarding
appellant nominal damages of
GH₵5,000.00 after it had already
awarded appellant general
damages of GH₵80,000.00.
As the
Court of Appeal rightly said;
‘nominal damages’ does not
stand on its own, separate from
General Damages. Nominal damages
are an aspect of General
Damages. They are the type of
general damages that are awarded
when no actual harm has been
caused by the tort complained
of, or the contract breached.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th
Edition defines it as; “1.
A trifling sum awarded when a
legal injury is suffered but
where there is no substantial
loss or injury to be
compensated; 2. A small amount
fixed as damages for breach of
contract without regard to the
amount of harm”. Aside
of nominal damages, there are
other types of damages that also
fall under General Damages.
Examples are; substantial
damages, aggravated and
parasitic damages, exemplary or
punitive damages and incidental
or consequential damages.
From the
judgment of the trial High
Court, the court based its
decision to award appellant
nominal damages of GH₵5,000.00
in lieu of want of proof of
special damages on the
authorities of YIRENKYI v TARZAN
INT. TRANSPORT [1962] 1 GLR 75
and AHENKORA v MOUBARAK [1972] 2
GLR 429.
It must
be emphasised that the situation
under which the High Court in
the two cases cited above
arrived at its decision, arises
only where plaintiff fails to
seek any relief for general
damages aside of special
damages. If a plaintiff who only
seeks a relief for special
damages fails in his bid to
establish it, but there is
evidence establishing the tort
or breach of contract complained
of, the courts normally award
nominal damages in lieu of the
failure to prove special
damages. However, this situation
does not arise where the
plaintiff has sought a separate
relief for general damages aside
of the special damages claim.
We agree
with the Court of Appeal that
having awarded the appellant
GH₵80,000.00 as general damages,
the trial court erred in making
another general damages award of
GH₵5,000.00 termed as ‘nominal
damages’ in lieu of failure to
prove the special damages claim
under relief (k). The setting
aside of this award was
therefore in order.
After
setting aside this award of
GH₵5,000.00, the Court of Appeal
went ahead to reduce the general
damages award from GH₵80,000.00
to GH₵5,000.00. This was what
the 1st appellate
court per Tanko, J.A. said in
its judgment on these two awards
of GH₵80,000.00 and GH₵5,000.00.
“I cannot but agree with the
appellants’ contention that the
award of
GH₵80,000.00 as general
damages for the detinue of the
said vehicles and trespass is
excessive and unreasonable. In
my respectful view and with all
due respect to the learned trial
judge and respondent’s counsel
who supported the award, there
appears to be a clear
misapprehension of the law on
damages as there are no separate
heads for nominal and general
damages. The true legal position
is that, it is the award of
general damages where available
which must in all cases be
nominal – See DELMAS AGENCY
GHANA LTD Vs FOOD DISTRIBUTORS
INT. (supra). And because
general damages are such as the
law will presume to be the
direct, natural or probable
consequence of the wrong
complained of, they are distinct
from special damages. Being
nominal, they are awarded where
the court decides in the light
of all the facts that no actual
damage may have been sustained
except that it is awarded as a
mark of vindication. That is why
they are normally awarded where
the tort complained of is
actionable per se under the head
of claim for ‘general damages’.
The learned trial judge was
therefore clearly in error, when
he made separate awards for
general and nominal damages.
This, in my view, is not merely
excessive as alleged by the
appellants but oppressive and
not in accord with law. The same
ought to be set aside. In
coming to that conclusion, I
have taken note of the award of
special damages for loss of
income relating to the said
vehicles and as well as the
award for the value of the
stocks/drinks, empty bottles and
crates carted away by the
appellants…”
{Emphasis added}
If the
Court of Appeal took into
considerations the awards made
by the trial High Court under
reliefs (d), (g) and (h), which
were not on appeal before it, in
reducing the general damages
award from GH₵80,000.00 to
GH₵5,000.00, then why did it say
it has set aside the judgment of
the High Court appealed from?
It was
therefore wrong on the part of
the Court of Appeal to purport
to set aside wholly the judgment
of the trial High Court
including decisions that were
not appealed against and which
the Court of Appeal appeared to
have approved of in its judgment
as quoted above. On this score,
ground (a) of the grounds of
appeal succeeds.
On the
GH₵80,000.00 claim, which the
Court of Appeal reduced to
GH₵5,000.00, it appears the
Court of Appeal misapprehended
the rationale behind the award
of the amount as general damages
for detinue and trespass. The
fact is that, appellant
requested that the general
damages to be awarded for the
trespass and detinue must be
exemplary. Appellant did not ask
for general damages simpliciter.
Appellant testified and provided
facts to support his claim for
exemplary damages.
Exemplary
damages, also known as punitive
damages, are awarded in excess
of actual or substantial damages
just to make an example of the
defendant or to punish him. This
Court in the case of AYISI v
ASSIBEY III & Others [1964] GLR
695 @ 696-697 held that even in
damages for trespass, exemplary
damages could be awarded in
addition to the normal nominal
and actual damages suffered. The
Court held: “In assessing
damages for trespass
consideration should be taken
not only of the extent of the
land on which the trespass had
been committed by the individual
defendants, but also the length
of time that the plaintiff had
been wrongfully kept off the
land…”
Also, in
the case of MAHAMA v KOTIA &
Others [1989-90] 2 GLR 24, the
plaintiff brought an action
against the defendants for
damages for the demolition of
her building and the surrounding
wall and the taking away of her
iron rods and using them. The
trial judge, having found that
the defendants had no authority
to demolish the building awarded
the plaintiff, inter alia (i)
₵594,000.00 as the replacement
value of the building and, (ii)
₵300,000.00 as exemplary damages
for trespass. On appeal by the
defendants against the quantum
of the award, the Court of
Appeal held, dismissing the
appeal at holding (2) as
follows:
“In
addition to the replacement
value the plaintiff was entitled
to damages for being deprived of
the use of her building. If she
had to find an alternative
accommodation, as in the instant
case, that would have to be
considered in the award of
damages. Furthermore, where the
damages were at large the manner
of the commission of the tort
might be taken into account; and
if it was such as to injure the
plaintiff’s proper feelings of
dignity and pride, it might lead
to a higher award than would
otherwise have been appropriate.
Since on the evidence the
defendants did not demolish the
plaintiff’s house out of spite
and ill-will and without any
authority but even took away the
iron rods and used them in their
own building, the award of ₵300,000.00
as exemplary damages was
reasonable”
It was
therefore a wrong proposition of
the law for the Court of Appeal
to conclude that having granted
appellants reliefs (d), (g) and
(h), it was wrong for the trial
High Court to further make an
award of GHc80,000.00 as general
damages. The trial judge gave
reasons for making that award
and it was neither contrary to
law, nor excessive or oppressive
as the Court of Appeal
contended. The trial judge made
reference to the judgment of
Lutterodt, J (as she then was);
now Wood, C.J., in the case of
NICOL v CUSTOMS, EXCISE &
PREVENTIVE SERVICES (CEPS)
[1992] 1 GLR 135, in arriving at
his decision to award exemplary
damages of GHc80,000.00.
As
Lutterodt, J stated in that case
and rightly so; “exemplary
damages are awarded when the
tortfeasor’s conduct was
reprehensible and so outrageous
that it deserved condemnation,
as for example where he was
actuated by malice, fraud,
cruelty, insolence, brutal show
of force or the like…”
The
rationale behind such awards is
to do something for the
defendant to know that the tort
he/she/it has committed does not
pay.
In the
instant case, there was no
justification for the
respondents’ invasion of the
business premises of the
appellant, whom it had worked
with for a period of over thirty
(30) years, with armed policemen
to lock up its warehouses and
cart away products already
supplied to appellant together
with the seizure of appellant’s
own sales vans for a period of
thirty-four (34) days, when the
issue at stake was with regard
to some balance yet to be
settled in their lawful business
dealings.
That
singular act of the respondents,
which attracted a sizeable crowd
to the business premises of the
appellant, created a bad
impression in the mind of the
public then present and even
beyond, about the hitherto good
reputation of the appellant who,
from the evidence on record, had
won several awards, including
the best distributor award
(national) for the over thirty
years that he had operated as a
distributor for the 3rd
respondent and its predecessors.
It therefore injured appellant’s
feelings of dignity and pride.
The trial
High Court was within the
confines of the law when it made
the award of GH₵80,000.00 as
exemplary damages for both
detinue and trespass. The Court
of Appeal therefore erred when
it substituted that amount with
the meagre sum of GH₵5,000.00 as
damages for both torts of
detinue and trespass.
On the
counter-claim, the Court of
Appeal did not err when it
ordered the appellant to pay the
actual value of the six (6)
dishonoured cheques, which total
GH₵104, 697.11. Since the
appellant did not appeal against
that part of the judgment of the
1st appellate court,
it is better to leave it
untouched.
The
appeal before us therefore has
merits. The orders of the trial
High Court in respect of reliefs
(d), (g) and (h) are hereby
restored. They are to the effect
that appellant is entitled to;
(d) the sum of GH₵7,820.00 being
loss of use of the two vans for
thirty-four (34)days at GH₵230.00
per day, (g) the sum of GH₵127,544.30
representing the total value of
stocks of drinks carted away and
(h) GH₵10,404.00 representing
the total value of empty crates
and cartons respondents took
away. Again, the GH₵80,000.00
that the trial High Court
awarded as exemplary damages
under the general damages claim
for detinue and trespass is
neither excessive nor oppressive
under the circumstances. It is
accordingly restored in place of
the GH₵5,000.00 awarded by the
Court of Appeal.
The costs
of GH₵10,000.00 awarded in
favour of the appellant against
the respondents and the GH₵2,000.00
awarded in favour of the 3rd
respondent against the appellant
on its counter-claim are also
restored since there was no
appeal against same. Flowing
from the above, the appeal is
allowed.
(SGD) YAW APPAU
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD) S. A.
B. AKUFFO (MS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) N. S.
GBADEGBE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD) V.
AKOTO – BAMFO (MRS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) G.
PWAMANG
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL
BRIGHT OBENG MANU ESQ. FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/ APPELLANT
ERIC MENSAH ESQ. WITH HIM JERRY
DEI FOR THE DEFENDANTS /
APPELLANTS/ RESPONDENTS
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