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DOTSE, JSC:-
This is an appeal by the
Defendant/Appellant/Appellant,
hereafter referred to as
Defendant, (who was by order of
this court, substituted in place
of the original Defendant-now
Deceased) against the judgment
of the Court of Appeal, Kumasi,
dated the 16th day of
April, 2015. The said Court of
Appeal judgment affirmed the
trial High Court decision of 10th
May 2006 which granted the
reliefs claimed by the
Plaintiff/Respondent/Respondent
hereafter Plaintiff against the
Defendant.
RELIEFS CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFF IN
THE HIGH COURT AGAINST DEFENDANT
In the trial High Court, the
Plaintiff claimed the following
reliefs against the Defendant:-
1.
A declaration of title and
recovery of possession of all
that piece or parcel of land
known as plot No. 17, TUC Estate
Adiembra, Kumasi.
2.
Damages for trespass
3.
Perpetual injunction against the
Defendant, her servants, agents
and assigns from interfering
with the said land.
BRIEF FACTS
The Plaintiff contended that
Plot No. 17, TUC, Adiembra,
Kumasi was leased to it on 15th
October 1992 by the Workers
Housing Society for 50 years
with effect from 1st
April 1971. They further
contended that the said lease
was registered at the Land
Registry on 11th
March 1993 under Land Title No.
15298 and Serial No 168/93. The
anchor of the Plaintiffs case at
the trial High Court had been
the said Land Title document
which they tendered as Exhibit
A. it is this Exhibit A, which
the two lower courts accepted
and relied upon despite the many
issues raised about it’s
authenticity and reliability.
It was the case of the Plaintiff
that the Defendant had
trespassed on the said land by
depositing cement blocks and
other acts preparatory towards
development of part of the land
and had refused to vacate and or
quit, despite repeated demands
and mediation attempts which
failed.
The Defendant on the other hand,
whilst denying the averments of
the Plaintiff, asseverated that,
she was on the 21st
day of August 1971 allocated
Plot No. 17B under the Ghana
Trade Union Congress Housing
Estate outright and Hire
Purchase Scheme per Depositor’s
Pass Book Account No. HP/CK on
21st August 2011. She
further contended that there
were other allocations of Plot
Nos. 17A, 17C and 17D to other
persons and that all of these
persons including herself had
performed overt acts of
ownership on the lands without
let or hindrance from anyone
whatsoever. The Defendant
finally pleaded the statute of
limitation and argued that the
Plaintiff is barred by effluxion
of time in raising the issue of
title and or ownership in
respect of this Estate House No.
17 B Adiembra, Kumasi.
BEFORE THE HIGH COURT
At the High Court, Kumasi, both
parties testified and were
cross-examined. They also called
witnesses and tendered documents
in respect of their rival
contentions.
DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT JUDGE
The trial judge held inter alia
that on the balance of
probabilities; in considering
the evidence and all facts and
circumstances of the case, the
Defendant could not set out the
limits and dimensions of the
land she claimed as her own and
as such it fell to reason that
she had indeed trespassed on the
Plaintiff’s land since the
Plaintiff - company had been
able to provide evidence and
facts which proved its claims.
The learned trial Judge declared
thus:
“The Plaintiff-company have
proved their case on the balance
of probabilities and they are
entitled to succeed in this
case. I therefore enter
judgment for the
plaintiff-company against the
defendant and declare that the
Plaintiff-Company are the lawful
lessees of plot No. 17 Block D
TUC Estate, Adiembra Kumasi.
I order the defendant to pay the
sum of ¢30,000,000 as general
damages to the Plaintiff-company
and to remove the offending
structure which occupies a
portion of the land leased to
the Plaintiff-company forthwith
emphasis. Supplied
Dissatisfied with this decision,
the Defendant filed appealed to
the Court of Appeal and sought
to have the judgment of the High
Court set aside.
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
The Court of Appeal took the
same view as the High Court,
dismissed the appeal in its
entirety and affirmed the
decision of the High Court. The
Court of Appeal, in a unanimous
decision, reasoned as follows:-
“In the instant case, I think
that the Respondent satisfied
all these requirements before
the trial Court and therefore
the identity of Plot 17 Block D
not being in dispute by the
production of a contradicting
site plan, the principles held
in the cases of Nyikplokpo v
Agbodotor [1987-88] 1 GLR 165
and Anane v Donkor [1965] GLR
188 on proper identification
of lands to be reduced to scale
where reliefs for declaration
and perpetual injunction are
sought are in my view not
relevant.”
Still dissatisfied with the
decision of the Court of Appeal
rendered on 16th
April 2015, the Defendant filed
the following grounds of appeal
to the Supreme Court.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME
COURT
i.
That the learned Appeal Court
Judges failed to exercise their
discretion judicially.
ii.
The judgment is against the
weight of evidence.
iii.
Further Grounds would be filed
on receipt of the record of
Appeal
Further Ground of Appeal and
Particulars of Law were filed on
30th January, 2017 as
follows:-
1. That the Court erred in
Law when it admitted and relied
on the lease (Survey Plan) Site
Plan attached thereto for its
decision. Emphasis
PARTICULARS OF LAW
The admission of the Lease, the
Site Plan attached thereto
contravenes Section 3 of LI
1444, the Survey (Supervision
and Approval of Plans)
Regulations 1989.
In the course of deliberations
towards preparations for the
delivery of judgment in this
case, it was observed that the
dispute between the parties in
this case is mainly a boundary
dispute.
As a result, this court on the
14th day of March
2018 ordered a Survey Plan of
the land in dispute to be drawn
up. This was to delineate not
only the land of the parties and
houses thereon, but also other
features that will help to
superimpose the land parcels of
the parties on the ground
vis-à-vis their respective site
plans and or documents of title.
Specific orders were thus made
by the court, directed at the
parties and or their counsel to
file Survey Instructions to the
Regional Surveyor of the Ashanti
Region in Kumasi. In addition,
the Supervising High Court Judge
in Kumasi was directed to take
the evidence of the Surveyor and
transmit same to this court.
Learned counsel were also
directed to file further written
submissions if found necessary.
It is gratifying to observe that
all the parties and or counsel
have complied with the above
directives with varying degrees
of compliance.
After the reception of the
Survey Plan and the evidence
that was adduced as a result of
the orders of this court
rendered on 14th
March 2018, it was considered
useful to limit our decision in
this appeal on the omnibus
ground of appeal which is to the
effect that, “The judgment
is against the weight of
evidence.”
It is trite law that an appeal
is by way of re-hearing,
particularly in cases where an
appellant, such as in this
appeal in which the Plaintiff
has indicated in his notice of
appeal that the decision is
against the weight of evidence.
This principle had been stated
very lucidly by Sophia Akuffo
(JSC) (as she then was) in the
celebrated case of Tuakua
v Bosom [2001-2002] SCGLR 61
as follows:-
“An appeal is by way of
re-hearing, particularly where
the appellant – alleges in his
notice of appeal that, the
decision of the trial court is
against the weight of evidence.
In such a case, although it is
not the function of an appellate
court to evaluate the veracity
or otherwise of any witness, it
is incumbent upon an appellate
court, in a civil case, to
analyse the entire record of
appeal, take into account the
testimonies and all documentary
evidence adduced at the trial
before it arrives at it’s
decision, so as to satisfy
itself that, on a preponderance
of probabilities, the
conclusions of the trial Judge
are reasonably or amply
supported by the evidence.”
Emphasis
This hallowed principle of law
has been followed in a phlethora
of cases such as Oppong v
Anarfi [2011] 1 SCGLR 557, at
565, Opare Yeboah
v Barclays Bank Ghana Limited
[2011] I SCGLR 330, at 345, Sai
v Tsuru [2010] SCGLR, 762,
particularly at 791 and
finally Gregory v Tandoh
IV and Hanson [2010] SCGLR 971
at 996, just to mention
a few.
Indeed if the learned trial
Judge, and our learned brethren
in the Court of Appeal, had
considered the proper
application of the above
principles, they would have
applied themselves differently
to the conclusions reached
therein in their respective
judgments. The following are
some of the apparent reasons why
the judgment of the lower courts
was against the weight of
evidence.
CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF
In the High Court, the Plaintiff
claimed against the Defendant
inter alia a declaration of
title and recovery of possession
of all that piece or parcel of
land known as plot No. 17 TUC
Estate, Adiembra, Kumasi.
However, when Nana Kwasi Mfum,
PW1 who described himself as
Director of the Plaintiff
company testified, he stated as
follows:-
“Q. Do you know the
Defendant?
A. I know her
Q. Why have you brought her
to court?
A. I purchased a plot of
land at TUC Kumasi. I have
documents covering this land.
Q. Do you know the land in
dispute?
A. I know the land in
dispute
Q. Where is it situate and
what is the house number?
A. It is situate at TUC
Plot No. 17 Block D estate,
Adiembra Kumasi”
Furthermore in the evidence in
Chief of the Plaintiff’s PW1, he
stated as follows:-
Q. You said you went on the
land and you saw that she was
making development on a portion
of your land.
A. She trespassed unto my
land. I advised her to stop but
she refused to stop that
development.
Q. What precisely has she
done on the land
A. The extension she made
has entered into our land”.
Then during cross-examination of
the plaintiff by learned counsel
for the Defendant, the following
is what transpired:-
Q. This lady has been on
her plot for more than 30 years
now.
A. She has her land there
and I also have mine there. That
does not mean I do not have land
at that area.
Q. The Defendant had been
on her land for more than 30
years
A. She has a building there
but she has made an extension
and trespassed into my land. It
is no (sic) T.U.C Housing Estate
who made this extension for
her.” Emphasis
Then under re-examination, the
Plaintiff re-emphasised the fact
that, even though he obtained a
permit for his development on
the land he did so on 21st
March 2001.
We have indicated supra, that
the Plaintiff’s anchored their
claims entirely on Exhibit “A”
which is their registered land
title document. Despite it’s
many imperfections, both the
learned trial Judge and our
brethren in the Court of Appeal
accepted it as authentic and
credible.
The Defendants have alleged
throughout the trial court that
this exhibit “A” is of a dubious
origin, lacks credibility and is
a fraudulent document.
The court appointed Surveyor who
testified and tendered exhibit
“CWA” stated as follows during
cross-examining by counsel for
the Defendant.
Q. The alleged
authenticated site plan of the
plaintiff when was this dated.
A. I cannot see any date
on the plan.
Q. Again on the lease that
was submitted to you by the
Plaintiff can you show to the
court who signed for the workers
housing society?
A. I do not know who signed
it but there is a signature on
it.
Q. Can you show to the
Court the signature of the
workers housing society?
A. I do not know who
signed, but there is a signature
on it.
Q.
The first signature represents
the witness for Workers Housing
Society, the name is R. P.
Adompreh and the other
signature from the Lands
Commission certifying the
document.
A.
That is so
Q.
So is this lease authenticated
by workers housing society?
A.
No” Emphasis
We have also studied this
exhibit A, and found on the
observations made by the
Defendant’s lawyer during
cross-examination of the
plaintiff and his two witnesses,
PWI and PW2 as well as the Court
appointed Surveyor to be
correct. These are:-
1. There is no date on the
site plan attached to the Lease
document to indicate when it was
prepared.
2. The site plan is not
signed by the person who
prepared it in other words, it
is not authenticated by the
surveyor who prepared it.
3. Thirdly, there is an
alteration on the site plan
where plot No. 17 is written,
indicating serious tempering
with the said document.
4. On the Lease document
itself, since it is supposed to
be a deed between The workers
Housing Society and the
Plaintiffs, there ought to have
been a signature of the Lessors
therein to authenticate and
validate the document.
5. It therefore meant that
the Lands Commission acted
recklessly in rushing to
register it when basic
formalities as to form and
substance had not been complied
with.
6. All these prove
conclusively that, exhibit A,
which is a document allegedly
made and executed in 1993 or
thereabout, was backdated to
dates in April 1971 and February
1975 respectively in the Lease
documents just to lend credence
to the longevity of the
Plaintiffs on the land.
7. From our observations,
the answer given by the
Plaintiff during re-examination
that he obtained a permit for
his development on the land in
or about 21st March
2001 represents the actual date
that the plaintiff entered the
land, started his acts of
development at the time the
Defendant and her neighbours
were already firmly settled and
enjoying their houses.
8. That the Plaintiff
company stated in their evidence
in chief that they purchased
this plot No. 17, Block D,
Adiembra Estate, Kumasi from the
T.U.C.
9. The above is completely
different from the description
of the Plaintiff’s land as
stated in the endorsement on the
writ of summons, which is stated
as Plot No. 17, TUC Estate,
Adiembra, and not Plot No. 17
Block D.
10. The Plaintiffs have
openly admitted that the
Defendant has land in the
vicinity and has an already
built house to which she was
making extensions to. This
phenomenon can only happen if
the defendant is already an
owner of property and had
commenced extensions to the
existing building.
DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE
In her evidence, the Defendant
who did not counterclaim denied
the Plaintiffs’ claims. She
stated that she owns Plot No. 17
B, TUC Estate, Adiembra in
Kumasi. When asked as to how she
came to own this house, she
answered as follows:-
“TUC put up estate houses at
Adiembra, Kumasi for workers. At
that time I was working at Ghana
Commercial Bank and plot No. 17B
was given to me.
Q. Can you tell us the
condition under which you came.
You said they gave it to you,
what do you mean by gave.
A. In 1971, the TUC said
it had put up Estate houses for
workers and so those who had
paid their dues should apply.
According to the Defendant, she
applied and was allocated the
Estate House in 1971 upon
payments of a deposit of ¢300.00
and the rest by monthly
instalment payment of ¢17.45
which was deducted from her
salary. In proof of the above,
the Defendant tendered exhibits
2, 3, 4 and 5 (see pages
105-130) of the appeal record.
These exhibits conclusively
established the following
undeniable facts:-
1. That the defendant paid
the initial deposit of ¢300.00
in August 1971 to the Ghana TUC
for the Estate House No. 17 B,
Adiembra which had been
allocated to her.
2. Thereafter, the
Defendant paid the monthly
instalment of ¢17.44 from
1971-1980 which had been
recorded and acknowledged until
the Estate House was fully paid
for.
3. There is also evidence
that the Defendant paid property
rates to the Kumasi Metropolitan
Assembly from 1978 to 2003 or
thereabout.
The rationale of the above
observations is that, the Court
of Appeal, being an appellate
court should have taken all the
above pieces of evidence into
consideration when evaluating
the appeal. This is because, as
was stated from the beginning,
an appeal is by way of
re-hearing especially as the
Defendant had indicated that the
judgment of the trial court was
against the weight of evidence.
From the survey plan that was
prepared and tendered into
evidence as Exhibit “CWA” before
the High Court, Kumasi at the
instance of this court, it must
have been clear to the
Plaintiffs that, before they
went to the land, the Defendant
was already comfortably
ensconced on the land and had
completed her extensions and
living in it.
From our study and observations
of this Survey Plan, we are of
the firm opinion that the
Defenant genuinely owned this
property as far back as 1971
before the Plaintiff commenced
his acts which we consider to be
trespass onto the Defendants
land.
As a matter of fact, if the
superimposition of the
respective site plans of the
parties and of the Houses in the
neighbourhood are taken into
consideration, it shows clearly
that it is rather the Plaintiff
who has trespassed unto the
Defendants land as well as road
reservations in the approved
layout. All the other Estate
Houses the Defendant mentioned
as being her neighbours have
been plotted on this survey plan
as Nos. 17C, 17D etc. this is
notwithstanding the fact that
the Surveyor who testified and
tendered this plan, Nathaniel
Dawuso has not been very
credible. This is because, even
though he had stated in
paragraph 3 of the report, that
there is no plot NO. 17A, 17B,
17C and 17D and 17 per the
approved layout, he nonetheless
indicated the entire block as
TUC Estates and denoted the said
numbers to the Houses. The
Surveyor then proceeded to make
specific references to the same
plot Nos. 17A, 17B etc in the
same report as well and
indicated them on the Survey
Plan. This court will thus
evaluate the Survey Plan Exhibit
“CWA” and accept it based on
other pieces of evidence which
we have already reviewed in this
rendition. In coming to this
understanding, we are not
unaware of the legal position
stated in a good number of
respected judicial decisions
that, a court is not bound by
the evidence relating to an
experts opinion such as the
surveyor given in this case. See
cases such as Sasu V White
Cross Insurance Co. Ltd. [1960]
GLR 4, CA, Darbah v Ampah
[1989-90]1 GLR 598, at 606, CA
and Tetteh & Anr v Hayford
(substituted by) Larbi & Decker
[2012] 1 SCGLR 417 at 423,
where the Supreme Court
stated as follows:-
“It is generally understood that
a court is not bound by the
evidence relating to an expert
opinion given by an expert such
as the Surveyor in the instant
case.”
But where a court decides to
disregard the evidence of an
expert, good reasons must be
given for this rejection.
In the instant case, even though
the Surveyor was at pains to
conceal some evidence as was
evident in his oral testimony
and cross-examination, there was
very little he could do in the
pictorial representation of the
parcels of land of the parties
as was ordered by this court to
be done by the superimposition.
We find it really necessary at
this stage to refer to the
unreported judgment of this
court in Suit No. CA. No.
J4/3/2915 intitutled Rosina
Aryee –
Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant v
1. Shell Ghana Limited –
Defendant/Respondent/Respondent,
2. Fraga Oil –
Co-Defendant/Respondent/Respondent
dated 22nd October
2015.
In view of the similarities and
peculiarities of the facts in
the case referred to supra and
the instant appeal, we deem it
somewhat appropriate to set the
facts out in some detail. The
facts in this Rosina Aryee case
admit of no complexities
whatsoever. They are as
follows:-
FACTS OF THE CASE
State Housing Company, hereafter
referred to as the Company,
leased the land in dispute
situate at Adentan Housing
Estate to the
Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant,
hereafter Appellant. The
Appellant leased the land to the
Defendant/Respondent, hereafter
Respondent for a term of 15
years under the terms of the
lease agreement, the Respondent
paid the appellant rent advance
for 10 years, with the rent for
the remaining 5 years to be paid
later, when the appellant went
to demand payment for the
remaining 5 years of the term,
the respondent refused saying
the appellant was not the owner
of the property and that the
land was owned by the
Co-Defendant/Respondent/Respondent
hereafter Co-Defendant.
The appellant took out an action
against the respondent, claiming
inter alia ejectment for denial
of title. In their defence the
respondent maintained their
position that the land was owned
by the Co-defendant. The
respondent counterclaimed for a
refund of their money inter
alia. The Co-Defendant was
subsequently joined as such, and
they in turn pleaded that they
were bonafide purchasers for
value and had also duly
registered their title in
accordance with law. In response
to the Co-Defendants case and
claims, the appellant denied
those averments and contended
that they were in possession
at all material times and that
they carried out business on the
land. It turned out that, the
State Housing Corporation had
granted the same land to the
Co-Defendants in May 2003,
having already granted same to
the appellant much earlier in
1997.
Upon the above facts, the case
was contested, and at the end of
the trial, the High Court found
the claims of the Co-defendant
to have been established and so
gave them judgment.
An appeal by the appellant to
the Court of Appeal was
similarly dismissed whereupon
the appellant headed to the
Supreme Court.
In the Supreme Court, coram:
Wood (Mrs) C. J, presiding,
Ansah, Dotse Yeboah and Benin
JJSC, the court speaking through
our illustrious and respected
brother Benin JSC, stated as
follows:-
The trial court Judge rejected
the plaintiff’s claim for what
he termed lack of independent
and corroborative evidence. In
the same vein the Court of
Appeal rejected it because among
other things she failed to call
her boundary owners; which is
understood to mean supporting
evidence. It must be pointed out
that in every civil trial all
what the law requires is proof
by a preponderance of
probabilities. See section 12 of
the Evidence Decree, 1975 NRCD
323. The amount of evidence
required to sustain the standard
of proof will depend on the
nature of the issue to be
resolved. The law does not
require that the court cannot
rely on the evidence of a single
witness in proof of the point in
issue. The credibility of the
witness and his knowledge of the
subject-matter are determinant
factors; see this court’s
decision in the case of
William Ashitey Armah vs.
Hydrafoam Estates (Gh.) Ltd,
Civil Appeal J4/33/2013, dated
28th May 2013,
unreported. Indeed even the
failure by a party himself to
give evidence cannot be used
against him by the court in
assessing his case. See this
court’s decisions in these
cases: In re Ashalley Botwe
Lands; Adjetey Agbosu and Others
vs. Kotey and Others (2003-2004)
SCGLR 420, per Wood, JSC (as she
then was) at page 448 and
William Ashitey Armah vs.
Hydrafoam, referred to
above.
After giving some other examples
and referring to the facts in
the Rosina Aryee case supra, the
Supreme Court per Benin JSC
stated the law in the following
cogent and succinct terms:-
”Thus the courts below were
bound by the law to examine
every piece of evidence on
record in order to reach a
decision whether the plaintiff
had discharged the burden of
producing evidence and
persuasion on a preponderance of
probabilities.
She did not require to call any
boundary owner/s or witness/es
to confirm that she had a
structure on the land or that
she conducted business on the
land prior to the date she
handed over the land with the
erected structure thereon to the
defendant. If you go through
her entire evidence and cross
examination you will not fail to
notice that these facts stood
unchallenged”
Concluding it’s decision in this
case, the Court stated the law
with such certainty that it is
useful to set it out in full
again as follows:-
“As earlier pointed out
the court below did not pay
regard to all these pieces of
vital evidence. Indeed
they did not pay heed at all to
exhibit B and the site
inspection report contained in
exhibit I which was very
critical to a determination of
whether the Co-defendant was
fixed with notice of any
encumbrance on the land. The
result is that, the co-defendant
was a reckless purchaser and not
an innocent one and did not
acquire title validly.” Emphasis
As can be seen, there are indeed
several similarities between the
case referred to in extenso
supra and the instant appeal.
1. In the first place, the
Defendant herein and her
neighbours had been living on
the land since 1971 or
thereabout and this fact had
been confirmed by the Plaintiffs
when they testified under
cross-examination. See also
Defendants exhibits 1 through to
7 series on record.
2. Secondly, in the
instant case, both parties claim
title through the workers
Housing Society, and so the
first person in point of time on
the land has priority over the
other.
3. Thirdly, the plaintiff
herein recklessly sought and
registered his lease Agreement
in respect of land that is
certainly not the land the
Defendant is occupying as Plot
No. 17 B. Even if it is, on the
doctrine of priorities, and the
fact that the Plaintiff’s
acquisition of title being later
in point of time than that of
the Defendant, the Plaintiffs
must be deemed not to have done
due diligence before rushing to
acquire and fraudulently
register the said title
documents.
4. As a matter of fact, if
you go through the entire
record, you will notice that the
presence of the Defendant on the
land and her activities on the
land stood unchallenged and in
some material particulars were
admitted by the Plaintiffs as
referred to supra. See exhibits
1 – to 7 series.
5. Having dissected
exhibit “A” as a document of
doubtful origins with fraudulent
undertones, it is clear that
being the rock of Gibraltar upon
which the Plaintiffs case had
been founded same must collapse.
Under the circumstances, it is
apparent that if the two lower
courts, especially the Court of
Appeal had considered their task
as a re-hearing of the appeal in
line with the established
principles earlier referred to
supra, there is no doubt that
the Plaintiffs should have lost
their case.
CONCLUSION
There is therefore no dispute or
doubt that the plaintiffs have
not been able to establish their
case against the Defendant on a
balance of probabilities as they
are required by law to do. See
section 12 of the Evidence Act,
NRCD 323. There have been so
many inconsistencies in the
plaintiff’s case that it is
surprising these were glossed
over and ignored by the lower
courts. We thus accordingly set
aside the judgments of the High
Court and that of the Court of
Appeal dated, 10th
May 2006 and 16th
April 2015 respectively. The
appeal by the Defendant thus
succeeds, and judgment is
therefore entered in favour of
the Defendant.
J. V. M. DOTSE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
ADINYIRA (MRS), JSC:-
I agree with the conclusion and
reasoning of my brother Dotse,
JSC.
S. O. A. ADINYIRA
(MRS)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
YEBOAH, JSC:-
I agree with the conclusion and
reasoning of my brother Dotse,
JSC.
ANIN YEBOAH
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC:-
I agree with the conclusion and
reasoning of my brother Dotse,
JSC.
P. BAFFOE-BONNIE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
APPAU, JSC:-
I agree with the conclusion and
reasoning of my brother Dotse,
JSC.
Y. APPAU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
KWAME ASIEDU-BASOAH FOR THE
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/APPELLANT.
ADU-GYAMFI FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT.
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