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MICHAEL TETTEH v. EMMANUEL TETTEH SIKA & ANOR.[13/4/00] C.A. NO. 149/99,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

ACCRA-GHANA

_________________________________

CORAM: BENIN, JA (PRESIDING)

TWUMASI, JA

OWUSU-ANSAH, JA

                                                                                                                                                    CA: 149/99

13TH APRIL 2000.

MICHAEL TETTEH

OF H/NO. H45/5

SAISI, KROBO-ODUMASE          . .        . .      PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

VRS.

1.           EMMANUEL TETTEH SIKA

2.           JOSEPH TETTEH KWADZO     . .        . .      DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS

_______________________________________________________________________________

 

 

JUDGMENT

OWUSU-ANSAH, JA.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court Odumase-Krobo. It would conduce to clarity of thought if the relevant facts are recounted in detail. On the 16th November 1995, the elders of Saisi, a suburb of Odumase-Krobo, decided to tidy up the township and also to fill up the potholes on the motor roads in the town.

Accordingly, communal labour was organised.  A truck was also hired, which conveyed gravels for the filling up of the said potholes.  The Plaintiff was one of the young men who joined the elders to do the communal labour at Saisi during that period.

The job could not be completed that day and so it became necessary to engage another truck, because of the unavailability of the first original truck to convey the gravel.

Consequently the elders approached the second Defendant and hired his tipper truck No. GR 9617D for the purpose.

According to the Plaintiff, as the 1st Defendant did not know where to deposit the gravels the elders asked him to go and show the 1st Defendant where the loads were to be deposited.

In the morning of the 17th November, 1995 the Plaintiff waited for, and stopped, the Driver of the tipper truck No. GR 9617 D (1st Defendant.)

At the request of the 1st Defendant the Plaintiff joined the truck to go and discharge some cement blocks then in the vehicle.

After discharging the blocks the Plaintiff sat in the front seat of the truck, the 1st Defendant Driver boarded the truck and drove off.

In the course of the journey the 1st Defendant stopped and gave a certain lady a lift; she sat between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant.

The road, according to the Plaintiff’s evidence, was “rough and sloppy”. He shut the door and the Driver started the engine. The vehicle moved forward and then stopped.  Suddenly the tipper truck started moving uncontrollably and went over a certain bridge.  The front door opened in the process.  He fell down from the vehicle, and fainted, waking up at the Atua Hospital.  He sustained serious injuries, and received treatments at Atua Hospital, Akosombo Hospital, Koforidua Hospital and then at the Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital Accra.  He now urinates through a catheter tube.

1. The Plaintiff therefore sued the Defendants jointly and severally for general damages for injuries sustained by him as a result of negligent/driving of vehicle No. GR 9617D by the 1st Defendant, in the course of his employment as agent/servant of the 2nd Defendant, on the 17th November 1995.

2. The Plaintiff further claims special damages of ¢400,000.00 being medical and transport expenses incurred at Atua Hospital, Akosombo Hospital, Koforidua Hospital and Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital, from 17th November 1995 to the date of this writ.

The Plaintiff gave particulars of negligence as including incompetent handling of the diesel Servo vehicle:

- Negligently allowing the ignition to go off rendering the vehicle uncontrollable.

- Failure to move, control, or manage the truck so as to avoid the occurrence of the accident.

- Failure to secure the door lock firmly to prevent it from opening.

- The plaintiff went on to give details of the serious injuries suffered including:

- Serious injuries to the urethra system.

- Painful right leg, right hip joint.

- Swollen tender lower abdomen with bladder injury.

- Inability to walk due to seven bodily injuries.

- The need to wear catheter tube through which to urinate.

The Defendants denied liability altogether, save the admission that 1st Defendant was the driver of the vehicle at the material time and that the said vehicle (GR 9617D) was owned by the 2nd Defendant.

The Defendants alleged that the plaintiff forcibly opened the car gate and jumped out of the vehicle when vehicle was in controlled motion but was bumpy.  The injuries, if any, which the plaintiff sustained, were his own making.

The Defendants vehemently denied negligence and refuted totally the particulars of negligence, and denied that any injuries sustained by the plaintiff were in any way attributable to the Defendants.

Finally, the Defendants aver that out of humanitarian concern they spent cash ¢300,000.00 in addition to providing transport to convey plaintiff to the hospitals listed in his statement of claim.

At the SUMMONS FOR DIRECTIONS stage a number of issues were set out for trial:

Issues (1) Whether or not the plaintiff is a professional Driver

(2) Whether or not the plaintiff led the communal labour Group to fill the potholes in town.

1. Whether or not the plaintiff boarded the tipper truck on the insistence of the 1st Defendant.

2. Whether or not the 1st Defendant did what he ought to have done in sparking a Diesel     Engine vehicle.

3. Whether or not the 1st Defendant was negligent.

4. Whether or not the plaintiff sustained serious injuries whereby he needs an operation.

5. Whether or not the plaintiff opened the door and jumped out of the moving vehicle.

6. Whether or not the plaintiff and parents settled the matter out of police action.

7. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to his claim.

8. Whether or not the plaintiffs action is frivolous and vexatious and should be struck out.

On the 10th September 1998, the learned Circuit Judge entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff and made the following awards:—

1.  Pain and suffering                                    ¢1,000,000.00

2.  Loss of amenities of life                              4,000,000.00

3. Loss of earnings at ¢100,000]

    monthly for twelve months]                        ¢1,200,000.00

4.  Medical Expenses                                       400,000.00

5. Police Report                                                       1,500.00

6.  Costs                                                          200,000.00

On the 23rd September, the Defendants caused an Appeal to be filed on their behalf which contained the omnibus ground “the judgment is against the weight of the evidence”, and an addendum to file additional grounds.

The following additional grounds of appeal have now been filed namely:—

(a) The learned Circuit Judge has failed totally to make any findings of fact on the evidence of the plaintiff that the vehicle titled to his side and the Driver (1st Defendant) and Dw1 shifted to where he (the Plaintiff) sat, neither did he evaluate them.

(b) The learned trial Circuit Judge’s evaluation of the evidence was faulty and misled him to reach a wrong conclusion that the 1st Defendant was negligent. 

(c) The learned trial Circuit Judge erred when he made an award under the head loss of Earnings”

Counsel for the plaintiff/respondent in his written submission raised an interesting point of law.

He points out that there is no record that Additional Grounds of Appeal were filed.  It is to be noted that it is only in the WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS that the Appellants are adding what their Counsel calls Additional Grounds.  This, he argues, is not the proper way of bringing in Additional Grounds of Appeal and therefore they should not be considered.

In response thereto, Counsel for the Defendants/Appellants states that under LI 218, the Court of Appeal Rules 1962, there was no requirement for written submission, hence it was usual to file additional grounds of appeal on receipt of the Appeal Record and at the hearing the party would then seek leave of the Court, before arguing the Additional Grounds viva voce.

However, says Counsel, under the new Court of Appeal Rules (CI 19) of 1997 as amended by CI 21 of 1998 where the Appellant is enjoined to file a Written Submission within 21 days of being notified that the Appeal Record has been transmitted to the Court, it is obviously impracticable to seek leave before filing, let alone arguing, any additional grounds of appeal.  This is the effect of Rule 8(7) of CI 19.  It provides:

“The appellant shall not, without leave of the Court urge or be heard in support of any ground of ground of objection not mentioned in the Notice of Appeal, but the Court may allow the appellant to amend the ground of appeal upon such terms as the court may think of it.”

Counsel’s objections are well founded.  However, on this occasion I do not think it would be improper or unjust to exercise the court’s powers under Rule 63 of CI 19 (ie. WAIVER OF NON-COMPLIANCE) since the Respondent has already answered the submissions.

 

Rule 63 states: when a Party to any proceedings before the Court fails to comply with these Rules or with any terms of any order for directions given or with any Rule of Practice or Procedure directed or determined by the Court, the failure to comply shall be a bar to the further prosecution of proceedings unless the court considers that the non-compliance should be waived”.

In the instant case I am inclined to waive the non- compliance since no injustice would be suffered by the other party. I am fortified in this view by a number of authorities including but not limited to the case of Mumuni vs. Zakaria & anor.  1992 1 GLR 208, admittedly a High Court decision but it is not irrelevant.

At all events, it may be advisable, at the earliest opportunity or at the first hearing, to seek the appropriate leave of the court not only as a matter of good practice but also as a matter of law, where necessary, with regard to the filing of additional grounds of appeal before the relevant written submission is filed to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(7).

In my view, the Court’s discretion any power under Rule 63 should be exercised sparingly in the supreme interest of the administration of justice.

Having now waived the Defendant/Appellant’s non-compliance with Rule 8(7) I now proceed to consider the grounds of Appeal as a whole.

Counsel for the Defendants/Appellants now argues ground (a) and (b) together.

He submits that on the evidence the vehicle was in good condition until after the accident.

The Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant as well as Dw1 agreed that the road was “sloppy and rough” and the vehicle was bumping in the course of the journey.

Counsel for the appellant further urges upon the court to “take judicial notice of the fact that during communal labours it is common to motivate the workers by providing them with alcohol and other drinkables which invariably contain alcohol”.  I must confess there is a paucity of direct authority on the point.

However in my view, although such a practice is common it has by no means acquired such notoriety as to be accorded the status of judicial notice.  In this case, even if counsel’s submissions were to be accepted there is no evidence that any particular person  or persons including the parties were drunk, and what part, if any, the drinks played in causing the accident. There is hardly any supporting evidence in this connection.

In any event, it was not pleaded Counsel submits further that the learned “trial judge woefully failed to address his mind to why the 1st Defendant and Dw1 did not fall, if the Plaintiff’s story is true that the vehicle tilted to one side and both 1st Defendant and Dw1 shifted to where he (the Plaintiff) sat”.

Counsel concedes that an appellate Court will be slow to interfere with findings of fact unless the trial judge has drawn wrong conclusions from the facts proved or has not made any definite findings of facts (see for example the cases of:)

1.  Reindof vs. Amadu 1962 1 GLR.

2.  Reynard vs. Allan 1934 WACA  52 at 53.

The trial judge very ably analysed the evidence of the parties and came to the conclusion that Plaintiff’s evidence on the issue was to be preferred.  Indeed at page 36 of the record, for example, he makes the relevant specific findings of fact, and adds. “I find the Plaintiff’s evidence on this issue as the truth.  I reject the Defendants evidence on this issue as an after thought ….. The Defendants evidence that the plaintiff opened the door and jumped out of the tripper truck cannot be true and I reject it.  There is sufficient evidence that on that day the first Defendant drove the tripper truck negligently and so brought the accident into fruition.  Refer to POPVIC vs. DERK 1961 VR 413 at 422 AC “Matter which otherwise might be ambiguous and coloured could be rendered suspicious and corroborative by reason of false denial…..”.

The issues in this case are essentially issues of fact.  In view of the basic findings of fact I am unable to disturb the judgment in this case.

I will now turn to ground © of the additional grounds which reads:—

“The learned trial judge erred when he made an award under the head “Loss of Earnings”. Counsel for the appellant argues that two years before the accident the Plaintiff had stopped driving.  There is also no evidence that he was earning anything.  His Driving licence had expired. Counsel submits that there is, therefore, no justification for the judge to award anything to him under this head.

In the light of those facts I think the learned trial judge was right in denying the Plaintiff’s claim to loss of earnings from the date of the accident in 1995 to date.

Be that as it may, the medical evidence shows that his incapacity is such that he would be unable to work for a considerable length of time.  It cannot be said with any degree of seriousness that but for the accident he would never have been able to obtain any employment.

In my judgment, the Plaintiff deserves some award for loss of future earnings.  But the question is on what basis. Since his driving licence had apparently expired for two years before the accident and the Plaintiff had stopped driving, it cannot be contended that he had any immediate prospect of being employed as a driver.

It is therefore my view that the Plaintiff would be entitled to the current minimum daily wage for a period of twelve months from the date of judgment.  It is hoped he would be well enough to pursue some calling or trade or business.  The award under head 3 of ¢100,000 per month for 12 months is set aside.  The current daily minimum wage for 12 months from the date of judgment is substituted therefor.

Subject to that, the appeal is dismissed.  For the avoidance of doubt I confirm the other awards made by the learned trial judge in favour of the Plaintiff/Respondents under the six different heads as enumerated above.

The appeal is dismissed accordingly.

P. K. OWUSU-ANSAH

JUSTICE OF APPEAL.

BENIN, JA.:

I agree

A. A. BENIN

JUSTICE OF APPEAL

TWUMASI, JA.:

I also agree

P. K. TWUMASI

JUSTICE OF APPEAL

COUNSEL

MR. A. NORVOR FOR THE PLAINTIFF

MR. K. HEWARD-MILLS FOR THE REFENDANT.

 

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