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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE HIGH COURT

ACCRA

CORAM; JUSTICE GERTRUDE TORKORNOO

 

SUIT NO. SUIT NO. BFS 476/08

02 July 2010

 

MODERN WOOD TECHNOLOGY LTD.

 

PLAINTIFF

VRS

 

 

ECOBANK GHANA LIMITED

 

DEFENDANT

 

 

This is not a run off the mill case in our civil jurisdiction. The undisputed facts are that the plaintiff held a current account at the defendant's branch in Kumasi. One Constantine Zeleku worked as the accountant of the plaintiff company during the period 2004 to 2007. His duties included writing the cheques of the company which he presented to the chief executive, Mr. Italo for his signature. Then Zeleku took these cheques away and distributed them to the creditors of the company in whose name the cheques were written. In horrifying criminality; what Zeleku did was that over the period of 4 years, he would write certain cheques in such a way that he would leave significant space at both the text and figure columns of the cheque. He did this to deliberately facilitate fraud by altering the value of the cheques. After Mr. Italo had signed those cheques, Zeleku would then insert both words and figures which would significantly multiply the value of the cheque. For example, if the original cheque was for 1,502,000 cedis, he would add to the text column the word twenty, thirty or forty; and in the figure column, the letter 2, 3, or four. So the original cheque for 1,502,000 would become 21,502,000 or 31,502,000 or 41,502,000 cedis. By the end of the four year period, Zeleku had inflated cheques which the plaintiff alleges amount to GH¢186,000.00. It was not established if Zeleku conducted this scam with the active collaboration of others or that they were passive helpers. However, after adding these extra values to these cheques, the next step Zeleku took in this scam was to have most of the cheques endorsed — either to him or to third parties before the money as withdrawn from the defendant bank. It is the plaintiff's case that it is an implied term of the contractual relations between the parties that the defendant would exercise reasonable skill and care in the execution of the plaintiff's orders, including how payments .are made on cheques drawn on the account, and that in breach of this implied term, the defendant negligently paid out the cheques altered by Zeleku. The particulars of negligence were set out as i. Paying out cheques which ordinarily should not have been paid by the bank taking into consideration the writings on the face which were jammed into each other and/or had abnormal spacing ii. Paying out cheques over the counter endorsed with the name of the drawee without demanding from the drawee any form of identification iii. The writing on the cheques ordinarily should have put the bank on suspicion to either refuse payment or at least inquire from the plaintiff whether the cheques were genuine and must be paid. This defendant failed to do. The plaintiff further argued that the act of paying out materially altered cheques offends against the Bills of Exchange Act, 1961 Act 55 and the said cheques cannot be debited against plaintiff's account. The plaintiff is therefore praying for an order to compel the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff with the sum of 186,000.00 Gh cedis debited against the account as a result of the withdrawal on these cheques with interest thereon from 8th September 2008 to date of final payment, along with damages and costs. Defendant denies the allegations and states that it carried out its duties with adequate care and skill. It outlined several steps it took in conformity with applying care and skill. The first was notifying the plaintiff's managing director of all cash cheques which were in excess of 3,000 GH cedis as part of the general measures the bank takes in its work It is their case that the response of the managing director was to direct defendant's officials who called him for verification ad confirmation of the cheques to the accountant - the same Zeleku who perpetrated the fraud - and they always obtained confirmation from plaintiff's accountant before paying out any of the plaintiff's cheques. Second, most of the cheques withdrawn by Zeleku himself after he had confirmed the authenticity and genuiness of the cheques. Thirdly, it complied with standard banking practices before paying any of plaintiff's cheques. Fourthly, that plaintiff had never complained of any anomaly or fraud before 2007, and that it was plaintiff who was negligent in not detecting over the period that its cheques were being forged. It was also the position of the defendant that all of the cheque books it issues to customers after they open their accounts have clear and express instructions in the cheque books as to how customers should secure and write their cheques Defendant contended that the plaintiff did not comply with its express instructions in the cheque books which enabIed the Accountant to alter the cheques and fraudulently withdraw money from plaintiff's accounts It also averred that due to plaintiff's designation as a large customer, defendant's officials called on plaintiff at his factory on diverse dates to discuss plaintiff's account and on one of these occasions over the three year period did defendant complain about its cheques being altered. Defendant concluded its defence with the position that it did not pay out materially altered cheques, that it acted with due care and diligence before paying out plaintiff's cheques and its conduct did not offend against Act 55 and that the loss had occurred as a result of plaintiff's own inefficient internal management procedures which did not detect the fraud over a period of 3 years and not as a result of defendant's negligence or at all. The basic facts of this case are not in dispute, neither does either party allege that the other was involved in the fraud that led to the loss. What is in dispute is who was negligent and who should bear the liability for the loss caused by the fraud. In Section 63 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1961 Act 55, the law provides that 1. Where a bill or acceptance is materially altered without the assent of the parties liable on the bill, the bill is avoided except as against a party who has personally made, authorized, or assented to the alteration, and subsequent endorsers. 2. Where a bill is materially altered, but the alteration is not apparent, and the bill is in the hands of a holder in due course, the holder may profit by the bill as if it had not been altered, and may enforce payment of it according to its original tenor. 3. For the purposes of this section, an alteration of the date, the sum of money payable, the time of payment, the place of payment, and where a bill is accepted generally, the addition of a place of payment without the acceptor's assent, are material alterations. By Clause 63 (3) therefore, the change of the sums payable constitutes a material alteration of the cheques in this dispute. 63(1) categorically directs that such cheques are avoided because the alteration was done without the assent of the plaintiff company which is liable on the bills. The only persons liable to pay for these cheques are Zeleku, because he is the one 'who personally made, authorized and assented to the alterations and the subsequent endorsers of the cheque, where payment on the cheques ended up with persons other than Zeleku. This is the statutory legal position. The plaintiff's action against the defendant is premised on the position that notwithstanding this law that the person liable on altered cheques is the perpetrator of the alteration, the defendant also owed an implied duty of care to it in the ambit of the contract between banker and customer. Within the context of Act 55, this duty is implied from the tenor of Section 58 which reads 58. Where a bill payable to order or on demand is drawn on a banker, and the banker on whom it is drawn pays the bill in good faith and in the ordinary course of business, it is not incumbent on the banker to show that the endorsement of the payee or a subsequent endorsement was made by or order the authority of the person whose endorsement it purports to be and the banker is deemed to have paid the bill in due course, although the endorsement is forged or made without authority' The law hedges the protection given to bankers from liability where a bill is forged or made without authority with two conditions. The banker must have paid the bill in good faith and must have done it in the ordinary course of business. Under Section 90 of Act 55, acting in 'good faith' means Where a thing is done honestly. There is no allegation that the defendant in this action was dishonest in its payment of the cheques, and this leaves the point whether the defendant as bankers acted in the 'ordinary course of business'. Acting negligently is never an act done 'in the ordinary course of business' as established in a long line of cases in both contracts and tort. In the law of torts, the law will always imply a duty to act diligently and with skill where a duty of care exists as a result of proximity between parties coupled with forseeability of damage if work is not carried out diligently The law of contract similarly implies a duty of care as a necessary incident to give business efficacy and as an expression of the uncontested Intention of parties to any contract There is no need to cite cases to buttress this point made because it is a cornerstone of commercial law. This court thus agrees with plaintiff that a duty not to act negligently is properly carried by the bank and this duty is not waived by Section 63 of Act 55. On the contrary, it is built into the legislation through Section 58. The implied duties of a customer of a bank and the bank have taken shape over the years through case law. I am indebted to Paget's Law of Banking 13th Edition 2007, LexisNexis Butterworths by Mark Hapgood QC for the clear discussion of the general law relating to banking and from which I have taken a Lot of direction for my assessment of the principles to apply to my decision in this case. The common law position, even without the instruments executed to establish, the banker/customer relationship is that 'the relationship of banker to customer is one of contract'. Please see Foley v. Hill 1848 2 HL Cas 28. Apart from the state of general contract which is basic to all transactions, other special contracts arise as the banker and customer enter into specific transactions or banking services. Whether a party to a transaction should be liable for negligence is always a matter of law. To cite Street on Torts by John Murphy 11th Edition Lexis Nexis Butterworths 2003, at page 247 'The question of whether the defendant has broken a duty of care is one of Law, not of fact; the standard required of the defendant is that of the reasonable person, a legal construct; In order to determine whether a person has been negligent, :a court has to identify the standards for acting required of a person operating in a particular capacity and evaluate whether the acts complained of as negligent fall below the standards for acting or are properly within those standards, Any acts executed below the standards expected of persons operating in that particular fieId are properly evaluated as negligent. Street states on page 257 'It has been seen that a person's conduct must conform to the standard of a person of normal intelligence. When a person holds himself out as being capable of attaining standards of skill in relation to the public generally .... - he is required to display the skill normally possessed by persons doing that thing. A doctor failing to diagnose a disease cannot excuse himself by showing that he acted to the best of his skill if a reasonable doctor would have diagnosed it. Nor can a young hospital doctor escape liability simply by pleading that he is inexperienced or overworked. He must still attain the level of competence to be expected from a person holding his ‘post' and entrusted with his responsibilities'. Thus in the case of Ghana Protein Company v. PHC Motors (judgment entered on 9th June 2009), I identified that the law holds an objective standard that must be applied to each set of circumstances to determine whether there has been breach of the duty of care or not, The determination of the standards to be applied are a matter of fact elicited from the evidence. In Agbemashior v. State Insurance Corporation 1972 2 GLR 65, Abban 3 as lie then was had this to say on the relationship between a finding of negligence and the standards that must be identified to arrive at such a finding or not: 'I do not think I need deal at any great length with the question of a solicitor's liability for negligence. It is. the same as anybody else's liability; having regard to the degree of skill held out to the public by solicitors, does the conduct of the solicitor fall short of the standard which the public has been led to expect of the solicitor'? In summary, to determine whether the bank or the plaintiff was negligent, since both allege negligence on the part of the other, the question I need to ask is - 'having regard to the degree of skill., required to be exercised by banks in discharging their duties to their clients, did the conduct of the defendant fall short of the standard which the public has been led to expect of bankers?' and vice versa 'having regard to the degree of skill required to be exercised by customers of the defendant bank in the writing of cheques and monitoring of their accounts, did the conduct of the plaintiff fall short of the standard which the bank has been led to expect of its customers?. My answer to both questions is that in relation to all the cheques, without exception, the plaintiff, acted below the standards expected of them in the discharge of their duty As a customer of the bank, and in relation to all the cheques except for only four cheques, which I will describe later,the conduct of the defendant fell far short of the standards expected of them. They were both negligent and ought to carry liabilities in this case. I will first deal with the duty of care held by a customer. The most salient duty pointed out by the defendant in this action has since 1918 been identified in the seminal case of London joint stock bank Ltd v. Macmillan and Arthur (1918) AC 777. It is known as the macmillan duty. This duty directs that the customer of a bank ‘undertakes to exercise reasonable care in executing his written orders so as not to mislead the bank or to facilitate forgery’. Thus the defendant’s defence that the plaintiff breached a duty not to facilitate forgery in the manner in which it wrote its cheques is totally on point within the law of contracts and this court agrees with the defendant that the plaintiff breached its duty of care to the defendant in the manner in which it wrote the cheques that were altered. The cheques tendered by the plaintiff are 71 (exhibits A to A70) in number and those tendered by the defendant are 67 in number (exhibits 4,5,6,7,8 series).many of the cheques were tendered by both parties and so there is an overlap. when a reconciliation of the numbers of plaintiff’s exhibits which were not also tendered by defendant (26 in all) and defendant’s exhibits not tendered by plaintiffs (21 in all) is done the total number of cheques tendered in court between the parties is 93. In coming to this conclusion, I did an examination of each and every one of the 93 cheques, as required of me.I also applied knowledge obtained from experience as a citizen who regularly writes cheques. The third information that directed my thinking is the standard of conduct directed by the bank in exhibit 9, the cheque book tendered, in which the inside leaf has direction for a bank’s customer in securing their cheques including the words ‘write the amount, in words and figures closely against the left hand margin & the currency symbol, so that no other words or figures.can be added.’ I do appreciate that this direction does not create a contractual obligation. My evaluation is that along with common sense, decided case law such as the Macmillan case, it identifies a standard of conduct which helps this court to determine whether 'the conduct of the plaintiff fall short of the standard which the bank has been led to expect of its customers': Although the word 'closely' in exhibit 9 is not defined, I surmise that since the numbers with the least number of words (one, two, six) have a maximum of three words, that space left before the writing commence should not be enough for a three letter number. Even with the smallest writing, this should cover a maximum of four millimeters - or two millimeters for each letter. Thus even allowing for one millimeter extra, the most careless customer should leave not more than five millimeters at the left hand margin before writing the cheque sum in words and two millimeters from the currency symbol. I have used a ruler to measure each of these cheques, and looked for the cheques with writing which commenced more than five millimeters from the left hand margin and two millimeters from the currency symbol. The simple position is that all cheques tendered by both plaintiff - exhibit A series and all cheques tendered by defendant— exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 series; written, more than six millimeters from the left margin of the cheque leafs. Some of them almost commenced from the middle of the line. But even worse, it was not only the first line from which the figure was written in words that the writing commenced away from the left margin. In virtually every cheque, the second and third lines also commenced away from the left margin. Another feature of these cheques is that invariably, and with the exception of only only four - exhibits 6c, 6h, 6g, 6p -the first letter of the original first word of the value of the cheques written in words is a small letter and not written in capitals, a manner of writing which is grammatically wrong and depicts carelessness on the side of the plaintiff's Managing Director if he ignored such cheques written in this way - especially where space beyond five millimeters is left before the number commencing with a small writing. The words of the value of a cheque constitute a sentence, and when a cheque is presented where the first word starts with a small letter, especially so far away from the left margin of the cheque leaf, there can be no conclusion other than that the plaintiff's Managing Director, as the principal directing mind of the plaintiff company with its mandate to write cheques, acted negligently in signing cheques that were presented to him in this form. Cheques in this group also show a standard of conduct far below what is expected of a customer. There can be no hesitation in finding that the lapse of signing cheques written in this manner - even without the warning on the inside page of every cheque book - is the height of carelessness which no responsible customer of a bank should indulge in. I will now consider whether the defendant was also negligent in its conduct. I have already stated that I find that the defendant was equally negligent in the skill it applied to the handling of the plaintiff's cheques and the statements made hereafter explain this position In support of the plaintiff's case, its Managing Director and Alhaji Yakubu, a foremost handwriting expert in this country testified It was the position of both of the gentlemen that the defendant should have noticed the fraud perpetrated because of the manner of writing on the cheques brought to them to honor. Firstly, the alterations in the form of the words of the additional figures were squeezed against the original first word written, away from the left margin in a manner that was abnormal. Alhaji Yakubu also identified that some of the ink used for those first words were different and deeper than the ink used in writing the rest of the cheque. Thirdly, the handwriting of the person purporting to write the cheque was similar to the person to whom the cheque was addressed, this person definitely not being the authorized signatory of the account, and in many circumstances, the handwriting of a third person to whom the purported original drawee endorsed the cheque was the same or similar to the writer of the cheque and the original drawee, when these three persons are not supposed to be the same persons. It is the plaintiff's case that these circumstances were so suspicious that the defendant should not have paid out these cheques .had it exercised due skill. I have examined all 93 cheques and grouped them to assist in describing them. The first group of cheques is the cheques where the writing started far away from the left margin and the second group are the cheques whose original writing commenced with small letters. I have already identified these in my discussion of the plaintiff's breach of its duty of care. The third group is where the writing of the first word which was added after the original writing is tightly squeezed against the second word written as described by Alhaji Yakubu and Mr. Italo. This is obviously a manner of writing which is not normal, since by the very manner in which numbers are properly and grammatically written, a space is left between numbers. Thus it is not normal for the word 'three' to immediately follow 'twenty' in the writing of 'twenty three' and where this is done, it is reasonable to expect that a banker who looks at such a cheque should be curious and notice this strange manner of writing. Failure to do so, especially coupled with other features which should alert to forgery and will be discussed in the fourth group, can only be conduct that falls far below that of a diligent banker, and it is my finding that it amounts to negligence. The cheques in this group are all cheques tendered by plaintiff except A32, 36, 40, 45, 46, 49, 50, 52,53, 56, 59, 63, 64,65,66, 67, 68, 69,A70, A71 (20 cheques out of 71); and all cheques tendered by defendant except 8m, 4, 4b/A63, 4e 4c/A53, 6c, 6e, 61, 6j, 7a, 7h, 71, 7m, 7p,7r, 7t, 7w/A69, 7y, 7z, 7aa/A68, 8f/A59, 8g/A36, 81, 8m/A64, 8n/A52, 8p, 8q, 8k/A67, (28 cheques out of 67). Taking out the exhibits which overlapped, these cheques are 19 in number. The fourth group is cheques on which the handwriting of the person who wrote the cheque on the face of it is obviously the same as the handwriting of the drawer of the cheque. Cheques in this group are all cheques tendered by plaintiff except A65, 66, and all cheques tendered by defendant except three (3) namely exhibits 6j, 7a, 81. A banker who is confronted with such a cheque, an indication that the person with the mandate to Write the cheque, is the same person who is withdrawing the money from it, when the name of the drawee is not the same as the person with the mandate,Ought to pay special attention and clarify from the holder of the cheque book how the same handwriting which ought to be his, is endorsing a name which is not His. in some cases, the named drawer endorsed it to a third party and the handwriting of the drawee endorser is still the same as the handwriting of the one Who wrote the cheque and the one who originally endorsed it. so although three persons were supposed to have written on these cheques, all three different persons had the same or extremely similar handwriting. This is the fifth group of cheques and it comprises all cheques tendered by defendant except 4,4a,4e,4f,5,6b,6j,6I,7,7a,7b,7f,7g,7d,7h,7I,7n,7t,7u,7v,7x,8b,8e,8f,8h,8I,8m,8r, and the following cheques tendered by plaintiff A-A4,8,10-18,A20,A54,55,57,59.In its defence, the defendant called DW1,Ms Adobea Owusu Addo, an officer who worked in operations.she described the standards the bank was expected to work to and did work to.By the evidence of this witness of the bank,which was not challenged, the bank’s standard operation obligation was to check whether a cheque was signed by the mandated signatory,the numbers and figures tallied,and the dates were appropriate – such that the cheque was not premature or expired.she also testified that the bank exercised a standard of conduct where every cheque with a value of more than 3,000s could not be paid by a counter clerk without cross checking with a second official.both she and Ms Valerie BruhI,testified that after taking these steps,they had discharged their duties.the defendant’s witness gave evidence that in the event of any suspicion about the cheques,they called the office of the plaintiff and were directed to speak to the accountant – the very man behind the fraud – and to the extent that they called the plaintiff company before honoring the cheques and got permission from Zeleku,their conduct did not amount to negligence. I disagree totally with them on this position and will now discuss the legal principles that undergird the position I have taken. To quote page 483 of paget’s, ‘a paying bank acts as its customer’s agent.’ An agent owes duties to its principals. Thus in Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated Ltd 1906 AC 439, the House of Lords held that thedoctrine that a person is deemed to have notice of a company's articles of association, and need not inquire whether the domestic arrangements necessary to carry out a power of delegation have been made, has no application where the document to which principle is sought to be applied is a forgery. As such, even if the defendant had notice of internal arrangements where the person to check with in the event of suspicion of material alteration was Zeleku, it is my opinion, supported by case law I will refer to shortly, that if it came to the bank's notice that the same Zeleku was the person behind the forgeries by the reason of the handwritings being similar to his, its duty to the plaintiff was not discharged by purportedly calling Zeleku to validate the cheques. In the words of Lord Lorebun LC at page 443 of the Ruben case 'It is quite true that persons dealing with limited liability companies are not bound to inquire into their indoor management, and will not be affected by irregularities of which they had no notice But this doctrine, which is well established, applies only to irregularitites that otherwise might affect a genuine transaction. It cannot apply to a forgery It would seem that after many controversial decisions on the standard of care to be demanded of a bank when bills paid are identified to be forgeries, the courts have settled to a position that is considered balanced. In the case of Barclays Bank plc v. Quincecare Ltd 1992 4 All England Report 363, in defining the paying bank's duty of care, it was held after careful consideration of competing factors that a banker must refrain from executing an order if and for so long as he is put on inquiry in the sense that he has reasonable grounds (although not necessarily proof) for believing that the order is an attempt to misappropriate the funds of a company. The court observed that factors such as the standing of the corporate customer, the bank's knowledge of the signatory, the amount involved, the presence of unusual features, and the scope and means for making reasonable inquiries would be relevant In Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd 1992 4 All ER 409, (Court of Appeal) in discussing the standard of care that a bank carries an obligation for, May L J said interalia 'In the simple case of a current account in credit the basic obligation on the banker is to pay his customer's cheques in accordance with his mandate. Having in mind the vast numbers of cheques which are presented for payment every day ....it is in my opinion only when the circumstances are such that any reasonable cashier would hesitate to pay a cheque at once and refer it to his or her superior, and when any reasonable superior would hesitate to authorize payment without enquiry, that a cheque should not be paid immediately upon presentation and such enquiry made....' See page 421. The standard of care was then formulated by Parker L J as follows at page 441 'The question must be whether if a reasonable and honest banker knew of the relevant facts he would have considered that there was a serious or real possibility albeit not amounting to a probability that his customer might be being defrauded... That at least, the customer must establish. If it is established then in my view a reasonable banker would be in breach of duty if he continued to pay cheques without enquiry. He could not simply sit back and ignore the situation' Please see pages 494 to 498 of Paget's Law of Banking. And I do not hesitate to take the guidance given by their Lordships in this case, although it is not binding on me. It is to be appreciated that if a counter cashier who is under pressure looks at any of the alterations on the cheques tendered in this case, they might miss that one because of the pressure of work. However all of exhibits A to A33, and 68 and 69, and all the exhibits of defendant except exhibits 4, 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e, 4f, 5, 8, 8a, 8b, 8c, 8d, 8e, 8f, 8g, 8h, 8j, 8k, 81, 8m, 8n, 8p, 8q, 8r, 8s had values over GH¢3,000. They were therefore dealt with not only by a counter cashier, but also critically evaluated by a senior officer of the bank. And for even the ones listed from Exhibit 4 to 8s above, the alterations were multiple, inviting notice by any alert banking officer. The standard of work to be used to assess whether the alteration of the cheques valued over GH¢3,000 should have been noticed by the bank acting by its employees is as therefore: i. a cheque first noticed by a counter cashier because its value is beyond GH¢3,000 and passed on to a senior officer to assess ii. a cheque examined by a senior officer of the bank, and discussed with the customer of the bank. This process would take more than 10 minutes of close examination by different levels of bank officers. Thus each of these cheques was not seen only cursorily but examined because of the values. With this level of examination, there should be no reason why these different officers of the bank should not have seen the material alterations that were glaring from the face of each cheque. Of course, if the money involved is at the level of a sum below which it is sufficient for a counter clerk to deal with the cheque leaf, the opportunity for close examination which should throw up any of these peculiarities may not arise. But with the sums involved, a senior official had opportunity to examine these cheques, and ought to have clarified this situation with the signatory of the account. But what makes worse the entire situation is that with the exception of very few cheques which I will discuss, each of the cheques tendered by the parties including those below GH¢3,000.00 had more than one feature which ought to have alerted to forgery - such as the squeezing of the first and second words on the cheques, in addition to the similarities of writing. To my mind, the need for the bank's alertness as to fraud is made even more keen by the double and sometimes triple whammy of irregularities on these cheques. It is my finding that any failure of the bank's officials to notice the alterations complained of constitutes negligence. And more particularly so when the bank is so alert as to forgeries that it has written in the inside pocket of exhibit 9 steps that a customer needs to take to ensure safety and security. What about the bank's position that they validated cheques with the customer through Zeleku. I fail to appreciate this argument. First, with the exception of exhibit 4, there is no indication that any of these cheques was validated with their customer. Secondly, the bank failed to tender any evidence showing a contractual variation to deal with a person other than the mandated signatory on the account and more significantly, not to speak with the mandated signatory if the suspicious circumstance involved the very accountant who they alleged the signatory had told them to deal with. to my mind, if I ask you to deal with an officer of a company, and the record., before the bank shows that he is the very person who is involved in a glaring irregularity, the 'bank's duty to its custormer is not discharged by saying that the mandated signatory had told them to deal with that officer. Thirdly, the position stated was supposed to be a general one and no evidence was placed before me to prove that for any particular one of these cheques, the bank actually spoke to Italo and he directed them to speak with Zeleku. Even if such a general direction existed, it did not remove the bank's duty to inform its customer of irregularities that should have been brought to his attention. That duty is carried by the defendant independent of any careless conduct of the plaintiff as a customer and the plaintiff's recklessness will not serve to exonerate the defendant bank from its own obligations. There were 8 cheques which were all cashed directly by Zeleku. These are 4b, 4c, 7p, 7w, 7y, 7z, 7aa, 8k. They would-have been perfect forgeries but for the fact that the handwriting of the one who wrote out the cheques is the same handwriting as the person who withdrew them, and yet the withdrawer's name is not the name of the person with the mandate to write out cheques on that account further. It must be noted that exhibits 4a :and 4e were supposed to have been cashed by Michael Sanyo whose picture is at the back of the cheques and exhibit 8q was endorsed by Richard Owusu Ansah and yet the handwriting of the drawers/endorser were the same as the One who wrote the cheques. These are examples of cheques that the defendant should not under any circumstances have paid out without checking with the mandated signatory of the account. My final finding is that exhibits A46, 6j, 7a, 81, are the only four cheques which should be considered perfect forgeries for which defendant can be totally exonerated from negligence for paying out without consulting with Mr. Italo because there was nothing on either the face or back of them which should rouse any suspicion for the defendant. The signature of the signatory was right, the dating was legal, and the handwriting of the drawee was different from that of the signatory. In summary, defendant was liable for all cheques tendered in this suit except for A46, 6j, 7a, and 81. These are valued at (GH¢11,335.40) Deducted from the claim of the plaintiff, this sum amounts to 174,664.60 The plaintiff is seeking damages for the negligence. It is my finding that since the parties were equally negligent, they should equally share the cost occasioned by the negligence in writing these cheques and paying them out without validating them with the authorized signatory. Half of the sum lost die to defendant and plaintiff's joint negligence is GH¢87,332.30 and the defendant is ordered to reimburse the plaintiff with this sum. Each party to bear their costs. COUNSEL:MR.KWAKU YEBOAH APPIAH HOLDING BRIEF OF MR.OSCAR FORDJOUR FOR PLAINTIFF PRESENT MRS.MARY NARTEY HOLDING MR.DAVID HESSE'S BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT ABSENT

 

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