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Criminal law
- Narcotic Drug - Importation
without licence - Possession of
- Use of property for Narcotic
Offence - Section 10(1) (a) 56
(c) of the Narcotic Drugs
(Control, Enforcement and
Sanctions) Law, PNDCL 236,
1990”.
HEADNOTES
the accused
persons engaged themselves in
Spain, the United Kingdom and
Tema, Ghana, on a date between
September 2003 and 7th
January 2004 in criminal
conspiracy to commit an offence
relating to narcotic drug, the
accused imported 588.33
kilograms of cocaine a narcotic
drug without a licence issued by
the Minister of health and had
in their
Possession Narcotic Drug
without lawful authority and Use
of property for Narcotic Offence
Each accused pleaded not guilty
to the offence but was found
guilty at the trial, convicted
and sentenced to a jail term of
twenty (20) years imprisonment,
and also confiscated all monies
found on the accused persons as
well as the house in which they
were arrested. The Court of
Appeal subsequently acquitted
and discharged the convicted 1st,
2nd and 3rd
accused persons on counts one
and two by a 2-1 majority, but
dismissed the appeal on count
three and sentenced the
appellant to 15 fifteen years
IHL; whereupon the 2nd
accused appealed further to this
court
HELD
We do not
entertain the least doubt the
trial court was right in its
findings of fact concerning him.
The first appellate court was
equally right in affirming the
trial court in finding the
appellant guilty, convicting him
and sentencing him according to
law. The ground of appeal that
the judgment was against the
weight of evidence finds no
merit and is therefore
dismissed. Considering all this,
we find no good reason to
disturb the sentence on the
appellant by the Court of
Appeal, and think it was even on
the low side and should have
been increased. In conclusion,
we hold that the judgments of
the lower courts were
impeccable, for the evidence
amply supported the finding of
guilt and conviction for
possession of the drug by the
appellant. The sentence ought to
be and is hereby affirmed; we
also affirm their decision and
dismiss the appeal as it failed
entirely
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Narcotic
Drugs (Control, Enforcement and
Sanctions) Law, PNDCL 236, 1990
Criminal
Code, 1960, Act 29.
CASES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Logan &
Laverick v the Republic
[2007-2008] SCGLR 75.
Hodgson v The
Republic [2009] SCGLR 642
Bonsu alias
Benjillo v The Republic [2000]
SCGLR 112
Warner v
Metropolitan Commissioner [1969]
AC 256 HL;
R v Boyeson
[1982] 2 All ER 161
Akosah v The
Republic [1979] GLR 250
Achoro v
Akanfella [1996-97] SCGLR 209
Obrasiwa v
Otu [1996-97] SCGLR 618
Thakur
Harihar Buksh v Thakur Umon
Parshad (1886) LR 141 A7
Robins v
National Trust Co. [1927] AC 515
Armartey v
The State [1964] GLR 256
Warner v
Metropolitan Police Commander
[1969] AC 132, [1969] 2 All E.R.
356,
Republic v
Bayford [1973] 2 GLR 421
State v Anani
Fiadzo [1961] GLR 416
R v
Onufrejcyk [1955] 1 QB 388
Kwashie v The
Republic [1971] 1 GLR 488
BOOKS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING
THE LEADING JUDGMENT
ANSAH, JSC:
COUNSEL
K.
ADJEI-LARTEY FOR THE APPELLANT.
ASIAMAH
SAMPONG P. S. A. FOR THE
RESPONDENT.
J U D G M E N
T
ANSAH, JSC:
The appellant
and five others were charged
jointly with a count each of the
following offences before the
High Court, Accra:
Count One
Statement of
offence.
“Engaging in
criminal conspiracy to commit
crime relating to
Narcotic
Drug contrary to
section
56 (c) of the Narcotic Drugs
(Control, Enforcement and
Sanctions) Law, PNDCL 236,
1990”.
The
particulars of offence were
that: all
the accused persons engaged
themselves in Spain, the United
Kingdom and Tema, Ghana, on a
date between September 2003 and
7th January 2004 in
criminal conspiracy to commit an
offence relating to narcotic
drug.
Count Two
Statement
of Offence.
Importation
of narcotic drug without licence
contrary to Section 1 of the
Narcotic Drugs Control
Enforcement and Sanctions
Law,1990, PNDC Law 236.
The
particulars of the offence were
that the accused imported 588.33
kilograms of cocaine a narcotic
drug without a licence issued by
the Minister of health.
Count Three
Statement of Offence
Possession of
Narcotic Drug without lawful
authority
contrary to
section 2 of the Narcotic Drugs
( Control Enforcement and
Sanctions Law, 1990 PNDCL 236.
The
particulars of the offence were
that between 30 December 2003
and January 2004 the accused
persons possessed cocaine
weighing 588.33 kilograms at
Tema.
Count Four
Statement of
Offence
Use of
property for Narcotic Offence
contrary to
section
10(1) (a) of the Narcotic
Drugs (Control, Enforcement and
Sanctions Law) 1990, PNDCL236.
The
particulars of the offence were
that the accused person, Kevin
Dinsdale Gorman, used his
property House No. 33/137,
Community 10, Tema, with the
intention of carrying on a
narcotic offence.
It is not
necessary to consider count four
in this appeal for the appellant
was not charged with it, or
convicted and sentenced for that
offence either.
Each accused
pleaded not guilty to the
offence but was found guilty at
the trial, convicted and
sentenced to a jail term of
twenty (20) years imprisonment,
and also confiscated all monies
found on the accused persons as
well as the house in which they
were arrested. The Court of
Appeal subsequently acquitted
and discharged the convicted 1st,
2nd and 3rd
accused persons on counts one
and two by a 2-1 majority, but
dismissed the appeal on count
three and sentenced the
appellant to 15 fifteen years
IHL; whereupon the 2nd
accused appealed further to this
court
on the following grounds quoted
in extenso, hereunder:
“a. That the
Court of Appeal erred in law in
upholding the decision of the
trial High Court that the
Appellant was guilty of
possession of Narcotic Drug
without lawful authority
contrary to section 56 of PNDCL
236, 1990.
b. The
judgment was not supported by
the evidence on record.
c. That the
conviction and sentence of the
appellant to a term of 15 years
IHL is harsh and excessive and
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice.
d. Further
grounds would be filed upon the
receipt of the records of
proceedings.”
Facts and
evidence of the case.
The facts and
evidence grounding this appeal
need recounting in order to
appreciate the reasons for our
judgment. They were that:
following intelligence reports
from sister international
agencies, the Ghana Narcotics
Control Board mounted
surveillance on the first
accused in the trial, a
shareholder and operations
manager of Tuna-To-Go a Tema
based Shipping Company for some
time. Telephone bills
intercepted on 31-12-03 between
2.00 and 7.00 a.m. showed that
the first, second and sixth
accused persons were engaged in
conversation with each other. At
the same time, one Craig, and
four ‘black men’ non-accused
non-appellants, landed what was
supposed to have been fish at
the Prampram beach.
In the
meantime, the accused persons
began to arrive in Ghana in a
sequential order; thus, on
2-1-04, the 1st
accused arrived from Venezuella
through London, on 30-12-03,
with the 3rd accused
arriving at the Kotoka
International Airport on…, and
the 4th accused on
6-1-04. On the 3-1-04, the 5th
accused followed suit.
We can now
shift focus to have a shot at
what happened at the Prampram
beach; the PW2, Tetteh Kofi, who
worked there as a watchman at
the Captains Lodge, said between
December 2003 and New Year’s
Day, 1-1-2004, the second
accused, (hereafter called the
appellant herein), told him they
were bringing fish from abroad
and three days later, the sixth
accused brought the ‘fish’ in
parcels; he PW2 and PW3,
Jonathan Lartey Awuley
discharged the ‘fish’ from a
boat and loaded them into a
vehicle brought and driven there
by the appellant. The appellant
paid him ˘200,000.00 (two
hundred thousand Cedis) for his
services.
The PW2 was
supported by the PW3, Jonathan
Lartey on all material
particulars for he was also paid
the same amount for doing the
same piece of work that day.
Events that followed showed what
was truly or exactly the ‘fish’
in question.
We may shift
attention to events taking place
in the house now. Kwame Boateng,
the houseboy of Gorman the first
accused, testified as the PW4
and said Gorman traveled but
returned on 30-12-03. The next
day he saw the appellant and 6th
accused come to the house in a
big car like what the appellant
drove. He the PW4 received some
boxes from the car which the 1st
accused asked him to carry
upstairs and he did so. The
appellant brought some more
boxes later which he the PW4
similarly carried upstairs.
Then on
7-1-03, a combined team of
personnel from the Narcotic
Control Board and the Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Ghana
Police Service raided the
residence of the 1st
accused and discovered ‘bails’
and parcels of whitish
substances suspected to be
cocaine concealed in specially
recently constructed
compartments in a wall covered
by a large dressing mirror. The
3rd, 4th
and 5th accused at
the trial were in the house at
the time of the raid.
When
confronted with the substance
the first accused said it was
‘cocaine’ brought to the house
by one Yakuba for safekeeping
for a fee of $50,000.00. All the
accused persons who were in the
house were arrested and sent to
the Narcotic control board
offices and later charged with
the offences.
The case for
the prosecution was further
strengthened by the evidence of
the PW1, Husseima Iddrisu, a
house-help of the first accused
who traveled to London but
returned with money which she
counted. After that ‘Krail’ and
the appellant came for the
money. She saw the 5th
accused a mason, partition a
room in the house into two and
plaster them; he removed a
cupboard upstairs and replaced
it with a big mirror previously
in the room of the first
accused; then the 1st
and 5th accused
rebuilt the compartment. During
the raid on the house on 7-1-04,
the police found the boxes in
the compartment behind the
mirror.
The PW5 David
Tei Ahulu saw Hodgson, the 5th
accused, working on the wall on
7-1-04 and corroborated the
evidence on how he also heard
PW11 Ben Ndego ask the 1st
Accused what the parcels
contained whereupon the latter
said it was cocaine given him by
a friend called Yakuba for
safekeeping for a fee of
$50,000.00
Ben Ndego
said upon the receipt of
intelligence from sister
international bodies the
National Narcotic Control Board
mounted surveillance on the
accused persons. They identified
the accused and their associates
as involved in the illicit
activities. When his outfit
conducted a raid on the house of
the 1st accused, 22
boxes of substance suspected to
be cocaine were found hidden in
a concealed compartment behind a
big sized mirror in the house of
the 1st accused
upstairs. A field test conducted
on the samples tested positive
for cocaine. A further search in
the house led to the discovery
of a book entitled ‘Cocaine’
On his part
the PW10 said he took
photographs of the scene and
tendered them in evidence as
Exhibits D, D1 to D19. Forensic
evidence by PW6 and 8 the
analysts, confirmed that the
substances were indeed cocaine
in exhibit 8, weighing 588.33
kilos.
At the close
of the case of the prosecution
the learned trial judge ruled
that the prosecution established
a prima facie case against each
accused and called upon him to
enter his defence.
Each accused
flatly denied the offence
charged against him and led
evidence in his defence. At the
end of the trial, the court held
the prosecution succeeded in
proving its case against each
accused beyond reasonable
doubts, found each guilty of the
offence and convicted him
accordingly. It then imposed a
jail term of 20 years IHL
imprisonment on each accused. It
also confiscated all monies
found on them during the raid as
well as the house in which the
contraband drugs were
found.
The convicted
accused persons were
dissatisfied with the conviction
and sentence and appealed to the
Court of Appeal, which dismissed
the appeal on count 3 by a 2-1
majority decision. The 3rd
and 4th accused
appealed further to this court
on numerous original and
additional grounds and on 7
February 2007, and in its
unanimous judgment upheld the
appeal; see
Logan
& Laverick v the Republic
[2007-2008] SCGLR 75.
Allan William Hodgson, the 5th
accused at the trial, had his
appeal to this court against the
judgment of the Court of Appeal
dismissed in
Hodgson v The Republic [2009]
SCGLR 642.
As it is
only the second accused at the
trial who is appealing against
the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, this time, I shall
therefore recap the evidence he
led in his defence. He said he
went to Kevin Gorman, his
brother in law, in his house on
31-12-03 in the morning to see
him and one Aisha; he denied
going there to offload boxes. He
denied the offences leveled
against him, and the evidence by
the Prosecution witnesses,
particularly that he hired and
paid some of them to offload the
boxes in which the cocaine was
found.
.
In his
statement of case, counsel for
the appellant stated that there
was nothing in PNDC Law 236
which required, or, created a
strict liability offence on an
accused person so that a person
who did not know the nature and
quality of the substance he
possessed cannot be said to have
been engaged in dealing in
Narcotic Drug but is a mere
‘luckless victim’.
This being a
criminal trial, the prosecution
bore the onus of proof that the
appellant possessed the narcotic
drug as charged against him,
which they must discharge on
proof beyond reasonable doubts.
To secure the
conviction of an accused person
on such a charge, Atuguba JSC
after considering the
authorities in an exhaustive
manner, stated the ingredients
of the offence in
Bonsu
alias Benjillo v The Republic
[2000] SCGLR 112 at 138
to be as follows:
‘I hold that
on a charge of possessing a
narcotic drug under PNDCL 236
the prosecution must prove: (i)
custody or control of the drug
by the accused; (ii) knowledge
of the presence of the drug: see
Warner
v Metropolitan Commissioner
[1969] AC 256 HL; R v
Boyeson [1982] 2 All ER 161
and Akosah v The Republic
[1979] GLR 250; and
(iii) knowledge of the nature of
the drug possessed.”
The trial
court found that the appellant
had possession of the drugs and
the first appellate court
concurred with the trial
judgment.
If the
evidence on record was studied
carefully, it would show that
even though the drugs were not
found in the actual possession
of the appellant, whether or not
the appellant possessed it
constructively, or by
imputation, could be inferred
from the circumstances that they
were under his control. There
was evidence it was the
appellant who drove the vehicle,
(a van), containing the boxes,
hired the services of some of
the prosecution witnesses to
offload boxes supposed to
contain fish upstairs; he
himself carried some of those
boxes upstairs. Of course, once
the appellant denied the
evidence by the prosecution, it
became a question of which
version of the rival facts as
between the prosecution and the
appellant the court ought to
believe. The trial court cast
its preference in favor of the
case of the prosecution and was
affirmed on appeal. Thus on the
vital issue of whether or not
the appellant had anything
substantially to do with the
boxes and their contents, the
concurrent findings of fact by
the lower courts was that he did
carry the boxes found to contain
the drugs physically and also
hired and paid carriers to send
them upstairs for hiding in the
specially constructed
compartments.
It was now
well settled in our
jurisprudence that it is not
easily permissible for a second
appellate court like this one to
interfere with concurrent
findings of fact by lower courts
unless such findings were not
supported by evidence so as to
make the findings unreasonable.
We have not spared ourselves the
burden of reading the evidence
several times over and come to
the conclusion the findings by
the lower courts were supported
by the evidence on record thus
rendering them amply supported
by the evidence and thus were by
no means perverse. On this
reference is hereby made to
Achoro
v Akanfella [1996-97] SCGLR 209
cited in Obrasiwa v Otu
[1996-97] SCGLR 618.
The
conditions under which this
court will interfere with
concurrent findings of facts by
lower appellate courts have been
stated several times in this
court. In the Achoro case, this
court said:
“…in an
appeal against findings of facts
to a second appellate court like
court where the lower appellate
court had concurred in the
findings of the trial court,
especially in a dispute,….this
court will not interfere with
the concurrent findings of the
lower courts unless it is
established with absolute
clearness that some blunder or
error resulting in a miscarriage
of justice, is apparent in the
way in which the lower tribunals
dealt with the facts.”
See pages
214-215 where some of the errors
which must be established, such
as the lower courts had clearly
erred in the face of a crucial
documentary evidence, or that a
principle of evidence had not
been properly applied: see
Thakur
Harihar Buksh v Thakur Umon
Parshad (1886) LR 141 A7;
or, as pointed out
Robins v
National Trust Co. [1927] AC 515,
that the finding is so based on
erroneous proposition of the law
that if that proposition be
corrected, the finding
disappears. In short it must be
demonstrated that the judgments
of the courts below are clearly
wrong. The examples are by no
means exhaustive.
It is equally
well settled that physical
possession alone would not be
sufficient to prove a case of
possessing narcotic drugs
against the appellant. The issue
was, was there evidence
establishing that the appellant
had the requisite mens rea or
guilty knowledge, or evidence
from which it was reasonable to
presume the appellant proved to
be in possession well knew, or
ought to have known that the
article he possessed was
prohibited drugs, in this case
cocaine? In Ghanaian criminal
jurisprudence, this ingredient
in the offence was stated by
Ollennu JSC in
Armartey v The State [1964] GLR
256 at 261, that:
“What is the
possession proof of which
without more, makes a person
guilty of an offence under
section47 (1), unless he proved
that his possession is lawful.
Upon a proper construction of
the section, the possession must
be possession with knowledge of
the nature and quality of the
article; awareness that what is
possessed is ‘opium or Indian
Hemp’ or residue from the
smoking of Indian Hemp’.
Physical possession without
knowledge of the nature and
quality of what is possessed
physically is no offence.
Without that knowledge there is
no legal possession which can
support the charge. Therefore to
succeed on such a charge, the
prosecution must prove legal
knowledge; that is, in addition
to proving physical or
constructive possession, they
must go further to lead evidence
which establishes that the
defendant had the requisite
knowledge, or evidence from
which it will be reasonable to
presume that the defendant
proved to be in possession well
knew or ought to have known,
that the article he possessed
was ‘opium or Indian Hemp’ i.e.‘
cocaine’ in this context.
In
Warner
v Metropolitan Police
Commander [1969] AC 132, [1969]
2 All E.R. 356, a
majority of the House of Lords
held that a person could not be
in possession of dangerous drugs
unless he was at least aware of
the nature of that which was
under his control although it
was unnecessary for the
prosecution to show that he knew
of its quality. The current
statutory English law is
contained in the Misuse of Drugs
Act, 1971, which provided that
an accused might be acquitted
and discharged if he proves he
neither believed nor suspected
nor had reason to suspect that
the substance he possessed was a
controlled drug. We would say
English law was different from
the Ghanaian on the requirement
of knowledge sufficient to fix
an accused with liability for
the possession of what was found
in his possession. We must
observe that whether or not our
law on the subject created a
strict liability offence was
adequately considered in
Bonsu alias Benjilo v The
Republic [supra] where
Atuguba JSC held it did not.
We fully
endorse his view for our
criminal law is on all fours
with the common law principle
that a crime such as we have in
question requires a mental
element, or a mens rea.
The
Amartey case (supra) made it
clear that possession is
physical or constructive control
coupled with knowledge of the
nature and quality of that which
was possessed. Therefore the
settled law in Ghana is that to
sustain a charge under section 2
of PNDCL 236, 1990, the
prosecution must prove that the
appellant had not only physical
control or custody of the drugs
but also was aware of its nature
and quality. Whether or not the
appellant had legal possession
of the substance in question was
a matter of evidence.
To be fair to
the appellant the cocaine was
not found on him physically, but
hidden in a specially
constructed chamber in the wall
of the house of first accused.
Was there proof of any
connection or nexus by the
appellant to these things?
There was
evidence he carried or hired and
paid carriers to carry boxes
containing the substances from
the beach in a van to the house
and into the recently
constructed chamber in the wall.
It is not usual to carry boxes
of fish into such chambers for
anything.
But by far
the most important fact
consideration was that whether
or not the appellant carried the
boxes from the beach into the
house or hired and paid
prosecution witnesses for the
job were issues of fact to be
determined by the trial judge,
and when he who had the
advantage of seeing and hearing
the witnesses as they gave
evidence had come out with a
finding of fact on those vital
matters, and concurred in by a
first appellate court, then a
second appellate court like this
court must be very slow indeed
to interfere with the findings
of fact so made; unless it can
be demonstrated that the
findings if facts were perverse
as lacking any credible
evidential support.
In a brazen
effort to avoid detection, was
the fact that the chamber was
covered with a mirror, so that
behind the façade of a mirror,
was the chamber in which were
hidden boxes containing the
noxious substances. There was
evidence the appellant drove the
van containing the boxes from
the beach, carried some of them
himself, hired others to do it
for him and paid them for their
labor. He who does anything
through others does it himself.
Whichever way one looks at it,
either actually or
constructively, the appellant
was found to have possessed the
boxes and known their contents
at one stage or the other.
It was
settled it was not sufficient
for the prosecution to prove
only physical handling of the
substance but equally important
was this coupled with knowledge
of the nature and quality of
what was possessed. Knowledge,
in this context, was akin to
what was requisite for stolen
goods under section 147 of the
Criminal
Code, 1960, Act 29. To
constitute an offence under the
section was proof of the
knowledge that the property in
question was obtained or
appropriated by an offence and
the issue was how that was
proved.
In
Republic v Bayford [1973] 2 GLR
421, the court said
guilty knowledge was largely a
matter of inference from the
circumstance and on the merits
of a particular case; the nature
of the property was important.
It is not derogatory of evidence
to say it was circumstantial; it
is often the best. In cases of
this nature such as we are
considering in this appeal,
seldom does an accused admit or
confess this all important
knowledge. It is often inferred
from the circumstances, albeit
not in a rash manner. Care ought
to be and is often taken that
the evidence must support the
inference. The parameters are
well circumscribed and
adumbrated in the local locus
classicus on the subject,
namely,
State v Anani Fiadzo [1961]
GLR 416 where the
Supreme Court held at page 418
that:
“Presumptive
or circumstantial evidence is
quite usual as it is rare to
prove an offence by evidence of
eye-witnesses and inference from
the facts may prove the guilt of
appellant. A presumption from
circumstantial evidence should
be drawn against the appellant
only when that presumption
follows irresistibly from the
circumstances proved in
evidence; and in order to
justify the inference of guilt
the inculpatory facts must be
incompatible with the innocence
of the appellant, and incapable
of explanation upon any other
reasonable hypothesis other than
guilt. A conviction must not be
based on probabilities or mere
suspicion.”
In the
celebrated case of
R v
Onufrejcyk [1955] 1 QB
388, it was said in
further explanation of
circumstantial evidence that
“It is often
the best evidence. It is
evidence of surrounding
circumstances, which by
undesigned coincidence is
capable of proving a proposition
with the accuracy of
mathematics. It is no derogation
of evidence to say it is
circumstantial.”
Thus, a judge
is permitted to infer from the
proven facts, other facts
necessary to complete the
elements of guilt or to
establish innocence. It is not
permissible to castigate a
judgment simply because it was
founded on circumstantial
evidence as was done by the
counsel for the
appellant.
A close study
of the evidence revealed that
there was more than sufficient
evidence to support the findings
of fact by the trial court so
that the first appellate court
was perfectly right in affirming
them.
The evidence
showed the role played by the
appellant in the saga which may
easily win laurels in any annual
best film award contest as
recounted above (by which he
first drove the vehicle that
transported the boxes from the
beach with he himself carrying
some of the boxes, hiring and
paying others to assist him in
so carrying the boxes upstairs
for hiding and hiding them in
that compartment in the wall),
were acts suggestive of one
fact, namely that he knew he was
handling an obnoxious substance,
and as it turned out to be,
cocaine. The appellant before
us played a pivotal role in the
affair.
We do not
entertain the least doubt the
trial court was right in its
findings of fact concerning him.
The first appellate court was
equally right in affirming the
trial court in finding the
appellant guilty, convicting him
and sentencing him according to
law. The ground of appeal that
the judgment was against the
weight of evidence finds no
merit and is therefore
dismissed.
The ground of
appeal against sentence can be
disposed of in only a few words:
it did not carry merit for it
was adequate under the
circumstances. The trial court
considered a lot of factors
before passing sentence on the
appellant. He said even though
he was not obliged to give
reasons for his sentence:
“But taking
into consideration the method or
design of the mode of
importation of the offending
drug – cocaine into the country
and by the very huge quantity of
the drugs brought in and the
modus operandi of all the
accused persons in this case,
they appear to be leaders or
grand masters for the
distribution of this condemned
drug in Ghana and elsewhere.”
Where the
trial judge got that information
or evidence from about the
distribution of the condemned
drug in Ghana so as to make that
damning sweeping statement about
the accused persons was not
indicated and certainly was not
disclosed in the entire
evidence. Excluding that
statement from that part of the
judgment for this reason, it
could be said the trial judge
was right in taking these
factors into consideration in
sentencing the appellant. In
fact, sentencing either after
conviction in a trial of first
instance or, on appeal, is a
matter entirely within the
discretion of the judge or the
court. The factors a court would
consider in determining the
length of sentence are stated in
Kwashie v The Republic
[1971] 1 GLR 488 at
493, CA to be:
“(1) the
intrinsic seriousness of the
offence; (2) the degree of
revulsion felt by law-abiding
citizens of the society for the
particular crime; (3) the
premeditation with which the
criminal plan was executed; (4)
the prevalence of the crime
within the particular locality
where the offence took place, or
in the country generally;(5) the
sudden increase in the incidence
of the particular crime: and (6)
mitigating or aggravating
circumstances such as extreme
youth, good character and the
violent manner in which the
offence was committed. Thus a
judge in passing sentence may
consider the offence and the
offender as well as the interest
of society”.
Where an
appellant complains about the
harshness of a sentence he ought
to appreciate that every
sentence is supposed to serve a
five-fold purpose, namely, to be
punitive, calculated to deter
others, to reform the offender,
to appease the society and to be
a safeguard to this country see;
also what this court said in a
similar situation in Hodgson
v The Republic (supra).
However one
looks at it, counsel for the
appellant did not make any
submissions on the ground of
appeal against sentence and it
is deemed he abandoned that
ground sub silentio;
other than that, that ground is
without any merit and is
therefore dismissed.
Considering
all this, we find no good reason
to disturb the sentence on the
appellant by the Court of
Appeal, and think it was even on
the low side and should have
been increased.
In
conclusion, we hold that the
judgments of the lower courts
were impeccable, for the
evidence amply supported the
finding of guilt and conviction
for possession of the drug by
the appellant. The sentence
ought to be and is hereby
affirmed; we also affirm their
decision and dismiss the appeal
as it failed entirely.
J. ANSAH
JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT
W. A. ATUGUBA
JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT
S. A. BROBBEY
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
DR.
S. K. DATE-BAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
N. S. GBADEGBE
JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL:
K.
ADJEI-LARTEY FOR THE APPELLANT.
ASIAMAH
SAMPONG P. S. A. FOR THE
RESPONDENT.
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