Chieftaincy -
Regional House of Chiefs -
Sitting chief of Traditional
Area - customary law -
Nomination of person to be
considered as a chief to replace
the deceased chief - Whether or
not 1st respondent
unreasonably refused to nominate
a candidate for the Wenchi
Paramount Stool - Whether or not
the kingmakers of the Wenchi
Paramount Stool properly
exercised their rights to
nominate and enstool 1st
appellant upon the refusal of 1st
respondent to honour the
kingmakers’ request to nominate
one of two known and accepted
candidate - Whether or not 1st
appellant was properly nominated
and enstooled as the Omanhene of
Wenchi - Article 277 of the 1992
Constitution - Courts Act, 1993
(Act 459), s 55(2) - Courts
(Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 620),
s 5 - Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act
759), s 62(2)
HEADNOTES
The paramount
chief of Wenchi Traditional area
died on July 7, 2004. After his
death, a petition was filed at
the Brong Ahafo Regional House
of Chiefs against the Wenchi
Queen mother and the Wenchi
Traditional Council. for a
declaration that he Nana Kusi
Appea a former chief of Wenchi,
was the sitting chief of Wenchi
Traditional Area. It was finally
determined in favour of the
queen mother and the Traditional
Council on the 6th of
June 2006. A series of meetings
followed the determination of
the case on that day. The most
relevant of the decisions taken
at the meetings was that the
king makers requested the queen
mother to nominate a person to
be considered as a chief for the
Wenchi Traditional Area to
replace the deceased chief. The
queen mother replied that she
needed three weeks to make the
nomination. The king makers who
made the request to the queen
mother were of the opinion that
since the death of the last
chief, the stool of Wenchi had
been vacant for some time and
needed to be occupied. They
therefore insisted that they
could not wait for as long as
three weeks demanded by the
queen mother According to the
king makers, she delayed
unreasonably. They therefore
approached Madam Abena Frema
Atuahene who performed the
customary tasks which would have
been performed by the queen
mother in respect of the
nomination and installation of
the chief. Eventually, Kwadwo
Nyam Nketia, hereinafter
referred to as the first
respondent, was nominated,
enstooled and installed as the
chief of Wenchi to replace the
deceased Nana Abrefa Mbore
Bediatuo VII. The queen mother,
the Wenchi Abakomahene and
Wenchi Jumankwaihene filed a
petition in the Regional House
of chiefs. In the Regional House
of Chiefs, judgment was given in
favour of the respondents. The
petitioners appealed to the
National House of Chiefs which
entered judgment for the
petitioners. It was against the
latter judgment that the
appellants who were respondents
to the original petition have
appealed to this court.
HELD
On the facts
of the instant case, the
purported nomination of the
first appellant was totally
flawed, faulty, invalid and
void. The ex post facto
processes of election,
selection, enstoolment and
installation of the first
appellant are irrelevant because
they lacked the necessary
foundation on the basis of which
they could stand
In the instant case,
there was no nomination at all.
If there was any nomination, it
was void and incurably bad. All
the processes which followed
from that void nomination were
bad and incurably bad. The
subsequent processes of
election, selection, enstoolment
and installation of the first
appellant simply fall out of
place and should be regarded as
equally invalid and void. Having
taken this line of reasoning, it
is not necessary to consider the
propriety or otherwise of the
processes which took place after
the flawed nomination. For the
foregoing reasons, the appeal
fails and is dismissed.
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
1992
Constitution
Courts Act,
1993 (Act 459)
Courts
(Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 620),
Chieftaincy
Act, 2008 (Act 759)
CASES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
In Re Kwabeng
Stool; Karikari and Anor. V
Ababio & Others [2001-2002]
SCGLR 515.
Republic v
Akim Abuakwa Traditional
Council; Ex parte Sakyiraa II
[1975] 2 GLR 115.
Komey v
Onanka [1962] GLR52
Republic v
Boateng; Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II
[1972] 1 GLR 317.
Macfoy v
United Africa Trading Company
Ltd [1961] 3 All ER 1169
Mosi v
Bagyina [1963] 1 GLR 337, SC.
BOOKS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
R. S.
Rattray, Ashanti Law and
Constitution, 1929 ed.
Committee of
Enquiry into Wenchi Stool
Affairs
DELIVERING
THE LEADING JUDGMENT
BROBBEY JSC:
COUNSEL
NANA ASANTE
BEDIATUO FOR THE APPELLANTS.
MUJEEB RAHMAN
AHMED WITH HIM MICHAEL KWABENA
ATTA-AGYEI FOR THE RESPONDENTS
______________________________________________________________________
J U G D M E N T
______________________________________________________________________
BROBBEY JSC:
S
This is the
unanimous judgment of the court.
The facts which gave rise to
this litigation were as
follows: Nana Abrefa Mbore
Bediatuo VII was the paramount
chief of Wenchi Traditional
area. He died on July 7, 2004.
After his death, a former chief
of Wenchi, Nana Kusi Appea,
filed a petition at the Brong
Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs.
The petition was against the
Wenchi Queen mother and the
Wenchi Traditional Council. The
petition was mainly for a
declaration that he was the
sitting chief of Wenchi
Traditional Area. The petition
was filed in April 2005. It was
finally determined in favour of
the queen mother and the
Traditional Council on the 6th
of June 2006. A series of
meetings followed the
determination of the case on
that day. The most relevant of
the decisions taken at the
meetings was that the king
makers requested the queen
mother to nominate a person to
be considered as a chief for the
Wenchi Traditional Area to
replace the deceased chief.
The queen
mother replied that she needed
three weeks to make the
nomination. The king makers who
made the request to the queen
mother were of the opinion that
since the death of the last
chief, the stool of Wenchi had
been vacant for some time and
needed to be occupied. They
premised their demand on the
facts that already two royals
had expressed interest in the
position of the chief and had
made the necessary approaches to
the queen mother to that effect.
Further, the process of
replacing the chief had started
soon after the former chief died
in 2004. It was not new to the
contestants, the queen mother
and the king makers. They
therefore insisted that they
could not wait for as long as
three weeks demanded by the
queen mother for a chief to be
nominated. The queen mother on
the other hand maintained that
there were consultations to be
made and other contestants had
to be given the chance to put
forward their interests and
therefore she could not be
hustled into making the
nomination as immediately as the
king makers demanded.
Following
what appeared to be a stalemate,
the king makers approached the
queen mother three times for her
to nominate a candidate to be
considered as the chief of
Wenchi. According to the king
makers, she delayed
unreasonably. They therefore
approached Madam Abena Frema
Atuahene who performed the
customary tasks which would have
been performed by the queen
mother in respect of the
nomination and installation of
the chief. Eventually, Kwadwo
Nyam Nketia, hereinafter
referred to as the first
respondent, was nominated,
enstooled and installed as the
chief of Wenchi to replace the
deceased Nana Abrefa Mbore
Bediatuo VII.
The queen
mother, the Wenchi Abakomahene
and Wenchi Jumankwaihene filed a
petition in the Brong Ahafo
Regional House of chiefs. The
respondents to the petition were
Kwadwo Nyam Nketia, the chief
elect, Nana Owusu Ansa Kokroko,
the Krontihene and Acting
Omanhene of Wenchi and Nana Kumi
Adusi Poku, Gyasehene of Wenchi
as the first, second and third
respondents respectively. The
reliefs claimed in the petition
were for:
“a. A
declaration that the purported
nomination of the first
respondent by Madam Abena Frema
Atuahene as the candidate for
Wenchi paramount stool is void;
b. A
declaration that the first
petitioner is the rightful
person to nominate a candidate
to the King makers of Wenchi
Traditional Council to be
installed as the Omanhene of
Wenchi.
c. A
declaration that the 2nd
and 3rd respondents
cannot install and enstool the 1st
respondent as the Omanhene of
Wenchi as the person who
purported to nominate him lacks
capacity to do so.
d. An order
for perpetual injunction
restraining the 1st
respondent from styling or
holding himself as the Chief of
Wenchi;
e. An order
of perpetual injunction
restraining the 2nd
and 3rd respondents
from installing and enstooling
the 1st respondent as
the Chief of Wenchi.”
In the
Regional House of Chiefs,
judgment was given in favour of
the respondents. The petitioners
appealed to the National House
of Chiefs which entered judgment
for the petitioners. It was
against the latter judgment that
the appellants who were
respondents to the original
petition have appealed to this
court.
The original
grounds of the appeal were:
a)
“The judgment of Nananom of the
Judicial Committee is against
the weight of evidence.
b)
The judicial committee found
that the 1st
appellant/respondent had not
been properly summoned by the
Elders and Kingmakers of Wenchi
to nominate a candidate for the
Wenchi paramount stool contrary
to the clear evidence on record
that 1st
appellant/respondent admitted
being so summoned and thereby
drew an erroneous conclusion.
c)
The Judicial Committee erred
when it found that 1st
appellant/respondent never
agreed or refused to nominate a
candidate despite overwhelming
evidence on record to the
contrary.
d)
The Judicial Committee erred on
a matter of fact when it found
that 1st
appellant/respondent never had
any opportunity to nominate a
candidate despite 1st
appellant/respondent’s own
admissions on record to the
contrary.
e)
The Judicial Committee erred as
a matter of law when it found
that Exhibit 1, the Report of
the Wenchi Stool Affairs
Committee of the National House
of Chiefs, could not be relied
upon by a judicial panel to
arrive at a judgment and thereby
rejected the findings made
therein and arrived at an
erroneous conclusion.
f)
The Judicial Committee erred as
a matter of law that the
processes leading to the
enstoolment of 1st
respondent/appellant was not
consistent with Wenchi customary
practice.
g)
Nananom of the Judicial
Committee of the National House
of Chiefs (hereinafter,
“Nananom) erred when they held
that 1st
petitioner/appellant/respondent
(hereinafter, “1st
respondent”) “never took part in
any meeting to discuss the issue
of nomination of a candidate”
contrary to clear evidence on
record by which 1st
respondent admitted as such.
h)
Nananom erred when they held l
that 1st respondent
was never summoned to a meeting
of the Wenchi royal family and
Wenchi Kingmakers contrary to
clear evidence on record.
i)
Nananom erred when they
disregarded evidence of Wenchi
custom to the contrary and held
that where a chief-elect uses
any sword other than the
customarily designated sword the
enstoolment cannot be valid
under customary law.
j)
Nananom erred on a point of law
when they held that where a
chief-elect is not confined for
the required period his
enstoolment cannot be valid
under customary law.
k)
Nananom erred on a point of
mixed law and fact when they
held that the enstoolment of 1st
respondent/appellant without the
participation of the 1st
respondent and the procedure
adopted did not conform to the
customary practice of Wenchi.
l)
Nananom erred when they relied
on alleged facts not in the
record of appeal to determine
the appeal.
m)
Nananom erred on a point of
mixed law and fact when they
held that the trial court, the
judicial committee of the
Brong-Ahafo Regional House of
Chiefs, erred in relying on the
National House of Chiefs’ Wenchi
Stool Affairs Committee on
Enquiry Report to arrive at its
judgment.
n)
Nananom erred when they found
that only two chiefs in the
history of Wenchi had been
enstooled by kingmakers without
the participation of the queen
mother and fell into further
error when they held that such
was not the customary practice
of Wenchi.”
The
appellants later filed what they
described as additional grounds
of appeal. From the original and
additional grounds of appeal,
the issues which the appellants
summarized for determination in
this court were:
“(1) Whether
or not 1st respondent
unreasonably refused to nominate
a candidate for the Wenchi
Paramount Stool?
(2)
Whether or not the kingmakers of
the Wenchi Paramount Stool
properly exercised their rights
to nominate and enstool 1st
appellant upon the refusal of 1st
respondent to honour the
kingmakers’ request to nominate
one of two known and accepted
candidate?
(3)
Whether or not the report of the
committee of Enquiry on Wenchi
Stool Affairs, 1976 could
validly be relied upon for a
judgment?
(4)
Whether or not 1st
appellant was properly nominated
and enstooled as the Omanhene of
Wenchi.”
A number of
issues arose from the above as
well as from the statement of
case of the respondents. To
resolve the issues, it is
pertinent to consider the 1992
Constitution, Article 277 which
defines who a chief is in this
country. It reads:
“a person,
who, hailing from the
appropriate family and lineage,
has been validly nominated,
elected or selected and
enstooled, enskinned or
installed as a chief or queen
mother in accordance with the
relevant customary law and
usage.”
This article
underscores the requisites to be
satisfied when considering the
making of a chief. They are
simply these:
1.
Nomination
2.
Election/Selection
3.
Enstoolment, enskinment or
installation
The
satisfaction of these
requirements should be in
accordance with the peculiar
customs and usages of the people
in the area for whom the chief
is being considered. From a
plain reading of the definition
in the Constitution, the most
fundamental requirement is
nomination. This applies of
course to areas where nomination
is an essential requirement
before settling on a person to
be considered as a chief. In
this context, nomination simply
means the proposal of a person
for election or selection as a
chief. Essentially, nomination
boils down to naming or
declaring a person who is
considered by the queen mother
as the rightful person to be
made a chief.
Nomination
should first take place before
all the other processes can
follow. In other words, it
should always precede the
election, selection, enstoolment
and installation of the chief.
The last four processes depend
on the existence of appropriate
candidate. They can only be
performed after nomination. It
is obvious that if no person is
nominated, there will be no
person to be elected, selected,
enstooled or installed as a
chief.
Nomination
provides the foundation on the
basis of which the other
processes will take place. If
there is no nomination at all,
or where the nomination is so
flawed or faulty as to be void,
there will be no basis for
performing the other four
processes. In effect, nomination
is sine qua non to the making of
a chief, under normal
circumstances.
At customary
law, there are clearly well
settled procedures to follow in
making the nomination. It is not
everybody or anybody who can
make a nomination. By custom,
only accredited queen mothers
are authorized to make
nominations. The only exception
to the rule on nomination by
queen mothers is where the king
makers take over the making of a
chief after the failure or
refusal of the queen mother to
make the nomination.
In the
instant case, all the parties
accept the fact that the first
respondent is the queen mother
of Wenchi. In that capacity, she
is the rightful person to
nominate a candidate for
consideration as Wenchi chief.
The facts
show that after the judgment had
been given by the Regional House
of Chiefs in connection with the
case filed by Nana Kusi Apea,
the family had their first
meeting. That was on the 6th
June 2006. The object was to
celebrate the victory and
ostensibly to plan the way
forward. There was another
meeting in the evening of the
same day. At that meeting, the
queen mother was requested to
give to the king makers the name
of the next candidate to be
considered as the chief. She
asked to be given three weeks
within which to make the
nomination. On the following day
at 10.00 am there was another
meeting at which she was again
asked to name a candidate. She
repeated her request to be given
three weeks to name the
candidate. The next request for
the candidate was made at
another meeting at 3.00 pm on
the 7th of June. She
again asked to be given three
weeks. By 6.30 p.m on the 7th
of June, 2006, sounds were heard
of “fontomfrom” which signified
that a new chief had been
selected. He was the first
appellant. By the 12th
of June 2006, the chief had been
installed.
That was
immediately followed by the
issuance of the petition in the
Regional House of Chiefs which
has culminated in the instant
appeal. Throughout the case, the
appellants had maintained that
the failure of the queen mother
to name a candidate when
requested to do so was
“unreasonable.” They took the
view that since the behavior of
the queen mother was
unreasonable, they were
justified in going ahead to take
over the nomination from her and
to install another person for
the position of a chief.
The simple
answer to this issue is this:
there is no doubt that the queen
mother was given three chances
to nominate a candidate. But all
the three chances took place
within a period of about twenty
four hours – from 6th
June to 7th June
2006. For the nomination to be
properly made, all interested
royals should be given the
chance to consider putting their
names forward for the post of
the chief, if they are
qualified. Additionally, custom
demanded that there should be
consultations by the queen
mother with her advisors as well
as elders. There are several
authorities on the need for
consultations in such matters as
will be found in R. S. Rattray,
Ashanti Law and
Constitution, 1929 ed.
at pa 1443 and In Re
Kwabeng Stool; Karikari and
Anor. V Ababio & Others
[2001-2002] SCGLR 515.
Considering
the fact that the demand was
made soon after returning from
the court judgment and repeated
at 10 am and 3 pm, it follows
that the queen mother was given
a period of about twenty four
hours within which to name a
candidate. It cannot be said
that the queen mother was given
sufficient time to make
necessary consultations or give
due chances to other royals to
decide whether or not to put
their names forward for
consideration. The basic
question is whether or not the
period of twenty four hours
given to the queen mother to
perform that customary function
was reasonable or unreasonable
In the peculiar circumstances of
this case, it cannot be said
that the twenty-four hour period
given to the queen mother to
perform that customary function
was reasonable. In the
circumstances, the failure or
refusal of the queen mother to
make the nomination within
twenty four hours could not be
described as unreasonable.
She was not
given adequate time to perform
her functions. If she was not
able to perform her functions
properly, it was the nature of
the demands made by the king
makers which made it impossible
for her to perform her functions
properly. In effect, the king
makers created the conditions
which made it impossible to
perform her functions properly
and then turned round to
complain and blame her that she
did not perform her functions
properly. That was unacceptable.
Was the situation created
different from the proverbial
statement that “you can give a
dog a bad name so that you can
get the opportunity to hang it?”
That is unacceptable to a court
of equity and conscience like
this Supreme Court.
When it
became apparent to the
appellants that the queen mother
was not going to nominate a
candidate within the time that
they wanted, the king makers are
alleged to have contacted the
Obaapanin of the family by name
Madam Abena Frema Atuahene. It
is not clear if she nominated
the first appellant for the
position of Wenchi chief. As
stated already, nomination is a
duty conferred on queen mothers.
For a woman to qualify to make a
nomination, she must be a queen
mother. If the one who performs
the function is not a queen
mother, she is not qualified to
perform that function.
Obaapanin
Frema Atuahene was not a queen
mother. If she was contacted to
nominate the first appellant as
the chief and did in fact
nominate him as such, she was
not qualified to do so. That is
the same as saying that she did
not have the capacity to make
the nomination or perform the
function exclusively assigned to
queen mothers. Her nomination
was therefore invalid.
At every
given time, there is only one
queen mother in a place. There
can be no proper situation where
there is a queen mother at post
and yet another person is chosen
to perform duties assigned
exclusively to the queen mother.
If what the appellants did is
endorsed, it will be a recipe
for chaos: It will mean that it
is possible to have a queen
mother at post and yet king
makers can bypass her and get
another person to perform her
functions for her, whether or
not she has endorsed that move
or delegated the other person to
function for her.
At her
installation, every queen
mother including the first
respondent swears to obey the
call of the elders at day or
night time, during rainy days or
at non rainy days. It was
alleged that the queen mother in
the instant case was summoned by
the elders but she refused to
heed their calls. The failure to
attend to the calls of the king
makers constituted a ground for
destoolment. Common sense alone
dictates that if any queen
mother including the first
respondent is recalcitrant to,
or refuses to heed the call of,
the elders she provides a ground
for her deposition. She should
be deposed to pave the way for
another person to be appointed
as the queen mother and to
perform the functions assigned
to queen mothers. That was what
happened in Republic v
Akim Abuakwa Traditional
Council; Ex parte Sakyiraa II
[1975] 2 GLR 115.
As was stated
several years ago in Komey
v Onanka [1962] GLR52 by
Ollennu J (as he then was), at p
53:
“So long as
the substantive holder of an
office has not been removed, has
not resigned or abdicated or
died, the office cannot be
vacant, and any purported
installation of another person
into that office is void ab
initio.”
We would add
that so long as the substantive
holder of the position of the
queen mother had not been
removed, had not resigned or
abdicated or died, the office
cannot be vacant for another
person to be asked to perform
her functions for her without
her authority or consent.
All the
parties in the instant case
agree that at all material times
up till today, the first
respondent was and has remained
the queen mother for Wenchi. It
was not proper to ignore her and
get another person to perform
her functions while she
continued to remain at post as
queen mother and continued to
operate as such queen mother.
Obaapanin Frema Atuahene could
not have properly performed the
functions assigned to queen
mothers while there was a
sitting queen mother who had not
delegated her so to do.
There is no
doubt that where the queen
mother is unwilling to
co-operate with the king makers
or reluctant to nominate a
candidate for three occasions,
the king makers can proceed to
put forward a candidate as a
chief. This is a customary law
principle too well settled to
require any elaboration. An
instance will however be found
in Republic v Boateng; Ex
parte Adu-Gyamfi II
[1972] 1 GLR 317. The taking
over by the king makers should
however occur only where the
queen mother has been given
reasonable opportunity to
nominate the candidate but she
has failed to do so. If the king
makers in the instant case went
ahead and put forward the first
appellant as the chief because
the queen mother did not name a
candidate within twenty four
hours, it was they who made it
impossible for her to name the
candidate by the haste in which
they demanded the candidate from
her. As stated already, they
created a situation which
disabled the queen mother from
performing her duties properly.
They could not turn round and
take advantage of the situation
which they themselves had
created by using it to take away
her functions from her.
References
were made to the fact in the
past there had been occasions
where chiefs had been nominated
in the Wenchi Traditional Area
without the involvement of queen
mothers. The instances cited
from the Committee of
Enquiry into Wenchi Stool
Affairs were situations
where the queen mothers were
given reasonable times and
reasonable opportunities to
nominate candidates and they
refused or neglected to name the
candidates. They are
distinguishable from the facts
of the instant situation where
the queen mother was not given
the opportunity to nominate a
candidate because she was not
given adequate time to confer
with her elders or make the
necessary consultations before
announcing her choice of
candidate.
It was argued
that the court or judicial
committee of the National House
of Chiefs could not base its
decision on the report of the
Committee of Enquiry into the
Wenchi Stool Affairs.
That argument is untenable
considering the statutory law on
the issue. In the Courts Act,
1993 (Act 459), s 55(2), the
courts are permitted to consider
“reported cases, text books and
other sources that may be
appropriate” when deciding on
the contents of customary law.
The issue at stake in the
instant case was the content of
the customary law of Wenchi
which was covered by the report
in question. The Regional House
of Chiefs was right in taking
into account the report of the
Committee on Wenchi Stool
Affairs which was
clearly one of the appropriate
sources. By the Courts
(Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 620),
s 5, the judicial committees of
the Regional House of Chiefs
forms part of the lower courts
of Ghana.
The argument
that the process of nomination
should be considered as having
been started in 2004 when the
last chief died or in 2005 when
Nana Kusi Apea instituted his
action is untenable. The case of
Nana Kusi Appea lasted for
nearly two years. Even if the
process started in 2004 or 2005
and therefore could be said to
have been pending, the king
makers and all concerned knew
pretty well that the lapse of
time for the litigation had
created a lull. Memories must
have faded or waned and so
people had to be reminded or
interest rekindled somehow or
the other. These could not be
done within twenty four hours
which the king makers gave to
the queen mother to make the
nomination. It should be borne
in mind that the exercise was to
nominate a chief for a whole
group of people and not just a
few individuals.
The attempt
to single out Wenchi Traditional
Area as having special customs
different and distinct from
other Akan customs on the powers
of queen mothers and
installation of chiefs was not
successful. The custom on the
role of queen mothers in the
installation of chiefs which
featured in the instant case was
the same as the general Akan
custom on such matters. Wenchi
was part of the Ashanti Region
until the establishment of the
Brong Ahafo Region during the
rule of the late Dr Nkrumah’s
CPP Government. The creation of
the separate Region did not
create along it new concepts of
customary law for that new
creation to be used as the
reason for the generation of new
customs. The people of Wenchi
were Akans within the Ashanti
Region and their customs
remained unchanged in spite of
the creation of the separate
Region. It was the same people
who were within the Ashanti
Empire who geographically were
mapped out to belong to a
different Region.
On the facts,
the queen mother could not be
said to have acted unreasonably
merely because she did not
nominate a candidate within
twenty four hours of the king
makers making their demand for a
candidate. The consequence of
not giving the queen mother
sufficient time to nominate a
candidate and proceeding without
her involvement was that the
first appellant’s election,
selection, enstoolment and
installation took place without
a valid nomination.
Apparently,
it is to forestall such hasty
installations that the
Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759),
s 62(2) now contains the
sweeping provision that:
“(2) Despite
any provision of this Act, an
installation of a chief or queen
mother is not valid unless, at
least fourteen days before the
date of the installation, public
notice of it in accordance with
the custom of the area, has been
given.”
If the
installation of the first
appellant had taken place after
the coming into force of Act
759, it would not have been
valid, considering the fact that
the twenty-four hour notice or
the seven-day notice of the
installation (from 6th
June to 12th June
2006) would not have satisfied
the mandatory two weeks demanded
by Act 759.
It has been
explained already that where
nomination is an essential part
of the process for the making of
a chief, like the Wenchi
Traditional Area, the most
fundamental process is
nomination. All other processes
are contingent upon a valid
nomination taking place. Without
a valid nomination, there can be
no valid election or selection
or enstoolment or installation.
On the facts
of the instant case, the
purported nomination of the
first appellant was totally
flawed, faulty, invalid and
void. The ex post facto
processes of election,
selection, enstoolment and
installation of the first
appellant are irrelevant because
they lacked the necessary
foundation on the basis of which
they could stand. As Lord
Denning put it in the celebrated
Sierra Leonean case of
Macfoy v United Africa Trading
Company Ltd [1961] 3 All
ER 1169, at pages 1172-1173, PC:
“If an act is
void, then it is in law a
nullity. It is not only bad, but
incurably bad… And every
proceeding which is founded on
it is also bad and incurably
bad.”
That passage
was appropriately adopted and
applied in Mosi v Bagyina
[1963] 1 GLR 337, SC.
In the
instant case, there was no
nomination at all. If there was
any nomination, it was void and
incurably bad. All the processes
which followed from that void
nomination were bad and
incurably bad.
The
subsequent processes of
election, selection, enstoolment
and installation of the first
appellant simply fall out of
place and should be regarded as
equally invalid and void.
Having taken
this line of reasoning, it is
not necessary to consider the
propriety or otherwise of the
processes which took place after
the flawed nomination.
For the
foregoing reasons, the appeal
fails and is dismissed.
[SGD] S.
A. BROBBEY
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
[SGD] DR. S. K.
DATE-BAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
[SGD]
P. BAFFOE - BONNIE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
[SGD]
B. T. ARYEETEY
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
[SGD] V.
AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL:
NANA ASANTE
BEDIATUO FOR THE APPELLANTS.
MUJEEB RAHMAN
AHMED WITH HIM MICHAEL KWABENA
ATTA-AGYEI FOR THE RESPONDENTS.
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