JUDGMENT
EDWARD WIREDU, J.S.C.:
This appeal is from the decision
of the Chieftaincy Tribunal of
the National House of Chiefs
dated 16th August, 1995.
This judgment by a majority of 3
to 2 affirmed the decision of
the Ashanti Region House of
Chiefs dated 9th March, 1993, in
favour of the co-petitioner
Respondent who will hereafter be
referred to simply as the
Respondent.
The Ashanti Regional Houses of
Chief by it's decision referred
to supra had allowed an appeal
brought by the Respondent
against the decision of the
Judicial Committee of Kumasi
Traditional Council which by a
majority of 2 to 1 upheld a
claim by the petitioner
appellant by its judgment dated
31st May, 1991.
The petitioner appellant in this
case will hereafter be referred
to simply as the appellant.
The main issue raised for
determination in this appeal is
an answer to the question
"Whether there exists a
constitutional relationship
between the appellant stool and
the Asaago Odikro Stool?" The
appellant claims that there
exits such a relationship and
contends that the Asaago Odikro
swears the oath of allegiance to
him as Taahyenhene to Otumfuo
the Asantehene whilst the
Respondent by his counter-claim,
claims that he is the Head of
Family of Asaago Stool. He
joined issue with the appellant
by an oath contending that the
Asaago Stool swears the oath of
allegiance direct to the Golden
Stool (Asantehene) and that the
Asaago Stool is not subservient
to the Taahyenhene.
It is of significance to note
here that it is this issue which
was determined before the trial
Chieftancy Tribunal in Kumasi in
favour of the appellant.
The proceedings show that both
parties provided evidence
traditionally as to how their
respective stools came from
Denkyira to settle in Ashanti,
evidence on matters within
living memory both oral and
documentary. The appellant
provided evidence by himself and
three other witnesses including
the Obaapanin of Asaago, the
present Odikro himself and one
Baffour Awuah Gyasehene of
Atwimahene. The appellant
further tendered in evidence
proceedings relating to an
action the Obaapanin and Asaago
Odikro brought before the Kumasi
Traditional Council against him
when he purported to remove the
Odikro by oath. The proceedings
in this action show that the
matter was settled and the
result was accepted by the
parties. The appellant further
tendered in evidence a letter
sent to him by the Respondent
claiming a share of monies
realised from the sale of a
portion of Asaago lands stating
in that letter as follows among
others that "We are all your
children and we all belong to
you."
The appellant provided evidence
to show that Asaago lands were
under his control and that he
had settled some Northerners on
a portion of Asaago land. There
was evidence also that the
Asaago Odikro swore before the
Taahyenhene when the latter was
going to swear the oath of
allegiance to the Asantehene
(Exhibit A). He further provided
evidence to show that the
Respondent reported to him in
the company of the Gyasehene of
Atwimahene (PW1) with the thigh
of a slaughtered sheep the
removal of Asaago Odikro as the
latters overlord. The three
witnesses of the appellant
supported his case substantially
in almost all the material facts
especially in matters, of recent
events within living memory
relating to the two stools.
The Respondent provided
traditional evidence as to how
the Asaago people came to settle
in Ashanti from Denkyira and by
three other witnesses.
Traditionally the evidence led
on behalf of the co-petitioner
Respondent generally accord with
the experience in practise that
a stranger to Ashanti must first
go through an Ashanti Paramount
Stool before being introduced to
the Asantehene to get settled.
To that extent only, the
traditional evidence brought by
the Respondent as to how his
ancestors came to Ashanti
appears to be in accord with
customary practice but when that
evidence however is weighed
against recent events as
narrated by the appellant as
supported by Asaago Obaapanin,
the Asaago Odikro himself, the
contents of Exhibit B the letter
written by Respondent to the
appellant such traditional
evidence becomes of little
significance. It is also not
devoid of the usual
contradictions and
inconsistences associated with
this kind of evidence.
The contents of Exhibit A, C and
D negate the claim by the
Respondent that there is no
constitutional relationship
between the two stools but that
there exist merely a friendly
relationship. The evidence of
recent events on matters within
living memory testified to by
the witnesses for the appellant
on the Asaago stool clearly show
that more weight ought to be
given to this than to the
traditional evidence which in
this case as in all other
traditional evidence is full of
inconsistencies, contradiction
and weaknesses.
The issue posed for
determination in this
proceedings is one of fact. Two
rival stories were put up by the
contesting parties namely, i.e.
whether the Asaago Odikro swears
the oath of allegiance to the
Taahyenhene as is contended by
the petitioner appellant or
whether the Asaago Stool swears
the oath of allegiance direct to
the Golden Stool as contended by
the Respondent.
The trial Chieftaincy Tribunal
in my respectful view directed
itself properly to this issue
and preferred the case presented
by and on behalf of the
appellant to the case put up by
and brought on behalf of the
Respondent by making the
following finding of fact:
(a) That from time immemorial
the Asaago village has always
owed allegiance to the
Taahyenhene Stool.
(b) That the Respondent sent
the thigh of a sheep in the
company of (PW1) to inform him
(the Taahyenhene) officially
that he Respondent had destooled
the Asaago Odikro.
(c) That the contents of
Exhibit A show clearly that on
26th May, 1975 when the
Taahyenhene swore the oath of
allegiance, the Asaago Odikro
swore in front of him showing
that the latter owes allegiance
to the former.
(d) That Asaago lands are under
the control of the Taahyenhene
and that the Taahyenhene was the
person who allocated part of the
land to some Northerners to
establish the Zongo Community.
That pacification rites in
Asaago and Oda river are
performed by him. The Tribunal
rejected the evidence of the
Respondent and his witnesses
that Asaago swears the oath of
allegiance direct to the
Asantehene/Golden Stool and that
his ancestors have sworn such
oath to the Asantehene.
(e) That the Asaago lands and
rites thereof are performed by
the Akyimpehene or Ankaasehene.
The Tribunal further rejected
the evidence of the Respondent
that it was the Asantehene Nana
Osei Tutu who gave the Asaago
lands to his ancestors which
evidence was contradicted by
(DW1) that it was Obiri Yeboah
who gave Asaago lands to
Respondent ancestors. It further
rejected the evidence of the
Respondent that he is the
Abusuapanin of the Asaago Odikro
Stool.
The proceedings in the action
taken by the Obaapanin and the
Odikro of Asaago against the
appellant tendered in evidence
as Exhibit (1) was properly and
rightly received in evidence by
the trial Tribunal and the
observations made by the panel
members of the Kumasi
Traditional Council who settled
the case set to rest any doubt
that may be entertained as to
the Constitutional relationship
between the appellant and the
Asaago Stool. See the case of
Egyin vrs. Aye SC 1962 (2) SLR
187. In this connection the
following observations made by
the individual members are
pertinent:
"Baffour Osei Akoto: I want
Nananom to think carefully,
about the "matter whether it is
proper for Taahyenhene to
destool his subordinate "Chief
Asaago Odikro arbitrarily".
"Chief Asaago Odikro
arbitarily".
"Akyeamehene page 90:
"Akyeamehene: It is anti-custom
for the Taahyenhene to swear the
"Great Oath to destool a chief.
Oheneba Osei Yaw,
"Kyidomhene has admitted that
the Defendant swore the
"Great Oath of destool the
Plaintiff and that he Kyidomhene
"invited the Defendant to
accompany him to the Palace to
"remove the Great Oath but he
refused to do. To assert
"that the Plaintiff says he
swores with the Mpomponsus swore
"to Otumfuo is unrealistic
because already the Plaintiff
"has swore the oath of
allegiance to the Defendant as
his "overlord."
Note: Nananom were unanimous in
their decision that the
"Defendant has erred for
swearing the Great Oath to
destool
the Plaintiff, Opanin Kwadwo
Nsiah, Asaago Odikro,
Obaapanin Yaa Asantewaa.
Secondly, the Defendant has also
erred for refusing to attend the
call of Oheneba Osei Yaw,
Kyidomhene to enable Kyidomhene
to withdraw the Great Oath
for peaceful settlement. At this
juncture the Defendant
rendered apology through Oheneba
Osei Yaw, Kyidomhene to
Nana Agyeman Nkwantabisa III,
Adontenhene the acting
President. "Kyidomhene and the
Plaintiff's Asaago Odikro
and Asaago Obaapanin for
wrongful destooling his
subordinate chief." The emphasis
are mine.
(g) The Tribunal rejected the
traditional evidence on behalf
of the Respondent as to who
actually settled the Respondents
ancestors on the banks of Oda
river (Asaago lands) in view of
the contradictions by the
Respondents witnesses DW1 who
testified that it was the
Akyimpehene who owns the land
and DW3 said the Asaago lands
belong to Ankaasehene.
Having accepted the evidence
brought by and on behalf of the
petitioner appellant, the trial
Chieftaincy Tribunal gave its
decision in favour of the
appellant. On appeal, that
decision was reversed by the
Ashanti Region House of Chiefs.
A careful examination of the
judgment from the Ashanti Region
House of Chiefs reveals that its
judgment was based on the
following:
(1) That an appeal was by way of
re-hearing. The House thereafter
erroneously assumed that the
re-hearing gave the House the
same powers as the trial
Tribunal without regard to the
judgment of the trial Tribunal
and the findings of fact made by
the trial Tribunal.
(2) By referring to what it
considered contradictions,
inconsistencies and weaknesses
in the traditional evidence
brought by and on behalf of the
appellant without considering
similar inconsistencies,
contradictions and weaknesses in
the case of Respondent referred
to and dealt with by the trial
Tribunal in its judgment.
(3) By drawing wrong inferences
from the document exhibit 1, the
proceedings in the case brought
by the Obaapanin and Asaago
Odikro against the appellant,
Exhibit B the letter written by
the Respondent to the appellant
in which the Respondent
emphatically stated "we are all
your children and we all belong
to you" after referring to
various sums given to individual
including the Obaapanin Yaa Obo.
Nothing is contained in the said
letter that the two stools (i.e.
Taahyen and Asaago Stool) own a
common land at Asaago which was
sold as the House would want it
appear to justify the
co-petitioner claim as his share
of the money.
The majority decision of the
members of the Chieftaincy
Tribunal of the National House
of Chiefs which affirmed the
decision of the Regional House
of Chiefs fell into the same
error by reviewing the whole
evidence in the case as if it
were re-trying the case itself,
thereby assuming the right to
make findings of fact of its own
entirely different from what the
trial Tribunal had made basing
its decision mostly on
inconsistent and contradictory
traditional evidence which the
trial Chieftaincy Tribunal had
properly addressed itself and
considered as unreliable to
determine the issue at stake.
The National House gave greater
weight to the traditional
evidence brought by and on
behalf of the Respondent
disregarding the test to apply
to such evidence as laid down
and accepted in the Bonsie case
reference 1957 (1) GLR 237. 1957
3 WALC 237.
The more serious objection the
two appellate Tribunals i.e.
(The Ashanti Regional House of
Chiefs and the National House of
Chiefs) decisions is that they
were given per incuriam to the
Supreme Court decision in the
case of Nana Kwaku Agyemang vrs.
Nana Boadu Kwadwo II. Tafohene
substituted by Nana Ponko
Baffour Civil Appeal No.6/93 of
8/2/94 unreported which
determined as to which Adikros
in Ashanti may swear the oath of
allegiance direct to the Golden
Stool. This decision is binding
on all the Chieftaincy Tribunal,
all the traditional Courts in
Ghana and the Supreme Court
itself the latter in principle.
See the 1992 Constitution.
Nothing special or perculiar has
been established by the facts of
this case to justify a departure
from the principles laid down in
the above case.
The Supreme Court decision supra
affirmed a decision of the
Judicial Committee of the Kumasi
Traditional Council of 4th
October, 1994 which had earlier
been affirmed by the National
House of Chiefs on 19th March,
1992. The latter decision laid
down two conditions which must
be satisfied for an Odikro to
justify his claim to swearing an
oath of allegiance direct to the
Asantehene.
Those conditions are:
(a) That the Odikro must perform
a direct duty/duties to the
Golden Stool and
(b) That on the death of the
occupant of the Golden Stool the
said Odikro must swear to the
deceased body of the Asantehene
lying in state and that on the
death of said Odikro the Golden
Stool must be represented at his
funeral.
The above conditions must
co-exist.
The respondent did not on his
evidence satisfy the above two
requirements. His claim to
supplying fish (which has
ceased) (to the Asantehene was
not direct but was through an
intermediary).
It is trite law that primary
findings of fact are the
preserve of trial Tribunals and
whenever such findings are
supported by evidence on record
they are not to be disturbed.
Such findings ought to be
respected through the hierarchy
of the Courts unless they are
not supported by evidence on
record or are considered to be
unreasonable on the facts of the
case as presented. See Quaye
vrs. Mariamu, 1961 GLR 93 S.C.
Adjabeng vrs. Adjetey 1961 GLR
465.
It is not open to an appellate
Court to usurp the function of
making primary findings of fact
by saying if I were trying the
case I would have accepted the
evidence of this or that
witness. That is the preserve of
the trial Court.
In the instant case the trial
Chieftaincy Tribunal directed
itself to the issue posed for
determination. After carefully
considering and reviewing the
two rival stories put up by and
on behalf of the parties, the
Tribunal accepted on the
preponderance of evidence
especially on matters within
living memory, the case
presented by and on behalf of
the appellant to that brought by
and on behalf of Respondent. All
the findings made in favour of
the appellant are supported by
evidence on record. The trial
Tribunal rejected the evidence
brought by and on behalf of
Respondent. The trial Tribunal
further rejected the evidence of
Respondent and his witnesses
that the Asaago Stool swears the
oath of allegiance direct to the
Golden Stool, it further
rejected the evidence that any
of the ancestors of the Asaago
Odikro had ever sworn the oath
of allegiance direct to the
Golden Stool. The burden of
proving this which rested on the
co-petitioner Respondent, he
failed to discharge, he was
unable to bring himself within
the principles and conditions
laid down in Nana Kwaku Agyemang
case supra.
It is pertinent to note that in
this case the Asaago Obaapanin
who owns the Asaago Stool and
nominates its occupants
testified that the Asaago swears
the oath of allegiance to the
Taahyenhene. Her evidence was
substantially supported by the
observation made by the members
of the Kumasi Traditional
Council in Exhibit 'C' which was
accepted by the trial
Chieftaincy Tribunal, hence its
judgment in favour of the
appellant. It therefore
surprises me that in the face of
such overwhelming evidence of
established facts of events
within living memory tendered at
the trial in favour of the
appellant and accepted by the
trial Tribunal after a careful
review of the evidence, which
neither the trial Tribunal nor
any of the appellate Chieftaincy
Tribunals expressed a doubt or
any difficulty in arriving at a
decision one way or the other on
the facts as were presented,
that this Court is now being
invited to refer back to the
National House of Chiefs, this
plain and simple issue as to
which of the two rival stories
touching the issue of allegiance
was to be preferred to the
other, which issue, each of the
lower Courts had determined.
To me the trial Traditional
Council was right in its view in
resolving that issue in favour
of the appellant. Its judgment
is unimpeachable. The judgment
of both the Regional House of
Chiefs and the National House of
Chiefs which decided otherwise
are wrong and ought to be so
held.
EDWARD WIREDU
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.
C. HAYFRON-BENJAMIN, J.S.C.:
The Plaintiff in this case, who
is now the Appellant before us,
swore the Great Oath of Asante
in respect of his claim to title
to "Asaago town and its
outskirt". He also claimed that
the Odikro stool of Asaago owed
allegiance to the occupant of
the Taahyen Stool. The majority
of Nanaanom in the Judicial
Committee of the Kumasi
Traditional Council gave
judgment in favour of the
Plaintiff to the effect that
"Asaago and all its outskirts
belong to the Taahyenhene"
Since the Judicial Committee of
the Kumasi Traditional Council
has no jurisdiction in land
matters that decision was null
and void and of no effect.
Nanaanom in both the Regional
House of Chiefs and in the
National House had no difficulty
in identifying this illegality
and set it aside. Interest in
this decision arises because the
Plaintiff now Appellant before
us prays that this Court should
set the judgment of the
Chieftaincy Tribunal of the
National House which affirmed
the decision of the Ashanti
Region House of Chiefs and enter
judgment in his favour. The
effect of such a judgment, in my
respectful opinion would be to
grant him the reliefs which he
sought in the Kumasi Traditional
Council and inferentially grant
him title to the Asaago town and
its outskirts lands. Such a
judgment cannot stand. I think
the case of MOSI vs. BAGYINA may
be invoked in expunging such a
paterntly illegal and
unwarranted decision from the
record. Accordingly I will set
aside the declaration of the
Judicial Committee of the Kumasi
Traditional Council that the
Asaago town and its outskirts
belong to the Taahyenhene.
Before us the Appellant contends
that:
"The central issue calling for
determination as far as this
appeal is concerned is whether
or not the Asaago stool owes
allegiance to the Taahyen Stool
and whether or not the Defendant
Respondent was clothed with the
Requisite capacity to initiate
his action."
Dealing with the issue of
capacity first, I think the
Appellant confuses the Oath
swearing process with a
counterclaim. The Kumasi
Traditional Council by their
majority also fell into the same
error. A customary Oath to
initiate a lie must be responded
to by a similar Oath either
denying the assertion in the
Oath or making a counter claim
to the same or a superior
subject matter. It is only then
that issue is joined and the
matter may be adjudicated upon.
It is a statutorily recognisable
form for instituting a cause or
matter affecting chieftaincy. In
the circumstances if the person
upon whom the Oath is pronounced
does not respond to the Oath,
that person must be customarily
arrested (Dadua) and there is
then admission of liability or
guilt by the person who fails to
respond to the Oath and a fine
and customary sanctions are
imposed. In the present
situations I do not think it is
proper for the Appellant to
swear to a customary instituting
a cause or matter affecting
chieftaincy and claim that the
Respondent had no "capacity to
initiate his action". First of
all by swearing in response to
the Appellants' Oath the
Respondent was not thereby
making a counterclaim. If the
Appellant knew that the
Respondent was not the proper
person upon whom the Oath was to
be sworn, then he had sworn a
reckless Oath (Ntamhunu) for
which he must suffer the
customary sanctions. I do not
think that the Appellant is
serious in his challenge to the
Respondent's capacity: For if
the Appellant persists then the
Judicial Committee of the Kumasi
Traditional Council must have
dismissed his claims. The good
sense in this situation is that
a party cannot institute an
action against another when he
(the party) knows that the other
has capacity and pray the Court
or Tribunal to give judgment in
that party's favour. In my
respectful opinion, the
objection to capacity of the
Respondent was irrelevant or
pershaps had been waived. The
issue of capacity is raised
because the Appellant lost in
the two lower Tribunal to the
Court.
There is yet another objection.
The Appellant had lost in both
the Regional and National House
of Chiefs and now seeks further
to ventilate his grievance
before us. The judgment of this
Court in AGYAKOMA vs. OPUNI &
ORS. (1987-88) G.L.R.D. 7 is
clear on the point and the
holdings as distilled by the
learned editor at page 13
thereof are instructive and will
bear compliance by this Court.
For the sake of regularity I
will set them down thus:
"Held, dismissing the
application: (1) the National
House of Chiefs was the highest
traditional judicial body in the
country and consequently it was
the authoritative exponent of
the customary law in Ghana and
its opinion had to be preferred
to those of lesser tribunals.
The unanimous views of the
judicial committees of the
Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs
and that of the National House
of Chiefs therefore, in the
absence of very convincing
argument to the contrary, had to
command the highest
consideration and would prevail
with the court. Dictum of Azu
Crabbe C.J in Sarkodee I vs.
Boateng II [1977] 2 GLR 343 at
348, CA (full bench) applied.
(2) Since the factual matters
raised had been adequately dealt
with by the appellate
traditional tribunals, below,
and the defendant had not
discharged the burden she faced
with two concurrent decisions
against her, she could not
re-agitate any of the matters
raised with any degree of
success and accordingly it would
be pointless to allow her leave
to appeal. srimate Bibhabati
Devi v. Kumar Ramendra Nayaran
Roy [1946] AC 508, PC and Akofi
v. Wiresi and Abagya (1057) 2
WALR 257 cited.
Their Lordships in the AGYAKOMA
case supra, emphasised that "in
the absence of very convincing
argument to the contrary" the
unanimous views of two high
chieftaincy committee "would
prevail with the Court. I accept
the dicta in the AGYARKWA case,
supra, and I think this Court is
bound by that decision unless of
course there are convincing
arguments to the contrary.
It was with these matters in
mind that I tried to prevail on
my learned and respected
brethren to let us seek
clarifications on some aspects
of the customary laws and
practices relevant for a
consideration. I fear therefore
that our inability to do so may
seriously affect the quality of
our opinions. In so saying I am
fortified by the provisions of
the Chieftaincy Act 1970 and
Court Act (Act 459) which make
it obligatory on Courts and
tribunals to consult the
appropriate customary laws and
practices, text books and other
sources in the ascertainment of
customary. Contrary, therefore,
to what learned Counsel for the
Appellant says that customary
law is a question of fact, by
the 1992 Constitution customary
law is a question of law. It
must therefore be ascertained
with a certain exactitude so as
to express the customs of the
communities which practice it.
In BOAMPONG vs. ABOAGYE (1981)
G.L.R. 927 the Supreme Court did
not think it below its dignity
to consult the National House of
Chiefs on the proper
circumstances under which a
chief may be said to have
abdicated. The Supreme Court
decision subsequent to the
enquiry reflected on the quality
of the advise so given. In the
absence of such enquiry, we are
bound to rely on our knowledge
of the customary law and as
revealed by the record. We must
however bear in mind that we
cannot substitute logic for
customary law.
I agree with Appellant's Counsel
that the central issue in this
appeal is whether the Respondent
Stool owes allegiance to the
Appellant Stool. This is
undoubtedly a cause or matter
affecting chieftaincy. The
majority of Nanaanom in the
Kumasi Traditional Council
however mixed the issue of title
to the Asaago Township with
allegiance of one stool to the
other. Nanaanom in both the
Regional and National House of
Chiefs found correctly that the
two matters could not be jointly
assessed to arrive at the
decision which the majority in
the Judicial Committee of the
Kumasi Traditional Council
reached. Nanaanom in the
Regional House of Chiefs said:
"Perhaps the issue which when
determined would dispose of this
appeal hinges on whether the
Asaago Stool swears to Taahyen
Stool or to the Asantehene
directly prior to determining
the issue from the evidence on
record, it is imperative to bear
in that in the hierarchy of
chiefs on chief may be
subordinate to another but that
alone does not connote
subservience. Similarly it does
not also imply that the one
lower in status swears the Oath
of allegiance to the one higher
in the hierarchy. From this
premise, there is evidence on
record that the Asaago Odikro
swears before the Taahyenhene in
front of the Otumfuo, which in
our view merely illustrates the
point that the two stools belong
to the same Fekuo. This
traditional ceremony in no way
implies that the Asaago Odikro
is subservient to the Taahyen
Stool or that the former
necessarily swears the Oath of
allegiance to the other."
It is obvious that the majority
decision did not consider this
cardinal principle of the
customary law of allegiance ably
enunciated by the Paramount
Chiefs of Ashanti constituting
the Judicial Committee of the
Ashanti Regional House of
Chiefs.
How such allegiance may prove
was firmly stated by the
minority opinion in the Kumasi
Traditional Council when Nana
wrote:
"....the Odikro of Asaago has
not in fact sworn any Oath of
allegiance to the Taahyenhene,
because the laid down tradition
and custom of Ashanti for
swearing of oath of allegiance
was not followed by not using
any traditional sword (afena) to
swear the oath of allegiance to
the Taahyenhene"
This was a crucial finding by
the minority, which correctly
stated the custom and negatived
the peripheral findings of the
majority. The statement was
straight and simple "no
traditional sword used, no valid
swearing of the oath of
allegiance". The evidence on
record was certain that the
Odikro of Asaago had not sworn
any oath of allegiance to the
Taahyenhene. The Asaago Odikro
in evidence in chief, and giving
evidence on behalf of the
Appellant stated categorically
that he did not swear any oath
of allegiance to the
Taahyenhene. Rather he danced
before him and that was all. Yet
again the Appellant could not
name the traditional sword by
which the Respondent swore the
oath of allegiance to him.
Did the Appellant have a
traditional sword by which he
could take the oath of the
Respondent. The clear answer is
No. Exhibit "A" which was
admitted without objection
refers to TAAHYEN STOOL AFFAIRS.
From that exhibit it was shown
that both the Appellant and the
Respondent belong to the KYIDOM
FEKUO whose leaders are the
Prices of the Golden Stool such
as the AKYEMPIMHENE and the
ANKAASEHENE. By the same Exhibit
A the Appellant swears by the
traditional sword called
"AHWEHWEBA". But the Respondent
swears by the traditional sword
called "GYAPATIA"
Now the AHWEHWEBA is the lowest
of the swords of chivalry in the
hierarchy of Asante State swords
used in pledging a chief's
allegiance to the Asantehene. It
is so used by Adikrofo and
lesser chiefs. The assertion
therefore that Appellant belongs
to the Obinempong class known as
"AGUDIE" could not be correct as
otherwise he would be swearing
by the principal traditional
sword called "MPOMPONSIO". The
sword by which the Appellant
swears - AHWEHWEBA - means that
he is an ordinary Odikro and
therefore he only has elders and
not sub-chiefs. Thus the
Appellant and his elders would
use the same sword in pleading
their allegiance to the
Asantehene. The Respondent was
not proved to be an elder of the
Taahyen Stool. It was because
the Respondent mistakenly got
into the KYIDOM FEKUW line when
the Appellant was swearing his
Oath of Allegiance that
Appellant contends that he owes
allegiance to him such a state
of affairs was denied by OHENEBA
BEKOE - the Mmarimahene of
Akyempim Stool saying it was a
serious error which should have
been corrected.
The witness was right, for the
witness was aware that the
Respondent swore by the
traditional sword 'GYAPATIA'.
Now what is this traditional
sword "GYAPATIA" . There was
evidence that this sword is used
by chiefs who perform personal
service of supply the Asantehene
with food or for want of a
better expression supply the
Asantehene such victuals which
he would eat. Such a chief would
in addition "Drink the Gods"
(Nanabosim) with the Asantehene.
Now "drinking the gods" means
taking an oath of secrecy.
Captain RATTRAY in his learned
treatise on ASANTI CONSTITUTION
gives an example of the occasion
of the return of the Juabens
from exile back to Asante from
AKIM ABUAKWA that the Juaben
chiefs were made to "drink the
gods" never to divulge any
secrets or sensitive knowledge
they had acquired during their
sojourns in AKIM ABUAKWA. There
was uncontroverted evidence on
record that:
"Later the Asantehene, Nana Osei
Tutu enquired from the visitors
(that is the Respondents
ancestors) the form of
traditional services they used
to perform to the Denkyira
Stool. They replied Otumfuo that
when they were at first
domiciled at Denkyira they used
to fish to serve the
Denkyirahene. The Asantehene
accepted the visitors and
decreed that they should "drink"
Abosom (to drink fetish) to
cement their loyalty and
allegiance to him".
In the face of this close
traditional tie with the
Asantehene, how could the
Appellant also claim that the
Respondent owes allegiance to
him?
In my respectful opinion not
much traditional history or
either party was disclosed. It
was agreed that both parties
were emigrants from Denkyira.
Indeed it is agreed that both
parties eventually settled on
the banks of the Oda River. The
difference, however, was in how
they came to settle on the banks
of that river. For the
Appellant, the land was given to
him by the Asantehene "on a
silver platter". For the
Respondent, his ancestors came
from Denkyira in search of a
relative, Mawoso, who introduced
him to the Akyempim - here who
also led him to his father, the
Asantehene. It was when the
Asantehene discovered that they
were fishermen to the Denkyira
that he asked the Akyempimhene
to settle them by the Oda River:
That the Respondents ancestors
were fishermen for the
Asantehene was comfirmed by the
OTI Odikro, the Respondent
neighbour who fulfils a similar
function for the Asantehene. The
parties both belong to the
KYIDOM FEKUO. But the Appellant
swears by the AHWEHWEBA,
traditional sword while the
respondent swears by the
GYAPATIA traditional sword.
"Exhibit B" is a letter
indicating there was a
relationship between the parties
in respect of both familiar and
formal proceeds from land sales
in the area of settlement.
In my respectful opinion the
assessment of the traditional
evidence was poor and contained
fallacious statements not
warranted by the evidence. Thus
wrote the Majority of Nanaanom
in the Judicial Committee of the
Kumasi Traditional Council:
"it is to be noted in accordance
with Asante constitution a thigh
of a slaughtered sheep is always
sent to inform a superior chief
of his subordinate chiefs
destoolment. And this is exactly
what happened in the Asaago
case"
Yet in "Exhibit C" the
proceedings (though in the
settling that it was conducted
illegal and void) the charge was
that the Appellant had sworn the
Great Oath of Asante to destool
the Asaago Odikro.
The majority decision also
admitted that it was the
Akyempimhene, the Ansasehene and
the Amantemhene who as leaders
of the KYIDOM FEKUO "that sought
Otumfuo's permission to enable
Taahyenhene to swear the Oath of
allegiance to him". The judgment
then castigates the Akyempimhene
for not swearing the Great Oath
on the Asaago Odikro when he saw
him swearing in front of the
Taahyenhene. I think there is
ample evidence that it was a
mistake and I accept it.
In all the circumstances the
majority of the Judicial
Committee of Kumasi Traditional
Council failed to test any valid
recent act or acts against the
traditional histories of the
parties.
I think the principles
enunciated in the ADJEIBI-KOJO
vs. BONSIE 3 W.A.L 257 at 260
must be understood in its proper
perspective. Where the trial
court or tribunal prefers one
history to the other principle
does not apply. It is only when
the trial tribunal is in doubt
about which rival story to
prefer that it must look for
evidence of recent acts. But I
will go forward and say that
application of the ADJEIBI-KOJO
principle must be predicated on
the rival claims to the same
property, office allegiance or
some such claim. In my
respectful opinion in the
present appeal there are no
rival claims to the same
allegiance. The Appellant claims
the Respondent owes allegiance
to him. The Respondent says he
owes allegiance to the
Asantehene. It is a matter of
evidence as confidently
enunciated by the Ashanti Region
House of Chiefs what the true
position is. The ADJEIBI-KOJO
principle could not apply. This
was the view taken by Nanaanom
in the Regional House of Chiefs
and supported by the National
House of Chiefs. Thus wrote
Nanaanom:
"We are also mindful of
Respondents Counsel's submission
that where traditional history
is unreliable events must be
resorted to in compliance with
the principle laid down in the
celebrated case of Kwadwo v.
Bonsie 3 WARL 257. However, we
have to state that events must
have a bearing with the past,
however, remote. It is in this
light that this again accepts
without any reservation the
evidence of the Appellant
(Respondent before the Supreme
Court) in preference to that of
the Respondent (now Appellant
before the Supreme Court). The
Appellants version on the
founding of the Asaago and
Taahyen Stools is more
reasonably probable and this
Committee accordingly accept it.
Hence the Appellants claim that
Asaago Stool swears directly to
the Asantehene is not in doubt".
The National House of Chiefs in
confirming the decision of the
Ashanti Region House of the
Chiefs agreed that the
Respondent evidence was the
"more probable".
I have in this opinion tried to
illustrate that it would repaid
a visit by this Court to the
Traditional authorities and
others for explanation to the
purport and significance of such
emblems as traditional swords
and the implications of their
application within the
performance of traditional
ceremonies and the effect on the
constitutional relationships, if
at all, between any two chiefs.
As it happened I must express my
regret this Court was unable to
consult the traditional bodies
on the vital customary issues
raised by this appeal without
which the decision of this Court
may be honoured more in its
breach than in its observance.
No Court or Tribunal has the
right or authority to make a
pronouncement or alter the
course and application of our
customary laws. Our constitution
decrees that the customary law
is that which is practised and
accepted by our various
communities. When there is doubt
as to the correctness of the
customary law or practice,
statute enjoins all Courts and
Tribunals to enquire from the
statutorily stated sources.
In the result, this appeal is
dismissed. The judgment of the
National House of Chiefs and the
Regional House of Chiefs are
affirmed. The judgment of the
Judicial Committee of the Kumasi
Traditional Council is set aside
and in its place I enter
judgment for the
Defendant-Respondent in that
tribunal.
KPEGAH, J.S.C.:
I will also allow the appeal in
this case.
ACQUAH, J.S.C.:
This appeal from the judgment of
the National House of chiefs
reveals that notwithstanding the
clear guideline by Lord Denning
in Adjeibi Kojo vrs Bonsie
(1958) 3 WALR 257 at 260 on the
method of assessing rival
traditional evidence, some of
our courts and tribunals still
have some difficulty in the
assessment of traditional
evidence.
Now traditional evidence is
evidence derived from tradition
or reputation or statements of
deceased persons with regard to
questions of pedigree, ancient
boundaries and the like, when no
living witnesses are available
to testify about such matter.
Thus the person who is himself
narrating such evidence has no
personal knowledge about the
matters he is testifying. The
same usually applies to the
person who also told the person
testifying. Such evidence is
therefore hearsay evidence, and
had the common law and sections
128 and 129 of the Evidence
Decree 1975 (NRCD 323) not made
same admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule, such
evidence would undoubtedly have
been inadmissible. Now because
traditional evidence is handed
down by word of mouth,
"... it must be recognized that
in the course of transmission
from generation to generation,
mistakes may occur without any
dishonest motives whatever.
Witnesses of the utmost veracity
may speak honestly but
erroneously as to what took
place a hundred or more years
ago": Adjeibi Kojo vrs. Bonsie
(supra) at page 260.
In most instances, the coherence
of a party's traditional
evidence, depends on the level
of intelligence of the witness
narrating. For a story told to
two persons would be differently
recounted by each of them. Yet
both heard the same story.
Accordingly in assessing rival
traditional evidence the
coherence of a party's version
or his demeanour should not be
the sole criterion for its
preference over the other
version: What is important is to
find out which of the rival
versions is authenticated by
acts and events within living
memory. Especially where such
acts and events are acts of
possession and ownership by a
party claiming ownership and
title to the subject-matter of
the claim. For what raises a
presumption of ownership in
favour of a party is not his
impressive demeanour nor the
coherence of his traditional
evidence but acts of possession
and ownership he exercises over
the subject-matter of the
action. Thus in Dua III vrs.
Tandoh (1927) PC 74-28, 109
wherein the trial judge relying
on the coherence of one party's
traditional evidence in
preference to the others acts of
possession, found for that
party, the Privy Council in
disapproving such finding, said
at page 110:
"Their Lordship are clearly of
opinion that the facts proved
and admitted establish that the
Bekwai people are in possession
of the disputed land, and this
fact throws upon the respondent
the burden of providing his
title, ... The real question is,
Did the evidence rebut the prima
facie title of the Bekwais shown
by possession. The learned trial
judge who tried the case thought
that it did not, and relied upon
the evidence of one Yaw Atwidei,
... this evidence was
traditional; ...But Tradition,
though of great value when
supported by action and facts,
becomes of lessened consequence
when brought into collision with
a series of definite incidents
inexplicable if the tradition be
regarded as accurate".
Now this presumption of title
raised by acts of possession and
ownership now appears as section
48 of the Evidence Decree 1975
(NCRD 323), which reads:
"48(1) the things which a person
possesses are presumed to be
owned by him.
(2) A person who exercises acts
of ownership over property is
presumed to be the owner of it".
It follows from the foregoing
that a party can succeed in his
claim even if his traditional
evidence is rejected. And so in
Ebu vrs: Ababio (1956) 2 WALR 55
at 57 it was held:
"Traditional evidence has a part
to play in actions for
declarations of title but there
are cases in which a party can
succeed even if he fails to
obtain a finding in his favour
on the traditional evidence".
As pointed out above, it is
against the background of events
and acts within living memory
that rival traditional evidence
should be assessed and not by
the demeanour of the party nor
the coherence of his version,
because those who are narrating
the story, and indeed those who
told these witnesses, had no
personal knowledge of the events
they are testifying about. And
an intelligent witness may be
able to render his story more
coherent than the other party,
though his version may be false.
Hence the need to ensure that
notwithstanding the brilliant
and confident way a version of
the traditional evidence had
been recounted, that version is
in accord with or supported by
events and acts in recent years.
For as directed in Adjeibi Kojo
vrs. Bonsie (supra) at 260:
"Where there is a conflict of
traditional history ... the best
way is to test the traditional
history by reference to facts in
recent years established and by
seeing which of two competing
histories is the most probable".
Explaining the import of the
above guideline, Wiredu, JSC in
Adjei vrs. Acquah (1991) 1 GLR
13 at 29-30 said:
"I do not think the guidelines
... are to the effect that for a
plaintiff to succeed his
traditional story must be
accepted as proved. This is not
a sine qua non to succeeding;
See Ebu vrs. Ababio (1956) 2
WALR 55. What the authorities
require is that such stories
must be weighed along with
recent facts as acts of exercise
of right ownership to see which
of the two rival stories appear
more probable. Facts established
by matters and events within
living memory, especially
evidence of acts of exercise of
ownership and possession must
take precedence over mere
traditional evidence".
To sum up, the court in
assessing rival traditional
evidence,
i. Must not allow itself to be
carried away solely by the
impressive manner in which one
party narrated his version, and
how coherent that version is.
ii. But must examine the events
and acts within living memory
established by the evidence,
paying particular attention to
undisputed acts of ownership and
possession on record.
iii. And then to see which
version of the traditional
evidence, whether coherent or
incoherent, is rendered more
probable by the established acts
and events.
iv. And finally, the party whose
traditional evidence such
established acts and events
support or render more probable,
must succeed unless there exists
on the record of proceedings, a
very cogent reason to the
contrary.
On the basis of the above
exposition, let me now turn to
the appeal. But first the facts.
The Taahyenhene of Kumasi, Nana
Kwame Gyamfi Kwanini II swore
the great oath of Ashanti.
I. that the Asaago town and
its outskirts belong to the
Taahyen stool of Kumasi.
II. That the Odikro of Asaago
owes allegiance to the occupant
of the Taahyen stool of Kumasi.
To this, the defendant
countermanded by swearing the
said oath
i. that the lands of Asaago were
gifted to defendant's ancestor
Kwame Gyasi by the Asantehene
through Ankaasehene of the
Kyidom division of Kumasi.
ii. That the Odikro of Asaago
owes allegiance to the
Asantehene.
At the trial which took place at
the Judicial Committee of the
Kumasi Traditional Council, the
plaintiff, Nana Kwame Gyamfi II
traced his ancestry from
Denkyira to Taahyen where they
were settled by Otumfuo, Nana
Osei Tutu who created a stool
for them and conferred the
customary duty of supplying him
with tobacco; and as an insignia
of that office, he gave them two
pipes, and made them to swear
directly to him. The village of
Asaago, he continued, was gifted
to his ancestors. He then
enumerated those who had since
occupied the Taahyen stool as
Nana Gyamfi Kumanin I, Kwame
Frimpong, Kwame Gyekye, Kwabena
Kununky, Kwame Antwi Agyei,
Kwadwo Boaduaa, Kwame Antwi
Agyei Tiaa, Kwame Poku, Kwadwo
Agyekum and finally he himself.
He said it was his predecessor
Nana Kwame Poku who created the
first odikro of Asaago village
in the person of Kwame Gyasi who
was later destooled and replaced
by Ama Hiaa, as there was no
male successor. She was in turn
succeeded by Yaa Obo. He said
the present odikro of Asaago,
Kwame Gyasi, swore the oath of
allegiance to his Taahyenhene's
predecessor called Nana Agyekum.
The plaintiff stated further
that he himself swore the oath
of allegiance to the Asantehene
Nana Opoku Ware on 26th May,
1975 and that at that swearing,
the Asaago odikro swore in front
of him as custom demands. And in
support of this he tendered as
Exhibit A, the document on the
said swearing from the Kumasi
Traditional council. He then
enumerated a series of act and
events in his favour, evidencing
his overlordship over the Asaago
village and concluded with the
incident of 23rd, October, 1990
when the Defendant in the
company of others, and with a
thigh of a sheep called on him
at his village and informed him
that, he, the defendant had
slaughtered sheep to destool the
Asaago odikro because the Asaago
odikro had collaborated with
him, the Taahyenhene, to deny
the Asaago people of their
lands: At this juncture, the
plaintiff said, he swore the
great oath of Ashanti, to affirm
that the Asaago village and its
outskirts belong to the Taahyen
stool and that the Asaago stool
owed allegiance to the Taahyen
stool.
In support of his case the
plaintiff called as his witness
Baafour Awuah as PW1 who
testified on the 23rd October
1990 incident; Yaa Asantewaa,
the Obaapanyin of Asaago as PW2
who confirmed that the Asaago
Stool owed allegiance to the
Taahyen stool, that Asaago land
belonged to the Taahyen stool
and that the defendant, his
grandson, was not the head of
the Asaago stool family; and
finally the odikro of Asaago,
Nana Kwame Gyasi as PW3 who also
supported the plaintiffs claim
that the Asaago stool owed
allegiance to the Taahyen stool.
The defendant, described in the
summons as the ebusuapanyin of
the Asaago stool family, traced
his ancestry to one Kusi, a
native of Denkyira who came with
his people to Ashanti in search
of one Amponsem, also a
Denkyira. They found him and
were introduced to the Otumfuo
by the Akyempimhene and the
Ankaasehene. He said when
Otumfuo saw that his ancestors
were fishermen, he settled them
near the river Oda and made them
swear to him to be faithful and
to supply him with fish. They
were placed in the Kyidom
division as their sub-divisional
head, although they swear
directly to Otumfuo. He said his
ancestors migrated to Denkyira
with their own black stool and
god called Atiekesia. On the
relationship between the Asaago
stool and the Taahyen stool, he
said that it was only a long
friendly one, and not one of
master and servant.
In support of his case the
defendant called Nana Owusu
Bekoe, the Akyempimhene's
Mamahene as DW1 who testified on
the traditional history as
narrated by the defendant; Ama
Serwa, the Obaapanyin of Odaso
as DW2 who also supported the
defendants traditional history;
and finally Nana Osei Ababio DW3
who testified that during the
Nkrumah regime the people in
their area decided to build a
new township with Asaago as
their head village. He said the
permission for this new township
was obtained from the
Ankaasehene.
The Judicial Committee of the
Kumasi Traditional Council,
relying on events and acts
within living memory as
established by the evidence, by
a majority of 2:1 gave judgment
for the plaintiff. The Ashanti
Regional House of chiefs,
relying on what they perceived
to be improbabilities in the
plaintiffs traditional evidence
unanimously reverted the
judgment of the trial court. On
the plaintiff claim to the
ownership of Asaago, they held,
rightly in my view, that that
was not a claim within the
competence of chieftaincy
tribunals. On further appeal to
the National House of Chiefs,
the judgment of the Regional
House of chiefs was affirmed by
a split decision of 3:2. It is
against this spilt decision that
the plaintiff/appellant lodged
the instant appeal to this court
on ground that
i. The National House of Chiefs,
chieftaincy tribunal made a
wrong finding of fact by
determining the issue of
allegiance solely on traditional
history without taking into
consideration recent facts and
events.
ii. The National House of
Chiefs, chieftaincy tribunal
erred in law by holding that the
respondent swore oath of
allegiance directly to the
Asantehene, even though
respondent has not complied with
the conditions necessary before
an occupant of a stool in
Ashanti can swear directly to
the Asantehene.
iii. The National House of
chiefs, chieftaincy tribunal
erred in law when it held that
the respondent had capacity to
respond to the oath sworn to by
the appellant.
Now from the grounds of appeal,
and the undisputed fact that
chieftaincy tribunals have no
jurisdiction to determine land
suits, the issues for resolution
in this appeal are first that of
the defendant's capacity, and
then the claim that the Asaago
stool owes allegiance to the
Taahyen stool..
In his written submissions the
plaintiff contended that from
the evidence of Yaa Asantewaa
PW2, the defendant was not the
head of the Asaago family and
therefore not competent to
respondent to the oath of the
plaintiff and the National House
erred in holding otherwise.
I really find it difficult to
comprehend the import of the
plaintiff's objection to the
defendant's capacity because
throughout the trial, it was not
the case of the plaintiff that
the defendant had no capacity to
respondent to his oath. And if
indeed the defendant did not
have such capacity, but
nevertheless the plaintiff chose
to sue a person he knew did not
have capacity to defend his
action, then it is the
plaintiff's action which ought
to be thrown out as having been
directed at the wrong person.
But I agree with the National
House that as a member of the
Asaago family he is entitled to
defend the action so as to
defendant the interest of that
family, if even he is not the
head of that family.
On the allegiance, the plaintiff
referred to this Court's
decision in Owusu Agyeman vrs.
Nana Baodu Kwadwo II, Ch. A No.
8/93 of 8th December 1994
wherein this court accepted that
for a stool to owe allegiance
direct to the Otumfuo, the
following conditions must be
satisfied:
a) The occupant must perform
direct duties to the Asantehene;
and
b) On his death the Asantehene
must be represented whilst lying
in state or on the death of the
Asantehene whilst the body is
lying in state he must swear the
oath of allegiance to the dead
body of the Asantehene.
He contended that there was no
evidence that any of the above
conditions had been satisfied by
the defendant, and therefore the
National House erred in so
finding.
Now the evidence led by both
parties was mainly traditional
but the Regional House of Chiefs
whose decision was upheld by the
National House expressed its
approach to the assessment of
the evidence, as follows:
"Our desire as committee to rely
on a recent event such as
whether the Asaago odikro swore
the oath of allegiance to the
Taahyenhene at the former's
installation is of no assistance
to us".
And on the basis of what they
perceived to be improbabilities
in the evidence of the
plaintiffs witness, the National
House of Chiefs too affirmed the
approach and conclusion of the
Regional House of Chiefs. Thus
in respect of the evidence of
PW1, for instance, the National
House reasoned that "The
explanation (of the respondent)
may be reasonable because in the
first place Baffour Awuah was
not shown to be an Okyeame of
Taahyenhene so sending the thigh
of sheep officially through him
to Taahyenhene is not customary
and that sort of evidence should
be disbelieved".
From the exposition on the
proper assessment of traditional
evidence, it is clear that the
above method of the assessment
by the National House is wrong.
For the evidence clearly
established that the defendant
in the company of others took
the thigh of a sheep to the
plaintiff to inform him that the
Asaago odikro had been
destooled.
The proper approach therefore to
the assessment of the evidence,
is how far does this undisputed
event and other events and acts
established by the evidence,
support or does not support
either of the rival traditional
evidence lead in respect of the
authority to which Asaago stool
owes allegiance.
On the part of the plaintiff
there is first, Exhibit A dated
26th May 1975 headed Taahyen
enstoolment affairs which showed
that when the plaintiff swore
before the Otumfuo on 26th May
1975, the Asaago odikro swore in
front of him: and in respect of
this event, the defendant was
thus cross examined:
"Q. You claim you swear to
Otumfuo, why is it that the
Asaago chief swears in front of
Taahyenhene.
A. It is uncustomary for the
Asaago odikro to swear in front
of Taahyenhene at Manhyia
palace. Again we were not aware
of Asaago odikro going to swear
in front of Taahyenhene
otherwise we would have opposed
that move".
The above answer from the
defendant did not deny the fact
of the said swearing in. Now it
was further put to the
defendant,
"Q. I put it to you that you
yourself accepted the
installation proceedings from
Manhyia palace.
A. Yes, I remember I accepted
the installation proceedings
which you tendered".
Now in Ashanti custom the very
fact that the Asaago odikro
swears before the Taahyenhene at
Manhyia palace, signifies that
the Asaago odikro owes
allegiance to the Taahyenhene.
And the defendant's own witness.
Nana Owusu Bekoe, DW1, was made
to acknowledge and admit this
custom when he was
cross-examined as follows:
"Q. Do you know that in
accordance with Asante custom,
if a divisional head (Fekutire)
is swearing the oath of
allegiance, all the Fekuo
members swear in front of him?
A. Yes I know that it is the
laid down custom for all Fekuo
members to swear in front of
their divisional head".
Such a confirmatory evidence
from the defendant's witness in
support of the plaintiff's
version renders plaintiff's
version preferable to that of
the defendant's version.
Now when DW1, after the above
admission, was confronted with
the obvious question as to why
he was alleging that. Asaago
odikro swears directly to the
Otumfuo when event of 26th May
1975 was to the contrary, he
answered by claiming ignorance
of the happening of that event.
He answered:
"A. If it is true that Asaago
odikro swore in front of you at
Manhyia palace, then it means
that Asaago odikro had assumed a
wrong chieftaincy title. It was
an anomaly on the part of the
Asaago odikro to swear in front
of you and that anomaly should
be rectified?"
One may ask, when? Exhibit A
clearly shows that the event did
indeed take place. But such an
answer claiming ignorance cannot
help the witness nor the
defendant since the swearing in
ceremony evidenced by Exhibit A
was arranged by DW1's overlord,
the Akyempimhene together with
the Ankaasehene - the two chiefs
whom the defendant claimed were
the overlords of Asaago village.
It was put to DW1 thus:
"Q. I put it to you that
Akyempimhene, Ankaasehene and
Oheneba Hiahenene and
Akumantihene went to seek
permission for my swearing of
oath of allegiance?
A. Yes I agree that the above
chiefs sought permission for
your swearing".
The second recent act in favour
of the plaintiff is that of
exhibit B, the letter dated 7th
June 1989, written by the
defendant to the plaintiff at a
time when no litigation was in
view, clearly evidences the
defendant's admission of the
subordinate position of the
people of Asaago to the
Taahyenhene. In this letter the
defendant talked about the
plaintiff selling some sand at
Asaago and giving some of the
money from the sale to some
people at Asaago, without the
defendant and some of the family
members having a share. He
pleaded for their share
reminding the plaintiff that "we
are all your children and we all
belong to you".
Now if the relationship between
Asaago and Taahyen stool is only
one of friendly relationship
with what authority can the
plaintiff go to Asaago to sell
sand, and how can the defendant
write that he and his family
members are all children of the
plaintiff and belonged to him?
The third event was the
presentation of the thigh of a
sheep by again this same
defendant, in the company of
others, to the plaintiff to
inform him of the alleged
destoolment of the Asaago
odikro.
Now whatever explanation the
defendant attempted to offer, it
was not denied that the event
took place. And as the majority
decision of the trial tribunal
rightly observed, the incident
was in accordance with Ashanti
custom that a thigh of a
slaughtered sheep is always sent
to inform a superior chief of
the destoolment of his
subordinate chief. The defendant
explained that he sent the thigh
for onward transmission to the
Okyempimhene. Did the defendant
later check to find whether the
Akyempimhene received the said
thigh? And having regard to the
defendant's statement in his
letter, Exhibit B, that he and
his family nembers were all
children of the plaintiff, there
is no doubt that the thigh was
meant for the plaintiff, the
'father' of the defendant and
his people.
The above events and acts
positively give credence to the
plaintiffs claim that the Asaago
stool owes allegiance to his
stool.
Now on the part of the defendant
who claimed that the Asaago
stool owed allegiance direct to
the Otumfuo, he could not
testify to a single event in
living memory at which an Asaago
Odikro swore directly to the
Asantehene. The defendant who
claimed that his ancestors
migrated to Ashanti with their
own god and black stool, said
that no one was occupying that
black stool. He was asked:
"Q. Who is the present occupant
of the black stool which you
brought from Denkyira?
A. No one is currently occupying
that stool we brought from
Denkyira".
And as to why no one is
occupying that stool, he said:
"A. It is because we did not
have male royals to occupy the
stool for us, that is why the
stool was left vacant".
Again the defendant testified
that his ancestors drank fetish
to owe allegiance to the Otumfuo
and were assigned the duty of
supplying fish. But there is no
single act or event in living
memory when any such fish were
sent to Otumfuo, or any event
showing that such a fetish was
drank. Indeed while the
defendant himself testified that
his family had stopped the
supply of the fish to Otumfuo,
DW1 said the practice was still
in existence, and yet he could
not mention a single such
incident. The defendant was
asked
"Q. May we know whether you
still continue supplying the
Asantehene with fish?
A. No, we have stopped with the
supply of fish to the Asantehene".
While DW1 in his evidence in
chief, said:
"From time immemorial, the
visitors had always taken fish
from river Oda to serve Otumfuo
and the practice is still in
existence".
Now whether the supply of fish
has stopped or still in
existence, was there any
occasion in living memory when
such fish was supplied?
It is indeed not enough for the
defendant to allege that his
people owe allegiance direct to
Otumfuo, or that his ancestor
drank fetish with Otumfuo, or
that his ancestors supplied fish
to Otumfuo. Such claim of direct
allegiance to Otumfuo must be
authenticated by concrete acts
and events in living memory
unequivocably evidencing such
direct allegiance by the Asaago
stool to the Otumfuo. The
evidence on record establishes
none of such acts. And in the
absence of any such acts and
events to rebut the acts and
event in support of the
plaintiffs version, the National
House of Chiefs erred in
affirming the judgment of the
Regional House of Chiefs.
I will accordingly allow the
appeal, set aside the judgment
of the National House of Chiefs,
and in place thereof enter
judgment for the plaintiff for a
declaration that the Asaago
stool owes allegiance to the
Taahyen Stool. The defendant's
counterclaim that the Odikro of
Asaago owes allegiance to the
Asantehene is hereby dismissed.
ATUGUBA, J.S.C.:
I will also allow the appeal.
COUNSEL
Mr. Boafo for the Appellant.
Respondent in person.
I.W. |