Wills - Caveat - Executors -
Forensic evidence - Whether the
last Will and testament of the
late John Kofi Dekyi is valid
and it is in compliance with the
provisions of the Wills Act,
1970 Act 360.- Whether the
Deceased did not have his mental
capacity to make a Will at that
time - Whether or not Deceased
testator did not execute any
Will in the presence of the two
law clerks of the Solicitor
alleged to have prepared the
Will as witnesses.- Whether the
withdrawal of notice of appeal
without leave meant that the
Court of Appeal had no appeal
before it - Whether the court
was bond to
accept any of the evidence
offered..
HEADNOTES
Mr. John Kofi Dekyi passed away
on the 9th of July,
2011. From all accounts, he was
a man of substantial means
consisting of properties spread
through Kumasi, Wenchi, Techiman.
He was survived by two wives,
(about) twenty-three children,
numerous grandchildren and other
relations. Upon his
death, a Will he was alleged to
have executed as his last Will
and testament on the 2nd
November, 2010 was read in which
he had made certain devises to
most of his children,
grandchildren, wives and family
relations. Dissatisfied
with the contents of the Will,
the Defendants/ Respondents/
Appellants (hereinafter
Defendants) caveated the Will.
The Executors named in the said
Will therefore took out a writ
to prove the Will in solemn form
in the High Court, Kumasi.
HELD
From the analysis above, it is
our respective conclusion that,
the Court of Appeal came to the
right conclusions on its
evaluation of the evidence and
their judgment dated 28/07/2015
is affirmed. The appeal will be
dismissed as lacking in merit
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Wills Act, 1970 Act 360.
Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 CI
19
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Republic v High Court;
Ex-parte Evangelical
Presbyterian Church of Ghana
[1991] 1 GLR 323, SC;
Shardey v Adamtey; Shardey
v Martey (Consolidated) [1972] 2
GLR 380, CA
Republic v High Court,
Accra (Commercial Division)
Ex-parte Hesse, Investcom
Consortium Holding S. A and
Scancom Ltd. – (Interested
Parties) [2007-2008] SCGLR 1230
Republic v High Court, Accra ex
parte Yalley (Gyan & Attor
Interested Parties) [2007-2008]
SCGLR 512
Daily Dispatch v Osei-Bonsu II
[2010] SCGLR 452
Djin v Musah Baako [2007-2008]
SCGLR 686.
Tuakwa v Bosom [2001-2002] SCGLR
61,
Johnson v Maja (1951) 13 WACA
290,
Akenten II & Ors v Osei
[1984-86] 2 GLR 437
Gregory v Tandoh and Anr. [2010]
SCGLR 971 at 975 t
Yankah v Administrator General
[1971] 2 GLR 186
Lloyd v. Roberts (1858) 14
E.R.871
Wright v. Sanderson (1884)
9 P.D. 149
In Re Krah (Decd)
Yankyerah & Others v Osei Tutu
and Anr. [1988-90] 1 GLR 638,
holding 2
Otoo No. I v Otoo No. I
and Others [2013-2014] 2 SCGLR
777
Hickling v Fair [1899] AC
15 at 27
Beaudry v Barbeau [1900]
AC 569
Papillion v Voice (1728)
Kel W 27
25 ER 478 at 481; Re
Palmer [1893] 3 Ch 369
Biney v Biney [1974] 1 GLR
313, CA;
Lord Wensleydale in Grey v
Pearson (1857) 6 HLC 61
In re Atta (Decd); Kwako v
Tawiah [2001-2002] SCGLR 461
Sasu v Whitecross Insurance Co.
Ltd. [1960] GLR 4
Fenuku v John Teye [2001-2002]
SCGLR 985
Smith & Ors v Blankson (subst
by) Baffour & Anor [2007-2008]
SCGLR 374
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
COUNSEL
MUJEEB AHMED RAHMAN ESQ.
FOR THE DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS
/APPELLANTS.
DANIYAL ABDUL KARIM ESQ. FOR THE
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS
/RESPONDENTS.
JUDGMENT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOTSE JSC:
FACTS
Mr. John Kofi Dekyi passed away
on the 9th of July,
2011. From all accounts, he was
a man of substantial means
consisting of properties spread
through Kumasi, Wenchi,
Techiman. He was survived by two
wives, (about) twenty-three
children, numerous grandchildren
and other relations.
Upon his death, a Will he was
alleged to have executed as his
last Will and testament on the 2nd
November, 2010 was read in which
he had made certain devises to
most of his children,
grandchildren, wives and family
relations.
Dissatisfied with the contents
of the Will, the
Defendants/Respondents/Appellants
(hereinafter Defendants)
caveated the Will. The Executors
named in the said Will therefore
took out a writ to prove the
Will in solemn form in the High
Court, Kumasi.
The reliefs endorsed on the
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents
(hereinafter Plaintiffs) reads
as follows:
i. Declaration that the
last Will and testament of the
late John Kofi Dekyi dated 2nd
November, 2010 is valid and in
compliance with the provisions
of the Wills Act, 1970 Act 360.
ii. An order for the
issuance of probate to the
Plaintiffs Executors to
distribute the estate of the
late John Kofi Dekyi in
accordance with the provisions
of the last Will and Testament
dated 2nd November, 2010.
iii. Any other orders as
the Justice of the case would
require in terms of the rules of
this Honourable Court
It was averred by the Plaintiffs
in the trial High Court in their
statement of claim to the
effect, that, the Deceased had
executed a last Will and
testament on 2nd
November, 2010 and had same
deposited at the registry of the
High Court, Kumasi and that a
copy of the said Will and
testament shall be tendered at
the trial. The Plaintiffs
averred further that it was the
Deceased who instructed his
Solicitors to prepare the said
last Will and testament and that
it was duly executed in the law
office of his Solicitors in the
presence of two (2) witnesses
who were the Solicitors law
clerks.
The Defendants however denied
the Plaintiffs assertions in
their Defence and the substance
of their denial that the
purported Will was not the deed
of the Deceased Testator was
anchored on the following:-
i.
That as at 2nd
November 2010, the Deceased did
not have his mental capacity to
make a Will and
ii.
Finally that the Deceased
testator did not execute any
Will in the presence of the two
law clerks of the Solicitor
alleged to have prepared the
Will as witnesses.
DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT
The learned trial judge
dismissed the claims of the
Plaintiffs in his judgment of
28th July, 2014. He held that
the Will which was in evidence
as Exhibit A could not be the
deed of the Testator and was not
made by him.
APPEAL AGAINST DECISION OF THE
HIGH COURT AND JUDGMENT OF COURT
OF APPEAL
Understandably, the Plaintiffs
were aggrieved. They filed a
notice of Appeal against the
said judgment on the 26th of
August 2014.
Two days later on the 28th
of August, they withdrew the
notice of Appeal and replaced
it with another, filed that
same day.
This act of the withdrawal and
subsequent re-filing was a very
sore point with the Defendants,
whose Counsel argued this point
doggedly in his statement of
case to the Court of Appeal.
Learned counsel’s argument was
to the effect that, Respondents
Counsel had breached Rule 17 of
The Court of Appeal Rules, 1997
CI 19 which required prior leave
before an appellant could
withdraw an appeal. Learned
counsel further argued that by
withdrawing the notice of appeal
without leave meant that the
Court of Appeal had no appeal
before it and was therefore not
seised with jurisdiction to
determine the appeal. The
Court of Appeal considered the
issue of jurisdiction raised by
learned Counsel for the
Defendants herein and found no
merit in it. The Court then
allowed the appeal of the
Plaintiffs herein and aggrieved
at the outcome, the Defendants
filed the following ten (10)
grounds of appeal for
determination by this court.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL TO SUPREME
COURT
a. The honourable Court
of Appeal erred when it held
that the
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents
did not need leave of the court
to withdraw their appeal filed
on the 26/08/2014.
b. The Honourable Court
of Appeal erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the appeal
when its jurisdiction was not
properly invoked by the
Plaintiffs/ Appellants/
Respondents.
c. The whole judgement
of the Court of Appeal is a
nullity as same was given in
want of jurisdiction.
d. The Honourable Court
of Appeal erred when it
preferred the evidence of PW3 to
that of the Court Witness.
e. The Honourable Court
of Appeal erred when it relied
on the evidence of PW3, a
discredited witness as the basis
for its judgement.
f. The Honourable Court
of Appeal erred when it held
that PW1 and PW2 were
disinterested witnesses whose
evidence should be preferred.
g. The Honourable Court
of Appeal erred when it held
that the Defendants/
Respondents/ Appellants should
have called the other purported
attesting witness as their
witness.
h. The Honourable Court
of Appeal erred when it failed
to hold that the failure of the
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents
to call the other attesting
witness and one Grace who
allegedly typed the disputed
Will was fatal to their case.
i. The Honourable Court
of Appeal erred when it held
that the signature on the Will
dated 2/11/10 was made by the
late John Kofi Dekyi and as such
same was valid.
j. The judgment is
against the weight of the
evidence on the record.
In our considered opinion, all
the above grounds of appeal are
quite repetitive and can
conveniently be subsumed and
dealt with by the determination
of the following issues:-
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
a.
Whether or not the Court
of Appeal erred in it’s decision
that leave was not required by
the Plaintiffs before they filed
the second notice of appeal.
b.
Whether judgment is
against the weight of evidence.
c.
Whether or not the
Deceased Testator, John Kofi
Dekyi validly executed his last
will and Testament on the 2nd
day of November 2010 in the
presence of two attesting
witnesses.
d.
Whether or not the
Deceased Testator, John Kofi
Dekyi was compus mentis at the
time he executed his last Will
and testament on 2nd
November 2010.
The above are the only issues
under which this court will
consider this appeal and render
it’s judgment.
In a seventy seven page
statement of case filed on
behalf of the Defendants, which
was repetitive and verbose, the
Defendants set out their case in
this court (will comment later
on this phenomenon). In this
statement of case, learned
counsel for the Defendants
submitted that the second notice
of appeal filed was contrary to
law and procedure, null and void
and thus incapable of invoking
the court's jurisdiction. This
submission naturally leads to
discussion of issue No. “A” set
out supra.
ISSUE A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEAL ERRED IN IT’S DECISION
THAT LEAVE WAS NOT REQUIRED BY
THE PLAINTIFFS BEFORE THEY FILED
THE SECOND NOTICE OF APPEAL.
Before proceeding to deal with
the legal issues raised therein,
it is considered worthwhile to
set out the statutory provisions
of the relevant Court of Appeal,
Rules 1997, C.I. 19 as follows:-
Rule 17
“Withdrawal of appeal
(1) Subject to rule 15, if
the appellant files with the
Registrar a notice of withdrawal
of his appeal, the Registrar
shall certify that fact to the
Court, which may thereupon order
that the appeal be dismissed
with or without costs.
(2) Copies of the notice of
withdrawal shall at the expense
of the appellant be served on
any of the parties with regard
to whom the appellant wishes to
withdraw his appeal, and any
party served shall be precluded
from laying claim to any costs
incurred by him after the
service unless the Court
otherwise orders.
(3) A party served with a notice
of withdrawal, may on notice to
the appellant apply to the Court
for an order to recover any
costs that he may necessarily or
reasonably have incurred prior
to the service on him of the
notice of withdrawal together
with his costs incurred for
purposes of obtaining the order
and for attendance in court.
In order to really get
some understanding from the
submissions of learned counsel
for the defendants, it is
perhaps appropriate at this
stage to also set out Rules 8
(1) and (2) of C. I. 19 which
deals with Notice and Grounds of
Appeal which is what the
Plaintiffs filed, withdrew and
re-filed without leave.
Rule 8 “Notice and
grounds of appeal
(1) Any appeal to the Court
shall be by way of re-hearing
and shall be brought by a notice
referred to in these Rules as
“notice of appeal”.
(2) The notice of appeal
shall be filed in the Registry
of the court below
and shall
(a) set out the
ground of appeal;
(b) state whether the whole or
part only of the decision of the
court below is complained of and
in the latter case specify the
part;
(c) state the
nature of the relief sought; and
(c) state the names and
addresses of all parties
directly affected by the
appeal.”
In order to further
understand the nature of the
document referred to as notice
of appeal, it is also considered
worthwhile to refer to Rule 10
(1) which deals with service of
notice of appeal. It reads as
follows:-
“The Registrar of the Court
below shall, after the notice of
appeal has been filed cause to
be served a true copy of it on
each of the parties mentioned in
the notice of appeal.”
This is a clear reference
to either the Circuit Court or
the High Court which may be the
Courts below. However, in the
instant case the court below is
the High Court, Kumasi.
Furthermore, there is no
evidence on record that the
Registrar effected service of
the first notice of appeal on
any of the parties.
Secondly, the record of
the case in the Court below had
not yet been transmitted to the
Court of Appeal in terms of Rule
17 set out supra. In other
words, Form six (6) had not yet
been served on the Court of
Appeal to be seised with the
appeal for it’s jurisdiction
referred to in Rule 17 supra to
be invoked.
In the case of
Republic v High Court, (Human
Rights Division), Accra,
Ex-parte Akita [2010] SCGLR 374,
the Supreme Court had
occasion to pronounce on when
the jurisdiction of the
appellate court is invoked as
follows:-
“It was well-settled that once
the Civil Form 6 had been served
on the trial High Court, that
court no longer had jurisdiction
over the case. At that point of
the proceedings, the court with
the appropriate jurisdiction
would be the Court of Appeal.
Since there was no doubt that
the Form 6 had been served on
the trial court, that should
have effectively ended its
jurisdiction. However, the trial
High Court proceeded to hear the
case for the reason that the
motion had been pending in that
court before service of the
Civil Form 6. That reason was
untenable. Rule 21 of the Court
of Appeal Rules, 1997 (CI 19),
anticipated the situation by
which aspects of the case would
be pending before the trial
court. In that event, the trial
court was duty bound to transfer
the case to the Court of Appeal.
Rule 21 of C.I. 19 was intended
to obviate that kind of
situation so as to avoid
protracting the proceedings
unnecessarily. The rule was not
intended to prolong the
jurisdiction of the trial Court
which had been curtailed by the
service of Form 6, Republic v
High Court; Ex-parte Evangelical
Presbyterian Church of Ghana
[1991] 1 GLR 323, SC; and
Shardey v Adamtey; Shardey v
Martey (Consolidated) [1972] 2
GLR 380, CA cited.”
“Per Ansah JSC concurring on
issue of effect of rule 21 of CI
19. By this rule, i.e. rule 21,
the High Court retains
jurisdiction when the record is
not ready for transmission or
has for any reason not been
transmitted to the Court of
Appeal, with the corollary that
as soon as it has been
transmitted to the Court of
Appeal, then its jurisdiction to
entertain any application is
curtailed except that whatever
is meant for the Court of Appeal
but was filed in the High Court
must be forwarded to the latter
court.”
What should be noted is
that, after the filing of a
notice of appeal, there are
various processes that have to
be complied with to give effect
to it such as
1.
settlement of appeal record,
reference Rule 11 of C. I. 19
and thereafter;
2.
the preparation of the record,
and
3.
finally it’s transmission to the
Court of Appeal reference Rule
14 of C. I. 19.
It is therefore clear that
since none of the above steps
had been taken or could have
been taken by the Plaintiffs and
the Registrar on the 1st
notice of appeal before it was
withdrawn and another refiled,
there is really no substance in
the arguments of learned counsel
for the Defendants. However,
since quite considerable time
and effort had been spent on it,
it is deemed worthwhile to deal
thoroughly with it in the
following terms.
It is important to
reiterate the point that, the
facts in the case of Republic
v High Court, Accra (Commercial
Division) Ex-parte Hesse,
Investcom Consortium Holding S.
A and Scancom Ltd. – (Interested
Parties) [2007-2008] SCGLR 1230
are quite different from the
facts and circumstances of this
case. In the ex-parte Hesse case
supra, even though the Court of
Appeal had indicated during the
hearing of an application for
Stay of Execution whilst an
appeal was pending that the
appeal was filed out of time,
nonetheless, the parties therein
had filed their respective
Statements of case. This meant
that Civil Form 6 had been
served on the parties which
indicated that the appeal record
had been transmitted from the
High Court to the Court of
Appeal. It was consequent upon
this that the parties had filed
their respective written
submissions. As indicated
earlier in this judgment, for
the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeal to be invoked, the Court
must be seised with the appeal.
The processes that culminate in
the Court of Appeal being seised
with the matter are
i.
notice of grounds of appeal,
Rule 8;
ii.
fulfilment of the conditions of
appeal to wit the payment of
security for costs for the
prosecution of the appeal. Rules
11 (4), 12 and 18 of C. I. 19;
and
iii.
Transmission of the appeal
record and the service of Civil
Form 6 thereof, Rule 14 of C.
I. 19.
A comparison of the facts
therein in the ex-parte Hesse
case and that of the instant
appeal, confirms the decision of
the Court of Appeal that, the
decision in the ex-parte Hesse
case cannot apply because the
facts are different from each
other. We accordingly endorse
the decision of the Court of
Appeal not to apply the ex-parte
Hesse case herein.
The Court of Appeal's finding is
in accord with common sense
rules because any other
interpretation will clearly lead
to an absurdity and injustice.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs
herein had filed and withdrawn
and refiled a notice of Appeal
within two days. Evidently, the
notice had not gone before the
Court of Appeal for rule 17 of
CI 19 to be triggered.
It is also reasonable to infer
that the parties therein in the
ex-parte Hesse case would have
gone to considerable expense at
that point in the appeal and
suddenly withdrawing it without
leave of the court would have
worked an injustice on the
affected party. This is clearly
unlike the instant case where no
expense had been incurred by the
Defendants when the two day
notice of Appeal was withdrawn
and refiled.
The Court of Appeal again
rightly held that it had not yet
been seised of the matter. This
was not in dispute. Therefore,
not yet being seised of the
matter, how could the Plaintiffs
seek their leave in respect of
withdrawing a notice of Appeal?
In any event, it is clear from
the record that the Plaintiffs
herein had no intention of
abandoning the prosecution of
the appeal and to find learned
Counsel's submission meritorious
would only lead to mischief and
work injustice on the
Plaintiffs. As held in the same
ex parte Hesse case where Wood
CJ, quoted with approval the
holding in the case of
Republic v High Court, Accra ex
parte Yalley (Gyan & Attor
Interested Parties) [2007-2008]
SCGLR 512 on examining the
law on statutory interpretation.
This is what Her Ladyship stated
in the headnote 1 on page
1231-32 of the Ex-parte Hesse
judgment as follows:-
"...on the construction of
statutes, the literalist,
that is the ordinary, plain, or
grammatical meaning, should be
adhered to if it clearly advance
the legislative purpose or
intent and does not lead to any
outrageous consequences.
That rule of construction might
fitly be described as the
subjective purpose rule with
that rule being invoked only
where the objective purpose rule
would lead to mischief or
injustice.” Emphasis
The venerable Lady Chief
Justice's reasoning here is
unexceptionable and ought to be
adopted, and we accordingly
apply it in deciding that Rule
17 of C. I. 19 is inapplicable
under the circumstances of this
case.
Finally, in the case of Daily
Dispatch v Osei-Bonsu II [2010]
SCGLR 452, the
competency of the appeal was
raised on behalf of the
Plaintiff. His Counsel contended
that since the process that
initiated the appeal was
headlined IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL instead of IN THE
SUPREME COURT, contrary to
rule 6(1) of the Supreme Court
Rules, 1996 (CI) 16, the appeal
was improperly constituted and
should be dismissed in limine.
The Supreme Court, speaking
through Gbadegbe JSC rightly
rejected that proposition. His
Lordship stated that, he hoped
it was not going to be construed
as a relaxation of the rules
since the appeal substantially
raised questions for
determination by the Supreme
Court. His Lordship continued,
“there was an appeal
lodged from the decision of the
Court of Appeal that must be
inquired into by the Supreme
Court in order to do substantial
justice to the parties and the
Court should not be blinded by
strict adherence to
technicalities.”
Flowing from the above
rationalisation, it can
therefore be concluded herein
without any shadow of
contradiction that the Court of
Appeal in the instant case
rightly rejected the submission
of learned counsel for the
Defendants and was right in
proceeding to hear and determine
the appeal therein as it clearly
had jurisdiction to do. This
therefore resolves issue A set
out above in favour of the
Plaintiffs.
ISSUE B
WHETHER JUDGMENT IS AGAINST
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE
It is now settled law, backed by
a host of cases that where an
Appellant complains that a
judgment is against the weight
of evidence, he is implying that
there were certain pieces of
evidence on the record which, if
applied could have changed the
decision in his favour, or that
there are certain pieces of
evidence that had been wrongly
applied against him. The onus is
on such an Appellant to clearly
and properly demonstrate to the
appellate Court the lapses in
the judgment being appealed
against. See case of Djin v
Musah Baako [2007-2008] SCGLR
686.
It is again trite law that an
appeal is by way of rehearing.
In the case of Tuakwa v Bosom
[2001-2002] SCGLR 61, our
respected Sister, Sophia
Akuffo, JSC delivering the
judgment of the court stated
that an appeal is by way of
rehearing, particularly where
the Appellant alleges in his
notice of Appeal that the
decision of the trial court is
against the weight of evidence.
In such a case, it is incumbent
upon an appellate Court, in a
civil case, to analyse the
entire record of appeal, take
into account the entire
testimonies and all documentary
evidence adduced at the trial
before arriving at its decision.
This is to satisfy the court
that, on a preponderance of the
probabilities, it’s conclusion
is reasonably or amply supported
by the evidence.
This issue will therefore be
dealt with and the above
principle used as a guide. In
evaluating the evidence on the
record before setting aside the
decision of the trial court, the
Court of Appeal laid down the
guiding principles as gleaned
from the case law over the years
in resolving probate matters
such as the instant one.
It started off with the case of
Johnson v Maja (1951) 13
WACA 290, where the Court held
thus:-
"Where there is a dispute as to
a will, those who propound it
must clearly show by evidence
that prima facie, all is in
order, that is to say, that
there has been due execution,
and that the testator had the
necessary mental capacity and
was a free agent. Once they
have satisfied the Court, prima
facie as to these matters,...
the burden is then cast upon
those who attack the Will and
they are required to
substantiate by evidence the
allegations they have made as to
the lack of capacity, undue
influence and so forth"
Emphasis
This holding was relied on by
Apaloo CJ in the case of
Akenten II & Ors v Osei
[1984-86] 2 GLR 437. The
Court of Appeal found that the
testimony of PW1, the legal
Counsel who prepared the Will
and PW2, one of the attesting
witnesses stood unchallenged.
It further found that Exhibit A,
the disputed Will was prima
facie, regular as it had an
attestation clause and the
signature of the Testator was
duly attested to by two
witnesses. Again, Exhibit 1
which was tendered in evidence
by the Defendants herein was an
earlier copy of a 2009 Will
executed by the Testator.
This Will did not differ
significantly from the disputed
one but its validity was not
disputed by the Appellants
herein. Again, the Court of
Appeal observed that the trial
judge disbelieved the allegation
of the Appellants that the late
John Dekyi was not of sound
disposing mind, neither was he
physically disabled at the time
of the execution of Exh A.
After analysing the evidence led
on these issues, this was the
trial judge's conclusion.
"I have found no answers to
these concerns because the
Defendants who had the burden to
provide them, failed to do so. I
am unconvinced that on
2/11/2010, late John Kofi Dekyi
was so sick that he could not
have gone to the office of
Lawyer Koffie to make a Will; I
also have no reasons to believe
that he was not of a sound
disposing mind at that time."
Of course, the Court of Appeal
was in absolute agreement with
the trial judge on his
appreciation of the evidence and
his conclusion drawn therefrom.
What is unfathomable in this
instance is having drawn the
right conclusions from the
evaluation of the evidence, the
trial court still went ahead to
hold that the Will could not
have been executed by the
Testator. This conclusion was
not supported by any evidence
whatsoever and it was perverse
for him to have so held that the
Will was not that of the
Testator.
At this stage, it may be useful
to refer to the case of
Gregory v Tandoh and Anr. [2010]
SCGLR 971 at 975 to
indicate circumstances under
which an appellate court like
this court may depart from
findings of fact by a trial
court.
These were stated in the case
supra as follows:-
(1)
Where from the record of appeal
the findings of fact by the
trial court were clearly not
supported by the evidence on
record.
(2)
Where the findings of fact by
the trial court could be seen
from the record of appeal to be
either perverse or inconsistent
with the totality of evidence
led by the witnesses and the
surrounding circumstances of the
entire evidence on record.
(3)
Where the findings of fact are
consistently inconsistent with
important documentary evidence
on record.
(4)
Where the trial court wrongly
applied a principle of law.
From the above, it is clear and
apparent that the final
conclusions of the learned trial
Judge were perverse. As such it
was proper for the Court of
Appeal to depart from these
findings.
Clearly then, the judgment of
the learned trial Judge was
indeed against the weight of
evidence as was found by the
Court of Appeal. Again Counsel
for Plaintiffs helpfully
provided a Court of Appeal
authority to the trial court
which he ought to have followed,
going by the doctrine of stari
decisis. This authority is the
unreported case of CivilAppeal
No. H1/281/2004 dated 15th
May 2008, page 8 intitutled
& John Fosu v Abena Adomah &
Eunice Osei,
where our respected brother
Gbadegbe JA
(as he then was) opined in the
unanimous judgment of the Court
of Appeal when he spoke on
behalf of the Court as follows:-
"PW1, PW2 and PW3 who testified
as to the preparation of the
Will and its due execution and
attestation were cross examined
by learned Counsel for the
Defendants. The cross
examination took a long time but
a careful examination of the
admitted evidence reveals that
it did not have the effect of
discrediting in substance their
testimony as to the
circumstances surrounding the
execution of the Will. In
fact, it appears that in the
course of the cross examination
nothing of consequence was
established on the allegation of
the Testator's alleged lack of
mental capacity to make the
Will. There was also no
mention of any person as having
forged the signature of the
Testator or directed the making
of the forgery.
I add that there was no
suggestion of any notice for the
lawyer, PW1 to have forged the
document. I think the defendants
must have thought that the
facts, bare as they were alleged
in their defence without more
would suffice to establish
forgery. In my view, since it
raised the commission of a
crime, the defendants were
obliged to prove it beyond
reasonable doubt and indeed,
their cross examination of the
Plaintiffs witnesses must lay
the foundation for this.
Unfortunately, the cross
examination only raised the
issue of the signature not being
that of the decedent by
comparison with the Will of
1992."
His Lordship further held that:-
..."I am of the thinking that
having regard to the fact that
PW1 was a lawyer engaged by the
deceased to make the Will for
him in the absence of any
evidence tending to show
interest, bias and or the like,
his evidence ought to receive
great weight. It is known that
when Testators seek to consult
lawyers to enable them make
provision for the distribution
of their assets after their call
to the maker they often keep
this to themselves and as such
when direct evidence as to the
making of Wills is offered in
circumstances that do not raise
any suspicion as in the instant
case, a court of law should be
slow to reject such evidence in
the fact[sic] of clearly
unsubstantiated challenges that
are nothing but idle attacks as
indeed has been made by the
defendants of and concerning
PW1."
If the facts in the instant case
such as the preparation of
Exhibit “A” by PW1 and its due
execution by the Testator and
PW2 etc., it follows that the
learned trial Judge should have
taken these facts into
consideration.
The reasoning as demonstrated
above by Gbadegbe JA (as he then
was) in the case referred to
supra, is unassailable and it is
mind boggling why the trial
judge refused to follow it,
especially as it is on all fours
with the instant case. He rather
chose to in the words of the
Court of Appeal "allow
himself to be swayed by
irrelevant matters..." which
led to the wrong and
unreasonable conclusion he came
to in his judgment. It is
therefore clear that the Court
of Appeal judgment is not
against the weight of evidence.
This issue is also resolved in
favour of the Plaintiffs.
ISSUE C
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECEASED
TESTATOR, JOHN KOFI DEKYI
VALIDLY EXECUTED HIS LAST WILL
AND TESTAMENT ON THE 2ND
DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010 IN THE
PRESENCE OF TWO ATTESTING
WITNESSES
It is provided under Section 2
(1), (2), (3) and (5) of the
Wills Act, (1971), Act 360 as
follows:-
Section 2 (1)
“No Will shall be valid unless
it is in writing and signed by
the testator or by some other
persons at his direction.
Section 2 (2)
No signature shall be operative
to give effect to any
disposition or direction which
is underneath or which follows
it, or which is inserted after
the signature has been made.
Section 2 (3)
The signature of the testator
shall be made or acknowledged by
the testator in the presence of
two or more witnesses present at
the same time.
Section 2 (5)
The witnesses shall attest and
sign the Will in the presence of
the testator, but a form of
attestation is not necessary.”
The evidence in support of how
Exhibit “A”, the Testator’s Will
was prepared was given by PW1,
Francis Koffie, the Deceased
Testator’s Solicitor of many
years. The said PWI testified in
Court as follows:-
“The Testator had on several
occasions instructed me to
prepare several Wills but he
always made new ones almost
every year, withdrawing the last
one. He was literate, so
after I prepared Exhibit “A”
based on his instruction he read
through it. Two of our office
clerks were invited. Rose Mary
Bonin and Maxwell Mensah Bimpong
were invited into my office to
witness the execution by Mr.
Dekyi of the Will. Both were
present when Dekyi signed the
Will, after which they also
signed as attesting witnesses in
the presence of each other and
the testator. After that, I
also signed as having prepared
it as a lawyer, having done it
as a competent person in
accordance with the provisions
of the Wills Act.”
Emphasis supplied.
The above evidence must be
evaluated against the background
that, the said Will, Exhibit “A”
had earlier during the testimony
of PWI been tendered by the
witness without any objection.
Furthermore, there is conclusive
evidence from the testimony of
PW1 that Exhibit “A” complied
with the provisions of the Wills
Act, referred to supra. Out of
abundance of caution despite the
extensive and rigorous
cross-examination that PW1 was
subjected to, what stands out
clearly in his evidence are the
following distinctive features
and occurrence.
1.
That Exhibit “A” is in
writing and was duly signed and
executed by the Testator, John
Dekyi.
2.
There were two attesting
witnesses both present at the
same time that the Deceased
Testator signed Exhibit A after
which both of them also signed
in the presence of each other.
3.
PW1, the Solicitor who
prepared the Will also signed
and endorsed the Will as the
person who prepared the Will.
The above therefore satisfies
all the essential ingredients of
Sections 2 (2), (3) and (5) of
the Wills Act, Act 360 as set
out supra. Furthermore, as will
be established in the course of
analyzing Issue D below, there
was also evidence on record that
the Deceased Testator had the
mental capacity at the date of
the execution of Exhibit “A”.
This is what PW1 testified to in
court on the mental capacity of
the Testator.
“To say that the Will was a
forgery, with all due respect is
unfortunate. I knew Dekyi
professionally since 1996, and
I daresay he was one person
who defied nature because given
his age at the time, he could
drive himself to court
immediately he was 90. He could
read unaided. He was meticulous
to a fault.” Emphasis
In answer to another question,
this is how PW1 again delivered
himself on the mental state of
the Deceased Testator on 2nd
November 2010.
“As a reasonable observer, he
walked from his house about 600
metres away to our office. He
was sound and after the Will was
made, he read through it before
he signed it. He had no
infirmity of mind at the time.”
Emphasis
The above pieces of evidence
showed clearly that the Deceased
Testator was mentally alert and
therefore had the mental
capacity to have executed the
Will on 2/11/2010. The above
evidence was also not disturbed
or shaken during
cross-examination or by other
evidence proffered by the
Defendants when they gave
evidence. Indeed, Apaloo C.J,
sitting as an additional High
Court Judge in the case of
Akenten II and Others v Osei
already referred to supra,
stated the essential
characteristics of a valid Will
as follows:-
“The evidential burden assumed by each
side in view of the position
taken by the parties, was that
the plaintiffs must show that
the document in respect of which
they sought probate was the
testamentary wish of G; that he
was compos mentis at the date of
its execution and was a free
agent and lastly, that it was
executed and attested in
accordance with the requirement
laid down in section 2 of the
Wills Act, 1971 (Act 360).
Upon showing that, the burden
then shifted to the defendant to
prove the alleged forgery”
Emphasis
The principle in the Akenten
II and Others v Osei case
was earlier applied and stated
in the case of Yankah v
Administrator General [1971] 2
GLR 186, where the court
held as follows:-
“If it appears on the face of
a will that it has been properly
executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law, the
presumption by law is that the
testator duly acknowledged it.
Although the isolated statement
of Mary Adams divorced from the
rest of the evidence would seem
to indicate that she did not
sign the codicil in the presence
of the testator and that she was
not present when the testator
signed the codicil, the
evidence of the solicitor who
drafted the codicil, the real
evidence provided on the face of
the codicil itself and the
probabilities of this case tell
strongly against that
interpretation of the evidence.
The totality of the evidence
showed that the codicil was
signed and attested to by the
witnesses in the testator’s
presence. Lloyd v. Roberts
(1858) 14 E.R.871 and Wright v.
Sanderson (1884) 9 P.D. 149
applied.” Emphasis
These principles of law had been
followed by the courts in the
following cases which all state
unequivocally that, although the
initial burden lay on those
propounding the Will, the burden
shifts to those in denial once a
prima facie case had been
established. This is especially
so in the instant case where
PW1, PW2 one of the attesting
witnesses and PW3 a Forensic
Expert had testified in proof of
the due execution of the Will,
Exhibit “A” thereof.
See the case of
In Re Krah (Decd) Yankyerah &
Others v Osei Tutu and Anr.
[1988-90] 1 GLR 638, holding 2
“In civil trials, although the
burden of proof lay on the one
who must succeed in the action,
it shifted in the course of the
trial. In the instant case, the
defendants had the particular
burden of producing evidence to
substantiate their claim that
the testator was in the habit of
thumbprinting his documents but
they had failed to discharge
that particular burden of proof.
The only inference that could
therefore be drawn was that the
testator used to sign his name
and for an unexplained reason,
he did not sign exhibit B. The
reason was that which was
supplied by the plaintiffs that
he was so ill that he was not of
sound mind to be able to execute
the document under his free
will.”
See Otoo No. I v Otoo No. I and Others
[2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 777 where
the Supreme Court stated
unanimously as follows:-
“The cardinal rule in the
construction of a will was that
the intention of the testator,
as declared by him and apparent
in the words of his will, must
be given effect to, so far as,
and as nearly as might be
consistent with law.
If the intention of the testator could
be ascertained from the will
itself, that intention must
prevail. If the court of
construction was in difficulty
when trying to deduce the true
intention of the testator, it
would apply what was known as
the rules or canons of
construction such as the will
must be read as a whole, in
order to ascertain the
intention. Hickling v Fair
[1899] AC 15 at 27; Beaudry v
Barbeau [1900] AC 569 at 575;
Papillion v Voice (1728) Kel W
27 at 32; 25 ER 478 at 481; Re
Palmer [1893] 3 Ch 369 at
373-374; Biney v Biney [1974] 1
GLR 313, CA; and dicta of
Lord Wensleydale in Grey v
Pearson (1857) 6 HLC 61; and
of Adzoe JSC In re Atta (Decd);
Kwako v Tawiah [2001-2002] SCGLR
461 cited.” Emphasis
In this instant, it is clear
that the Deceased Testator did
not intend his estate to fall
into intestacy and this must be
upheld.
RELEVANCE OF EXPERT OPINION
One related matter connected
with the resolution of Issue c
as set out supra is the issue of
the conflicting expert opinions
on whether the signature of the
Testator on Exhibit “A” is
really his signature as compared
to other undisputed documents
examined by two forensic
experts. The Court of Appeal
examined thoroughly why in their
opinion CW1, the court expert
Godwin Lavoe's evidence could
not hold a light to that of PW3.
After comparing the evidence of
both experts and going through
the authorities on forensic
examination, the Court came to
the conclusion that the analysis
of PW3 showed that he did a far
better job than that of CW1 and
his expertise clearly outshone
that of the Court Witness. One
cannot fault the Court of Appeal
for arriving at that conclusion.
After updating themselves with
the authorities on forensic
evidence and a careful
consideration of the signatures
on the record, the court held
that the conclusion of PW3 was
to be preferred to that of CW1,
whose conclusion was tentative
and did nothing to resolve the
issue before the court.
In any event, it still remained
an opinion and it was the
court's duty to critically
evaluate the evidence and come
to the right conclusion. This
the Court of Appeal had done by
coming to the conclusion that on
the totality of the evidence on
the record, the judgment of the
trial Court was perverse and
against the weight of evidence
and this they amply demonstrated
by their reasoning in the
judgment.
Indeed the learned trial Judge
was not bound to accept any of
the expert opinions that had
been led before him. Those
pieces of evidence did not
relieve him of his duty of the
trier of facts before him. The
legal authorities are quite
certain and clear on this. The
Court of Appeal was therefore
right in our opinion in
departing once again from the
findings of fact made by the
learned trial Judge.
See for example the cases of
Sasu v Whitecross Insurance Co.
Ltd. [1960] GLR 4 where the
Supreme Court held and directed
that expert evidence is to be
received with reserve, and does
not absolve a Judge from forming
his own opinion on the evidence
as a whole.
See also the case of Fenuku
v John Teye [2001-2002] SCGLR
985 where Ampiah JSC
speaking on behalf of the court
held thus:-
“The principle of law regarding expert
evidence was that the judge need
not accept any of the evidence
offered. The Judge was only to
be assisted by such expert
evidence to arrive at a
conclusion of his own after
examining the whole of the
evidence before him. The expert
evidence was only a guide to
arrive at the conclusions. In
the instant case, on the
totality of the evidence
adduced, the Supreme Court was
satisfied, as the Court of
Appeal did, from preponderance
of the probabilities, that it
was more likely than not, that
exhibit F was executed by the
late Fenuku and that it was not
a forgery”
In view of these settled
authorities, and having apprized
ourselves with the reports of
both PW3 and CW1, and taking
into consideration the
signatures of the Testator on
all the various documents
examined vis-à-vis Exhibit “A”,
we come to the irresistible
conclusion that, John Kofi
Dekyi, the Deceased Testator is
the author and executor of
Exhibit “A”. The legal position
might very well be stated that,
in evaluating the expert
evidence given in trial of cases
before the courts, in as much as
the court is not bound to accept
such opinion hook line or
sinker, the court in rejecting
or accepting such an expert
opinion must proffer explanation
for whatever position is taken
in the matter. For example, in
the instant case, we have indeed
satisfied ourselves from ocular
observation of the signatures in
issue that, the similarities in
those signatures make Exhibit A
more probable as having been
authored by the Deceased.
On the totality of the evidence,
the law and our analysis
thereof, we conclude that the
Deceased Testator validly
executed his last Will and
Testament which in this case is
Exhibit A on the 2nd
day of November 2010 in the
presence of two attesting
witnesses.
ISSUE D
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECEASED
TESTATOR, JOHN KOFI DEKYI WAS
COMPOS MENTIS AT THE TIME HE
EXECUTED HIS LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT ON 2ND
NOVEMBER 2010
We have already referred to the
testimony of PW1 wherein he
stated the good health that the
Testator enjoyed even at his
ripe age of 90. We also made
reference to his enjoyment good
mental capacity at all material
times. Indeed the learned trial
Judge on this point made
positive findings of fact and
concluded that there was no
reason to believe that the
Deceased Testator was not of
sound disposing mind at the
time. In order to set the
records straight, we consider it
worthwhile to quote in extenso
the exact words used by the
learned trial Judge in the
judgment as follows:-
“The snack (sic) is that,
though the defendant have failed
to adduced evidence of his
admission at Okomfo Anokye
Hospital on three occasions,
when they were quizzed by the
lawyer for the plaintiffs, they
were unable to give the date of
any of those three occasions. It
is possible they could have
forgotten the dates he was at
the hospital. Granted that is
the situation, I am of the
opinion they could have produced
a document to confirm their
deceased father was at the
hospital. For instance, since
DW1 and 3rd Defendant
have said they took him to the
hospital on all the occasions,
was their father not issued with
an attendance card or a folder
as is the usual practice in a
respectable hospital like the
one in issue? If they could not
trace any of these documents,
why did they not get the
hospital authorities to come to
court to testify as to when
their father was admitted at the
hospital? I have found no
answers to these concerns
because the defendants who had
the burden to provide them,
failed to do so. I am
unconvinced that on 2/11/2010,
late John Kofi Dekyi was so sick
that he could not have gone to
the office of Lawyer Koffie to
make a Will; I also have no
reason to believe that was not
of a sound disposing mind at the
time. Emphasis.”
The learned trial Judge later in
the same judgment stated
unequivocally that he was not
convinced that their late
father’s health deteriorated on
his return to Ghana from the USA
to the extent that he could not
have had the mental capacity to
make a Will as he did on
2/11/2010/
With the above quotations, it is
clear as daylight that all the
reasons upon which the
Defendants anchored their
challenge to the Will of the
Testator on 2/11/2010, to wit
its validity in terms of section
2 of the Wills Act, and the
Testator having mental capacity
to make the Will had been
discounted by the trial Judge
based on evidence from the
record of appeal.
Furthermore, if we take into
consideration the various
dispositions and devises in
Exhibit “A” of the disputed
Will, the very nature of these
devises makes it clear that it
could only have come from a
person who was mentally alert
and of a strong mind and
character.
We have examined the devises in
Exhibit A, and we are really
impressed that at that ripe age,
the Testator had the presence of
mind for essential details not
only in respect of the
beneficiaries, but also in the
nature of the properties he
devised. There is thus no doubt
that he was compos mentis at the
material time of the execution
of exhibit A.
From the analysis above, it is
our respective conclusion that,
the Court of Appeal came to the
right conclusions on its
evaluation of the evidence and
their judgment dated 28/07/2015
is affirmed. The appeal will be
dismissed as lacking in merit.
PROLIXITY OF STATEMENTS OF CASE
FILED BY LEARNED COUNSEL
Finally, before ending the
judgment, we wish to comment on
the tedious length of the
statement of case filed by both
parties. The Appellant filed a
77 page document whilst the
Respondent filed a 45 page
statement of case. Such lengthy
statements of case, though may
be filed with some scholarship,
most of the time extend to
unnecessary and tedious length.
This Court has had occasion to
caution Counsels on such
prolixity in the case of
Smith & Ors v Blankson (subst
by) Baffour & Anor [2007-2008]
SCGLR 374 wherein our Sister
Sophia Akuffo JSC,
delivering the judgment of the
Court had this to say:-
"...this court deplores the
prolixity with which Counsel for
the Plaintiff-Appellants set out
the claims, issues and grounds
of appeal. Many of these
amounted more to legal
submissions than pleadings. It
is not by lengthy words and
paragraphs that a bad case can
be transmuted to a good one. The
only ends served by such
protracted pleadings is to waste
the Court's time and at times
confuse the issues. It amounts
to an abuse of the process of
the courts. Counsel for
Plaintiffs-Appellants, a very
senior member of the Bar, ought
to know better, and he would be
advised to desist from such
unnecessary rambling and wordy
pleadings and submissions in the
future... the admission of 26
issues for trial is shocking and
unjustifiable; it only affords
to Counsel an opportunity to
throw waffle all over the place
(whether in terms of evidence or
arguments) resulting in
inordinate wastage of the
courts' time and resources."
We endorse the above words of
our respected Sister and state
unreservedly that, counsel
should henceforth pay particular
attention to substance and
relevant detail rather than
engaging in polemics. Grounds of
appeal for instance must be
tailor measured to specific
substantial infractions apparent
in the record of appeal which
are capable of overturning the
judgment appealed against.
In the premises, the appeal by
the Defendants against the Court
of Appeal judgment of 28th
July 2015 fails and is
accordingly dismissed. The said
Court of Appeal judgment of even
date is affirmed.
(SGD)
V. J. M. DOTSE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) N. S. GBADEGBE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) V. AKOTO -
BAMFO (MRS)
JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) A. A. BENIN
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD) G. PWAMANG
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL
MUJEEB AHMED RAHMAN ESQ.
FOR THE DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS
/APPELLANTS.
DANIYAL ABDUL KARIM ESQ. FOR THE
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS
/RESPONDENTS.
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