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HOME           14  WEST AFRICA COURT OF APPEAL

 

                                   

WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL, GOLD COAST

Accra, 9th July, 1952

FOSTER-SUTTON, P., COUSSEY, lA., AND MANYO-PLANGE, J.

 

1. NANA OFOR! ATTA II, OMANHENE OF AKYEM ABUAKWA, KIBI, GOLD COAST COLONY

2. BAFUOR OWUSU AMO, ODIKRO OF MURONAM                                  Appellants

 v.

1. NANA BONSRA AGYEI, AS ADANSEHENE AND AS REPRESENTING THE STOOL OF ADANSE

2. BANKA STOOL AS REPRESENTED BY BRAKO ABABIO II                Respondents

                                

Estoppel-Previous suit-Person privy to Plaintiff-Person in same interest standing by.

There had been a previous action in which the Stool of Muronam litigated against the Banka Stool the title to a piece of land; the Banka Stool won. The case now under appeal related to the same land. The appellants were the plaintiffs below, No.1 being the Paramount Chief of Akim Abuakwa, to whom the Muronam Stool is subject, and No.2 the head of the Muronam Stool; they at first sued the representative of the Stool of Adanse, but he asked for his master, the Banka Stool, to be joined as co-defendant. The defendants denied plaintiffs' claim and also pleaded the former judgment as estoppel. The trial Judge held that.plaintiff No.2 (the Muronam Stool) was estopped thereby having been a party in the previous action, and that as plaintiff No.1 was suing on the plea that the Muronam Stool lands are attached to the paramount Akim Abuakwa, he, also, was estopped from questioning a judgment obtained against a Stool claim­ing under him, as the issue in the previous action was about the title itself to the land and he knew of that action and had a right to intervene but did not. The trial Judge dismissed the case, and the plaintiffs appealed, in substance on the grounds that the parties were not the same as before and that the trial Judge was wrong in holding that the Paramount chief of Akim Abuakwa knew of, or had a duty to intervene in the previous case.

Held: (1) As regards the second plaintiff, now appellant No.2: in the previous case between him and the person now respondent No.2, there was a judgment against him in regard to the title to the land in dispute, therefore he was estopped from re-litigating the title to the same land.

          (2) (a) As regards the first plaintiff, now appellant No.1: the opening state­ment in the former suit and the writ and statement of claim in the present suit show that the land is claimed as the property of the Muronam Stool and that Akim Abuakwa's interest is only by virtue of Muronam's allegiance to Akim Abuakwa; Akim Abuakwa can only establish an interest in the land by establish­ing the title of the Muronam Stool and is therefore privy to the rvluronam Stool and estopped from re-litigating the title by the judgment in the previous suit against the Muronam Stool.

              (b) Appellant No.1 had, as above stated, the same interest as appellant No.2 in the previous action; the proceedings in that case showed that appellant No.1 knew about them, but having stood by in that action by appellant No.2 in which the defence claimed that the land belonged to another paramount Stool, was estopped from re-opening the question of Muronam's title to the land.

Case cited:- (1) In re Lart: Wilkinson v. Blades (1896) 2 Ch. 788. Appeal by plaintiffs: No. 46/50.

J. B. Danquah for Appellants.

N. A. Ollennu for Respondent. [pg149]

The following judgment was delivered:

Manyo-Plange, J. In this appeal the plaintiffs-appellants claimed by their writ the first as Paramount Chief of Akim Abuakwa to whom Muronam Stool and Stool land are subject and, the second, as the Odikro of Muronam to whose Stool the Muronam Stool lands belong for a declaration of their title to the land the subject matter of the action and for an injunction.

The writ was issued against only the first defendant-respondent. The title to the land the subject matter of the action has in a former action (Chief Kwame A ndoh and another of Muronam on behalf of the Stool of Muronam v. N ana Kwakye Penkro, Bankahene and two others) been litigated by the second plaintiff-appellant's Stool and the Banka Stool as represented by the then Bankahene. In that action judgment was given against second plaintiff-appellant's Stool.

In that action, the Bankahene's defence was that the land was for the Adansehene for whom he was caretaker. The first defendant-respondent there­fore applied for the joinder of the Banka Stool as represented by Brako Ababio II as co-defendant and he was accordingly so joined.

Pleadings were ordered and statements of claim and defence were filed. The defendants-respondents by their defence denied that the plaintiffs-appellants were entitled to the declaration sought and pleaded further, that the plaintiffs­appellants were estopped from litigating the title to the land in dispute and, in support of the plea of estoppel, pleaded the judgment in the former action referred to above.

The plea of estoppel was upheld by the learned trial Judge on different grounds against the plaintiffs-appellants.

The learned trial Judge held that the second plaintiff-appellant was a party to the former action in which the cause of action and the subject matter of the action were the same as in this action and was therefore bound by the judgment in that action and thereby estopped from again litigating the title to the land in dispute.

As against the first plaintiff-appellant, he held that the claim made by the Muronam Stool in the former action was quite clearly within the knowledge of the Omanhene of Akim Abuakwa and, that as the first plaintiff-appellant pleads that the Muronam lands are attached to his Stool, there was then, if true, a clear duty on Akim Abuakwa to intervene, and having been cognisant of those pro­ceedings and having a right to intervene, and not having done so, Akim Abuakwa Stool, that is first plaintiff-appellant, is now estopped by his conduct from questioning a judgment obtained against a Stool claiming under him; since it was not only the right of possession of Muronam which was then attacked, but it was the title to absolute ownership that was challenged ..

Having thus held, the trial Judge gave judgment against the plaintiffs­appellants, dismissing their claim with costs. It is against this judgment that the plaintiffs-appellants have appealed on 14 grounds. In my view, the determination of this appeal turns only on the first two grounds which read as follows:-

" 1. The learned Judge of the Court below was Wrong in finding for the

respondent and co-respondent on their plea that-

, the issues between the parties had been determined by a decision given by the Court of the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti on the 19th December, 1940, and which decision had been upheld by the West African Court of Appeal on the 29th May, 1941,'

" in that, taken together, the two previous decisions did not in fact and in law, determine the issue of ownership of the land in dispute, the parties in the previous action were not the same, the issues to be determined were not the same, and the evidence required in support was also not the same. Neither the first Plaintiff nor the principal Defendant in the present action was privy to any party in the previous action of 1940. [pg 150]

"2. The learned Judge of the Court below was wrong in holding that the claim made by the Muronam Stool in 1940, was quite clearly within the knowledge of the Omanhene of the Akim Abuakwa State, or that there was a clear duty on the part of the Omanhene to intervene, and that not having so intervened he is now estopped by his conduct from questioning a judgment obtained against a Stool claiming under him. The Odikro of Muronam did not claim under the Omanhene of Akim Abuakwa in that suit."

The first ground attacks the finding of estoppel by record which was against the second plaintiff-appellant and the second ground attacks the finding of estoppel by conduct against the first plaintiff-appellant.

I shall deal firstly with the first ground. As stated by the learned trial Judge, a perusal of the copy of the proceedings with the judgments which was exhibited and is Exhibit" A " in this action, shows that the second plaintiff-appellant and second defendant-respondent in this action, were the principal parties in the former action: second plaintiff-appellant in that action being the first plaintiff, and the second defendant-respondent the first defendant. The issue was the same as in the present action i.e. ownership to land, and the land in dispute the same as the land in dispute in the present action. The claim of the second plaintiff­appellant then, as now, was for a declaration of title to the same land as in this action. The judgment which was given against the second plaintiff which was confirmed on appeal by this Court, was one of a dismissal of his claim and not a non-suit; it reads as follows:-

" I find there is no evidence on the plaintiff's side to justify the grant of the declaration of title which he seeks ... There will therefore be judgment for the defendants with costs to be taxed."

It was therefore a final judgment as to his claim to the title to the land in dispute. That being a final judgment in rem against the second plaintiff-appellant, he is in my view as held by the learned trial Judge, estopped from re-litigating the title to the ownership of the same lane!. Ground 1 therefore fails.

Before leaving this ground, I would like to add that, although the learned trial Judge did not base his finding against the first plaintiff-appellant on his being privy to any party to the former action, I am of the opinion that the first plaintiff-appellant is also bound by the judgment in the former action on the ground of his being privy to the second plaintiff-appellant who claimed title as owner to the land. In the former action there were no pleadings, but Counsel for the plaintiff in that action stated in his opening as follows:-

" ... originally all three parties (that is Muronam, Banka and Kade) lived on Anum and Prah lands subject of the Ofori Stool, i.e. the Paramount Stool of Akim Abuakwa to which they all owed allegiance through the Odauhene of Otwereso and Osenase ... The plaintiffs were the first to settle on the land in that area. They claim to have been on the land from time immemorial. "

It is to be observed that there was no suggestion of the plaintiffs having derived their title to the land from Akim Abuakwa nor is it so suggested in this present action. This claim of Muronam is not challenged by Akim Abuakwa; on the contrary Akim Abuakwa joins Muronam to reassert the claim that the lands are Muronam lands, for by their writ, they claim that the land belongs to Muronam. The writ and the statement of claim in the present action read together with the opening statement of plaintiff's Counsel in the former action already quoted, make it clear in my view that the land is claimed to belong to Muronam and that its attachment to the Stool of Akim Abuakwa is only by virtue of Muronam's admitted allegiance to Akim Abuakwa, and it is that allegiance that gives Akim Abuakwa an interest in the Muronam lands. There­fore, any interest that Akim Abuakwa may have in the land in dispute is derived [pg 151] from, and entirely dependent on Muronam's title to the land; that is Akim Abuakwa claims her interest through Muronam and not that Muronam claims under Akim Abuakwa as the learned trial Judge \vould seem to have held. Akim Abuakwa therefore, can only establish an interest in the land by establishing the title as owner of the Muronam Stool. This view is strengthened by the joinder of the Muronam Stool as co-plaintiff. Akim Abuakwa Stool therefore, is privy to the Muronam Stool through which it claims an interest in the land in dispute, and is thereby estopped by the judgment in the former action from again litigating the title.

I now come to ground 2. Exhibit" A ", the proceedings in the former action, in my view makes it abundantly clear that the Omanhene of Akim Abuakwa was at the time of these proceedings aware of them and of the claim made by the Muronam Stool in the action, and the claim set up by the Banka Stool. The Muronam Stool serves Akim Abuakwa Stool through a sub-chief of Akim Abuakwa that is the Odauhene. This sub-chief was fully aware of the action and proceedings. He was subpoenaed at the instance of the plaintiffs and he deputed and authorised his linguist to attend and give evidence on his behalf-see page 94 of the record and the linguist's evidence at page 121 of the record. In addition to this, the Secretary to the Omanhene of Akim Abuakwa and Registrar to the Akim Abuakwa State Council went from Kibi to Kumasi to give evidence for the plaintiffs-see page 129 of the record, and before this he had been serving notice on the defendants to produce documents.

In these circumstances, I find it inconceivable that the Omanhene of Akim Abuakwa could have been unaware of the proceedings. The matters I have referred to, in my view, abundantly support the learned trial Judge's finding that the proceedings were clearly within the knowledge of the then Omanhene of Akim Abuakwa.

Now, there could have been no doubt that the claim put up then by the Bankahene would, if established, have been adverse to the interests, if any, of Akim Abuakwa in the land in dispute. That being so, what should the Omanhene of Akim Abuakwa have done in the circumstances? In my view he should have applied to be joined as co-plaintiff. He took no such course. Being cognisant of the proceedings, he was "content to stand by and see his battle fought by somebody else in the same interest": the interest is the same, because the matter to be determined in the present action was the same as was determined in the former action, namely Muronam's title to the land in dispute, without which Akim Abuakwa cannot establish an interest in the land. Having stood by and seen the battle fought to a finish to the disadvantage of Muronam, he goes to sleep for nearly five years, then suddenly wakes up and tries to re-open the question of Muronam's title to the land in dispute which had been determined in the former action.

Clearly the first plaintiff-appellant is by his conduct estopped from so doing and I think the case of In re Lart: Wilkinson v. Blades (1) supports the view that the first plaintiff-appellant is estopped by his conduct. I see practically no distinction between that case and the present except that, in Wilkinson v. Blades (1), Wilkinson actually took a benefit under the judgment; but that in my view only amounted to further evidence of acquiescence.

Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants argued that, as the dispute was between two sub-chiefs of the Paramount Stool, the Paramount Stool could not intervene; because, whatever the result, its title to the land could not be affected. That argument would have had some force if the former action had been one in which the titles of the opposing parties were both derived from the Paramount Stool of Akim Abuakwa.

Here, not only are the titles to the land in dispute not derived from the Akim Abuakwa Stool, but the defence claimed that the land belonged to some other [pg 152]

Paramount Stool, that is, the Stool of Adansi.

  The Stool of Adansi had previously laid claim to the land in dispute, in the case of Omanhene of Adansi against the Queen Mother of Muronam in which judgment was given in favour of Adansi in the District Commissioner's Court and was upheld on appeal to the Provincial Commissioner's Court; but on further appeal to the Chief Commissioner's Court the appeal was allowed not on the merits, but only on the ground that the Court of first instance had no jurisdiction. When therefore Adansi's title to the land was again asserted, it was clearly the duty of Akim Abuakwa to intervene if she had an interest to the land. Ground 2 must therefore also fail.

As I have already stated the determination of this appeal turns in my view only on the two grounds I have dealt with. The conclusions at which I have arrived make irrelevant any considerations of the other grounds of appeal. I would therefore dismiss this appeal with costs.

Foster-Sutton, P. I concur. Coussey, J A. I concur.

Appeal dismissed.

 

                                                                  [pg 153]
 
 
 

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