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2 WEST AFRICA COURT OF APPEAL |
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3rd December, 1934.
Cor, Deane, C.J., Yates, and Aitken, JJ.
IN THE
MATTER OF THE BEPOSO CONCESSION-CONCESSION ENQUIRY No.
197, ASHANTI.
HERBERT
FLINTOFT
Claimant.
NANA OSEI AGYEMAN
PREMPEH II, CHIEF KOJO POKO, GYASEHENE OF KUMASI,
CHIEF KWEKF BAYIN OF BEPOSO, GYASE DIVISION, KUMASI,
CHIEF APPIAH NUAMAH, QUEEN MOTHER OF BEPOSO
Grantors,
NANA
KWABENA WUSU, OMANHENE OF EJISU ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF' AND OF
ALL OTHER THE PEOPLE OF THE STOOL OF EJISU
Opposer-Appellant.
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1934.
Appeal from Court of
Chief Commissioner,
Enquiry into validity of
concession--ex facie
order-Application for leave to
oppose made before final
order-Substitution of another
application to oppose in
representative capacity Motion
adjourned pending determination
of Suit concerning interest of
Grantors and Opposer in property
the subject of the
concession-Final Order for
Certificate of Validity made
before hearing of motion or
determination of Su-it.-Section
27 of Concessions Ordinance
wrongly relied upon to protect
Opposer's rights-Section 12
(2) of Ordinance imposes duty
on Court to ascertain proper
person.~ to grant
concession-These issues subject
of Suit and Motion.
Held: Appeal allowed. Order for
issue of certificate set aside,
Remitted to Court below for
determination of motion.
A. Case-Hayford
for Opposer-Appellant.
C. C, Carter for
Claimant,
E.
O. Asafu-.4djaye for
Grantors,
The following judgments were
delivered:--
ArrKEN, J.
On the 14th of December, 1931
Mr. Herbert Flintoft, the
claimant, for the sum of £50,
obtained from the grantors a
gold and mineral concession, now
known as the Beposo Lands
Concession, over an area of
approximately five square miles
near Lake Bosumtwi at Beposo.
Subject to the payment of a
yearly rent of £12 until the
commencement" of winning of gold
or crushing of
ore" and thereafter a yearly
rent of £300, the concession was
granted for a period of
ninety-nine years provided that
the claimant (his heirs
exeeutors administrators and
assigns) observed and performed
certain not very onerous
covenants. Other advantages were
thereby conferred on the
claimant (his heirs executors
administrators and assigns)
which it is not necessary to
specify, though attention may be
drawn to his right to determine
the said term of ninety-nine
years at any time by giving to
the grantors " six calendar
months notice in writing in that
behalf".
Notice of this concession was
filed on the 24th of December,
1931; the deed itself was duly
registered on the 8th of
January, 1932; and on the 25th
of January, 1932 the documents
on which the claimant relied in
support of his right to the
concession were filed.
On the 21st of February, 1933,
the matter of this concession
seems to have come before the
Chief Commissioner's Court of
Ashanti, Concessions Division,
for the first time. The Court
was then constituted
by Mr. C. M.
Barton, the Circuit Judge, and
the enquiry was numbered 197.
The learned Judge ordered that
the necessary enquiry into the
validity of this concession
should be held at Kumasi on the
27th of February, 1933, and we
may safely assume that the
provisions of section 11 of the
Ashanti Concessions Ordinance
were duly complied with.
On the 27th of February, 1933
the enquiry was held at Kumasi
before
Mr.
C.
M ..
Barton, Circuit .Tudge. After
hearing the evidence of the
linguist to the Omanhene N ana
Osei Agyeman Prempeh II and of
the Registrar of the District
Commissioner's Court at Kumasi,
and after the concession deed
itself had been admitted in
evidence by consent, the learned
Judge made the following order:-
" Certificate of validity in
respect of Concession Inquiry
"No. 197 to issue subject to the
following " conditions:-
" (1) A cadastral plan of the
concession to be prepared.
" (2) The Governor being
satisfied that the financial "
circumstances of the claimant
are such as to ensure "that the
concession will be sufficiently
developed " and worked ".
It is to be observed that up to,
and including, that 27th of
February, 1933 no application
for leave to oppose the grant of
a certificate of validity had
been made to the Chief
Commissioner's Court, nor had
any hint of opposition thereto
reached the ears of the learned
Judge so far as we know. In the
circumstances his order was a
perfectly proper one, but not
being the final
order for
the issue of the certificate of
validity it left the way open
for any person desiring to
oppose the grant of such
certificate to apply to the
Court under section 14 (1) of
the Ashante; Concessions
Ordinance for leave to oppose.
On the 4th of August, 1933 Nana
Kwabena Wusu, the Omanhene of
Ejisu, filed a notice in the
Chief Commissioner's Court that
the Court would be moved by him
on the 15th of September, 1933,
for an order that he " be made a
party to the " above concession
(i.e.,
the Beposo Concession) opposing
the grant " of certificate of
validity to the grantees". I am
here quoting the actual wording
of his notice of motion, it was
probably not drafted by learned
Counsel. This notice of motion
was duly served on the grantors
and the claimant on the 10th of
August, 1933, and there was an
affidavit in support which was
presumably served on the same
parties along with the notice of
motion.
On the said 15th of September,
1933 this motion came before'
the Chief Commissioner's Court,
which was then constituted by
Mr. C. E. Woolhouse Bannerman,
O.B.E., the acting Circuit
Judge, and was adjourned to the
29th of the same month. On the
latteI date it was withdrawn by
Mr. A. Heward-Mills, who
appeared on behalf of the
would-be opposer, and it is to
be observed that the motion thus
withdrawn was one by Nana
Kwabena Wusu, th0 Omanhene of
Ejisu, in his personal capacity.
On the 16th of December, 1933 a
notice was filed to the effect
that the Chief Commissioner's
Court would be moved on the 18th
of December, 1933 by Counsel for
Nana Kwabena Wusu, Omanhene of
Ejisu, on behalf of himself and
of all other the people of the
stool of Ejisu, for an order
that the said N ana Kwabena Wusu,
Omanhene of Ejisu, on behalf of
himself and of all other the
people of Ejisu, be made a party
to the enquiry into the Beposo
Lands Concession for the purpose
of opposing the grant of a
certificate of validity therein.
An affidavit in support appears
to have been filed on the same
date. Mr. Asafu-Adjaye, on
behalf of the grantors, sought
to argue that one application by
the Oman.hene of Ejisu for leave
to oppose having been withdrawn,
he could not make another. It
was pointed out to him, however.
that the first of these two
applications was made by the
Omanhene in his personal
capacity, whereas the second of
them was made by him as
representing himself and the
people of the stool of Ejisu. He
felt no difficulty whatever in
holding that the withdrawal of
the first application was no bar
to the second, and Mr.
AsafuAdjaye appeared to
acquiesce in our decision.
On the 18th of December, 1933,
this motion came before the
Chief Commissioner's Court
constituted by Mr. C. E.
Woolhouse Bannerman, O.B.E., the
acting Circuit Judge, and was
adjourned to the 18th of
.January, 1934, apparently
because service thereof on
the claimant had not been
effected. It next came before
the Chief Commissioner's Court,
constituted by the same learned
Judge, on the 19th of January,
1934, and the learned Judge's
notes of what then took place
read as follows:-
" IN THE MATTER OF THE
ORDINANCE.
" CONCESSION ENQUIRY No. 197 (AsHANTI).
" A motion on notice for an
order of this Court to join "
the Omanhene Chiefs and Elders
and Councillors " of the Stool
of Ejisu.
"Affidavit of Joseph Kenneth
Botchey of Ejisu "(Registrar) of
the 'l'ribunal of the Omanhene
of " Ejisu filed herein the 16th
day of Decembel', 1933, " in
support of motion.
Motion is read.
" Mr. Albert Heward-Mills moves.
" Mr: Asafu-Adjaye opposes.
"Mr. Albert Heward-Mills informs
the Court that he " has served
copy of the affidavit and motion
paper " on Mr. Flintoft and that
he has seen Mr. Carter of "
Giles Hunt
& Co. That Mr. Carter has
informed " him that he has no
objection to this motion being "
heard.
'fhe Court points out that there
is already an action " pending
before this Court between the
applicants " on the one hand and
the lessors and lessees on the "
other; that this motion is not
necessary and the " issues will
be tried in the substantive
action.
'Mr . .Albert Heward-Mills
applies for the motion to "
stand adjourned
sine die
pending the hearing and "
determination of the substantive
action.
" Mr. Adjaye has no objection.
" By the Court-
" Motion stands adjourned
sine die
until after the " hearing of the
suit"
Mr. Carter has stated to us that
he was never approached by Mr.
Heward-Mills in regard to the
hearing of this motion on the
said 19th of ,January, 1934, and
that he never informed the
latter that he had no objection
to the' motion being heard on
that date. It is indeed
regrettable to find the learned
counsel at issue over a personal
question like this, especially
as :Mr. Heward-Mills was not
before us to give his version of
the incident; but no application
was mane to the learned Judge to
set aside his order adjourning
the motion until after the
hearing- of the suit between the
opposers and the grantors, nor
was any attempt made to appeal
against it; consequently that
order remains in full force and
effect. It is obviously of
considerable value to the
opposers because, if they do
succeed in establishing their
claim to be joint owners of the
Beposo lands together with the
grantors
(see
paragraph 7 of the affidavit of
John Kenneth Botchey filed in
the Chief Commissioner's Court
on the 16th of December, 1933),
they will be in a strong
position to press their views as
to the inadequacy of the
consideration for the Beposo
Lands Concession on the
claimant. I am aware, of course,
that Mr. C.B. Pearson, the
Acting Circuit Judge, who
purported to grant a certificate
of validity of that concession
on the 28th of May, 1934,
ignored this or0.er made by his
predecessor in office on the
19th of January, 1934, but I am
clearly of opinion that he was
bound by that order and had
neither power to rescind it nor
to disregard it. There is now
only one way of getting rid of
it, and that is with the consent
of the would-be 0pposer.
From what I have already said it
will be realised that Mr.
Carter, for the claimant, had an
impossible case to argue.
Nevertheless he made a valiant
attempt to argue it, and it
seems only courteous to deal
with that attempt before I
close. Mr. Carter put forward
two arguments. :First he
submitted that Barton, J.'s
Order of the 27th of February,
1933, which I have quoted in
full, must be regarded as a
final order for the issue of the
certificate of validity and
therefore as barring the way to
any subsequent application for
leave to oppose:
see
section 14 (1) of the Ordinance.
The answer to this argument is
that the order of the 27th of
February, 1933 is very obviously
and
ex facie
not a final order. Next Mr.
Carter argued that the
proceedings before Mr. C. B.
Pearson, Acting J. on the 28th
of May, 1934 must be regarded as
a hearing of the would-be
opposer's application for leave
to oppose and as a refusal
thereof from which, by virtue of
the provisions of section 14 (1)
of the Ordinance, there can be
no appeal. Certainly the learned
Judge referred to the motion in
opposition in the course of
those proceedings and read the
affidavit in support, but I
cannot gather from his notes
that he ever regarded himself as
hearing that motion and, indeed,
no one ever asked him to hear
it. He simply seems to have
looked at it and then, literally
and metaphorically, to have
pushed it aside. Whatever the
effect of that may be, I do not
think that it can amount to a
judicial hearing and
determination of the questions
at issue between the parties;
more6vBr, as I have already
pointed out, Mr. C. B. Pearson
was bound by Mr. C. E. Woolhouse
Bannerman's Order of the 19th of
January, 1934, and that
prevented him from hearing the
would-be opposer's motion until
the determination of the suit
between him and the grantors
unless, of course, the would-be
opposer should consent to an
earlier hearing. In other words
Mr. C. B. Pearson had no power
to hear and determine the
would-be opposer's motion on the
28th of May, 1934, whatever his
intentions may have been, and no
power to grant a certificate of
validity until that motion was
heard and disposed of. In the
result this appeal must be
allowed and the order of the
28th of May, 1934, granting a
certificate of validity in
respect of the Beposo lands
Concession, must be set aside.
The matter is hereby remitted to
the Court of the Chief
Commissioner of Ashanti, to deal
with the would-be opposer's
application for leave to oppose
in due course of law and with
due regard to Mr. C. K Woolhouse
Bannerman's Order of the 19th of
January, 1934.
DEANE, C.J., GOLD COAST.
I have had the advantage of
reading the judgment of Mr.
Justice .Aitken and agree with
the conclusion at which he has
arrived. I should, however, like
to say shortly how the case
presents itself to me.
There was nothing in my opinion
to prevent the opposer from
making his motion to the Court
to be made a party to an enquiry
for the purpose of opposing the
grant of a certificate of
validity to the holder. That
right was conferred on him by
section H (1) Cap. 5 of the Laws
of Ashanti which enacts" Any
person desiring " to oppose the
grant of a certificate of
validity of a concession " may
apply to the Court for leave to
oppose at any time before " the
date of the final order for the
issue of such certificat.e; and
" the Court may, in its
discretion, after hearing the
application, " either grant or
refuse such leave, and no appeal
shall be allowed " from a
decision of the Court under this
section" .
The date of the final order for
the issue of the certificate
which was issued on. the
application of the attorney for
the holder was the 28th day of
May, 1934. The date of the
application for leave to oppose
was 16th day of December, 1933.
The opposer was thus well within
the time allowed him to enter
opposition and it was only after
due hearing that that
application could be refused by
the Court. The opposer in his
motion had set out the grounds
on which he claimed to be heard
and it was only therefore after
due consideration of his case
advanced in support of those
grounds that the Court could
exercise its judicial discretion
and refuse the right to him to
appear as a party to oppose.
Now what occurred? On 18th
December, 1933, the motion came
on for hearing before Mr.
Bannerman, then Acting Circuit
Judge, Mr. Heward-Mills
appearing to represent the
opposer, Mr. Asafu-Adjaye for
the grantors. Mr. Plintoft did
not appeal' though served, but
Mr. Heward-Mills stated that he
had seen his solicitor, Mr.
Carter, and he had 'no objection
to the matter being heard. This
Mr. Carter denies, but it is
significant that he does not
claim that his client was not
served, and I have come to the
conclusion in view of his
argument in this Court that he
did not appear because he
considered that in view of the
order made by Mr. Barton his
client could afford to regard
the matter as only a fight
between two lots of natives
about the rent reserved in the
lease with which he was not
concerned. That this was an
entirely wrong view I hope to
make clear later. However that
may be on 18th December, with
the consent of Mr. Heward-Mills
and Mr. AsafuAdjaye for the
grantors; the motion was
adjourned by the learned Judge
sine die
pending the determination of a
suit then pending between the
opposers on the one side and the
grantors and the holder on the
other in which the same claim
raised by the motion viz: a
claim by the opposer that he and
his people were co-owners of the
concession land with the
grantors, was in issue. It is to
be noted that the learned Judge
himself pointed out that owing
to the action already pending
the motion was, in his opinion,
unnecessary since the issues set
up by it would be tried in a
substantive action, from which
we may perhaps infer that he
also believed that the opposers
stood to gain nothing from the
lessee by their opposition. He
however agreed, on the
application of Mr. Heward-Mills,
that the motion should stand
adjourned
sine die
pending the hearing and
determination of the substantive
action.
Thus the matter stood when on
26th May, 1934 one Christian, a
clerk of the holder's
solicitors, who purported to be
the attorney of the holder, made
a verbal application to }1r.
Pearson then occupying the bench
of the Circuit Court for an
order that the certificate of
validity should issue for the
concession. Mr. Heward-Mills and
Mr. Asafu-Adjaye appear to have
been in Court at the time, and
Mr. Heward-:Mills at once called
the learned Judge's attention to
Mr. Bannerman's order adjourning
his motion, pending the hearing
of the case between the parties,
and pointed out that if the
order asked for was made that
would deprive his client of the
rights he claimed, while Mr.
Asafu-Adjaye remarked that there
was authority for granting
subject to right of others
interested in the grant. 'l'he
matter then stood over to 28th
May,
1934, when the learned Acting
Circuit Judge, who in the
meantime had looked at the
papers, stated that while he
appreciated Mr. Heward-Mills'
contention he was of opinion
that time was running against"
that valuable concession" which
it was to the interest of all
parties should not be lost, and
further that the interests of
Nana Kwabena Wusu anel others
(the opposers) were sufficiently
protected by the provision in
section 27 of Cap. 5, and he
therefore, after taking the
evidence of Christian, who
produced the cadastral survey
ordered by Barton, J. and a
certificate by the Colonial
Secretary that His Excellency
the Governor was satisfied as to
the financial status of the
client, ordered the issue of the
certificate.
Now it is clear that the idea
that the interests of the
opposers were sufficiently
protected by section 27 of Cap.
5 seems to have been a rooted
obsession in the minds of
everyone who had to do with this
matter except }Ir. Heward-Mills,
Mr. Bannerman, Mr. Pearson, Mr.
Carter and Mr. Asafu-Adjaye all
apparently thinking that the
interests of the opposers were
sufficiently protected by
section 27. If, however, the
section is looked at it will be
seen that, after providing that
a certificate of validity shall
be good and valid from the date
of such certificate as against
any person claiming adversely
thereto, it goes on to enact
that in the event of the land
therein referred to or any
portion thereof becoming or
being declared to be the
property of any person other
than the grantor mentioned in
such certificate, the Court
shall make such order as it
deems just with reference to the
payment or apportionment of
rent, and the Court shall cause
to be sent to the Treasurer an
office copy of such order.
1£ the terms of this section are
regarded it will be seen that,
so far from the opposer's
interests being protected or
unaffected by it, it completely
extinguished his interests
vis-a-vis
the lessee once the certificate
was signed as from the date of
the certificate, and only
allowed the Court, in case he
established thereafter rights to
the land as against the grantor,
to make orders as to how the
rent reserved under the
certificate was payable. The
section, however, is quite
inapplicable in this case since
when the opposer's motion was
made no certificate had been
signed: he was objecting to the
issue of the certificate, and
his claim was made long before
the issue of the certificate,
the issue of which, as we have
seen, would deprive him entirely
of his right to object to the
lease or its terms. His motion
was adjourned, and the points
raised in it reserved for
determination, and later 011 it
was disregarded entirely because
the Court thought it did not
matter at all. In my opinion it
mattered greatly and the reason
given for disregarding the
elementary principle of natural
justice not to take away a man's
rights without hearing him,
which is jealously preserved in
section 14, is not a good one,
and the determination of the
matter without hearing
appellant's case was illegal.
In my opinion, moreover, it was
illegal for another reason.
By section 12 (2) of the
Concessions Ordinance it is
provided that no concession
shall be certified as valid
unless the Court is satisfied
that the proper persons were
parties to the concession, and
that it may be reasonably
presumed that they understood
the nature and terms thereof.
Inasmuch as in his reasons for
asking to be allowed to oppose
the opposer had set up a reason
which, if true, would entitle
him to be a party to any
concession dealing with the land
in question, it is quite clear
that the learned Acting Circuit
Judge could not be satisfied
before he had examined into the
truth of the claim who were the
proper persons to be made
parties to the concession. Mr.
Barton had issued a provisional
order for a certificate of
validity so long ago as 27th
February, 1933, but the
opposition had been entered to a
final order being issued on 16th
December, 1933, and accordingly
when in May, 1934 the
application for a final order
was made the situation had
entirely changed, a new enquiry
had been instituted, and the
Court was bound, before granting
the final order for the
certificate, to hear and
determine the opposition motion
before it, otherwise it could
not be satisfied as to the
proper persons being parties to
the concession, and if it was
not satisfied was prohibited
from issuing the order for the
certificate of validity.
The Court in fact was enjoined
by section 14 not to issue the
certificate before hearing and
determining the opposing motion:
it was prohibited from issuing
the certificate under section 12
(2)
by the fact that owing to the
non-decision of the claim to the
land raised in the motion it was
impossible for it to be satisfied
that the proper persons were
parties to the concession. What is
the result? Mr. Carter contends
that the certificate having been
granted there is an end of the
matter under the first part of
section 27. In my opinion. the
contention is not sound. Can it be
seriously contended when an order
validating a concession has been
made in the teeth of the law and
without jurisdiction that it can
be saved by a section of the same
Ordinance which has forbidden that
it should be made. This is a
highly drastic Ordinance which has
the effect of taking away from the
owner of land his right to object
to a contract made by a stranger
with another with regard to his
land if he has not objected in
time to prevent the issue of a
certificate of validity to that
stranger. The procedure must be
strictly followed. In this case
the opposer brought his claim to
the notice of all parties long
before the certificate was issued,
and his claim has never been heard
as the Ordinance requires, but the
certificate of validity has been
granted shutting him out from
objecting to what he submits are
grossly unfair terms. In my
opinion the Court had no
jurisdiction to make the order
which it did, and that order must
be set aside and the matter
remitted to be dealt with in due
course and in accordance with the
law after the opposer has been
heard and his motion determined.
YATES, J.
I concur. |
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