Procedure and
and practice
- - Res judicata
- Interest - judicial
review. - Supreme Court Rules
1996 (C.I 16) Rule 54(a) - Review part
of the decision - Clarification
of the use of the word “jointly”
and “jointly and severally” in
the judgment and the certificate
of the order of this Honourable
Court respectively - Whether
computation of the interest
should compound or simple
interest
as regards the contract
- Whether of not there ware
procedural
issues which affects the Courts
jurisdiction to entertain the
application
- Whether there was
exceptional circumstances which
have necessitate a review of the
clarificatory orders - Wheher or
not there was a clear violation
of existing statutory provisions
governing the computation of
interest on judgment debts.
-
HEADNOTES
On the 20/4/2009 the
applicant herein commenced an
action against the three
respondents in this application
at the Commercial Division of
the High Court, Accra. The High
Court gave judgment in favour of
the plaintiffs against the 1st
and 3rd defendants
and dismissed the action against
the 2nd defendant,
the Attorney-General. An appeal
was lodged at the Court of
Appeal, Accra by the Applicant
herein against part of the
judgment which dismissed the
applicant’s claim against the 2nd
defendant. The Court of Appeal,
on 28/03/2013 allowed the appeal
and made the second defendant as
a judgment debtor. The second
defendant lodged an appeal to
this Court against the judgment
of the Court of Appeal. This
Court on 28/11/2014 dismissed
the appeal. Not satisfied by the
judgment of this court, the
second defendant filed an
application for review of the
judgment of this Court dated
28/11/2014 but same was
dismissed on 28/01/2015. The
second defendant on 25/11/2015
by a motion sought clarification
on parts of the judgment of the
28/11/2014. In that
clarification application, the 2nd
Defendant herein prayed this
court for the following reliefs
as per the motion paper. the use
of the word “jointly” and
“jointly and severally” in the
judgment and the certificate of
the order of this Honourable
Court respectively
.HELDIn
conclusion, we think that that
the applicant has succeeded in
establishing the existence of
special circumstances which
calls for a review of part of
our decision of 10/03/2016 which
deals with the computation of
post judgment interest.
Therefore under rule 1 (D) and
2(2) (a,b,c) of CI 52 that is
the Courts Award of Interest and
( Post Judgment Interest) Rules,
2005, C.I. 52, interest on the
transaction under consideration
should run at the rate specified
by statute till date of final
judgment from the date of the
judgment to the date of final
payment
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
1992 Constitution
Courts Act, Act 459 1993
Courts (Award of Interest and
Post Judgment Interest) Rules
2005 CI 52
Courts (Award of Interest)
Instrument 1984 LI 1295
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
GIHOC Refrigeration and
Household Product Ltd (No1) v
Hanna Asi (No1) [2007-2008]
SCGLR,
Afranie v Quarco [1992] 2
SCGLR 561 And Nasali v Addy
[1987-88].
Mechanical Lloyd Assembly
Plant v Nartey [1987-88] 2 GLR
598
Butt v Chapel Hill
Properties Ltd & Anor
[2003-2004] SCGLR 638, IBM World
Trade Corporation v Hasnem
Enterprises Ltd [2001-2002]
SCGLR 303
Standard Chartered Bank
(Ghana) Ltd v Nelson [1998-99]
SCGLR 810
Network Computer System
(NCS) Limited v Intelsat Global
Sales And Marketing Ltd [2012] 1
SCGLR 218
Mosi V Bagyina [1963] 1
GLR 337 SC
Tindana (No2) v Chief of Defence
Staff & A-G [2011] 2 SCGLR 732
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Black’s Law Dictionary 9th
Edition
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
ANIN YEBOAH
COUNSEL
PEASAH
BOADU ESQ. FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT
SYLVESTER
WILLIAMS (CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY)
FOR THE 2ND DEFENDANT
/RESPONDENT.
RULING
ANIN
YEBOAH JSC
The applicant herein has moved
this Court under Article 133(1)
of the 1992 Constitution and
Rule 54(a) of the Supreme Court
Rules 1996 (C.I 16) to review
part of the clarificatory
decision delivered by this
court’s ordinary bench on the 10th
of March 2016.
To appreciate the reasons for
this delivery it would be
worthwhile to briefly state the
facts giving rise to this
application for review.
On the 20/4/2009 the applicant
herein commenced an action
against the three respondents in
this application at the
Commercial Division of the High
Court, Accra. The High Court
gave judgment in favour of the
plaintiffs against the 1st
and 3rd defendants
and dismissed the action against
the 2nd defendant,
the Attorney-General. An appeal
was lodged at the Court of
Appeal, Accra by the Applicant
herein against part of the
judgment which dismissed the
applicant’s claim against the 2nd
defendant. The Court of Appeal,
on 28/03/2013 allowed the appeal
and made the second defendant as
a judgment debtor. The second
defendant lodged an appeal to
this Court against the judgment
of the Court of Appeal. This
Court on 28/11/2014 dismissed
the appeal. Not satisfied by the
judgment of this court, the
second defendant filed an
application for review of the
judgment of this Court dated
28/11/2014 but same was
dismissed on 28/01/2015. The
second defendant on 25/11/2015
by a motion sought clarification
on parts of the judgment of the
28/11/2014. In that
clarification application, the 2nd
Defendant herein prayed this
court for the following reliefs
as per the motion paper.
-
“the use of the word
“jointly” and “jointly and
severally” in the judgment
and the certificate of the
order of this Honourable
Court respectively.
-
the appropriate computation
of the interest (whether
compound or simple interest)
as regards the contract
signed on 26th
August 2005, between the
Plaintiffs, NDK Financial
Services and the 1st
Defendant, Ahaman Enterprise
Limited.
-
the period for the
computation of the interest
exigible.”
It was therefore pursuant to the
above application and reliefs
that this Court delivered itself
as per the Ruling of 10th
March 2016 which has
necessitated this Review
application
After hearing arguments this
Court on the 10/3/2016 made the
following orders:-
A.
“The expression” jointly
and severally” was not used in
this Court’s judgment of 28th
November, 2014. We accordingly
order a rectification of the
certificate of payment to
reflect that payment under the
haulage contract be paid to the
plaintiffs jointly by the 1st
Defendant/Applicants herein.
B.
The second relief as per
the motion is refused for the
avoidance of doubt; the interest
payable under the contract is
compound interest.
C.
The computation of
interest shall run from the date
of the contract up to the date
of filing the appeal in the
Court of Appeal at the rate of
6.5% per month calculated on a
30 day per month basis
collectible monthly in arrears.”
Learned counsel for the
applicant in moving the
application limited his
complaint on the third paragraph
of the orders made by the
ordinary bench and submitted
that the ordinary bench
misapplied the Court Award of
Interest and Post Judgment
Interest Rules 2005 CI 52, and
submitted the decision was given
per in curiam.
In opposing the application the
second defendant , that is the
Attorney-General raised
procedural issues which goes to
our jurisdiction to entertain
the application, In their
affidavits in opposition which
smacks of legal arguments, it
was deposed to in paragraphs 19,
20 and 21, that as the order
given by this Court when its
clarificatory opinion was sought
was not a decision of this court
contemplated by Rule 54 of C.I
16 of the Supreme Court Rules
1996, the application was not
properly before this Court in
the sense that the clarificatory
opinion delivered was not a
decision of this Court
contemplated by Rule 54 of CI 16
of the Supreme Rules 1996. The
second defendant also contended
that the matter is res judicata.
This calls for an examination of
Rule 54 of C.I. 16 in detail.
Rule 54 of CI 16 states as
follows:-
“The Court may review any
decision made or given by it on
any of the following ground-
-
Exceptional circumstances
which has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.
-
Discovery of new and
important matter or evidence
which after the exercise of
due diligence, was not
within the applicants
knowledge or could not be
produced by him at the time
when the decision was
given.”
We think learned counsel for the
respondent has narrowed the
scope of the word decision in
legal proceedings. Decisions are
not limited to what a court of
law in the usual course of
hearing a matter delivers.
Reference may be made to Black’s
Law Dictionary 9th
Edition at page 467 where the
word decision is defined thus:-
“A judicial or agency
determination after
consideration of the facts and
the law; especially a ruling,
order or judgment pronounced
by a court when considering or
disposing of a case”.
It thus follows that when a
court is seized with
jurisdiction in determining any
matter and gives a ruling, be it
interlocutory or otherwise the
court should be deemed as having
given a decision.
In this application, what the
ordinary bench did was to
clarify part of its own judgment
when its jurisdiction was
properly invoked by the second
defendant/respondent herein. In
our respectful views the court’s
order was a decision delivered
in the application. It follows
that this application falls
within the ambit of Rule 54 and
therefore it is a decision of
this court which could be
reviewed.
Another point which was raised
but not well argued was the
issue of res judicata. We think
that as the ruling in the
clarificatory opinion of this
court was a decision, it was
amenable to review if the
circumstances for review exist
and this court could not declare
same as res judicata as under
Article 133 (1) of the 1992
Constitution this Court may
review any decision made or
given by it in the course of
exercising its jurisdiction.
Learned counsel for the
applicant in moving the
application contended that
exceptional circumstances which
have resulted in miscarriage of
justice is apparent on the
record to necessitate a review
of the clarificatory orders. He
relied on the decided cases on
rule 54 like:
GIHOC Refrigeration
and Household Product Ltd (No1)
v Hanna Asi (No1) [2007-2008]
SCGLR, Afranie v Quarco [1992] 2
SCGLR 561 And Nasali v Addy
[1987-88]. This
court has exhibited remarkable
consistency by applying strictly
the basic principles governing
applications for review,
nevertheless if an applicant
successfully demonstrates that
exceptional circumstances exist
which have resulted in
miscarriage of justice this
court may exercise its review
jurisdiction. Reliance was
placed in the often - quoted
case of Mechanical Lloyd
Assembly Plant v Nartey
[1987-88] 2 GLR 598 in which
Taylor JSC made an attempt to
lay down the criteria that may
necessitate a review by this
court. Among the listed criteria
was that “decision given per
in curiam for failure to
consider a statute or case law
or fundamental principle or
procedure and practice
may justify a review.”
In this application learned
counsel for the applicant indeed
demonstrated that this court did
not apply the existing statute
governing the award of interest
on judgment debt as when the
decision was delivered, the
Courts (Award of Interest and
Post Judgment Interest) Rules
2005 CI 52 was already in force
as at 24th January
2006. As this Court’s ordinary
bench clarificatory ruling of
10/03/2016 did not apply the
statutory provision regulating
interest on judgment debts but
resorted to a repealed statute,
that is LI 1295 that is Courts
(Award of Interest) Instrument
1984 the decision of the
ordinary bench was given per
incuriam.
It was therefore submitted that
cases decided on the repealed LI
1295 like Butt v Chapel Hill
Properties Ltd & Anor
[2003-2004] SCGLR 638, IBM World
Trade Corporation v Hasnem
Enterprises Ltd [2001-2002]
SCGLR 303 and Standard Chartered
Bank (Ghana) Ltd v Nelson
[1998-99] SCGLR 810 should
be deemed as statutorily
overruled by the coming into
force on 24th January
2006 of the Court’s Award
Interest and (Post Judgment
Interest Rules) 2005, CI 52.
Under this statute, the period
of computation of interest after
judgment is not regulated by the
date of lodging any notice of
appeal as the ordinary bench
ordered.
The applicant has thus succeeded
in establishing that exceptional
circumstances exist for this
court to correct the patent
error which was given in clear
violation of existing statutory
provisions governing the
computation of interest on
judgment debts.
We think the above reason should
suffice for this ruling but
learned counsel for the
applicant, placing reliance on
the case of Network Computer
System (NCS) Limited v Intelsat
Global Sales And Marketing Ltd
[2012] 1 SCGLR 218 sought to
press the point that as the
order was void this court should
have exercised its jurisdiction
to set it aside when its
attention was drawn to it.
We have carefully considered the
majority opinion in the above
case in which it was held thus:
-
“A
superior court could set
aside a void order made by a
court no matter how the void
order was brought to its
notice. Therefore even
though the repeat
application before the
Supreme Court was only for
stay of proceedings under
the conditional order of
stay of execution pending
appeal made to the Court of
Appeal from the refusal by
the High Court to set aside
the registration of the
judgment, yet, since the
conditional order by the
Court of Appeal was a
nullity under section 17 of
Act 180, it is vacated here
and now without waiting for
the substantive appeal to be
heard on its merit. The
appeal was only one mode of
impeaching a void order but
it was not the only mode;
any other mode whatsoever
would serve the same
purpose”
The majority opinion relied on
the well-known case of Mosi V
Bagyina [1963] 1 GLR 337 SC
to support the above proposition
of law. We think that care must
be taken in application of the
above proposition of law in
practice. In The Mosi v
Bagyina supra, the High
Court’s jurisdiction was invoked
to set aside its own void order
and the learned judge dismissed
the application on the ground
that he had no jurisdiction.
It was on appeal to the Supreme
Court that the void order was
set aside on the grounds that
the High Court had jurisdiction
to set aside its own order when
it is found that it is a void
order. Even though we do not
doubt the soundness of the
proposition of law enunciated in
the case we think that the
procedure to resort to vacate
void orders should not be
overlooked.
A party aggrieved by a judgment
of the High Court may resort to
an appeal, review or judicial
review. The choice is his.
However as the minority in in
the Network Computer System
(NCS) Ltd, supra, pointed
out, the laid down procedure to
impeach any void decision must
be followed. Appeals in this
country are all statutorily
conferred on appellate Courts by
the Courts Act, Act 459 of 1993
and the 1992 Constitution. The
subsidiary rules of court
regulate the time frame and
procedure for appealing against
any judgment whether void or
not.
If a party resorts to an appeal
to impeach a void order or
judgment we think that the
procedural rules governing
appeals must be strictly
followed to vest the appellate
court with jurisdiction to
exercise, for justice has always
been administered in accordance
with the rules regulating the
procedure of the court or
tribunal in any common law
jurisdiction.
Specific time frames are set
down by the rules for appeals,
reviews and judicial review
applications and the rules
should not be ignored on the
basis that the order sought to
be impeached is void. See
Tindana (No2) v Chief of Defence
Staff & A-G [2011] 2 SCGLR 732
For any step taken in legal
proceedings should be sanctioned
by law as Mosi v Bagyina,
supra, itself has declared.
In conclusion, we think that
that the applicant has succeeded
in establishing the existence of
special circumstances which
calls for a review of part of
our decision of 10/03/2016 which
deals with the computation of
post judgment interest.
Therefore under rule 1 (D) and
2(2) (a,b,c) of CI 52 that is
the Courts Award of Interest and
( Post Judgment Interest) Rules,
2005, C.I. 52, interest on the
transaction under consideration
should run at the rate specified
by statute till date of final
judgment from the date of the
judgment to the date of final
payment.
(SGD) ANIN YEBOAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD) G. T. WOOD
(MRS)
CHIEF JUSTICE
(SGD) J. ANSAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) V. J. M. DOTSE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD) P. BAFFOE- BONNIE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD) V. AKOTO BAMFO (MRS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD) J. B. AKAMBA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
COUNSEL
PEASAH
BOADU ESQ. FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT
SYLVESTER
WILLIAMS (CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY)
FOR THE 2ND DEFENDANT
/RESPONDENT.
RULING
ANIN YEBOAH JSC
The applicant herein has moved
this Court under Article 133(1)
of the 1992 Constitution and
Rule 54(a) of the Supreme Court
Rules 1996 (C.I 16) to review
part of the clarificatory
decision delivered by this
court’s ordinary bench on the 10th
of March 2016.
To appreciate the reasons for
this delivery it would be
worthwhile to briefly state the
facts giving rise to this
application for review.
On the 20/4/2009 the applicant
herein commenced an action
against the three respondents in
this application at the
Commercial Division of the High
Court, Accra. The High Court
gave judgment in favour of the
plaintiffs against the 1st
and 3rd defendants
and dismissed the action against
the 2nd defendant,
the Attorney-General. An appeal
was lodged at the Court of
Appeal, Accra by the Applicant
herein against part of the
judgment which dismissed the
applicant’s claim against the 2nd
defendant. The Court of Appeal,
on 28/03/2013 allowed the appeal
and made the second defendant as
a judgment debtor. The second
defendant lodged an appeal to
this Court against the judgment
of the Court of Appeal. This
Court on 28/11/2014 dismissed
the appeal. Not satisfied by the
judgment of this court, the
second defendant filed an
application for review of the
judgment of this Court dated
28/11/2014 but same was
dismissed on 28/01/2015. The
second defendant on 25/11/2015
by a motion sought clarification
on parts of the judgment of the
28/11/2014. In that
clarification application, the 2nd
Defendant herein prayed this
court for the following reliefs
as per the motion paper.
a.
“the use of the word “jointly”
and “jointly and severally” in
the judgment and the certificate
of the order of this Honourable
Court respectively.
b.
the appropriate computation of
the interest (whether compound
or simple interest) as regards
the contract signed on 26th
August 2005, between the
Plaintiffs, NDK Financial
Services and the 1st
Defendant, Ahaman Enterprise
Limited.
c.
the period for the computation
of the interest exigible.”
It was therefore pursuant to the
above application and reliefs
that this Court delivered itself
as per the Ruling of 10th
March 2016 which has
necessitated this Review
application
After hearing arguments this
Court on the 10/3/2016 made the
following orders:-
1.
“The expression” jointly and
severally” was not used in this
Court’s judgment of 28th
November, 2014. We accordingly
order a rectification of the
certificate of payment to
reflect that payment under the
haulage contract be paid to the
plaintiffs jointly by the 1st
Defendant/Applicants herein.
2.
The second relief as per the
motion is refused for the
avoidance of doubt; the interest
payable under the contract is
compound interest.
3.
The computation of interest
shall run from the date of the
contract up to the date of
filing the appeal in the Court
of Appeal at the rate of 6.5%
per month calculated on a 30 day
per month basis collectible
monthly in arrears.”
Learned counsel for the
applicant in moving the
application limited his
complaint on the third paragraph
of the orders made by the
ordinary bench and submitted
that the ordinary bench
misapplied the Court Award of
Interest and Post Judgment
Interest Rules 2005 CI 52, and
submitted the decision was given
per in curiam.
In opposing the application the
second defendant , that is the
Attorney-General raised
procedural issues which goes to
our jurisdiction to entertain
the application, In their
affidavits in opposition which
smacks of legal arguments, it
was deposed to in paragraphs 19,
20 and 21, that as the order
given by this Court when its
clarificatory opinion was sought
was not a decision of this court
contemplated by Rule 54 of C.I
16 of the Supreme Court Rules
1996, the application was not
properly before this Court in
the sense that the clarificatory
opinion delivered was not a
decision of this Court
contemplated by Rule 54 of CI 16
of the Supreme Rules 1996. The
second defendant also contended
that the matter is res judicata.
This calls for an examination of
Rule 54 of C.I. 16 in detail.
Rule 54 of CI 16 states as
follows:-
“The Court may review any
decision made or given by it on
any of the following ground-
(a)
Exceptional circumstances which
has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.
(b)
Discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which after
the exercise of due diligence,
was not within the applicants
knowledge or could not be
produced by him at the time when
the decision was given.”
We think learned counsel for the
respondent has narrowed the
scope of the word decision in
legal proceedings. Decisions are
not limited to what a court of
law in the usual course of
hearing a matter delivers.
Reference may be made to Black’s
Law Dictionary 9th
Edition at page 467 where the
word decision is defined thus:-
“A judicial or agency
determination after
consideration of the facts and
the law; especially a ruling,
order or judgment pronounced
by a court when considering or
disposing of a case”.
It thus follows that when a
court is seized with
jurisdiction in determining any
matter and gives a ruling, be it
interlocutory or otherwise the
court should be deemed as having
given a decision.
In this application, what the
ordinary bench did was to
clarify part of its own judgment
when its jurisdiction was
properly invoked by the second
defendant/respondent herein. In
our respectful views the court’s
order was a decision delivered
in the application. It follows
that this application falls
within the ambit of Rule 54 and
therefore it is a decision of
this court which could be
reviewed.
Another point which was raised
but not well argued was the
issue of res judicata. We think
that as the ruling in the
clarificatory opinion of this
court was a decision, it was
amenable to review if the
circumstances for review exist
and this court could not declare
same as res judicata as under
Article 133 (1) of the 1992
Constitution this Court may
review any decision made or
given by it in the course of
exercising its jurisdiction.
Learned counsel for the
applicant in moving the
application contended that
exceptional circumstances which
have resulted in miscarriage of
justice is apparent on the
record to necessitate a review
of the clarificatory orders. He
relied on the decided cases on
rule 54 like:
GIHOC Refrigeration and
Household Product Ltd (No1) v
Hanna Asi (No1) [2007-2008]
SCGLR, Afranie v Quarco [1992] 2
SCGLR 561 And Nasali v Addy
[1987-88].
This court has exhibited
remarkable consistency by
applying strictly the basic
principles governing
applications for review,
nevertheless if an applicant
successfully demonstrates that
exceptional circumstances exist
which have resulted in
miscarriage of justice this
court may exercise its review
jurisdiction. Reliance was
placed in the often - quoted
case of Mechanical Lloyd
Assembly Plant v Nartey
[1987-88] 2 GLR 598 in which
Taylor JSC made an attempt to
lay down the criteria that may
necessitate a review by this
court. Among the listed criteria
was that “decision given per
in curiam for failure to
consider a statute or case law
or fundamental principle or
procedure and practice
may justify a review.”
In this application learned
counsel for the applicant indeed
demonstrated that this court did
not apply the existing statute
governing the award of interest
on judgment debt as when the
decision was delivered, the
Courts (Award of Interest and
Post Judgment Interest) Rules
2005 CI 52 was already in force
as at 24th January
2006. As this Court’s ordinary
bench clarificatory ruling of
10/03/2016 did not apply the
statutory provision regulating
interest on judgment debts but
resorted to a repealed statute,
that is LI 1295 that is Courts
(Award of Interest) Instrument
1984 the decision of the
ordinary bench was given per
incuriam.
It was therefore submitted that
cases decided on the repealed LI
1295 like Butt v Chapel Hill
Properties Ltd & Anor
[2003-2004] SCGLR 638, IBM World
Trade Corporation v Hasnem
Enterprises Ltd [2001-2002]
SCGLR 303 and Standard Chartered
Bank (Ghana) Ltd v Nelson
[1998-99] SCGLR 810 should
be deemed as statutorily
overruled by the coming into
force on 24th January
2006 of the Court’s Award
Interest and (Post Judgment
Interest Rules) 2005, CI 52.
Under this statute, the period
of computation of interest after
judgment is not regulated by the
date of lodging any notice of
appeal as the ordinary bench
ordered.
The applicant has thus succeeded
in establishing that exceptional
circumstances exist for this
court to correct the patent
error which was given in clear
violation of existing statutory
provisions governing the
computation of interest on
judgment debts.
We think the above reason should
suffice for this ruling but
learned counsel for the
applicant, placing reliance on
the case of Network Computer
System (NCS) Limited v Intelsat
Global Sales And Marketing Ltd
[2012] 1 SCGLR 218 sought to
press the point that as the
order was void this court should
have exercised its jurisdiction
to set it aside when its
attention was drawn to it.
We have carefully considered the
majority opinion in the above
case in which it was held thus:
3
“A superior court could set
aside a void order made by a
court no matter how the void
order was brought to its notice.
Therefore even though the repeat
application before the Supreme
Court was only for stay of
proceedings under the
conditional order of stay of
execution pending appeal made to
the Court of Appeal from the
refusal by the High Court to set
aside the registration of the
judgment, yet, since the
conditional order by the Court
of Appeal was a nullity under
section 17 of Act 180, it is
vacated here and now without
waiting for the substantive
appeal to be heard on its merit.
The appeal was only one mode of
impeaching a void order but it
was not the only mode; any other
mode whatsoever would serve the
same purpose”
The majority opinion relied on
the well-known case of Mosi V
Bagyina [1963] 1 GLR 337 SC
to support the above proposition
of law. We think that care must
be taken in application of the
above proposition of law in
practice. In The Mosi v
Bagyina supra, the High
Court’s jurisdiction was invoked
to set aside its own void order
and the learned judge dismissed
the application on the ground
that he had no jurisdiction.
It was on appeal to the Supreme
Court that the void order was
set aside on the grounds that
the High Court had jurisdiction
to set aside its own order when
it is found that it is a void
order. Even though we do not
doubt the soundness of the
proposition of law enunciated in
the case we think that the
procedure to resort to vacate
void orders should not be
overlooked.
A party aggrieved by a judgment
of the High Court may resort to
an appeal, review or judicial
review. The choice is his.
However as the minority in in
the Network Computer System (NCS)
Ltd, supra, pointed out, the
laid down procedure to impeach
any void decision must be
followed. Appeals in this
country are all statutorily
conferred on appellate Courts by
the Courts Act, Act 459 of 1993
and the 1992 Constitution. The
subsidiary rules of court
regulate the time frame and
procedure for appealing against
any judgment whether void or
not.
If a party resorts to an appeal
to impeach a void order or
judgment we think that the
procedural rules governing
appeals must be strictly
followed to vest the appellate
court with jurisdiction to
exercise, for justice has always
been administered in accordance
with the rules regulating the
procedure of the court or
tribunal in any common law
jurisdiction.
Specific time frames are set
down by the rules for appeals,
reviews and judicial review
applications and the rules
should not be ignored on the
basis that the order sought to
be impeached is void. See
Tindana (No2) v Chief of Defence
Staff & A-G [2011] 2 SCGLR 732
For any step taken in legal
proceedings should be sanctioned
by law as Mosi v Bagyina,
supra, itself has declared.
In conclusion, we think that
that the applicant has succeeded
in establishing the existence of
special circumstances which
calls for a review of part of
our decision of 10/03/2016 which
deals with the computation of
post judgment interest.
Therefore under rule 1 (D) and
2(2) (a,b,c) of CI 52 that is
the Courts Award of Interest and
( Post Judgment Interest) Rules,
2005, C.I. 52, interest on the
transaction under consideration
should run at the rate specified
by statute till date of final
judgment from the date of the
judgment to the date of final
payment.
(SGD) ANIN YEBOAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD)
G. T. WOOD (MRS)
CHIEF JUSTICE
(SGD)
J. ANSAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
V. J. M.
DOTSE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD)
P. BAFFOE- BONNIE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD)
V. AKOTO BAMFO (MRS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD) J. B.
AKAMBA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
COUNSEL
PEASAH BOADU ESQ. FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT
SYLVESTER WILLIAMS (CHIEF STATE
ATTORNEY) FOR THE 2ND
DEFENDANT /RESPONDENT.
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