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Chieftaincy - National House of
Chiefs - Judicial Committee -
Whether or not the long absence
of a chief constitutes
abandonment and ábdication -
Whether evidence adduced at the
trial. cannot be supported
having regard to the judgment -
Whether Whether or not it was
rightly installed a new
Paramount Chief ?
HEADNOTES
The Petitioners and Respondents
are all subjects of the Senya
Beraku Stool with Nenyi Kweku
Issiw VI as their Paramount
Chief. In Senya Bereku there are
two Kingmakers, namely, the
Asafo Company No. 1 and No. 2.
The petitioners are from the
Asafo Company No. 2, while the
respondents are from the Asafo
Company No 1. Nenyi Kwaku Issiw
VI is from the Asafo Company No
2. In November 1992, Nenyi Kwaku
Issiw VI left the jurisdiction
of Ghana leading to the
appointment of the 1st
Petitioner as the Regent and
Acting President of the Senya
Beraku Traditional Council. In
February 1993, the 3rd
Respondent brought a petition
against Nenyi Kweku Issiw VI
seeking to destool him as the
Paramount Chief of Senya Beraku.
Nenyi Kwaku Issiw VI on the
grounds that at the time of the
petition, Nenyi Issiw V1 had
jumped bail and was considered a
fugitive of the law. That
petition was unsuccessful.
Subsequently, in March 1994 the
3rd Respondents brought another
petition to destool Nenyi Issiw
V1. This action was
discontinued. After the
discontinuance of the 2nd petition,
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents
herein, claiming to be
Kingmakers from Asafo Company
No1, nominated and installed the
4th Respondent as Paramount
Chief of Senya Bereku without
regard to the Asafo Company No
2. They claimed that at the time
of the installation of Nenyi
Kwaku Issiw VI who was from the
Asafo Company No 2 they did not
participate and therefore a
precedent had been set that one
faction alone could install a
chief. Peeved by the action of
the Respondents, the petitioners
initiated an action in the
Judicial Committee of the
Central Regional House of Chiefs
(Cape Coast) challenging the
enstoolment of the 4th
Respondent on the grounds that
Nenyi Kweku Issiw VI is still
the lawfully installed and
recognized Paramount Chief who
has neither abdicated nor been
destooled. The Judicial
Committee, held that Nenyi Kweku
Issiw IV, by fleeing his
jurisdiction and evading arrest,
had abandoned the stool. They
also upheld the claim of the
Respondents that one faction
could install a chief. The
Petitioners’ appeal to the
National House of Chiefs was
dismissed
HELD :-
Having decided the central issue
that there was no abdication,
and that the purported
installation by the respondent
was void because the stool was
not vacant, the question whether
or not the right people took
part in the second installation
is moot. The appeal succeeds and
the decisions of the Central
Regional House of Chiefs and the
National House of Chiefs are set
aside.
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759)
Section 40(2) and (3)
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Republic v Kumasi Traditional
Council, Ex parte Nana Opoku
Agyeman II [1977] 1 GLR 360 CA
Essilfie and Another v Anafo VI
and Another [1993-94] 2 GLR 1
Boampong v Aboagye and others
[1981] GLR 927,
Komey v Onanka [1962] 1 GLR 52
Boampong V Aboagye(supra) and
Nana Yiadom 1 v Nana
Amaniampong(1981) GLR 3
HUAGO IV. V. DJANGMAH II
[1997-98] 1 GLR 300, SC.
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC:-
COUNSEL.
BRIGHT AKWETEY FOR THE
PETITIONERS/APPELLANTS/APPELLANTS.
YAW BOAFO WITH HIM FRANK PINTO
AMARTEY FOR THE RESPONDENTS/
RESPONDENTS/ RESPONDENTS.
JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________________
BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC:-
The case before us is an appeal
by the
petitioners/appellants/appellants,
hereafter, referred to as
petitioners, against the
decision of the Judicial
Committee of the National House
of Chiefs confirming the
majority decision of the Central
Regional House of Chiefs. The
said decision was in favour of
the
respondents/respondents/respondents,
hereafter referred to as
respondents.
The facts of the case are as
follows:
The Petitioners and Respondents
are all subjects of the Senya
Beraku Stool with Nenyi Kweku
Issiw VI as their Paramount
Chief. In Senya Bereku there are
two Kingmakers, namely, the
Asafo Company No. 1 and No. 2.
The petitioners are from the
Asafo Company No. 2, while the
respondents are from the Asafo
Company No 1. Nenyi Kwaku Issiw
VI is from the Asafo Company No
2.
In November 1992, Nenyi Kwaku
Issiw VI left the jurisdiction
of Ghana leading to the
appointment of the 1st
Petitioner as the Regent and
Acting President of the Senya
Beraku Traditional Council. In
February 1993, the 3rd
Respondent brought a petition
against Nenyi Kweku Issiw VI
seeking to destool him as the
Paramount Chief of Senya Beraku.
Nenyi Kwaku Issiw VI on the
grounds that at the time of the
petition, Nenyi Issiw V1 had
jumped bail and was considered a
fugitive of the law. That
petition was unsuccessful.
Subsequently, in March 1994 the
3rd Respondents brought another
petition to destool Nenyi Issiw
V1. This action was
discontinued. After the
discontinuance of the 2nd
petition, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
Respondents herein, claiming to
be Kingmakers from Asafo Company
No1, nominated and installed the
4th Respondent as Paramount
Chief of Senya Bereku without
regard to the Asafo Company No
2. They claimed that at the time
of the installation of Nenyi
Kwaku Issiw VI who was from the
Asafo Company No 2 they did not
participate and therefore a
precedent had been set that one
faction alone could install a
chief. Peeved by the action of
the Respondents, the petitioners
initiated an action in the
Judicial Committee of the
Central Regional House of Chiefs
(Cape Coast) challenging the
enstoolment of the 4th
Respondent on the grounds that
Nenyi Kweku Issiw VI is still
the lawfully installed and
recognized Paramount Chief who
has neither abdicated nor been
destooled. The Judicial
Committee, held that Nenyi Kweku
Issiw IV, by fleeing his
jurisdiction and evading arrest,
had abandoned the stool. They
also upheld the claim of the
Respondents that one faction
could install a chief. The
Petitioners’ appeal to the
National House of Chiefs was
dismissed and the decision of
the Regional House of Chiefs
(Cape Coast) was upheld. In
August 2013, Nenyi Kwaku Issiw
IV returned to Ghana. The
Petitioners have brought this
appeal against the decision of
the Judicial Committee of the
National House of Chiefs on the
sole ground that the judgment
cannot be supported having
regard to the evidence adduced
at the trial.
Where an appellant argues that a
judgment cannot be supported
having regard to the evidence on
record, an appellate court is
under an obligation to examine
the findings of fact of the
court below to determine whether
those findings can be supported
by the evidence on record. Where
the findings of fact are
inconsistent with the evidence
on record, the appellate court
has a duty to make its own
findings based on the said
evidence. However, the appellant
in such cases assumes the burden
of showing from the evidence on
record that the judgment cannot
indeed be supported having
regard to the evidence adduced.
In Bonney v Bonney [1992-1993]
GBR 779 SC, the court had this
to say:
“Where an appellant contended
that a judgment was against the
weight of evidence, he assumed
the burden of showing from the
evidence that that was in fact
so. The argument that an appeal
is by way of rehearing and
therefore the appellate court
was entitled to make its own
mind on the fact and draw
inferences from them might be
so, but an Appeal Court ought
not under any circumstances
interfere with findings of fact
by the trial judge except where
they are clearly shown to be
wrong, or that the judge did not
take all the circumstances and
evidence into account, or had
misapprehended some evidence or
had drown wrong inferences
without any evidence in support
or had or had not taken proper
advantage of having seen or
heard in support, the
witnesses.”
The submissions of both the
Petitioners and the Respondents
call for the resolution of two
main issues:
1.
Whether or not the long absence
of Nenyi Kwaku Issiw VI from
Senya Beraku constitutes
abandonment/ábdication rendering
the Senya Beraku Stool vacant?
2.
Whether or not the 1st, 2nd and
3rd Respondents rightly
installed the 4th Respondent as
the Paramount Chief of Senya
Beraku?
We will first address the issue
of abandonment leading to
vacancy of a stool. The 1992
Constitution defines a chief in
Article 277 as
“A chief means a person, who,
hailing from the appropriate
family and lineage, has been
validly nominated, elected,
selected and enstooled,
enskinned or installed as a
chief or queen mother in
accordance with the relevant
customary law and usage.”
Thus, the Chieftaincy
institution, though not a
creation of the Constitution,
has received recognition from
the Constitution. Before a
person is nominated for
enstoolment, there must
necessarily be a vacancy. So the
first issue in this case begs
the question of how a stool
becomes vacant. In Ghana, a
stool may become vacant in one
of three ways; namely, death,
destoolment, or abdication. All
other issues like abandonment,
sickness, renunciation, etc are
causes of, rather than reasons
for, vacancy.
Firstly, a stool may become
vacant through death of the
occupant. This needs no further
explanation.
Secondly, a stool may become
vacant by deposition of a chief.
Deposition connotes two things
namely, destoolment and
deskinment. Deskinment refers to
the process of removing from
power a chief whose symbol of
authority is the skin. On the
other hand, destoolment refers
to the process of removing from
office a chief whose symbol of
authority is the stool. The
process of deposition is based
on the custom of a traditional
area which vary from community
to community. In the case of The
Republic v Kumasi Traditional
Council, Ex parte Nana Opoku
Agyeman II [1977] 1 GLR 360 CA,
the court had the opportunity to
deal with the requirements of a
valid deposition. The court
stated as follows:
“The pre-requisites of a valid
customary destoolment of an
Ashanti chief were (a) the chief
must have committed a known
customary offence; (b) this must
have been brought to his notice
by the elders; (c) if it was
intended to destool him, the
elders must formulate charges
against him, and (d) he must be
tried on those charges and a
finding of guilt made.”
The Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act
759) has settled the essential
requirements for a valid
destoolment. Section 40(2) and
(3) of Act 759 provides as
follows:
“(2) A Traditional Council shall
not declare a chief to be
deposed unless in accordance
with subsection (3) and the
Traditional Council Judicial
Committee has considered the
charges against the chief and
found the chief liable to
deposition.
(3) Except where deposition is
accepted without challenge, and
subject to an appeal, a chief is
not deposed, unless
(a) deposition charges have been
instituted against the chief;
(b) the appropriate customary
practice for deposition in the
area concerned have been
complied with.
(4) Subsection (3) does not
preclude a Traditional Council
from imposing appropriate
customary sanction on a
divisional or subordinate chief
of a Traditional area, the
Traditional Council or member of
the Traditional Council of the
area.”
Deposition can only be done by
people who have been vested with
that power under customary law.
In Essilfie and Another v Anafo
VI and Another [1993-94] 2 GLR 1
the court held as follows:
“The power to destool a chief
was a customary right vested
wholly in the kingmakers who
alone had the power to make and
unmake a chief customarily.
Accordingly, the chieftaincy
tribunals of the traditional,
regional and the National House
of Chiefs as established by law
had no power to destool a chief
or make an order for his
destoolment.”
Flowing from the above, a chief
cannot be deposed by anyone
other than the kingmakers who
put him on the stool. Even in a
cause or matter affecting
chieftaincy, the judicial
committees lack the power to
order the deposition of a chief.
The third way of creating a
vacancy, and for the purposes of
this case the most relevant one,
is abdication. Abdication can be
defined as the formal act of
renouncing and resigning from a
stool. Abdication is a voluntary
act of a chief which can
reasonably be interpreted to
mean that he has vacated his
office as a chief. Examples of
acts that would amount to
abdication include a chief
forcibly jumping from a
palanquin or when a chief leaves
his palace unceremoniously.
However, abdication is not
complete without the full
participation, consent, and
concurrence or acceptance of the
elders and Kingmakers who
enstooled that particular chief.
Thus, it is only those who elect
a chief who can also
legitimately accept his
abdication. In Boampong v
Aboagye and others [1981] GLR
927, the Supreme Court defined
abdication as follows:
“abdication [is] a voluntary
renunciation of a stool by a
chief in public, e.g. in the
palace or dwabrem (i.e.
assembly place), which is
accepted by his elders and
kingmakers and is sealed by the
performance of the necessary
customary rites and formalities,
eg the slaughtering of sheep.”
Abdication as defined above is
not one sided. It begins with
the chief taking the necessary
initiative and ends with
consummation by the elders and
kingmakers of the stool. The
chief must first of all,
voluntarily inform the elders
and kingmakers of his decision
to step down as chief. The act
of abdication not being one
sided must be followed by the
elders and the kingmakers
accepting the chief’s decision
to step down. There must then be
performance of the necessary
rites and customs to signify the
abdication of the chief. The
process of abdication must be
publicized so that the subjects
of the stool will know that
their chief has stepped down. In
Boampong v Aboagye,(supra), the
court gave the essentials of a
valid abdication by a chief as
follows:
“In short, the sine qua non for
a valid customary abdication in
the Akan customary law are:
i.
Voluntary renunciation of the
stool by the occupant;
ii.
Its acceptance by the stool
elders and kingmakers;
iii.
Through the performance of the
requisite rites and formalities;
and
iv.
Publicity.”
The court went further to state
that all four must co-exist for
the abdication to be valid.
All other matters considered as
creating vacancy on a stool
either fall under any of the
above or are causes of it. For
example if a chief is said to be
a fugitive at law or has
abandoned his people or has
broken his oath of office, it
does not automatically render
the stool vacant. It may be a
cause for the right people to
initiate destoolment proceedings
in the appropriate forum. If a
chief openly renounces his
stool, he continues to remain a
chief and the stool does not
become vacant until his
renunciation is accepted by the
kingmakers and the necessary
rights performed or the
kingmakers take the necessary
steps to destool him.
Where none of the above modes by
which a vacancy is created is
established, a stool cannot be
said to be vacant, and any
purported installation of
another person will be null and
void. In Komey v Onanka [1962] 1
GLR 52 the court in holding 1
stated as follows:
“(1) unless the holder of an
office has been removed, or has
resigned or abdicated, the
office cannot be vacant, and any
purported installation of
another person into that office
is void ab initio”
Having established the necessary
legal frame work within which a
chief could be said to have
abdicated, let us apply the
principles therein contained to
the facts of this case.
The Central Regional Judicial
Committee (CRJC) came to the
conclusion that, the long
absence of the chief from his
traditional area was
uncustomary. This is how they
put it,
“This CRJC has considered this
issue 1- whether or not a
Paramount Chief could just leave
his stool, elders and the whole
paramountcy for a continuous
period of three years or seven
years without a single letter?-
the answer is emphatically NO!
This Committee has found that
according to evidence of 1st
petitioner on record, the only
letter received by the 1st
petitioner was not complete-
because it had no address of the
Odefey. By customary law,
customary practices and usages,
or the tradition, every chief is
such a unique personality and a
symbolic figure or a leader of
his people in the chiefdom. And
in the case of a paramount
chief, the premium is even
higher if not the highest within
the paramountcy. The petitioners
are saying that their paramount
chief Odefey Issiw has left for
a medical treatment yet the
petitioners could not tell the
court as to what disease the
Odefey was suffering from. It is
the finding of this judicial
Committee that such situation is
most uncustomary and therefore
untenable.
“This Committee first has to ask
itself that for how long this
Odefey has to hold his people or
the others at (sic) ransom,
because the petitioners
themselves on record do not know
the whereabouts of the Odefey,
neither do they know when he is
coming back.”
The committee then referred to
the cases of Boampong V
Aboagye(supra) and Nana Yiadom 1
v Nana Amaniampong(1981) GLR 3
and continued,
“The Petitioners’ Counsel Mr.
Dawson, cited the above cases to
support his case that despite
the long absence of the Odefey
without communication with his
people that does not amount to
abandonment nor abdication. This
judicial committee hereby
dismisses this notion of the
Counsel, since the facts of the
cases he cited, are not on all
fours with this very case. After
all, each and every case has its
own merits. This law cited is
therefore found to be untenable
and unconvincing,”
As stated in the facts, the
petitioners’ appeal to the
National House of Chiefs was
also dismissed. In dismissing
the appeal and upholding the
decision of the Judicial
Committee of the Regional House
of Chiefs (Cape Coast), the
Judicial Committee of the
National House of Chiefs stated
as follows:
In our view, even though the
Supreme Court did not mince
words when it held in this same
case that customary law consist
in the performance of the
reasonable in all the
circumstances of the case, the
above constitutes some of the
means of abdication or
renunciation of a stool. Among
the modes of abdication or
renunciation of a stool as
enumerated by this house the one
relevant to this committee is
the leaving of the palace
unceremoniously by a chief
amounts to abandonment of the
stool… And in the peculiar
circumstances of the instant
case the incumbent chief was
found to have abandoned the
stool thereby rendering same
vacant irrespective of whether
or not any formal customary rite
was made to that effect. This
Committee, in view of the above,
endorses the trial Committee’s
approach in what they term
“applying the ordinary standards
of common sense by Akan custom
and tradition” in making a
finding of fact that the Chief
had in deed abdicated the stool
by abandonment.”
Before us, the Petitioners argue
in their statement of case that,
the Supreme Court having laid
down the requirements of
abdication in Boampong v Aboagye
(supra), both the Central
Regional House of Chiefs and the
National House of Chiefs were
enjoined by law, to apply the
requirements in evaluating the
case of Nenyi Kweku Issiw VI.
The two Judicial Committees in
this case unwarrantedly refused
to apply the law relating to
abdication of a stool. All the
Judicial Committees involved had
before them the authority of
Boampong v Aboagye which sets
out the essential requirements
of a valid abdication. However,
they chose to ignore the said
authority. The Judicial
Committee of the National House
of Chiefs in upholding the
decision of the Judicial
Committee of the Regional House
of Chiefs (Cape Coast) stated as
follows:
“This Committee, in view of the
above, endorses the trial
Committee’s approach in what
they term “applying the ordinary
standards of common sense by
Akan custom and tradition” in
making a finding of fact that
the Chief had in deed abdicated
the stool by abandonment.”
Words or expressions are
normally construed in their
ordinary dictionary meaning
without any gloss or additions.
However, where a word or
expression as used had acquired
a special or technical meaning,
the court must construe the word
or expression in its special or
technical meaning and not its
ordinary meaning. This view can
be supported with the case of
Monta v Paterson Simons (Ghana)
Ltd [1974] 2 GLR 162.
From the several decided cases
in Ghana, particularly Boampong
v Aboagye (supra), the word
abdication is a term of art. The
word had acquired a technical
meaning which does not
necessarily accord with its
ordinary meaning. Any
construction or application of
the word must be done in accord
with the technical meaning
acquired particularly as
provided in Boampong v Aboagye.
When the authority of Boampong v
Aboagye was put before the two
judicial committees, they were
bound to apply same considering
the fact that the case before
them was on abdication. Unless
they were seeking to expand the
technical meaning of the word
abdication by “applying the
ordinary standards of common
sense by Akan custom and
tradition”, which is not the
case, they were bound by the
decision in Boampong v Aboagye.
We therefore hold that the two
judicial committees woefully
failed to appreciate the law
regarding the creation of a
vacancy in a stool. The two
judicial committees held that
abandonment could lead to
abdication without going through
the requirements laid down by
law. That cannot be the case.
Abandonment was construed by the
Judicial Committee of the
National House of Chief as “to
leave somebody especially
somebody you are responsible
for, with no intention of
returning”. The committee relied
on the Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary, 6th
Edition. Abandonment as defined
above cannot amount to
abdication as was found by both
judicial committees. Abandonment
to say the least can be
considered as a ground for
destoolment. For the respondents
to succeed in their claim of
vacancy through abdication, they
must establish that Nenyi Kweku
Issiw VI, before leaving the
country, voluntarily renounced
the stool either orally or by a
letter or any other means, and
that the said renunciation was
accepted by the elders and
kingmakers of Senya Beraku. They
must further show that the
elders and kingmakers performed
the necessary customary rites
and formalities to signify the
abdication of the stool by Nenyi
Kwaku Issiw. Lastly they must
show that the entire process of
abdication was made known to the
public. In the absence of these
requirements, this court cannot
hold that the Senya Bereku Stool
became vacant as a result of
Nenyi Kwaku’s decision to leave
the country.
The respondents have not adduced
any evidence to establish any of
the above requirements neither
have they adduced any evidence
to show that Nenyi Kwaku was
destooled. In fact the
respondents initially realized
that they could not talk of
abandonment and for that matter
abdication, because they brought
this action within 2 years of
the departure of the incumbent
chief. Two years could not be
said to be a long period of
abandonment. Their desire to
replace him stemmed from the
fact that they felt that he had
brought disgrace to the stool by
his remand in police custody and
his escape from justice after
jumping bail. That is why they
took the initial step of trying
to destool him. It was only
after they failed in that regard
that they started to talk of
abdication.
We are fortified in our
conclusion by reference to the
case of
HUAGO IV. V. DJANGMAH II
[1997-98] 1 GLR 300, SC.
The facts in that case (as
found in the head notes), make
for very interesting reading.
“The paramount chief of the
Great Ningo Traditional Area
(GNT A) functions both as a
chief and the high priest of
their deity, the Djange shrine.
There were two ruling houses in
the GNT A: the Adainya and Loweh
Kpono royal families. The first
respondent, Nene Osroagbo
Djangmah II from the Adainya
family was enstooled as the
paramount chief of the GNT A in
1972. He was duly recognised by
the government. However, Nene
Tei Djangmah IX, an uncle of the
first respondent from the
Adainya family, challenged his
enstoolment and that led to a
protracted chieftaincy dispute
between the two. In the course
of the dispute, the first
respondent left the traditional
area and went into a
selfimposed exile which lasted
for several years. On 22 July
1983, the first respondent wrote
to the sietse, the Oman stool
father of the GNT A, to inform
him that he had abdicated as the
paramount chief and the high
priest of the GNTA. The Oman
stool father then wrote to the
first respondent to accept his
abdication. Subsequently, the
first appellant, Huago IV, from
the Loweh Kpono family, was
enstooled as the paramount chief
of the GNTA. Later the first
respondent brought an action
against the first appellant and
the kingmakers of the Loweh
Kpono family before the Greater
Accra Regional House of Chiefs
(GARHC) for a declaration that
he was still the paramount chief
of the GNTA. The appellants
denied the claim on the ground
that the first respondent had
abdicated from the stool. The
chieftaincy tribunal of the
GARHC found, on the evidence
that, there was no precedent of
a Ningo custom on the conditions
for the abdication of a chief.
The tribunal, however, held that
the conditions for a valid
abdication of an Akan chief as
stated in Boampong v Aboagye
[1981] GLR 927, SC were
reasonable and fair and could be
applied to the Great Ningo
Traditional Area. And even
though the tribunal found on the
evidence that those conditions
had not been fully satisfied,
it nevertheless held that since
the first respondent had turned
his back on his people for so
long, it [pg 301] would not only
be morally wrong for him to go
back to the stool, but also that
would bring the institution of
chieftaincy into disrepute. The
tribunal therefore held that the
abdication of the first
respondent was effective and
legally operative. On appeal by
the first respondent from that
decision to the National House
of Chiefs, the judicial
committee affirmed that the
conditions for a valid
abdication of a chief as stated
in Boampong v Aboagye (supra)
was fair and reasonable. Since
the tribunal also found that
those conditions had not been
met in the case of the first
respondent, it allowed the
appeal from the decision of the
Greater Accra Regional House of
Chiefs. Aggrieved by that
decision the appellant appealed
against it to the Supreme Court.
Held, dismissing the appeal
(Kpegah JSC dissenting): (I) the
proper test to entitle a
chieftaincy tribunal to apply a
known customary practice or
principle in one area to another
area where no precedent existed,
was the reasonableness and
fairness of the known customary
practice or principle.
Chieftaincy matters were within
the preserve of the chieftaincy
tribunals. Since on the evidence
the chieftaincy tribunals of the
Greater Accra Regional House of
Chiefs and the National House of
Chiefs exhaustively dealt with
the matter before them, there
was no cause to disagree with
the reasonableness and fairness
of the principle on the
conditions for abdication by an
Akan chief as they approved,
adopted and applied to the
situation as it existed in the
Great Ningo Area which had no
known precedent of abdication of
a chief.
(2) The conditions for a valid
customary abdication of a chief
were (i) voluntary renunciation
of the stool; (ii) its
acceptance by the stool elders
or kingmakers; (iii) performance
of the requisite rites and
formalities; and (iv) publicity
of the abdication. Accordingly,
the judicial committee of the
National House of Chiefs were
justified in holding that the
letter of abdication by the
first respondent and its
acceptance by the sietse, the
stool father of Ningo, could not
by themselves be legitimately
considered sufficient as a valid
customary abdication.
Accordingly, the first
respondent was still the
occupant of the Great Ningo
paramount stool. Boampong v
Aboagye [1981] GLR 927, SC
applied.
As can be seen from this case,
the chief himself wrote to the
stool father that he had
abdicated. The stool father
wrote back to accept this
renunciation and somebody else
was subsequently customarily
enstooled as the new chief. It
was only after these events that
the old chief, who had written
the letter, brought an action
saying he was still the chief.
This claim was resisted by the
Stool father saying he had
abdicated. The Supreme Court
referred to the Boampong v
Aboagye case and said the letter
alone and acceptance without
more was insufficient to pass
for customary law abdication.
In other words the 4 grounds of
(1) renunciation, (2),
acceptance by the kingmakers,
(3), publication and (4),
performance of the necessary
customary rites, must be present
at one and the same time. Common
sense plays no part here! As was
put by Wiredu JSC,
“The matters such as abandonment
of post and neglect of customary
duties by the first respondent,
as was contended by the tribunal
to justify their finding in
favour of the appellant, could
have formed the basis of a
charge against him for his
destoolment in the appropriate
forum.”
We therefore hold that in spite
of the long period of absence of
Nenyi Kwaku Issiw VI from his
paramount area, the Senya Bereku
Stool did not become vacant and
that Nenyi Kwaku Issiw VI is
still the chief of the
traditional area, and that the
purported installation of
another person by the
respondents is null and void.
Having decided the central
issue that there was no
abdication, and that the
purported installation by the
respondent was void because the
stool was not vacant, the
question whether or not the
right people took part in the
second installation is moot. The
appeal succeeds and the
decisions of the Central
Regional House of Chiefs and the
National House of Chiefs are set
aside.
ADDENDUM.
We have come to this conclusion
because we believe it is in
accord with the law which we
swore an oath to uphold. But we
cannot say the behavior of the
Chief Nenyi Issiw is in accord
with the oath of allegiance
which he swore at his
enstoolment, both to his sub
chiefs and his people. We
recognize that demands of
modernity sometimes mean chiefs
have to be away from their
traditional areas for some
spells of time. But for a person
who has sworn an oath to be
available to his people through
rain and shine, bar illness, the
behavior of the Nenyi is very
reprehensible and very
uncustomary. For 10 or more
years the Chief was nowhere to
be found and even his regent and
Queen mother did not know his
whereabouts. And this could well
be because he was running away
from justice as the respondents
claim. His behavior is
despicable and reprehensible and
must be condemned by all right
thinking people. No wonder both
the Regional and National Houses
of Chiefs felt that he had lost
any moral right to call himself
a chief after abandoning his
people for so long.
Fortunately, the law has given
him a reprieve and a second
chance of some sort. We
sincerely hope that he will grab
this opportunity with both
hands, take proactive steps to
mend any broken bridges and
reconcile his people for the
development of the Senya Bereku
paramountcy, for the betterment
of the people he swore an oath
to serve.
P. BAFFOE-BONNIE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
J. V. M. DOTSE
ANIN YEBOAH
Y. APPAU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
G. PWAMANG
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
BRIGHT AKWETEY FOR THE
PETITIONERS/APPELLANTS/APPELLANTS.
YAW BOAFO WITH HIM FRANK PINTO
AMARTEY FOR THE RESPONDENTS/
RESPONDENTS/ RESPONDENTS. |
