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Land - Ownership - Declaration
title - Recovery and Procession
- Acquiescence and laches -
Whether defendants’ land
certificate and leases obtained
are valid - Whether plaintiff is
the custodian of the said land -
Whether the plaintiff is
entitled to bring the action in
the capacity - Whether or not
plaintiff is stopped by
acquiescence and laches -
Whether a purchaser is bound to
investigate the validity of land
granted to him
HEADNOTES
The defendant/appellant Lebanon
Society is a registered
association of citizens of
Lebanon living in Ghana; the
plaintiff/respondent, Numo Adjei
Kwanko II, is a Wulomo and head
of Tsiewe family at Teshie
Accra. The plaintiff sued the
society at the High Court, Accra
to recover 15 acres of land at
the Spintex Road, Accra. The
plaintiff pleaded and gave
evidence in support thereof that
he is the Osabu and Ayiku Wulomo
of Teshie and sued as the
custodian of Kle Musum Quarters
of the Tsie We family and of the
land in dispute registered as
Registry No. 1332/65. The
plaintiff bought the land from a
member of the Society called
Moufid El-Adas, who obtained it
on a lease from the Nungua Stool
and registered it at the Land
Title Registry, Accra; and
obtained a land certificate on
it. He registered his title at
the Deeds Registry as No.
1332/65. El-Adas assigned his
registered title to the Society
and commenced developing it by
constructing institutions of
learning on it. The plaintiff
said he was developing the land
when in 2001, Nii Adjei Kwanko
II instituted action at the High
Court, Accra against it, the
Lands Commission and the Land
Title Registry.The Supreme Court
adjudged in Suit No. 8/92 dated
19/4/94, that the beneficial
interest in document number 1332
/65 resided in only the Tsie We
family of Teshie, and made a
further finding of fact that
“Only the Wulomo and elders of
Tsie We can alienate lands
described in registered document
No.1332/65.” The plaintiff
averred that the 1st
defendant has appropriated about
100 acres of his land without
his consent; the 2nd
defendant has registered the 1st
defendant’s document even though
there was a prior registered
document No. 1332/65 in the
records of the Lands Commission,
and also violated Supreme Court
judgment in Suit No. 8/92, on
Tsie We lands. The 3rd
defendant was alleged to have
issued a land certificate to the
1st defendant even
though there were prior records
of plaintiff’s interest in
public records, unimpeached by
any Court of law.
HELD
we have examined the judgment
under appeal, the evidence on
record including the submissions
by counsel and found no error or
blunder in them and we therefore
proceeded as we were bound to
do, reject this and all the
other grounds of appeal, and
dismissed the appeal before us
and reserved our reasons for to
today, which we have given
above, this morning. For
the reasons given above, we
affirmed the judgment of the
Court of Appeal and the trial
court. Consequently we dismissed
the appeal brought against it.
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Limitation Decree, 1972, (NRCD
54).
Land Title Registration Act,
1986, (PNDC Law 152),
Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act
122.)
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Tuakwa v Bosom 2001-2002 SCGLR
61
Odonkor v Amartei [1992-93] 1
GBR 59
Zabramah v Mohammed & other
[1992-93] GBR 1614;
Basare v Sakyi [1987-88] 1 GLR
313.SC.
Manu v Nsiah [2005-2006]
SCGLR 25.
Achoro v Akanfela and
another [1996-97] SGLR 209;
Obrasiwa v Otu [1996-97]
SCGLR 618;
Godzi v Laryea 1[1992-93
GBR. 428, CA
;Gregory v Tandoh IV;
Fosua & Adu Poku v Dufie
(Deceased) & Adu Poku Mensah
(2009) [2009] 975;
Tuakwa v Bosom [2001-2002]
SCGLR 61
Colonial Securities Trust
Company v Massey 55 LJ. QBD
101.
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
ANSAH
JSC:
COUNSEL
JAMES AHENIKORAH FOR THE 1ST
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/APPELLANT.
KWAME FOSU GYEABOUR FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANSAH JSC:
On
29-11-2016, this court dismissed
the appeal brought against the
judgment of the Court of Appeal
dated 18 November 2013, and
reserved our reasons for so
ruling which we proceed to
deliver now. The said Court of
Appeal dismissed the appeal
against the judgment of the High
Court, Accra, given in favor of
the plaintiff at the trial but
the respondent in the appeal at
the Court of Appeal and in this
court.
Aggrieved
by the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, the first defendant
appealed to this court on the
grounds that:
“1 The
judgment of the Court of Appeal
is wrong because it completely
flies in the face of the Land
Title Registration Law and its
underlying theory of getting rid
of the necessity of
investigating all over again the
title of the vendor with its
attendant doctrine of notice
applicable under the land
Registry Act each time the land
or interest therein comes to be
dealt with, once title to the
land gets registered under the
Land Title Registration Law.
2 The
Court of Appeal committed error
by rejecting the general
principles governing the land
title registration system
counsel quoted because, in its
opinion, they are principles
from foreign authorities which
do not bind it, regardless of
their high persuasiveness.
3 The
Court of Appeal misdirected
itself in seeing nothing wrong
with the plaintiff’s family
seeking to rely on the alleged
excess between the term of years
granted to the Lebanon Society
and the grantor’s own term of
years as an element of fraud to
challenge the Society’s
registered title when there is
no privity of state or
interest existing between the
family as landlord and the
Society’s grant or as tenant in
any way prejudiced by the grant.
4 The
finding that the terms of years
granted to the Society was in
excess of the term of years the
grantor himself held is against
the weight of evidence.
5 The
Court of Appeal misdirected
itself in law when it failed to
appreciate that the statutory
declaration relied upon by the
plaintiff as the root of his
family’s title to the land in
dispute is a mere self-serving
document of title to land in
dispute which can have no
greater validity than a
registered title to that land
guaranteed by the state.
6 The
statutory declaration relied
upon as the root of the
plaintiff’s title to the land in
dispute is ultra vires
and void since the declaration
was made of a family land and
not as land acquired by the
law”.
On
21st January 2016
this court granted the 1st
defendant appellant permission
to file the following additional
ground of appeal, that:
“Both the
High Court and the Court of
Appeal were wrong in giving
judgment in favor of the
plaintiff on the basis of the
document described as “deed of
title” dated the 21st
July 1965 registered at the land
registry as instrument No.
1332/65, whereas that document
was not a registrable instrument
under the Land Registry Act,
1962, Act 122”.
Brief facts of the case.
They are
that the plaintiff sued the
defendants for:
(a)
a declaration title to over 100
acres of land situate, lying and
being at Teshie, Accra, bounded
on the North measuring 4000 feet
more or less on the South
measuring 4000 feet more or less
on the east measuring 500 feet
more or less and on the West
measuring 500 feet more or less
(b)
Perpetual injunction to restrain
1st defendant from
any further development on the
land until
(c)
Perpetual injunction to
restrain gnat and 3rd
defendants from registering any
transaction made by 2nd
defendant in favor of the 1st
defendant
(d)
An order of cancelation of the
registration made by 2nd
defendant in favor of the 1st
defendant
(e)
An order of cancelation of the
land certificate issued by the 3rd
defendant in favor of the 1st
defendant.
The
defendant/appellant Lebanon
Society is a registered
association of citizens of
Lebanon living in Ghana; the
plaintiff/respondent, Numo Adjei
Kwanko II, is a Wulomo and head
of Tsiewe family at Teshie
Accra. The plaintiff sued the
society at the High Court, Accra
to recover 15 acres of land at
the Spintex Road, Accra.
Statement of claim
and the evidence of the
plaintiff at the trial:
The plaintiff pleaded and gave
evidence in support thereof that
he is the Osabu and Ayiku Wulomo
of Teshie and sued as the
custodian of Kle Musum Quarters
of the Tsie We family and of the
land in dispute registered as
Registry No. 1332/65. The
plaintiff bought the land from a
member of the Society called
Moufid El-Adas, who obtained it
on a lease from the Nungua Stool
and registered it at the Land
Title Registry, Accra; and
obtained a land certificate on
it. He registered his title at
the Deeds Registry as No.
1332/65. El-Adas assigned his
registered title to the Society
and commenced developing it by
constructing institutions of
learning on it. The plaintiff
said he was developing the land
when in 2001, Nii Adjei Kwanko
II instituted action at the High
Court, Accra against it, the
Lands Commission and the Land
Title Registry.
The Supreme Court adjudged in
Suit No. 8/92 dated 19/4/94,
that the beneficial interest in
document number 1332 /65 resided
in only the Tsie We family of
Teshie, and made a further
finding of fact that “Only the
Wulomo and elders of Tsie We can
alienate lands described in
registered document No.1332/65.”
The plaintiff averred that the 1st
defendant has appropriated about
100 acres of his land without
his consent; the 2nd
defendant has registered the 1st
defendant’s document even though
there was a prior registered
document No. 1332/65 in the
records of the Lands Commission,
and also violated Supreme Court
judgment in Suit No. 8/92, on
Tsie We lands. The 3rd
defendant was alleged to have
issued a land certificate to the
1st defendant even
though there were prior records
of plaintiff’s interest in
public records, unimpeached by
any Court of law.
Amended Statement of
defense and evidence of the 1st
defendant:
The 1st defendant
admitted that the plaintiff is
the Osabu and Ayiku Wulomo of
Teshie but asserted however that
by a ruling of the High Court in
Suit No. Misc.1108/97, dated 17th
August 1999, entitled Republic
v. Chief Register of Lands, Ex
parte Nii Nortey Adjeifio & 2
others. The opening words: “THIS
IS TO CERTIFY THAT NUMO ADJEI
KWANKO II OSABU AND AYIKU
WULOMO, FETISH PRIEST OF TESHIE
AND HEAD OF KLE KUSUM QUARTER …”
were quashed by an order of
certiorari by the High Court.
The Supreme Court confirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeal
and held that the Kle Musum
Quarter lands are owned by Tsie
We.
The 1st defendant
pleaded further that he was the
assignee in possession of the
piece of land occupying an area
of 15.36 acres (6.237) hectors
of land registered as No. GA
11981. There was the consent of
the Nungua Stool and the Greater
Accra Regional Lands Commission
by a Deed of Assignment dated 18th
February 1998, executed by
Moufid-El-Adas as the
sub-lessor, the 1st
defendant, the assignee in
possession of that piece of
land.
Moudfid-El-Adas derived his
title to the land from the
Nungua Stool by an indenture of
lease dated 1st
November 1977, executed by Nii
Odai Ayiku IV, the Nungua Mantse
and his principal elders, and
another lease dated 5th
June 1943 for a term of 99 years
stamped as LVB 7662/95.
The 1st defendant
described the Lebanon Society as
a purchaser for value without
notice, and the plaintiff was
estopped by acquiescence and
laches. The 1st
defendant and its assignor had
been in possession of the said
land since 1977 and have
exercised acts of ownership over
same including clearing the land
from time to time and leveling
it with hired machinery
incurring great expense because
of sand winning activities.
They had been in adverse
possession of the land for 24
years and the plaintiff’s title
to the land was extinguished in
1989, under the provisions of
the Limitation Decree, 1972,
(NRCD 54).
Summons for directions:
The parties settled the
following issues for
determination at the trial,
namely:
a)
Whether defendants’ land
certificate and leases obtained
are valid.
b)
Whether plaintiffs’
document by virtue of
plaintiffs’ registered document
No. 1332/65, is the owner of the
said quarter land.
c)
Whether plaintiff is the
custodian of Tsie We and the Kle
Musum Quarter land.
The
additional issues were:
1.
Whether the plaintiff is
entitled to bring the action in
the capacity of Osabu Ayiku
Wulomo and in the capacity as
“Trustee of Tsie We lands.”
2.
Whether or not the 1st
defendant has appropriated about
100 acres of plaintiff’s land.
3.
Whether or not :
a)
The plaintiff is stopped by
acquiescence and laches.
b)
The plaintiff’s title became
extinguished in 1989 under the
provisions of the Limitation
Decree, 1972, (NRCD 54).
The trial court took evidence in
support of the respective cases
of the parties and found as a
fact that 1st
defendant’s lease and Land title
certificate were invalid; also
that plaintiff by virtue of its
registered document number
1332/85, is the owner of the
land in dispute. The judge
entered judgment for the
plaintiff on its claim to the
land in dispute and ordered
recovery of possession thereof
in his favor. He finally granted
an order of perpetual injunction
to restrain the 1st
defendant from any further
development of the disputed
land.
In accordance with Section 122
of the Land Title Registration
Act, 1986, (PNDC Law 152), the
judge ordered the Lands
Commission (Land Title Registry
Division), the rectification of
the Land Title Register by
cancelling the registration of 1st
defendant’s Land Title
Certificate No. GA 1981 Vol. 02
Folio 233 forthwith; he awarded
costs of GH ¢6,000.00 (Six
thousand Ghana Cedis) against
the 1st defendant.
Section 122 of PNDCL 152 “The
Land Title Registration Act,
1986” was that:
“Rectification by
Court
(1)
Subject to section (2), the
Court may order the
rectification of the land
register by directing that a
registration where it is
satisfied the cancellation or
the amendment of the
registration has been obtained,
or committed by fraud or
mistake.
(2)
The register shall not be
rectified so as to affect the
title of a proprietor who has
acquired a land or an interest
in land for valuable
consideration, unless the
proprietor ha knowledge of the
omission, fraud or mistake or
substantially contributed to it
by an act, a neglect or
default.”
The trial court found as a fact
that the 1st
defendant‘s grantors did not own
any piece of land at Teshie and
contended that their
registration was void and
fraudulent whose particulars
were given as:
‘a) 1st defendant
and its grantors registered
their document while there was a
prior registered document of
plaintiff that land had not been
expunged by any judicial
process;
b.) 1st defendant and
its grantors registered the land
in dispute which belongs to,
plaintiff’s family’.
On 20 April 2011, the 1st
defendant appealed the judgment
to the Court of Appeal on the
grounds that:
“1 His Lordship the trial judge
erred in not dismissing the
plaintiff’s (case) in the face
of the evidence that the grantor
of the 1st defendant
had registered its title to the
land in dispute at the Land
Title Registry before it was
bought by the 1st
defendant who registered that
title at the Registry.
2 His Lordship the judge erred
in allowing his decision to be
influenced by the irrelevant
fact that the lease granted to
the 1st defendant was
for a term longer than that of
its grantor when the plaintiff
was not the lessor of the
head-lease and claimed adversely
to the title of the lessor.
3 His Lordship the trial judge
in not appreciating that once
title to the land in dispute
became registered at the Land
Title Registry and that title
was disposed of to another.
The Court of Appeal
considered the submissions by
the parties before it and after
making some findings of facts,
concluded that they were
supported by the evidence; for
these reasons, it did not feel
satisfied to disturb them; it
found no merit in any of the
grounds of appeal before it and
unanimously dismissed the
appeal.
The
plaintiff further appealed to
this court against the judgment
of the Court of Appeal on the
grounds that:
“1 The judgment of the Court of
Appeal is wrong because it
completely flies in the face of
the Land Title Registration Law
and its underlying theory of
getting rid of the necessity all
over again the title of the
vendor with its attendant
doctrine of notice applicable
under the Land Registry Act,
each time the land or interest
therein comes to be dealt with,
once title to the land gets
registered under the Land Title
Registration Law.
1.
The Court of Appeal committed an
error by rejecting the general
principles governing the land
title registration system
counsel quoted because in its
opinion, they are principles
from foreign authorities which
do not bind it, regardless of
their high persuasiveness.
3. The Court of Appeal
misdirected itself in seeing
nothing wrong with the
plaintiff’s family seeking to
rely on the alleged excess
between the term of years
granted to the Lebanon Society
and the grantors and the
grantor’s own term of years as
an element of fraud to challenge
the Society’s registered title
when there is no privity of
estate or interest existing
between the family as landlord
and the Society’s grantor as
tenant in any way prejudiced by
the grant.
4.
The finding that the term of
years granted to the Society was
in excess of the term of years
the grantor himself held is
against the weight of evidence.
5.
The Court of Appeal misdirected
itself in law when it failed
to appreciate that the statutory
declaration relied upon by the
plaintiff as the root of his
family’s title to the land in
dispute is a mere self –serving
document of title to land which
can have no greater validity
than a registered title to that
land guaranteed by the state.
6.
The statutory declaration relied
upon as the root of title to the
land in dispute is ultra
vires and void since the
declaration was made of a family
land and not of stool land as
required by the law”.
Consideration of the grounds of
appeal:
Ground
one of the appeal:
The crux of ground 1 of appeal
was that the appellant was not
obliged under the Land Title
Registration Law to conduct a
search or investigate a land
title of its grantor before
purchasing land so far as it
paid a consideration for same.
Counsel for the appellant
submitted that the judge relied
on English and American
authorities in coming to this
conclusion, but which
authorities do not bind the
Ghanaian courts, particularly
when there are Ghanaian statutes
and authorities available. That
may well be so but it is common
knowledge that even if American
and English authorities are not
binding on local courts on the
same topic, but when there are
no local authorities on a topic
then foreign authorities can be
borrowed or received and applied
as guides or as being of a
persuasive force.
If there are authorities on the
same topic/subject, they may be
received and applied if; there
are any from outside they may be
treated as offering guidance but
not as binding on the Ghanaian
courts applied to suit local
circumstances.
But in this case, the judge
found that evidence on the
respondent’s acquisition of the
land in dispute was not
challenged by the appellant.
Ground two of appeal: We did not
find any merits in the
submissions on the grounds of
appeal marshaled before us that
a sub lease could conceivably be
of a longer duration than a head
lease and still be valid, and we
therefore rejected it.
We are satisfied the judgment
under appeal was amply supported
by the evidence led and do not
feel able to disturb them as
urged upon us by counsel for the
appellant.
Ground four of appeal: As
stated already the gravamen of
this ground of appeal was the
hackneyed ground that the
judgment was against the weight
of evidence; a ground of appeal
that a judgment was against the
weight of evidence, was dealt
with by this court in
Tuakwa v Bosom 2001-2002 SCGLR
61 where this court
stated that:
“ an appeal is by way of
re-hearing, particularly where
the appellant alleges in his
notice of appeal that the
decision of the trial court is
against the weight of evidence.
In such a case, although it is
not the function of the
appellate court to evaluate the
veracity or otherwise of any
witness, it is incumbent upon an
appellate court, in a civil
case, to analyze the entire
record of appeal, take into
account the testimonies and all
documentary evidence adduced at
the trial before arriving at its
decision, so as to satisfy
itself that on a preponderance
of the probabilities, the
conclusions of the trial judge
are reasonably or amply
supported by the
evidence.”
See also Odonkor v Amartei
[1992-93] 1 GBR 59;
we have reviewed the entire
record and concluded that on the
preponderance of the
probabilities the judgment of
the trial court in favor of the
plaintiff at the trial,
respondent herein, was
reasonably supported by the
evidence and the Court of Appeal
justifiably affirmed it on
appeal before it. We find no
reason to allow the appeal
against the judgment of the
lower courts and we dismiss the
ground of appeal couched in the
words of ground four of appeal.
Section 59 of PNDCL 152 Land
Title Registration Act, 1986,
(PNDC Law 152), provided as
follows:
“Protection of
persons dealing with registered
land
Where valuable
consideration is given by a
person in respect of a
disposition, the rights accruing
to that person through the
disposition shall not be
affected by the omission
(a)
To inquire into or
ascertain the circumstances in
which the consideration for a
previous registered transaction
was paid or the manner in which
that consideration was utilized;
(b)
To search a register
or record kept under the Land
Registry Act, 1962 (Act
122.)
Fraud tainted the acquisition
and registration of the title to
the land in dispute by the
appellant. In this case fraud
was pleaded by the respondent,
and found proved by the trial
court - see pages 244 and 247 of
the record of appeal. The trial
judge found also that the
appellant did not challenge the
evidence. The trial judge
ordered the appellants under
PNDCL 152, to rectify the
record. The Court of Appeal
affirmed the finding of fraud by
the trial court and the order to
cancel the title and affirmed
the finding of facts that 1. The
land in dispute belonged to the
respondent’s family; 2. The
Nungua stool had no authority to
grant it to the appellant’s
grantors. The trial court was
right on the unchallenged
evidence of the respondent on
the ownership of the land in
dispute –the principle ‘nemo
dat quod non habet’ applied.
Also, a purchaser is bound to
investigate the validity or
otherwise of the grant to him of
a piece of land or to be deemed
to have notice of any defect in
the title of his grantor; see:
1 Zabramah v Mohammed & other
[1992-93] GBR 1614;
2 Basare v Sakyi [1987-88] 1 GLR
313.SC.
GROUNDS 5 AND 6 OF
APPEAL.
These dealt with the method of
acquisition by the respondent.
1 The evidence that following
the acquisition of the land by
the 5 quarters of Teshie, the
apportionment between them, and
subsequent farming and division
of the land, was not challenged;
2 The evidence in the Exhibit E
series judgments on the land in
dispute in favor of his quarter;
2.
Exhibits F and F1 were judgments
by Jackson J on the land in
dispute. They went on appeal to
the West African Court of
Appeal.
3.
The statutory declaration was
not challenged. It was evidence
of ownership of the land in
dispute farmed on by the
respondent.
4.
Paragraph 3 of Exhibit H showed
the appellant took the land in
dispute as a lessee from the
Tsie We family of Teshie – see p
385, the respondent is the head
of family of the Tsie We family
of Teshie. The appellant
admitted that the land in
dispute belonged to the Teshie
family but not the Nungua Stool.
The appellant’s grantor admitted
that the land in dispute
belonged to the Teshies. In law,
where the evidence of a party
corroborates the evidence of the
other party the evidence of that
party ought to be believed: see
Manu v Nsiah [2005-2006] SCGLR
25.
5.
Where evidence on the ownership
of the land in dispute is
corroborated by the appellant’s
own grantor, then the evidence
of ownership of the respondent
to the land in dispute is
corroborated by the appellant’s
own grantees evidence, the
respondent’s version as to
ownership of the land in
dispute is to be believed by the
court.
Now as we have endeavored to
state in this appeal the facts
are clear that the first
appellate court concurred in the
findings of facts by the trial
court and the principles
governing concurrent judgments
of a lower appellate court and
trial courts are well known to
be that namely;
“Now in an appeal against
findings of facts to a second
appellate court like this court,
where the lower appellate court
had concurred in the findings of
the trial court, especially in a
dispute the subject matter of
which is peculiarly within the
bosom of the two lower courts or
tribunals this court will not
interfere the concurrent
findings of the lower courts
unless it is established with
absolute clearness that some
blunder or error resulting in a
miscarriage of justice, is
apparent in the way in which the
lower tribunals dealt with the
facts.” See Achoro v Akanfela
and another [1996-97] SGLR 209;
Obrasiwa v Otu [1996-97] SCGLR
618; Godzi v Laryea 1[1992-93
GBR. 428, CA;Gregory v Tandoh
IV; Fosua & Adu Poku v Dufie
(Deceased) & Adu Poku Mensah
(2009) [2009] 975; Tuakwa v
Bosom [2001-2002] SCGLR 61.
Ground four of appeal
that the judgment was against
the weight of evidence.
It was held that an appeal is
by way of a rehearing,
particularly where the appellant
alleges in his notice of appeal
that the decision is against the
weight of evidence. In such a
case, although it is not the
function of the appellate court
to evaluate the veracity or
otherwise of any witness, it is
incumbent upon an appellate
court, in a civil case, to
analyze the entire record of
appeal, take into account the
testimonies and all documentary
evidence adduced at the trial
before arriving at its decision,
so as to satisfy itself that on
a preponderance of the
probabilities, the conclusions
of the trial, judge are
reasonably or amply supported by
the evidence; see Tuakwa v Bosom
[2001-2002] SCGLR61; Odonkor v
Amartei 1992-93] 1 GBR 59.
In Colonial Securities Trust
Company v Massey 55 LJ. QBD 101,
Lord Esher MR. said where a case
tried by a judge without a jury
comes to the Court of Appeal,
the presumption is that the
decision of the court below was
right and that presumption must
be displaced by the appellant.
If he satisfactorily makes out
that the judge was wrong then in
as much as the appeal is in the
nature of a re-hearing, the
decision should be reviewed, if
the case is left in doubt, it is
clearly the duty of the court of
Appeal not to disturb the
decision of the court
below.
Applying these principles to
this case, we have examined the
judgment under appeal, the
evidence on record including the
submissions by counsel and found
no error or blunder in them and
we therefore proceeded as we
were bound to do, reject this
and all the other grounds of
appeal, and dismissed the appeal
before us and reserved our
reasons for to today, which we
have given above, this morning.
Conclusion:
For the reasons given above, we
affirmed the judgment of the
Court of Appeal and the trial
court. Consequently we dismissed
the appeal brought against it.
(SGD)
J. ANSAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COUR
(SGD) ANIN YEBOAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) P. BAFFOE - BONNIE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) N. S. GBADEGBE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) V. AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL
JAMES AHENIKORAH FOR THE 1ST
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/APPELLANT.
KWAME FOSU GYEABOUR FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT
IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE |
