Writ issued in the Native
Tribunal of the State
Council-case transferred by
Provincial Commissioner to the
Divisional Court State Council
had no jurisdiction to entertain
the claim on the writ-such
jurisdiction only possessed by
the Paramount Chief's
Tribunal-claim accordingly
within the jurisdiction of a
Tribunal under Sec.
48
of the Native Administration
Ordinance and therefore subject
to the provisions of Sec.
65. Divisional Court
possesses jurisdiction under
Sec. 14 of the Courts
Ordinance but cannot exercise it
under Sec. 17 (ibid)-but
Commissioner may transfer any
cause commenced or brought
before any Tribunal and
Divisional Court can then
exercise its statutatory
jurisdiction. Appeal dismissed.
Held: The Divisional Court
possesses its jurisdiction under
the Courts Ordinance and Rules
made thereunder. The order of
transfer only enables the Court
in this particular case to
exercise the jurisdiction and
powers already given by Section
14.
(2) The appeal is dismissed with
a direction to the Court below
that full force and effect must
be given to the mandatory terms
of Sch. III Order 26, even if it
'involves alteration in the
capacity in which the Plaintiff
sues or the Defendant is sued.
Attention drawn to the
distinction between the ..
possession" and the exercise" by
the Supreme Court of
jurisdiction in land cases.
MaIm v. Wulff (III W.A.C.A.
232) considered and overruled on
the
obiter dictum
therein expressed.
The facts appear from the
judgments.
C. F. H. Benjamin for
Appellant.
W. Ward Brew
(with him K. A. Korsah)
for Respondent.
The following judgments, with
which the other member of the
Court was in agreement, were
delivered :_
GRAHAM PAUL, C.J., SIERRA LEONE.
This case started in the Native
Tribunal of the State Council of
the Apimayim State, the writ of
summons commanding the Defendant
to attend" before this Tribunal,
, The State Council' ". On the
motion of the
Defendant-Appellant the
Provincial Commissioner's Court,
by Order dated 3rd October,
1930, made under section 71 (1)
(c) of the Native
Administration Ordinance No. 18
of 1927 (now section 75 (1)
(c)), transferred the case
from the State Council to the
Divisional Court. On the case
coming before the Divisional
Court Counsel for the
Defendant-Appellant raised three
points of law upon which the
Divisional Court Ruling on
7th June, 1939. Against that
Ruling the De Appellant has
appealed to this Court.
Among his grounds of appeal the
Defendant-A included :-
5. Because the Writ of Summons,
having been issued by Council in
the first instance, was without
jurisdiction and void ",
This ground was not raised by
the Defendant-Appt the
Divisional Court; but in this
Court the Appellant's made it
his first ground of appeal and
it was fully argue. this Court.
It is quite clear that under the
Native Administration Ordinance
the State Council had no
jurisdiction to entertain the
claim in the writ of summons.
Respondent's Counsel! attempt to
suggest that the State Council
had jurisdiction The only
Court having original
jurisdiction in the case 1
Paramount Chief's Tribunal which
is quite different from the
state Council. (Section 48
of the Native Administration
Ordinance.) .
The question then is whether the
Provincial Commissioner Court
could effectually transfer from
the- State Council Divisional
Court a case pending in the
State Council although the
State Council had no
jurisdiction to entertain the
claim in the case
The
" Divisional Court" referred to
is a Divisional
Court of
the Supreme Court which under
section 14 of the Courts
Ordinance shall, within the Gold
Coast and subject as in this
ordinance mentioned,
possess and exercise all the
jurisdiction power and
authorities which are vested in
or capable of being exercised by
His Majesty's High Court of
Justice in England". It is that
the claim in this case is
covered by that general
jurisdiction But by
section 17 of the Courts
Ordinance it is provided as
follows
.• 17. Notwithstanding anything
in this Ordinance contained
Supreme Court shall not
exercise
jurisdiction :-
•• (a) in the Gold Coast
Colony in any civil cause or
matter subject to the
provisions of section 65 of the
Native Administration Ordinance
save and except in accordance
with the provision to such
section, or in any cause or
matter within the jurisdiction
conferred on a Provincial
Commissioner's Court by sections
57 _ this Ordinance".
The relevant part of section 65
of the Native Administration
Ordinance is in the following
terms :-
.. 65. Whenever it shall appear
to the Court that any civil
matter brought before it is one
properly cognizable by a
Tribunal under sections
48, 49, or 50, or by a State
Council or by a Provincial
Council or by two
Provincial Councils sitting
jointly. under the provision of
this Ordinance, the Court shall
stop the further progress of
such civil matter before it, and
refer the parties to a competent
Tribunal or state Council
or to the Provincial Council or
Councils, as the case may be
The claim in this case is within
the jurisdiction of the tribunal
under section 48 of the Native
Administration ordinance
and therefore it would
appear to be " a civil cause or
matter. subject to the
provisions of section 65 of the
Native Administration (Colony)
Ordinance" and it does not come
within any of the provisos to
section 65. It therefore appears
that the case is one over which
the Divisional Court under
section 14 of the Courts
Ordinance " possesses"
jurisdiction but cannot
"exercise" its jurisdiction
because of section 17 of the
Courts Ordinance.
That being the position of the
Divisional Court vis-a-vis
this case one may now turn
to the terms of the subsection
under which the Provincial
Commissioner's Court made the
order for transfer in this case.
The subsection is in the
following terms :-
" (1) The Provincial
Commissioner's Court may, either
of its own motion or on the
application of either party to
the cause or matter, by order
stop the hearing of any civil or
criminal cause, matter or
question commenced or brought
before any Tribunal whether as
of first instance or by way of
appeal, or, referred,
transferred, or remitted thereto
under section 76 of the Courts
Ordinance, or under section 73
of this Ordinance, or otherwise,
on such terms as it may consider
just; and thereupon the
following provisions shall
apply;-
"(a)
If such cause, matter, or
question shall appear to the
Provincial Commissioner's Court
to be one within the
jurisdiction of some other
Tribunal, it may by the same or
another order direct that such
cause, matter, or question shall
be enquired of, tried, and
determined by such Tribunal as
shall appear to it to have
jurisdiction over such cause,
matter, or question; or
"(b)
Except in the case of any cause,
matter, or question which
relates to the ownership,
possession, or occupation of any
land, or which is otherwise one
,properly within the exclusive
jurisdiction of a Divisional
Court, the Provincial
Commissioner's' Court may in
like manner direct that 5JIch
cause, matter, or question shall
be enquired of and determined by
a Magistrate's Court constituted
either by the District
Commissioner or by the District
Magistrate (as may be specified)
; or
"(c)
In the case of any cause,
matter, or question which cannot
under the provisions hereinabove
in this section contained
properly be enquired of, tried
and determined by a Magistrate's
Court, the Provincial
Commissioner's Court may in like
manner direct that such cause,
matter, or question shall be
enquired of, tried, and
determined in the Divisional
Court."
Section 76 is also important. It
is as follows :-
" 76. Any cause, matter, or
question, which the Provincial
Commissioner's Court shall have
transferred from a Tribunal
under section 75 shall (unless
the action is abandoned or
discontinued) thereupon be
enquired of, tried, and
determined in accordance with
the tenor of the order of the
Provincial Commissioner's Court
.
•• Provided that, if any order
of the Provincial Commissioner's
Court purporting to have been
made under section 75 shall be
found not to have been made in
accordance with the provisions
thereof, the Provincial
Commissioner's Court shall, of
its own motion or otherwise,
amend such order so as to make
it accord with such provisions".
It does appear from the terms of
subsection (a) of section
75 that the Legislature did
contemplate that a summons
issued in a Tribunal having no
jurisdiction to issue that
particular summons might be
transferred to a Tribunal having
jurisdiction. Moreover a
Tribunal may have" commenced or
brought before" it a cause,
matter or question in which it
has no jurisdiction, and the
power of the Commissioner's
Court to transfer arises
whenever any action is "
commenced or brought before " a
Tribunal.
The State Council is not a "
Tribunal" as defined in the
Native Administration (Colony)
Ordinance but section 95 (3)
appears bring the •. State
Council" within the provisions
of section 75.
Section 95 (3) is in the
following terms:-
•• (3) In connection with the
jurisdiction exercised by a
State Council under this
Ordinance. reference in this or
in any other Ordinance to
Tribunal or to Native Tribunals
shall, except where the context
otherwise requires, deemed to
include a reference to State
Councils".
It appears to follow that the
Provincial Commissioner's Co had
power to make an order of
transfer of this case to the
Division Court and that by
section 76 of the Native
Administration (Colon Ordinance
the Divisional Court was bound
to •. exercise" t
jurisdiction it •. possessed
", and to enquire of, try,
and determine the case •. in
accordance with the tenor of the
order of t Provincial
Commissioner's Court".
That disposes of the fifth
ground of appeal of the
Defendant Appellant.
As regards the other grounds of
appeal, the Appellant's Court
abandoned No.3 for the reason
that the learned Judge in the
Court' below had already ruled,
following what he conceived to
be the effect of the decision in
Malm v. Wulff (III. W.A.C.A..
232), that the
amendment of the writ of summons
made by another Judge under
which the capacity in which the
Defendant was sued was: changed
from a personal to a
representative capacity, could
not stand. That question
will receive further comment
later.
As to the other grounds of
appeal, Nos. 1 and 2 deal with
the terms of the claim as
appearing in the writ of summons
issued in the State Council.
That claim is quaintly worded
but from the. analysis of it
there appear several
propositions by way of statement
of claim:-
1. The land known and called
Nchimuwah has been attached to
the stool from time immemorial
and not to the Defendant's
ancestors as he claims.
2. No Paramount Chief ever gave
Defendant's ancestor the said
land to look after and share the
tribute.
3. The Defendant has voluntarily
granted a document t the
Plaintiff about rights to this
land.
4. The Plaintiff has sworn oaths
according to native custom that
the land belongs not to the
Defendant or hi ancestors but to
the stool and the Defendant has
fail to respond according to
native law and custom to the.
oaths but instead has begged the
Plaintiff.
It is not quite clear on the
statement of claim what
precisely the claim of £50
damages is for. Is it for
slander of title, or for
trespass, or for menses profits?
None of the criticisms which
have been made of the writ of
summons amount to a statement
that there is no cause of action
disclosed. In fact the Defendant
Appellant's own affidavit of
23rd August, 1930 states that
the " Plaintiff claims my family
land called Bassofie which has
been wrongly named by him as
Nchimuwah ".
There is undoubtedly a cause of
action disclosed but this is
obviously a case for the
application of the Rules under
the Courts Ordinance by which
the Divisional Court is bound in
the exercise of its jurisdiction
in any case--particularly
Schedule III Order 26 which,
inter alia,
provides that all amendments
which may be necessary or
proper" for the purpose of
determining in the existing suit
the real question or questions
in controversy between the
parties, shall be so made ". It
cannot be too definitely
emphasised that the Divisional
Court possesses or derives its
only jurisdiction under, and
must exercise that jurisdiction
in strict conformity with, the
Courts Ordinance and the Rules
of Court made thereunder. The
order of transfer does not give
the Divisional Court its
jurisdiction; it only enables
the Divisional Court to exercise
in this particular case the
jurisdiction and powers already
given to it by section 14 of the
Courts Ordinance. The Divisional
Court can and must deal with any
transferred case in every
respect as if it were a case
originally brought before it by
its own writ of summons.'
Whenever a case is transferred
from a native court of any kind
to the Divisional Court the
first duty of the Judge is to
see that the claim as stated
correctly expresses what the
Plaintiff is really claiming
and, if not, to make whatever
amendments may be necessary.
This is clearly a case for this
duty to be done before the Court
below proceeds further with the
case. It is absurd to suggest,
as the Appellant does in his
second ground of appeal, that
the Court below had no
jurisdiction to amend.
If the decision in
Maim v. Wulff
interfered with the exercise by
the Court of its powers and the
performance by the Court of its
duty under Schedule III Order
26, it would, in my respectful
opinion, have to be
recol1'3idered. This .Court
cannot, in my opinion, by a
decision restrict the powers or
the duties of a Court which are
expressly laid down in a Rule of
Court. But a perusal of the
report of the case of
Maim v. Wulff
shows that the decision on this
point was
obiter dictum,
all the members of the Court in
that case having agreed in the
first reason stated by the
learned President for dismissing
the appeal in that case which
was in effect that the appeal
was not properly before the
Court.
This appeal in my opinion should
be dismissed with a direction to
the Court below that full force
and effect must be given to the
mandatory terms of Schedule III
Order 26, even if it involves
alteration in the capacity in
which the Plaintiff sues or the
Defendant is sued. Also it is
desirable to express the opinion
that this is a case where the
Court below, having amended the
writ of summons so as to cover
the real question or questions
in controversy
between the parties. should
order pleadings,
It only remains to refer shortly
to the fourth ground of a When
the Court below has ascertained
the real question in
controversy between the parties
and amended the writ of summons
accordingly, and pleadings have
been filed, it will then be for
the Court to consider (if
necessary taking evidence on the
point) whether under the native
law applicable there is a ca
action shown in regard to all or
any of these questions against
the Defendant in the
capacity in which, under the
writ of summons as finally
settled, he is sued. That
disposes of the fourth ground
of appeal.
KINGDON, c.]. NIGERIA.
I have had the· advantage of
reading the judgment which has
been delivered by my learned
brother, the Chief Justice of
Sierra Leone. In it he points
out the distinction drawn by the
Legislature ; between the
"possession" and the " exercise"
of jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. It is a "nice"
distinction and one which
does not appear to have occurred
to anybody before, at any rate
not to any of the Counsel who
have appeared before this court
either in this case or in that
of
Maim v. Wulff.
But now attention is drawn to
the point I feel bound to agree
that distinction is there
and that effect must be given to
it. I difficult to believe that
the Legislature really intended
such subtlety, but we have to
interpret the statute law as we
find it . The effect is to cause
me to revise the opinion which I
expressed in the case of
Maim v. Wulf
in the second of the reasons
given by me for thinking that
the appeal in that case should
be dismissed Fortunately,
as has been pointed out, what I
said then was
obiter dictum
and made no difference to the
decision of the appeal.
I am now satisfied that the view
which I then expressed
that it was" a question of
jurisdiction" was wrong, and
that I was in error
in saying" the Court only
derives its jurisdiction to hear
the suit at all from the
order of transfer made by the
Provincial Commissioner's
Court "; and again, "The
Divisional Court has by a
special order, had special
jurisdiction conferred upon it
and" again the words "which,
under its ordinary powers, has
no jurisdiction to try".
It is now made clear that the
Supreme Court derive its
jurisdiction from section 14 of
the Courts Ordinance and not
from any order of transfer. The
order of transfer merely
withdraws the ban placed upon
the exercise of the jurisdiction
by section 17 of the Ordinance.
This being so it becomes a
matter not of jurisdiction
but of procedure, and I agree
that the Court has both the
power and the duty to apply to
the full its ordinary rules
procedure. I, therefore, concur
upon this point with the
judgement delivered by my
learned brother, the Chief
Justice of Sierra Leone, and I
also concur therewith upon all
other points.