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                                    COURT OF GHANA 2000

 

 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA-GHANA

_________________________

CORAM: WIREDU, AG. CHIEF JUSTICE

KPEGAH, J.S.C.

ADJABENG, J.S.C.

ATUGUBA, J.S.C

MS. AKUFFO, J.S.C.

OPANIN KWEKU ENU

(SUBSTITUTED BY KOJO TUAKWA)       ....     APPELLANT

VERSUS:

KWEKU BOSOM                                          ....     RESPONDENT

 

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JUDGMENT

SOPHIA AKUFFO, J.S.C.

On February 14th 2001, we unanimously allowed the appeal herein but reserved our reasons, which we now give as follows:—

In this appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated June 17th 1999, the Appellant set out his grounds of appeal in rather prolix terms.

These may however, be briefly summarised as follows:—

a. The Court of Appeal erred in not assessing the evidence before the trial court to ascertain whether or not the evidence supported the trial court's judgment.

b. The Court of Appeal erred in proceeding on the assumption that the matter before the trial court turned solely on the facts and thereby ignored issues of law, which had been raised by the evidence.

c. Since the appellant's claim was for a declaration of title and the respondent had not counterclaimed for a similar declaration, or at all, the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the trial court's order that 'the status quo ante should be maintained'.

The background to this appeal is that, the appellant, on his own behalf and as the Head of the Aburadze family of Gwira Akyinimu, claimed against the respondent for declaration of title to two pieces of land known as Gwira Akyinimu, in the Edina Traditional Area, and orders for recovery of possession and perpetual injunction.

The appellant's case was to the effect, that the disputed lands were originally broken and settled by his ancestor Kwesi Gwira, the first Odikro, who had been accompanied by his sister, Tseasewa. In the course of time, according to the appellant, a member of the defendant's family married the niece of the Odikro and, as a result of the marriage, Gwira promised that farming land would be made available to members of the respondent's family who wished to farm, and this became an established practice. Also, according to the appellant, when the respondent himself needed land for a salt industry, he had approached Nana Gwira III and requested an allocation, which request had been granted after the  performance of custom. However, the respondent had, without the consent of the Odikro, attempted to extend the area of his allocation, and, moreover, had been claiming ownership of the entire land and purporting to sell portions thereof, thereby precipitating the suit.

For his part, the respondent, asserted that the lands were the family's ancestral property and that, therefore, he needed no permission or consent from the appellant to alienate any part. The respondent also claimed that the founder, Kwesi Gwira was his ancestor who hailed from the Adwenadze (Aowin) family of Bantama near Elmina. According to the respondent, Kwesi Gwira married Tseasewa who was from Anomabu and was the ancestress of the appellant. After Kwesi Gwira died, his children were permitted to farm on the lands and function as caretakers for their father's Adwenadze family, provided they paid annual homage to the family's Stool at Bantama. In further support of his contention, the respondent asserted that, during the time of one of the appellant's predecessors, Kofi Gin (or Kofi Gyem), an attempt was made by the appellant's family to enstool a chief at Gwira Akyinimu, without the requisite prior reference to the respondent's family, as a result of which the Head of the respondent's family swore the Great Oath of Elmina on the said predecessor.  Consequently, the matter was arbitrated upon and it was made clear to the appellant's family that it could not enstool anyone at Gwira Akyinimu without the prior consent and permission of the respondent's family. The appellant's family then slaughtered a sheep to appease the respondent's family. The respondent also contended that his family, as the landowners, had at various times made grants of portions of the land and had also, upon the request of the appellant, made grants to the Oman of Gwira Akyinimu and had otherwise exercised acts of ownership on the lands without any protest from the appellant or his family. Therefore, the respondent contended further that the appellant was estopped by the arbitration award, by his conduct and acquiescence and by the respondent's long and quiet possession, from claiming title to the lands.

Subsequently, four other persons successfully applied to be joined as co-plaintiffs claiming that, when the trial court ordered a survey of the property in dispute, the areas pointed out by the respondent for demarcation as his property encroached onto their respective properties. The co-plaintiffs are not Appellants herein.

In the Court of Appeal, the appellant's original ground of appeal was simply that the decision of the trial court was against the weight of the evidence. Subsequently, and with the leave of the Court of Appeal, he argued on additional grounds to the effect that:—

a. The trial judge did not apply any principle of law in his judgement and thereby fell into error.

b. The trial Judge failed to appreciate that since the appellant had been in undisturbed possession of the land in dispute for several years, his possession was good title against the whole world except someone with better title and because of this lack of appreciation, the Judge erroneously ignored the burden on the respondent to prove his title.

Afreh, J. A. read the judgement of the Court of Appeal. In  respect of  additional ground one, the court held that, where only issues of fact arise for determination in a case and they can be resolved  without any citation of law, then the judge is not bound to refer to, analyse or apply any legal principles, provided the decision is not contrary to the law or can be supported in law.

Additional ground two was the only ground the Court considered to be worthy of its attention. Their Lordships, however, found that the trial judge had adequately considered the evidence and reached conclusions that were reasonable in the light of the evidence.

With regard to the third ground of appeal, Afreh, J.A. stated that the trial judge did not, and was not bound to, direct himself on the question of burden of proof, and by the very fact that he came to a conclusion, it can be assumed that he knew and applied the law on burden of proof in a civil case. Consequently, he held that, unless the appellant could show that there was insufficient or no evidence to support the judgement, there was hardly any point in the appeal court being asked to consider the question of burden of proof.

With all due respect to the learned judges of the Court of Appeal, we find their conclusions to be rather odd. The adjudication process is nothing if it is not a process guided by law.  Admittedly, a judge is not required to cite any particular law in every case, particularly where it turns essentially on the facts, however, the evaluation of evidence is a legal process and the law of evidence is expected to be and must be seen to have been applied fully and without any exception, save such exceptions as are permitted by the law. Thus, whether or not the trial judge makes specific reference to the particular legal provisions he applies in the evaluation of evidence, the law of evidence must run as the undercurrent guiding the flow of his assessment and if the outcome of the exercise is such that it is alleged that the trial judge's evaluation offends against the applicable rules of evidence, it is incumbent on an appellate court to review the record in the light of the rules of evidence.

Furthermore, an appeal is by way of a rehearing, particularly where the appellant alleges in his notice of appeal that the decision of the trial court is against the weight of the evidence. In such a case, although it is not the function of the appellate court to evaluate the veracity or otherwise of any witness, it is incumbent upon an appellate court, in a civil case, to analyse the entire record of appeal, take into account the testimonies and all documentary evidence adduced at the trial before it arrives at its decision, so as to satisfy itself that, on a preponderance of the probabilities, the conclusions of the trial judge are reasonably or amply supported by the evidence. It is our view that the Court of Appeal in this case failed to do this.

In our opinion, neither the trial judge nor the Court of Appeal properly applied the rules of evidence. The appellant's main case before the Court of Appeal was that, in evaluating the evidence, the trial judge proceeded on the assumption that the appellant "had a burden greater than producing evidence which was reasonably more probable than that of the defendant."  Part II (dealing with the burden of proof) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323), Section 12 provides as follows:—

"12(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a preponderance of the probabilities.

(2) 'Preponderance of the probabilities' means that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court by which it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence."

Although the Decree makes mention of the 'belief in the mind of the court or the tribunal of fact', it goes without saying that such belief must be founded upon and guided by the totality of the evidence on record.

In explaining the significance of the innovations introduced by the Evidence Decree, particularly in the allocation of the burden of proof in actions, such as this one, for a declaration of title, this court, in Odonkor vrs. Amartei, [1992-93] part 1 GBR, 59, held that the principle that a plaintiff in an action for declaration of title must win on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defendant' case no longer held sway in Ghana. Rather, under the Decree, the judge in all civil cases, must consider the relative merits of the case on a preponderance of the probabilities, rather than 'on an archaic principle which might not accord with reason or common sense.'

The fundamental question before the trial judge was 'who is the owner of the lands in dispute?' The trial Judge concluded that:—

"From the totality of the evidence led, I find as a fact that Gwira came from Bantama and belonged to the Defendant's family and he broke the virgin forest. He was said to be Nana Gwira I because he founded the village. That is quite normal since some heads of family are titled "Nana" just like the Plaintiff herein. I find Tseasewa hailed from Anomabu and was married to Kwesi Gwira. I find Tseasewa's people also came from Anomabu and were allowed to occupy the land as caretakers and were to pay annual tolls of a sheep and eighteen shillings cash to the Defendant's family. I also find that the Plaintiff's family were entitled to a one-third share of anything taken from any tenant placed on the land. With this relationship, it appears that the Defendant had allowed the Plaintiff complete control over the land subject to their observing these terms. Therefore, the Plaintiff could not claim absolute ownership of the land however long they had been on the land. In the same vein, the Defendant could not by-pass the Plaintiffs family and without informing them grant portions of the land to other persons."

So, what was the totality of the evidence as at the close of the trial? It was not in dispute that the original settler of the land was Nana Gwira. The problem was that both parties, although they did not belong to the same family, claimed Gwira as their ancestor. The Appellant, in his evidence-in-chief traced his connection to Gwira as follows:—

"My ancestor Nana Kwesi Gwira cultivated the land with his sister Aberewa Aba Tseasewa, and their mother was called Aba Awen. Nana Kwesi Gwira and Aba Tseasewa had other brothers and sisters but they all died leaving only the two survivors. Aba Tseasewa had children namely, Brodwemaba, Amoesiwa, Aba Mansah. Brodwemaba begat Akosua Tawiah, Kweku Ainoo, Kobina Anowa and Ahema. Akosua Amoesiwa begat Adwoa Praba and Kwesi Gwira. Aba Mansah begat Atta Panyin and Atta Kakra and Madam Tawiah. I came from the line of Aba Mansah.  Madam Tawiah begat my mother called Nana Amma... On the death of Nana Kwesi Gwira, he was succeeded by Nana Kobina Essuon who was also a member of the family. Nana Kobina Essuon was succeeded by Kwesi Tawiah on whose death E.K. Osei succeeded. E.K. Osei is still alive."

The Respondent did not significantly challenge this crucial portion of the evidence on cross-examination. As for the Respondent, apart from his bare assertion that Gwira was his ancestor, nowhere in his pleadings or testimony, did he establish any connection whatsoever between his family and Gwira. Nor did he produce any witnesses to establish any such connection. Thus, the finding that Gwira hailed from the Respondent's family had no support from the evidence.

Rather his Lordship, in total disregard of the stipulations of the above-quoted provisions of the Evidence Decree, took the stance that, since P.W.2 testified that Aba Tseasewa was from Anomabu and she was doubtlessly the ancestor of the Appellant, then it followed that the Respondent's story was the correct version. In the light of the provisions of the said Decree, this conclusion was, with all due respect to the learned trial judge, a non-sequitor.

Additionally, the judge completely disregarded the glaring fact that:—

a. All the Plaintiffs (owners of adjoining properties, whose claims he found as established), knew only the Appellant's family as the owners of the land, and did not know the Respondent's family as such;

b. The Respondent clearly had no,knowledge of the boundaries of the subject matter in dispute between him and the Appellant, which lack of knowledge was the catalyst for the joinder of the co- plaintiffs to the suit;

c. Equally, the Respondent had a total lack of knowledge of who was the current Chief of the village, even though according to him, as a consequence of his family's over-lordship of the land, the installation of such a Chief necessitated the prior consent of his family;

d. According to P.W.l's testimony, at the swearing in of Nana Gwira IV, (at which time he, the witness, was the acting Omanhin of Edina Traditional Area) the said chief (a member of the Appellant's family) was accompanied only by the elders of his Abiradze stool family, and although, according to custom," ...The person who gives the permission must also appear before the Omanhin during the swearing-in-ceremony ... nothing of the sort happened, that person has to inform the Omanhin he gave the stool to the person coming to swear the oath."

In such circumstances, the preponderance of the probabilities, clearly, stood in favour of the Appellant and in the absence of any cogent evidence from the Respondent shifting the probabilities in his favour one is hard put to find any justification for the Trial Judge's finding that Gwira belonged to the Respondent's family.

Regarding the payment of tolls to the Respondent, his Lordship relied entirely on the testimony of the Respondent's sole witness, D.W.1, the bulk of whose knowledge was derived from what he was told by his father nearly 90 years previously, even though this witness' testimony varied in many respects with that of the Respondent. Other portions of this witness's evidence worthy of note are:—

All in all, what is most apparent from the record is that, the Judge simply chose to disregard the evidence produced by the Appellant, without any serious evaluation, and accepted, wholesale, the assertions of the Respondent, despite the dearth of adequate supportive evidence. Consequently, there is no doubt in our minds that the Judge erroneously placed the burden of proof solely on the Appellant and virtually assigned none whatsoever to the Respondent. After reviewing the record, it was, therefore, our conclusion that, on a preponderance of the probabilities, the judgement of the trial Judge was not supported by the totality of the evidence and the Court of Appeal erred in confirming the same without any scrutiny of the record.

We, therefore, set aside the judgement and orders of the trial court and enter judgement for the Appellant on all his claims.

JUSTICE SOPHIA AKUFFO (MS)

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

JUSTICE EDWARD WIREDU

AG. CHIEF JUSTICE

JUSTICE KPEGAH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

JUSTICE ADJABENG

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

JUSTICE ATUGUBA

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

COUNSEL

Mr. Owusu Ansah for the Appellant.

Mr. Ivan Quansah for the Respondent.

 
 

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