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JUDGMENT
ADZOE, J.S.C.
This is an appeal against the
unanimous judgment of the Court
of Appeal dated 14th December,
2000 affirming an award made by
the trial High Court at Kumasi
on 22nd January, 1999. This High
Court Judge made the award
pursuant to his own previous
order for the valuation and
sharing of the assets and
liabilities of a school owned
jointly by the parties. The
appellant contends that the
properties of the school had not
been “professionally or
otherwise valued” before the
award was made by the High Court
and that the Court of Appeal was
wrong in affirming the said
award.
The dispute between the parties
was primarily about the
ownership of a school
established in Kwadaso, Kumasi,
in the Ashanti Region and called
the Minnesota International
School. It was originally
established by four men in 1982.
In 1984, two of the four
founders decided to quit, and
the parties herein were left to
run the school as joint owners.
The plaintiff in the suit is the
appellant before us and the
defendant is the respondent. I
shall hereafter refer to them as
Appellant and Respondent. They
were the two left behind to run
the school. They entered into a
partnership agreement and
registered the school in their
joint names as owners.
The appellant became the
Headmaster of the school, and
the Respondent took the office
of Financial/Administrative
manager, up to 1992.
Troubles started in about 1992
when, according to the
appellant, the respondent
refused to render accounts and
claimed to be the sole owner of
the school.
When matters came to a head, the
appellant sued the respondent on
10th May, 1994 at the High Court
in Kumasi, claiming a
“declaration that the plaintiff
and the defendant jointly own”
the school.
The trial High Court Judge gave
judgment for the appellant and
held that the parties jointly
owned the school and that they
owned it “in equal shares based
on the capital contribution of
¢50,000.00 each” as provided in
the partnership agreement.
Exercising his discretion under
Order 63, rule 6 of the High
Court (Civil Procedure Rules,
the learned judge made the
following order:
“Furthermore, I hold that the
assets and liabilities of the
parties were to be shared in
equal proportions.
From the evidence above it is
quite clear to me that the
parties cannot continue to
operate as a partnership at will
and order that the partnership
be wound-up and the assets and
liabilities of the partnership
shared as provided for under
clause 8 of Exhibit I”.
Exhibit I is the partnership
agreement. In order to ensure a
fair sharing of the and
liabilities the learned High
Court judge further made an
order that:
"The parties are to appoint
competent experts to evaluate
the assets and liabilities and
same be distributed to the
parties in equal shares under
the supervision of the court".
There is no evidence in the
record of proceedings that any
valuation of the "assets and
liabilities" of the school was
ever made by "competent experts"
appointed by the parties as
envisaged by the court's order.
A valuation properly so-called
demands of the valuer to find
out the reasonable value of the
tangible assets involved in the
exercise. There must be clear
evidence that each property was
valued at a price which it would
have fetched at the time of the
valuation on a sale in the open
market between a notional buyer
and a notional seller; the open
market in the present case may
be confined to Kumasi or the
Ashanti Region since the
properties are in Kumasi. In a
case like the one before us
where a valuation is needed for
the particular purpose of having
the total value of the assets
shared equally between the
parties, I consider that any
valuation must be transparent
and prima facie fair.
In the instant case, however,
there is absolutely no evidence
of a valuation. The school's
Accountants, Messrs M.A. Darko &
Co. filed before the court on
29th September, 1998, what
purported to be financial
statements of the school, which
statements are clearly not
valuation reports. Prior to the
financial statements Nii
Quaye-Mensah & Associates on
17th November, 1997 had also
filed what they themselves
labelled an "Inventory". This
"Inventory" merely listed
certain properties allegedly
owned by the school and did not
place any value on them.
The appellant even took
objection to the "Inventory" for
reasons that (i) it did not
reflect the school's accounts,
(ii) it included the defendant's
own Peugeot Pick-up which was
not the property of the school
and (iii) that it did not
include text-books and science
equipments of the school. This
protest by the plaintiff was
contained in an affidavit filed
before the court on 18th
November, 1997.
Before the 20th of November,
1997, the Registrar-General had
been appointed as the Trustee
and official Liquidator. On 17th
November, 1997, one Mr. Joseph
Tamakloe, an officer of the
Registrar-General's Department,
acting on behalf, and on the
authority, of the
Registrar-General, swore to an
affidavit in which he deposed
that to the best of the
knowledge of the
Registrar-General "the total
school fees for a term is about
¢28,000,000.00" and that school
fees for the third term of the
1996/97 academic year and the
1st term of the 1997/98 academic
year had already been collected
by the teachers of the school.
It cannot be doubted that these
fees were collected by or at the
instance of the respondent.
On 20th November, 1997, the
Registrar-General was discharged
as the official Liquidator and
the Registrar of the court was
appointed to divide the assets
listed in the "Inventory" filed
by Messrs Nii Quaye-Mensah and
Associates to the parties in
equal shares. Both parties did
not permit this division to be
carried out. After some time,
respondent offered to "pay the
appellant out completely in the
sum of ¢5,000,000.00 (Five
million cedis) cash". When this
offer reached the appellant he,
on the other hand, demanded to
be paid ¢287,475,352.50 as his
half share of the assets.
It was at this stage that the
High Court called the case on
22nd January, 1999 and ordered
that the appellant be paid
¢8,000,000.00 as his share. It
is clear that when on that 22nd
of January, 1999, the High Court
judge made the order he had no
valuation figure of the assets
to guide him, and the record
shows that he did not even
advert his mind to the valuation
he himself had ordered. I think
it would be fair to the parties
and the Learned High Court Judge
as well as the learned Justices
of the Court of Appeal to
reproduce what the learned High
Court judge said:
"By Court: After hearing given
the parties ample time to settle
the quantum of money payable to
the plaintiff an income due to
the School up to the date of the
judgment. It seems quite clear
that the movable items
inventoriesed have been
apportioned among the parties.
The bone of contention that is
entitled to ¢9,656,520.00 and a
further income of
¢256,713,832.50.
There is no evidence whatsoever
at the trial or from the audited
account in proof of this
monstrous demand. Since this
court is not a goldmine, I order
that the defendant pays the sum
of ¢8,000,000.00 to the
plaintiff forthwith".
The learned High Court Judge
might have thought that he had
an unfettered power to award the
appellant any sum of money he
considered proper in the
circumstances. But he was
mistaken. He had no such power.
I would agree with counsel for
the appellant when he described
the award as "capricious" in the
sense that it was arbitrary and
unreliable as the actual half
share of the assets and
liabilities of the school. To
that extent the appeal must
succeed on ground one of the
appeal which is that:
"The Court of appeal erred when
it affirmed the decision of the
High Court without critically
examining the evidence contained
in the record of proceedings".
I myself cannot imagine how the
Court of Appeal came to the
conclusion that the High Court
"took into account the realities
on the ground by awarding
¢8,000,000.00 as the appellant's
share of the assets ..." I will
therefore allow the appeal.
The appellant has urged this
court to set aside the award and
order a more equitable sharing
of the assets of the school
based on an effectual valuation.
The declared intention and
desire of the trial High Court
is that the properties be valued
by experts and the amount
determined be shared between the
parties "in equal proportions".
Since no valuation had been
done, I think the appellant's
request is in order.
The appeal is allowed. The
judgment of the Court of Appeal
and the order of the High Court,
Kumasi, dated 22nd January,
1999, awarding ¢8,000,000.00 to
the appellant as his share are
hereby set aside.
The case should be remitted to
the trial court, Kumasi, for a
professional valuer to be
appointed to carry-out the
valuation ordered by the court
for the purpose of a fair
sharing between the parties as
ordered by the High Court.
T. K. ADZOE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
BADDOO, J.S.C.
The facts which gave rise to the
appeal are as follows:—
The Plaintiff/Appellant and the
Defendant/Respondent, herein
after, shall be called the
Plaintiff and Defendant
respectively, with two other
persons, established a school on
Plot 15 Block B, Kwadaso, Kumasi
sometime in 1982. The land
belonged to the Defendant, who
already had built an out-house,
popularly or locally known in
Ghana, as Boys Quarters, on the
land. This was rented out to the
school and was used as offices,
while classes were conducted in
wooden structures constructed on
the vacant plot.
In 1984, the two other persons
who started the school with the
Plaintiff and Defendant in 1982,
left the school.
In the same year, the Plaintiff
and Defendant entered into a
partnership agreement under Act
125 of 1962, to run the school
named the Minnesota
International School, as a
commercial venture. The school
was registered with the Ministry
of Education and the Ghana
Education Service. All the
relevant documents with regards
to the establishment and the
registration of the school were
signed by the Plaintiff and
Defendant.
For the next 8 years the
Plaintiff and the Defendant
jointly managed the school;
Plaintiff in the role as
headmaster, while the Defendant
managed the financial and
administrative side of the
school. As a commercial venture,
the income of the school in 1993
for the term was over ¢33
million.
In 1994, Plaintiff invited the
Defendant in his capacity as
financial and Administrative
Manager of the school, to render
accounts of the financial
position of the school.
The Defendant refused and
claimed the school as sole
owner. Plaintiff was
consequently barred from
entering the school by the
Defendant from 20th June,1994.
Plaintiff therefore issued a
writ at the High Court Kumasi
for "a Declaration that the
Plaintiff and the Defendant
jointly owned the Minnesota
International School, Kumasi".
JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT
This case has had a chequered
career at the High Court since
1994.
First it came before Justice
P.K. Owusu Sekyere on the 11th
of July 1994, when he took the
summons for Directions and set
the case down for hearing on
7/12/94.
Thereafter there were series of
adjournments until 7/7/95 when
counsel for the Plaintiff asked
for an adjournment to enable the
parties settle the matter. The
case was then adjourned to
18/10/95.
There was no further hearing
till the 16th of January 1996
when it was called before a new
judge Justice ABADA. He
adjourned the case to 14/2/96
for hearing.
Finally on 8/3/96, hearing
commenced before the new judge
Justice ABADA. On the 2nd of
July 1996, the trial judge gave
judgment for the Plaintiff as
follows:—
"In my judgment, the Plaintiff
has succeeded in establishing by
cogent prima facie evidence,
that the parties agreed to form
a joint partnership and the
object of that partnership was
to establish the Minnesota
International School. I further
hold that the parties own the
school in equal shares, based on
the capital contributions of
¢50,000 each. Furtherance, I
hold that the assets and
liabilities of the parties are
to be shared in equal
proportions. From the evidence
above, it is quite clear to me
that the parties cannot continue
to operate as a partnership at
will and therefore in exercise
of the powers conferred on the
court, I order that the
partnership be wound up and the
assets and liabilities of the
partnership shared as provided
for under clause 8 of Exh. 1.
The parties are to appoint
competent experts to evaluate
the assets and liabilities and
same to be distributed to the
parties in equal shares under
the supervision of the court".
LIQUIDATION.
On the 27th of August, 1997, the
Registrar of the High Court was
appointed an Official Trustee.
He was to appoint an official
liquidator to wind up the
partnership under section 47(5)
of Act 152.
Then on the 4th of December,
1996 the Registrar General was
appointed as a Trustee and
Official Liquidator, to wind up
the affairs of the Minnesota
International School.
On the 24th of February 1997,
the Defendant filed a motion, to
compel the official liquidator
to expedite the liquidation of
the partnership. In his
affidavit in support the
Defendant averred that the
liquidator had abandoned his
duty of winding up the
Partnership and has constituted
himself into a self-appointed
proprietor, managing the school.
But one CHRISS KUMASS of the
Registrar General's Department
in an affidavit dated 5/3/97 in
opposition to the application by
the Defendant, swore that it was
rather the Defendant who was
frustrating the liquidation of
the school, by failing to
furnish the official liquidator
with the proper accounts for the
period 1994, 1995 and 1996.
On the 23rd May 1997, in the
absence of the official
liquidator and counsel for the
Plaintiff, the court granted the
Defendant's application for
expeditious liquidation and gave
the official liquidator 21 days
to complete the liquidation of
the school.
On the 10th of Nov. 1997, one
Tamakloe of the Registrar
General's Department filed an
affidavit to which was attached
an Inventory of the properties
of the Minnesota International
School. The Inventory included
789 Desk Table and 938 classroom
chairs. The Inventory also
showed that the total fees
collected for the 3rd term of
the academic year 1996/97 was
¢28 million, while the fees for
the academic year 1997/98 had
been collected by the teachers.
On the 18th of Nov. 1997, the
Plaintiff filed an affidavit
protesting against the inventory
filed on 17/11/97. He claimed
that the inventory did not
include the school text books,
the science equipments and the
population of the school.
The Registrar of the High Court
Kumasi was mandated to divide
the assets of the school
according to the agreed terms of
50%-50% between the Plaintiff
and the Defendant.
Again the Plaintiff protested in
another affidavit dated 6/1/98
that the inventory did not
include, the accounts of the
school from 1988 and all the
school fees collected at the
beginning of the school.
Plaintiff claimed that since the
school was owned jointly by him
and the Plaintiff, all assets
including all the school
accounts should be divided
between them.
He filed another affidavit on
21/1/98 in which he averred that
the school fees and the
classrooms, particularly,
Primary and JSS should be
included in the inventory and
these should be valued, so he
could receive his share.
The parties could not agree on a
formula for the distribution of
the assets of the Partnership
and the matter was adjourned by
the court several times, from
January to September 1998.
On the 22/9/98, the Defendant
filed an affidavit in which he
offered to buy off the Plaintiff
by paying him the sum of ¢5
million as a final settlement of
his share in the Minnesota
International School.
The Plaintiff rejected this
offer by the Defendant and
insisted that the judgment of
the court be carried out.
Then on the 7th of Dec. 1998,
the Plaintiff also filed an
affidavit in which he set out
his conditions for the
settlement of the matter. These
included the following:—
Salary Allowance due the
Plaintiff = ¢
9,656,520
50% of all
assets
= 21,375,000
50% of Net
Income
= 256,713,832.00
Total
= ¢287,745,352.50
Defendant responded to the
Plaintiff's offer on 11/12/98 by
stating that the chop boxes and
chairs were to be shared 50% -
50%.
That there was no salary due to
the Plaintiff and that the
balance as at 23/9/97 was
= ¢888,255
= ¢444,112.50
Confronted with this avalanche
of affidavits and claims and
counter claims, the trial judge
decided that since the parties
could not come to a settlement,
the court must settle the
matter.
Consequently on 22/1/99, the
court awarded the Plaintiff the
sum of ¢8 million as his share
of the Partnership.
APPEAL
The Plaintiff dissatisfied with
this order, appealed to the
Court of Appeal against the
judgment of the High Court.
The Court of Appeal on
14/12/2000, dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the judgment of the
High Court.
The Plaintiff dissatisfied with
the decision of the Court of
Appeal, has appealed to the
Supreme Court on two grounds of
appeal on 22/1/2001.
1. That the Court of Appeal
erred when it affirmed the
decision of the High court
without critically examining the
evidence contained in the record
of proceedings.
2. The Court of appeal erred
when it did not order the assets
of the school to be shared
equally.
MATTERS FOR DETERMINATION
Before I deal with the grounds
of appeal, let me look at the
judgment of the trial court and
the order which was made by the
trial judge. At P.70 line 25,
the trial judge said:-
"From the evidence above, it is
quite clear to me that the
parties cannot continue to
operate as a partnership at will
and therefore in exercise of the
powers conferred on the court, I
order that the partnership be
wound up and the assets and
liabilities of the partnership
shared as provided under clause
8 of Exhibit 1."
From this judgment it is clear,
unambiguous and unequivocal,
that the assets and liabilities
of the school are to be shared
in equal proportion between the
Plaintiff and Defendant.
The question to be answered is
whether the award of ¢8 million
to the Plaintiff by the court
represent 50% share of the
assets of the Minnesota
International School.
By this award however the trial
court had actually assessed the
value of the school to be worth
¢16 million.
But the report on the Financial
Statement of the school for the
period ending 1994 to July 1996
prepared by one Eric Orlando,
the Accountant of the High Court
Kumasi, indicated that the
statements were not complete
because the officer did not have
access to all the relevant
documents he needed to prepared
the statements.
On p.121, the report read:—
"However the documents provided
us by the official liquidator is
inadequate and most related to
period between 1985-1994. I.e.
does not fall within the period
in question. No class list to
assess the number of pupils in
the school and the amount paid
as school fees. The amount paid
as teachers salaries and other
expenses are also not known.
However balance sheets relating
to the period 1994 to June 1996
which were prepared by the Darko
& Company Chartered Accountancy
firms in Kumasi which were used
to prepare the school, accounts
were shown to us for study. We
therefore attach copies of the
said accounts for your study and
advice, since the materials used
in preparing the said accounts
were not made available to us,
to enable us prepare our own
accounts as requested. In the
summary we cannot prepare any
meaningful Financial Statement
to show the true income and
expenditure position of the
school for the periods 1994,
1995 to July 1996 as requested".
In the face of this honest
admission by the Accountant that
no meaningful financial
statement could be prepared to
show the true income and
expenditure position of the
school for period 1994, 1996 and
1996, it will be difficult, to
put it rather mildly, to resist
the argument of the Plaintiff
that the award of ¢8 million was
not based on any accepted proof
and therefore was not fair.
The Plaintiff in his affidavit
dated 29/8/94, had stated that
the Defendant barricaded the
door; to his office in August
1994, thus preventing him from
working in the school as the
headmaster.
In response Defendant admitted
barricading the door but claimed
that he was justified in doing
so.
Plaintiff therefore claimed that
since he was barred from
entering the school in August
1994, he had not received any
salary or allowance up to the
end of 1996. This has not been
denied by the Defendant.
Since the Plaintiff and
Defendant are joint owners of
the school, then Plaintiff is
legally entitled to his salary
and allowances from the period
he was barred from entering the
school up to 1996.
In awarding the sum of ¢8
million to the Plaintiff as a
final settlement of his share in
the school, did the court take
this factor in consideration?
There is no evidence on record
to indicate that the trial court
took this element into account
when making this award.
The Court of Appeal said at
P.175 of the record, that the
trial court took into account
the realities an the ground by
awarding ¢8 million to the
Plaintiff as his share of the
assets of the partnership.
These "realities on the ground"
were never defined, nor were we
told what element constituted
these realities on the ground.
The judgment of the trial court
made it abundantly clear that
the assets and liabilities of
the school were to be shared
equally between the Plaintiff
and the Defendant. There is
therefore no legitimacy for
using any other formula as a
basis for sharing the assets of
the school.
On P.31 of the record, the
Defendant stated on Exh. 'M' in
an information on Private
Schools that the number of
pupils on roll was 1042.
Plaintiff claimed in an
affidavit on 17/11/97 that the
school fees collected per term
was ¢28 million. Plaintiff
further claimed that Defendant
was still running the school
with the same pupils, because it
was not possible to divide the
pupils into two equal shares.
Since Plaintiff was entitled to
50% of the pupils, the court
ought to have taken this into
consideration in making the
award for ¢8 million. There is
no evidence that the court took
this factor into account in
making the award.
DISCRETIONARY POWERS
Counsel for the Defendant
submitted that the learned judge
was exercising his judicial
discretion when he awarded the
Plaintiff the sum of ¢8 million
as his half share of the school.
That being an exercise of
judicial discretion, this court
ought not to interfere with the
decision of the court.
It is a long settled principle
that discretionary powers must
be exercised fairly. In general
it implies a duty to be fair and
to observe the elementary rules
of natural justice for a limited
purpose in the exercise of the
functions that are not strictly
judicial but administrative.
It is my considered opinion that
in the matter before this court,
the exercise of the trial
judge's discretion was an
administrative function which
could have been done by the
official liquidator if he had
been allowed to do his work.
A critical examination of the
record shows clearly that the
trial judge had not been fair in
the award of ¢8 million to the
Plaintiff as his share of the
assets of the school.
First, the trial judge failed to
take into consideration the fact
that the Plaintiff was barred
from the school in August 1994
and therefore he did not receive
any salary or allowance from
that time up to the end of 1996.
Since the Plaintiff is a joint
owner of the school with the
Defendant, as the court itself
had found, he was entitled to
some of the proceeds of the
school from 1994 to 1996.
Secondly the total population of
the school, 1042 remained with
the Defendant even after the
winding up. The Plaintiff is
entitled to be paid something
for this. There is no evidence
that this was even remotely
considered in the award paid to
the Plaintiff.
Thirdly the Financial Statement
of the school could not be
prepared to reflect the true
income and expenditure position
of the school for 1994, 1995,
1996. That being the situation,
the trial judge was not in any
position to share the assets of
the school equally between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant. Any
exercise of discretion by the
judge in that respect was bound
to be arbitrary, capricious and
uninformed.
The Constitution under Article
296 states:—
"Where in this constitution or
in any other law discretionary
power is vested in any person or
authority.
(a) That discretionary power
shall be deemed to imply a duty
to be fair and candid.
(b) The exercise of the
discretionary power shall not be
arbitrary, capricious or biased
either by resentment, prejudice
or personal dislike and shall be
in accordance with due process
of law.
It is my considered opinion that
the award of ¢8 million to the
Plaintiff as his share of the
assets of the Minnesota School
was not fair and was not based
on any clear principles.
In the case of TRAABOULSI V.
PATTERSON ZOCHONIS [1973] 1GLR
133, Azu Crabbe held that where
a judge of first instance
misapprehends the evidence in
the exercise of his discretion
this will be sufficient
justification for interference
by the appellate court.
In JENKINS V. BUSHBY [1891] 1 CH
KAY L.J. said:—
"In a question of discretion,
authorities are not of much
value. No two cases are exactly
alike and even if they were, the
court cannot be bound by a
previous decision to exercise
its discretion in a particular
way, because that would be in
effect putting an end to the
discretion".
But in Charles Osenton & Co. v.
Johnson [1942] AC 130 Viscount
Simon L.C. said—
"The law as to the reversal by a
Court of Appeal of an order made
by a judge below in the exercise
of his discretion is well
established and any difficulty
that arises is due only to the
application of well established
principles in an individual
case. The appellate tribunal is
not at liberty merely to
substitute its own exercised by
the judge. In other words
appellate authorities ought not
to reverse the order merely
because they would themselves
have exercised the original
discretion, had it attached to
them, in a different way. But if
the appellate tribunal reaches
the clear conclusion that there
has been a wrongful exercise of
discretion, in that no weight,
or no sufficient weight has been
given to relevant
considerations, such as those
urged before us, by the
appellant, then the reversal of
the order no appeal may be
justified".
It is my considered opinion that
the trial judge did not only
misapprehend the evidence, but
failed to give critical
considerations to relevant
issues, in the exercise of his
discretion.
I am not unaware of the
principles governing appeals
against concurrent finding of
fact by two lower courts, as in
the present case.
In ACHORO and another v.
AKANFELA AND Another [1996-97]
SCGLR 209 and OBRASIWA V. OTU
[1996-97] S.C. GLR 618 the
Supreme Court held among other
things that:—
"In an appeal against findings
of facts to a second appellate
court, like this court, where
the lower court had concurred in
the findings of the trial court,
especially in a dispute, the
subject matter of which is
peculiarly within the bosom of
the two lower courts or
tribunals, this court will not
interfere with the concurrent
findings of the lower courts,
unless it is well established
with absolute clearness that
some blunder or error resulting
in a miscarriage of justice is
apparent in the way in which the
lower courts dealt with the
facts".
This principle does not apply to
the present case before the
court, because the decision of
the trial court was not based on
a findings of fact, nor did the
appellate court confirm a
findings of act by the trial
court.
The decision or judgment of the
court was an exercise of the
discretion of the trial judge,
which exercise was confirmed by
the Court of Appeal.
The criticism levelled against
the judgment was that the trial
judge was not fair in the
exercise of his discretion.
Article 296 of the Constitution
requires that the exercise of
discretionary power shall not be
arbitrary, capricious or biased,
but should be fair and candid.
I have found that the trial
judge in the exercise of his
discretion in awarding the
Plaintiff an amount of ¢8
million as his share of the
assets of the Minnesota
International School which had
been wound up, was not fair.
This court as the final
appellate court of the land, has
the jurisdiction to consider
whether the exercise of
discretion by the trial court
was arbitrary, fair or
capricious.
In the light of the foregoing, I
shall set aside the judgment of
the Court of Appeal and High
court.
I shall order that actual value
be put on all the assets of the
school up to the date of winding
up and same be shared equally
between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant. This can be done even
though the old structures have
been pulled down, because the
records of the school should be
available. Plaintiff is further
entitled to any profit that
accrued from the use of his half
share of the assets from the
date of winding up.
This also can be ascertained and
quantified.
S.G. BADDOO
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
ACQUAH, J.S.C.
I agree
G.K. ACQUAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
ATUGUBA, J.S.C.
I agree
W.A. ATUGUBA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
DR. TWUM, J.S.C.
I agree
DR. S. TWUM
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL
Mr. Kofi Addo for Appellant.
Mr. Francis Koffie for
Respondent.
gso*
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