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Practice and procedure – Appeal – Grounds of appeal – Appellant abandoning all grounds except one – Appellant may not raise abandoned grounds of appeal on further appeal – Court or tribunal to confine its judgment to the sole ground argued.

Practice and procedure – Appeal – Rehearing – Tribunal omitting to evaluate exhibit or resolve issue – Appellate tribunal may do so.

Practice and procedure – Appeal – Concurrent findings – Appellate tribunal not to disturb findings unless perverse.

Evidence – Admissibility – Objection – Technical objections to evidence in chieftaincy proceedings to be avoided – Chieftaincy tribunals fact finding bodies.

Evidence – Presumption – Judgment – Validity – Judgment on appeal presumed valid until upset by appellate court.

Evidence – Traditional evidence – Evaluation – Recent acts.

The appellant had lost the action in the Kumasi Traditional Council and appealed to the Kumasi Regional House of Chiefs and finally to the National House of Chiefs. At the hearing in the National House of Chiefs, the appellants abandoned all grounds of appeal except one, namely whether the 1st respondent was a royal. The National House of Chiefs found for the respondents and dismissed the appeal. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court and sought to argue the abandoned grounds.

Held: (1) The appellants having abandoned all other grounds of appeal the National House of Chiefs was entitled to confine its judgment to the ground argued. Except an objection to jurisdiction, which could be raised at any stage, it was not open to a court or tribunal to formulate an issue not raised for determination on appeal or for a party to argue grounds of appeal piecemeal, choosing whatever forum in the hierarchy of our courts in which to argue a particular ground of appeal. If by reason of the abandonment of a ground of appeal the court or tribunal did not address the issue it was not open on a further appeal for the appellant to raise the abandoned ground.

(2) It was an invariable practices of the Supreme Court that concurrent findings of fact, if not perverse, would not be disturbed. The judicial committee of the Kumasi Traditional Council having found the primary facts in which the Ashanti Regional and National Houses of Chiefs concurred and there being no allegation that the findings were perverse it was not open to the court to reverse the judgments.

(3) In fact-finding tribunals such as the judicial committee of the houses of chiefs, technical objections should be avoided, the primary concern being the reception and evaluation of factual evidence.

(4) If a court failed to evaluate an essential piece of evidence and therefore could not attach due weight to it, it could not be said that its judgment was not against the weight of the evidence on record. Consequently it became the duty of an appellate court to resolve the issue the better to ensure justice. It was trite law that appeals were by way of rehearing. Therefore where there was an issue for determination the appellate court was in as good a position to evaluate the evidence, give it due weight and come to its own conclusions regard always being paid and weight given to any sound conclusions of the trial court which alone had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. In the instant situation none of the tribunals adverted to the exhibit and the Supreme Court was in a very good position to evaluate the evidence and give it due weight, if necessary, and come to its own conclusion.

(5) In order to test the veracity of conflicting traditional histories by reference to recent acts the trier of fact must examine the rival traditional histories. If in the end the trier of fact preferred one traditional history to the other there should be no recourse to recent acts. It was only when the trier fact encountered difficulty over which history to believe that it must have recourse to recent acts, occurrences or incidents which corroborated the one or other history. Adjeibi Kojo v Bonsie, (1957) 3 WALR 257 referred to.

Case referred to:

Adjeibi Kojo v Bonsie (1957) 3 WALR 257, [1957] 1 WLR 1223, 101 SJ 972, PC.

APPEAL from the judgment of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs to the Supreme Court.

W A N Adumuah-Bossman for the appellants.

A Mmieh for the respondents.

HAYFRON-BENJAMIN JSC. This appeal comes to us by leave granted by Nananom of the chieftaincy committee of the National House of Chiefs. The appellants admit that they have consistently lost in all the hierarchy of the chieftaincy tribunals. But they contend in their statement of case that by their notice of appeal filed in this court, their said notice contains:

“4. Original grounds of appeal and a notice that additional grounds of appeal will be filed.”

They further contend that: “The proposed additional grounds are a better statement of the grounds which the appellants desire to urge in this court and they include but also go beyond the specific original grounds of appeal.” Thus apart from the 4 original grounds of appeal the appellants put forth before us no less than seven (7) additional grounds of appeal. Interest however arises in the proceedings before the National House of Chiefs. It is settled law that an appeal emanates from the judgment of the court or tribunal whose judgment is under attack. Such a judgment is presumed correct until it is upset by the appellate tribunal or court.

Before the National House of Chiefs learned counsel for the appellants stated categorically, and was so recorded by Nananom, that he abandoned all other grounds of appeal. Upon so abandoning all his other grounds of appeal Mr A K Mmieh, learned counsel for the respondents replied: “I agree that the most important issue is whether or not the 1st respondent is a royal.” The ground which learned counsel was arguing at the time when he abandoned all the other grounds of appeal was “whether the 1st respondent is of Agona clan to seek election. The appellants say he is Ekuona the respondents say he is an Agona.”

Having so narrowed the issue for determination to the “sole grounds of lineage” Nananom were in full grasp of the arguments advanced by counsel and the majority of them had no difficulty in finding for the respondents and dismissing the appeal. The National House of Chiefs gave three cogent reasons (citing as it were page and line) from the record of appeal in support of their judgment.

In our opinion the minority judgment exhibited a clear confusion of thought. In spite of the fact that counsel for the appellants had abandoned all his other grounds of appeal, the minority view was able to say that:

“The case has been fought on eligibility, and procedure and election at the tribunals of the traditional council and the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs and at both tribunals judgment has been given in favour of the respondents; “this has occasioned the appeal at this tribunal.”

Originally the grounds of appeal covered nomination, election, enstoolment and swearing of oath of allegiance to both Tafoman and Asantehene, but at this hearing counsel for appellants hinged himself to the issue of genealogy, ie whether the 1st respondent was of Agona clan to seek election. I see that this meant a combination of grounds 1 to 5 of the original grounds of appeal, but as there was no objection to such an approach, the appeal was heard on such lines. By this view the minority judgment acknowledged that there was only one issue for determination, ie whether the first respondent was a member of the royal Agona clan of Tafo and therefore entitled to

Certainly that was the only issue which the National House of Chiefs has to resolve. The minority judgment however had to overcome the hurdle contained in the clear finding on that issue by the judicial committee of the Kumasi Traditional Council which in its majority judgment wrote:

“Piecing the evidence of the plaintiffs together one would realise that Ampoma Dufa was never a maid-servant or grand-daughter of the Tafo stool. If therefore Ampoma Dufa was a royal of the Tafo stool then all her descendants are Tafo royals and are eligible to the stool.”

In the face of this clear finding and the statement in exhibit 1 which declared in an oath case that the respondents are “the royals of the Tafohene and they shall for even as they remain resident at Asoromaso be recognised as such” we can only conclude that the conclusions contained in the minority judgment were perverse.

As only one issue had been raised for determination, the appellants having abandoned all their other grounds of appeal, Nanaanom who formed the majority of the tribunal were entitled to confine their judgment to resolving the single issue so raised. It is not the business of a fact finding or indeed any court to formulate an issue which the parties or appellants have not raised and determine the case or appeal on that issue.

In the present situation the appellants abandoned all other grounds of appeal. An appeal court can only deal with the complaints of the appellant against the judgment appealed from. An appellant will therefore, except in a case of objection to jurisdiction which may be raised at any level of our judicial system, not be permitted to argue their grounds of appeal piecemeal choosing whatever forum in the hierarchy of our courts in which he may wish to argue a particular ground of appeal. If therefore by reason of the abandonment of a ground of appeal the tribunal or court does not address the issue it is not open on a further appeal for the appellant to raise the abandoned ground.

Before us the appellants have raised many grounds of appeal which they considered to “include but also go beyond the specific original grounds of appeal.” In view of their abandonment of all their other grounds of appeal before the National House of Chiefs it seems to us that only two issues stated in the statement of their case are relevant to a consideration of this appeal. Again the appellants rely on the principle enunciated in the case of Adjeibi Kojo v Bonsie (1957) 3 WALR 257, PC. The appellant in respect of this principle contend that “the traditional evidence, genealogical or otherwise, given by PW7 or indeed by any other witness has to be tested by reference to the contents of exhibit J”

(a) whether 1st respondent belongs to the Ekuona (or Asokore) clan and is therefor ineligible as a candidate to occupy the Agona clan stool of Tafo, Kumasi in succession to the late Tafohene Nana Boadu Kwadwo II who dies on 27 May 1986.

(b) whether, assuming that the 1st respondent belonged to the Agona clan, he is nevertheless not eligible to succeed the late Tafohene because as being Ekuona he is only an attached or affiliated member of the Tafo Agona royal family.”

In reply to the appellants statement of case the respondents stated in their case that there were in reality two issues for determination by us. In our view the first issue is like the issues stated in the appellants statement of case reproduced above, stated in double negatives. But the respondents’ second issue goes directly to the issue before us and is a clear repetition of the issue which both parties agreed to before the National House of Chiefs and it states:

“Whether the 1st respondent is a royal of Asonomaso/Tafo royal house and therefore eligible to mount the vacant Tafo stool.”

In objection to the whole appeal the respondents contended, as stated before, that three judgments have already been entered in their favour by the traditional tribunals and argued that “it is the established principle in appellate courts that where two concurrent judgments have made findings of fact on the evidence and on the credibility of witnesses an appellate court has no unfettered licence and unbridled discretion to disturb such judgments and to make its own findings contrary to the facts found in the concurrent judgments of the courts below.”

The respondents have stated the principle in rather strong language but the statement is generally correct. However, in view of the replication by the appellants to the respondents objection “that the concurrent findings made by the majority judicial committees are unwarranted and/or do not constitute reasonable inferences from the primary facts established by the evidence on record” we shall deal with that issue in the course of this opinion.

In support of their contention that the 1st respondent is not a royal of the Agona clan Tafo stool, the appellants invite us to consider the evidence of Charles Agyei Poku (PW7). Reading his evidence critically it is clear that he was a liar. On the record the judicial committee of the Kumasi Traditional Council noted:

“COURT NOTES: Committee to enquire from PW7 whether he comes from the Tafo Agona royal family and he replies in the negative.”

Charles Poku in furtherance of his design to denigrate the status of the 1st respondent was willing, contrary to the evidence, to call himself “efie nipa” (a domestic slave). When it was put to him that as a domestic it was not open to him to give evidence as to the genealogy of a family to which he did not belong, his feeble answer was that he objected to the statement that Yaa Afia Dwuma gave birth to Ponkwaa. He nevertheless admitted that he was not in a position to challenge anybody who asserted that Ponkwaa was a Tafo Agona royal.

Yet Yaa Konaku (DW3) the mother of 1st respondent when asked questions about Adwoa Fordjour the mother of Charles Agyei Poku (PW7) candidly replied:

Q. If Charles Poku claims that he is not eligible to the stool how do you reconcile with your evidence?

The majority judgment of the Kumasi Traditional Council evaluating the evidence of Charles Agyei Poku (PW7) said:

“The evidence of PW7 Charles Agyei Poku, cannot also be accepted in its entirety since he confirmed under oath that he neither belonged to the Agona royal family nor the family of 1st defendant. He admitted in evidence that he did not even know the genealogy of 1st defendant, the 1st respondent.

Important family history like this should be told by the members of the family and not by strangers or neophytes.”

We agree with the judicial committee that in our society when evidence of a persons genealogy or pedigree is to be offered such evidence should generally be given by members of the family or persons who have intimate knowledge of the family's genealogy and not by strangers. Charles Agyei Poku by his own evidence disabled himself from giving evidence on the issue of the genealogy of the 1st respondent. His evidence on this issue was therefore valueless.

Next the appellants place great reliance on exhibit J and contend that it proves that contrary to the traditional evidence offered by the 1st respondent and his mother (DW3) that the 1st respondent is not a member of the Tafo Agona royal family. Examining the judgments of both the Kumasi Traditional Council and the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs it is plain that Nananom did not evaluate the effect this exhibit would have had on their judgments. Indeed before Nananom of the National House of Chiefs the majority judgment made no reference to exhibit J and therefore did not evaluate the quality of the contents of that exhibit in relation to the issue at hand. The minority judgment though it referred to the exhibit did so within the context of an estoppel. In the view of learned counsel for the appellant had the several tribunals adverted their minds to the contents of this exhibit they would have given due weight to it and their conclusions might have been different.

Learned counsel appears to be on strong ground. If a court fails to evaluate an essential piece of evidence and therefore cannot attach due weight to it, it cannot be said that its judgment is not against the weight of the evidence on record. Consequently it becomes the duty of an appellate court to resolve the issue the better to ensure justice. It is trite law that appeals are by way of rehearing. Therefore where there is an issue for determination the appellate court is in as good a position to evaluate the evidence, give it due weight and come to its own conclusions regard always being paid and weight given to any sound conclusions of the trial court which alone has the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. In the instant situation none of the tribunals adverted their minds to the exhibit and we are in a very good position to evaluate that piece of evidence and give it due weight, if necessary, and come to our own conclusions. In which case the appellants will be entitled to the benefit of our contrary opinion if we so conclude.

A close examination of exhibit J shows that that document does not purport to say what the appellants say it is. There is uncontroverted evidence that Kwabena Nketia, Kwame Adu, Madam Adjoa Fordjour and Kwadwo Fordjour are all members of the royal Agona clan of Tafo. Consequently it was right that Kwame Adu should thumbprint this exhibit. Certain technical objections have been made by the respondents against its admissibility. This court has said times out of number that in fact-finding tribunals such as the judicial committee of the houses of chiefs technical objections should be avoided, the primary concern being the reception and evaluation of factual evidence.

The crucial question is who is this Yaw Kyei (head of Ekuona family) who thumbprinted as witness to the exhibit on the 15 November 1979? Is he the same as the Yaw Kyei in exhibit 1 who was party to the settlement dated the 16 February 1942 in which he was declared to be one of the “royals of the Tafohene, Kumasi”?

The evidence from the exhibits tendered and admitted in the case is that exhibit J was made in consequence of a dispute between Opanin Kwadwo Fordjour and Kofi Acheampong both members of the Agona family over the succession of the late Opanin Kwabena Nketia. There was a family meeting in the presence of witnesses at which Opanin Yaw Kyei presided. Exhibit J says this Opanin Yaw Kyei was the head of the (Ekuona family) yet the principal characters were acknowledged) members of the Agona clan and the issue was which of the two nephews was entitled to succeed. It sounds to us that a meeting like this to which witnesses (the public) are invited the proper thing to do is to invite an independent person to preside. The connection between the Agona royals and the Ekuonas of Asoromaso has been amply noted in the record.

But is the Yaw Kyei of 1979 the same Yaw Kyei of 1942, a period spanning 37 years? The cross-examination of Yaa Konadu (DW3) by the appellants and the committee reveals illuminating glimpses of who this Yaw Kyei of the Agona family was. For the sake of clarity they are set down here:

A. He was a senior member of the family and whenever there was a funeral in the family my name and his name were used to announce the funeral to the public.

A. Don't know my age. I had given birth to two children when Prempeh I returned form Seychelles.”

It is a matter of recent history that Prempeh I returned from Scychelles to the then Gold Coast in 1924, approximately 69 years at the time the witness was being cross-examined.

From the above cross-examination it is evident that even though Yaw Kyei was a brother, in Asante (Akan) sense a cousin, he was older enough than Madam Yaa Kunadu for her to call him “Uncle.” Therefore if Madam Yaw Kunadu, for the purposes of calculation was 22 years of age at the time of the arrival of Prempeh I from Seychelles and Yaw Kyei was about 10 years older then Madam Yaa Kunadu is presently about 92 years of age and Yaw Kyei if alive would be 102 years of age. Thus even for the purposes of the 1942 settlement Yaw Kyei would be 50 years old at the time.

Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that: “Yaw Kyei would never have committed himself to exhibit J which cut him off from the line of descent altogether.”

Learned counsel is correct. First the Yaw Kyei who witnessed that exhibit had no interest in the declarations which were made, he being of the Ekuona clan. That was the reason he was described as a witness. Second the Yaw Kyei of the Agona clan was in all probability dead at the time exhibit J was prepared in November, 1979.

1st respondent further contended that Charles Poku and Abusuapanin (1st appellant) had conspired to remove the name of her ancestress Ponkwaa from the family's geneological tree owing to a dispute about the ownership of a house. Thus in his statement of claim in the High Court, which was an exact copy of the geneological tree of Yaa Afia Dwuma, he had omitted to place Ponkwaa as one of his ancestresses. Besides Opanin Kwadwo Fordjour was able to say under oath without challenge that:

“Ampoma Dufa and Ponkwaa are the descendants of Afia Fofie and they all belong to the Agona royal family of Tafo. Kwaku Bour (1st plaintiff) is the descendant of Ponkwaah. The Asonomaso Agona members of family are the descendants of Ampoma Dufa.”

If indeed the 1st appellant is a descendant of Ponkwaa and it is not so stated in exhibit J then no reliance can be placed on it. The declarant and his sister Akua Tawiah were by that exhibit seeking to exclude Kofi Peprah and Kwadwo Fordjour children of Akua Taah and a daughter of Yaa Afia Dwuma from membership of the Agona family. Inferentially since the 1st respondent is the grandson of Akua Taah he was also not a member of the royal Agona family of Tafo.

No credible evidence was led to establish the nexus between the 1st respondent and the Yaw Kyei of the Ekuona clan even though on the face of exhibits F and G there were stated the names of several persons who could have been called to give evidence of that fact. Again Madam Yaa Kunadu insisted that family funeral announcements went out in the joint names of both Yaw Kyei and herself yet her name does not appear on the two exhibits. In all the circumstances we conclude that the Yaw Kyei mentioned in exhibit J is not the same person as the Yaw Kyei a member of the royal Agona family of Tafo.

The appellants rely on the principle enunciated in the case of Adjeibi Kojo v Bonsie supra and contend that the triers of fact, that is to say the judicial committee of the Kumasi Traditional Council should have considered the rival traditional histories of the parties bearing in mind the versions of Charles Agyei Poku (PW7) and the matters contained in exhibit J. In the view of learned counsel for the appellants their versions constituted the true position of the 1st respondent with respect to the royal Agona clan of the Tafo stool.

In the Adjeibi Kojo case supra Lord Denning giving the advice of the Board of the Privy Council dismissing the appeal noted:

“The dispute was all as to the traditional history which had been handed down by word of mouth from their forefathers. In this regard it must be recognised that, in the course of transmission from generation to generation, mistakes may occur without any dishonest motives whatever. Witnesses of the utmost veracity may speak honestly but erroneously as to what took place a hundred or more years ago. Where there is a conflict of traditional history, one side or the other must be mistaken, yet both may be honest in their beliefs. In such a case demeanour is little guide to the truth. The best way is to test the traditional history by reference to the facts in recent years as established by evidence and by seeing which of two competing histories is the most probable.”

In the present appeal we have rejected the evidence of Charles Agyei Poku (PW7) and seriously doubted the source and content of exhibit J. It seems to us therefore that learned counsel misunderstands the true import of Lord Denning’s dictum.

Certainly the trier of fact must examine the rival traditional histories. If in the end the trier of fact prefers one traditional history to the other the principle does not apply. It is only when the trier fact runs into difficulty as to which side to believe that in such a situation it is better to test the competing traditional histories by recourse to recent acts, occurrences or incidents which support the one or other case. In the instant appeal the judicial committee of the Kumasi Traditional Council came down firmly on the side of the 1st respondent as to his membership of the royal Agona clan Tafo stool and the principle in Adjeibi-Kojo did not apply.

Even if it was incumbent upon us to apply the Adjeibi Kojo principle, supra we are satisfied that the 1st respondent demonstrated enough recent acts of membership of the royal Agona clan of the Tafo stool as to earn him the verdict of the judicial committee of the Kumasi Traditional Council.

True, where an appellate court agrees with the finding of fact of a trial court it is not necessary that such findings be repeated in their judgment. In the present appeal a few examples will serve to illustrate the in-applicability of the Adjeibi Kojo principle. Nananom of the National House found:

(a) that the 1st plaintiff (1st appellant (acknowledged that the 1st defendant (1st respondent) and Yamoah belong to the same clan, Agona.

(b) Since Yamoah was the son of Ampoma Dufa on the basis of that evidence 1st respondent and Ampoma Dufa “hail from the same clan.”

(d) The shaving of Yaa Konadu's (DW3) hair in connection customary funeral rites to signify and establish her membership of the royal Agona Tafo stool on two occasions - that is on the death of Tafohene Nana Boadu Kwadwa and on the death of Tafohema, Nana Obaa.

(e) The pleadings in the High Court, Kumasi in the case entitled: Opanin Kwaku Buor & anor v Opanin Kwadwo Fordjour & anor reveal both parties belong to the same Agona clan of Tafo and Asoromaso and that Akua Taa the great grand-mother of the 1st respondent was a recognised member of the royal Agona clan of Tafo.

(f) The defendants in the High Court case admit that the 1st appellant is the head of the Agona clan of Tafo while he is the head of the same family resident at Asonomaso.

The respondents have urged on us an objection that the appellants having lost thrice in the hierarchy of the chieftaincy tribunal ought not to be heard in this court. The only matter which induced us not to accede to the objection as a preliminary ground was the replication that the findings of the lower courts were “unwarranted and/or do not constitute reasonable inferences from primary facts established by evidence on record.”

In our opinion the issue for determination was seriously narrowed by the appellants themselves and we are satisfied that the judicial committee of the Kumasi Traditional Council having found the primary facts in which the Ashanti Regional and National Houses of Chiefs concurred there being no allegation that the findings were perverse it was not open to this court to reverse the judgments. It is indeed the invariable practices of this court that concurrent findings of fact if they are not perverse will not be disturbed. In our view the factual matters raised in this case had been adequately resolved by the judicial committee of the Kumasi Traditional Council and the appellate traditional tribunals below. The appellants not having discharged the burden which they faced with three concurrent judgments against them, they could not be heard to re-agitate the same grounds before us.

In a last ditch attempt at salvaging their appeal the appellants raised the issue of the identity of the shadowy figure called “Obiyaa.” The appellants contended that if this shadowy figure was a man as contended by the 1st respondent and the 1st respondent admitted that he was descended from him then 1st respondent could not be a member of the royal Agona clan of Tafo. The identity of the shadowy figure called Obiyaa came into focus because of a reply given in the cross-examination of the 1st respondent which runs:

A. I and Opanin Kwabena Anin are related to the family of Obiyaa Attakora brother of Nana Ponko Baffour I, who migrated from Denkyira to Tafo, the first daughter of Obiyaa Attakora called Akosuo Adome became the first queenmother of Tafo. The 2nd and 3rd Tafo chiefs Tiamo Antwi and Frimpong Ahyia were all brothers of Ponko Baffour, first Tafo Chief. Sarfo Akonto was the first child of Akosua Adoma. The queenmother. I am directly connected with the family of Ponko Baffour I, Tromo Antwi, Frimpong Ahyia, Sarfo Akonto, Agyen Frimpong and Boadu Kwadwo I.”

The judgment of the majority of Nanaanom in the judicial committee did not address this issue. But the minority judgment seized upon it and concluded that if this Obiyaa Attakora was the father of Akosua Adoma who is the recognised ancestress of the 1st respondent then the 1st respondent is only related to the Tafo stool from the “paternal side.” The 1st respondent realising this error in interpreting from Asante-Twi into English for the purpose of perpetuating the evidence, filed a motion to correct the record and exhibited a document entitled: “Field Notes & Nana Boadu Kwadwo Tafohene of Kumasi Traditional Area age 69 years” the subject-matter was “Tafo stool history.” The motion was opposed and Nananom reserved their ruling. In the majority judgment reference was made to this motion but Nananom did not resolve it. The National House of chiefs did not address itself on this issue because the appellants abandoned this ground of appeal which in their original ground of appeal was stated in (ii).

We think that we are in a good position to resolve this issue since the relevant evidence is on record. The exhibit under consideration marked PB for the record was compiled by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon in July 1982. The person interviewed was Nana Boadu Kwadwo, the acknowledged Tafohene. There is evidence on record that Nana Boadu Kwadwo died in 1986, two years before the present litigation commenced. Indeed it was the dispute about the succession to Nana Boadu Kwadwo which provoked this litigation.

We have examined the exhibit and we are satisfied that as evidence of the declarant’s geneology or pedigree the document satisfies the requirements of section 128 of the Evidence Decree 1975 (NRCD 323). Accordingly we accept the statement in exhibit PB that: “Among these was the chief of the Agona clan Ponko Baafo, his sister Obiyaa Attakora, and her daughter Akua Adoma.” In our respectful opinion Obiyaa Attakora was a woman and the sister of Ponko Baafo.

In this litigation the appellants set out on a mischievous design to cause confusion and destabilise Tafoman. They knew at all material times to this litigation that the 1st respondent was a royal of the Tafo stool and has in fact been sworn in as Tafohene. In cross-examination of the 1st respondent by the appellants the 1st respondent said:

“Q . You remember you have been substituted in a case on appeal at the Ashanti Region House of Chiefs in the matter between Nana Tafohene and a royal from Adwumam?

If the appellants knew that he was not a royal of the Tafo stool nor a chief why did they substitute the 1st respondent for the deceased chief Nana Boadu Kwadwo? This court while it will accede to genuine grievances in chieftaincy matters will strike down on vengeful men and mischief-makers in chieftaincy matters and will not permit such men to abuse the processes of the courts and tribunals. They will be mulcted in heavy costs. The appeal is dismissed.

Owusu and another v Anane and others [1994 - 95] 2 G B R 716 – 734 SC

SUPREME COURT

Sgd BAMFORD-ADDO JSC

S Kwami Tetteh, Legal Practitioner