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HOME    UNREPORTED CASES OF THE SUPREME

                                    COURT OF GHANA 2002

 

 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

SUPREME COURT

ACCRA

_______________________________________

CORAM:     MRS BAMFORD-ADDO, J.S.C. (PRESIDING)

KPEGAH, J.S.C.

ADJABENG, J.S.C.

ATUGUBA, J.S.C.

AFREH, J.S.C.

CA NO. 12/2000

24TH JULY, 2002

P.S. INTERNATIONAL LIMITED   )            ..    PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

PER DR. A.Q.A. ARCHAMPONG   )

LAWFUL ATTORNEY ETC.           )

VRS.

GODKA GROUP OF COMPANIES             ..     DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/APPELLANT

 

_______________________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

AFREH, J.S.C.:

This is an Appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 15th April, 1999 dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the High Court dated 17th May, 1995.

The appellant relied on and argued eight grounds of appeal. But they can reduced to three main grounds:

(i) That the judgments of the High Court and the Court of Appeal were null and void because they were delivered after the statutory periods within which they should have been given.

(ii) That the Court of Appeal erred in treating as evidence two invoices attached to the statement of claim.

(iii) That the Court of Appeal erred in holding that lawyer Archampong had capacity to institute proceedings on behalf of the plaintiffs as plaintiffs’ attorney.

The claim of the plaintiff (plaintiffs) was for

(a) The sum of USD 50,733.90 being balance of debt due and owing by the defendants to the plaintiff in respect of two separate merchantile transactions.

(b) Interest on the said amount at commercial or bank rate with effect from 1st January, 1988 to the date of judgment.

The defendants also counter-claimed from the plaintiffs rent at the rate of ¢25,000.00 per year from 31st October, 1987.

According to the plaintiffs, who were a firm of international traders in the U.S.A., on 2nd September, 1987 they conveyed and sold to the defendants by sea freight, a consignment of 38,491 pairs of used olive green shorts at the price of USD 1.20 a pair, 25 pairs of soccer boots at USD 1.00 a pair, bringing the total price of the goods to USD 46,214.20. Also, on 5th October 1989, they sold and conveyed to the defendants, 1280 cartons of sundry biscuits valued at USD 15,208. As at the time plaintiffs instituted the instant action the defendants had paid USD 20,088 of the total value of the goods and later USD 4,000.

The Defendants did not dispute the plaintiffs’ claim relating to the second consignment of goods, but they contended the first consignment of used olive green shorts was not sold to them but sent to them on sell-or-return basis and therefore they remain the property of the plaintiffs and were being kept in the defendants’ warehouse at ¢25,000 per year. The main issue between the parties was, therefore, whether the first consignment of goods was sold to the defendants or not; that is whether or not the goods, the subject-matter of the claim were sold to the defendants outright or sold to them on sell-or-return basis.

In their first ground of appeal the defendants contend that the court of Appeal erred in holding that the provisions of Order 63 Rule 2A of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1954 (L.N. 140A) as amended by L.I 1107 are purely administrative (or directory) and its infringement by a Court will not render a judgment null and void. They also contend, that the judgment of the Court of Appeal is null and void, having been given on 15th April, 1999 a few days after eight weeks after close of case contrary to Rule 33 sub-rules 1 and 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997, C.I. 19.

The two grounds of appeal are considered together because they raise the same issues.

Order 63 r. 2A of L.N. 140A provides:

“2A (1) At the close of a case before it the Court shall fix a date, which shall be not later than six weeks after the close of that case, for the delivery of judgment therein.

(2) It shall be the duty of the Court to deliver judgment as soon as possible after the close of each case before it, and in any event not later than six weeks after the close of any such case.

(3) For the purposes of this rule a case shall be deemed to be closed when the evidence has been given to the Court and the speeches subsequent thereto have been concluded.

(4) The times of the vacations in any year shall not be reckoned in the computation of the period of six weeks referred to in this rule.

(5) Where for any reason judgment has not been delivered within the period of six weeks referred to in this rule, the Court shall forthwith inform the Chief Justice in writing of that fact and shall state the reasons for the delay in so delivering judgment and the date upon which it is proposed to deliver judgment.

(6) Where judgment has not been delivered within the period of six weeks referred to in this rule, any party to the proceedings may in writing notify the Chief Justice of that fact and request that a date be fixed for the delivery of judgment.

(7) Upon receiving a notification from the Court or a party under paragraph (5) or (6) the Chief Justice may fix a date for the delivery of judgment by the Court and notify the Court accordingly, and it shall be the duty of such Court to ensure that judgment is delivered upon the date so fixed by the Chief Justice”.

In the recent case of THE REPUBLIC Versus JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL REGION HOUSE OF CHIEFS:  EX-PARTE SUPI MARK AABA and ORS, S.C., CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1/99 dated 25TH JULY, 2000, unreported, this Court unanimously held that the provisions of Order 63 Rule 2A are mandatory, not administrative or directory and any judgment given on contravention of it is null and void. 

However, in the Republic vrs. The High Court, Accra, Ex Parte Expandable Polysterene Products Limited decided this morning the Court held that in view of Article 157(3) of the constitution, 1992 to which the Court’s attention was not drawn in Ex-Parte: Supi Mark Aaba, a judge of a Superior Court who has heard a case to its conclusion cannot withdraw from it or become functus functio until he has delivered judgment; and therefore a judgment delivered by him more than six weeks after close of the case is not null and void.

Applying this decision to the instance case this ground of appeal must be dismissed.

However, we want to make a few comments on the lengthy and learned submissions of counsel for defendants before us, we must begin by deploring the approach counsel adopted. He quoted only two of the seven sub-rules of Order 63 rule 2A and, basing his arguments on these two sub-rules alone, proceeded to submit that the rule prescribes mandatory requirements which render any judgment of the High Court delivered more than six weeks after the close of a case null and void. We cannot fathom his motives for this approach but whatever they were such an approach to statutory interpretation is improper and should be discouraged. The proper thing is to consider the whole of the provision to be interpreted in its context.

The question whether a statutory provision imposes mandatory or directory requirements arises where, because of deficient drafting, the statute uses words of command without saying what should happen in case of non-compliance. In spite of the deficiency or hiatus the Court, charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provision, must ascertain what consequence the legislature intended should follow from a failure to comply with the requirement. It seems there is no universal rule for determining whether a provision is mandatory or directory. See Lord Campbell L.C. in Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner (1860) 2GeG.F. and J502 at pp 507, 508 and Lord Penzance in Howard v. Bodington (1877) 2 P.D. 203, at p.211.

However, there are some opinions, which seem to indicate a broad approach the Court may apply in dealing with such statutory provisions.  Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition states at page 314:

“In some cases, the conditions or forms prescribed by the statute have been regarded as essential to the act or thing regulated by it, and their omission has been held fatal to its validity. In others, such prescriptions have been considered as merely directory, the neglect of them involving nothing more than liability to a penalty, if any were imposed, for breach of the enactment”.

In the case of Montreal Street Rly Co. vrs. Normandin [1917] A.C. 170 at 174 (P.C.) Sir Arthur Channell said:

“When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in respect of this duty would work serious inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main objective of the legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisos to be directory only, the neglect of them though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done”.

These words are very apt. 

We agree with the view of Foster, J.A. in the court below that:

“……(L)itigation as it was at the present is already expensive enough. To construe the local rules (Ord. 63 r.2A) in conformity with counsel’s submission and declare null and void a whole judgment obtained after years of litigation would be most unjust and unfair to the parties, who have no control over the delivery of judgments by the Courts.  The parties would thereby be punished for the indolence and neglect of judicial officers but the real culprits pay no price.”

We also agree with the Court of Appeal, per the late Foster, J.A., that the disciplinary power of the Chief Justice over offending judges is deterring enough to keep the judges on their toes.  Ordinarily the Chief Justice has no power to interfere with the exercise by a judge of his judicial powers during a trial, including when to deliver judgment. Thus in Mahama v. Soli [1976] 1GLR 96, Edward Wiredu, J, (as he then was) refused an order of the Chief Justice not to read a judgment he was about to deliver. But a judge who fails to deliver judgment within six weeks after the close of a case may suffer the humiliation of being ordered to deliver judgment on or by a date fixed by the Chief Justice.

Indeed the construction urged upon us by counsel for the appellants offends against a rule of interpretation that “when there is a choice of meanings there is a presumption that one which produces an absurd, unjust or inconvenient result was not intended…..” — Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Ed. Pp 16-17.  In s.314 of his code, Benion in his Statutory Interpretation 2nd Edition at page 686 states that:

“The court seeks to avoid a construction that causes unjustifiable inconvenience to persons who are subject to the enactment, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament.  Sometimes however there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example where it appears that Parliament intended it or the literal meaning is too strong”.

We do not think there is any overriding reason for applying such a construction to Order 63 rule 2A.

As the learned author also says this is an area where consequential construction is applied.

“If the Court were to hold the most trivial breach of an apparently absolute requirement as vitiating the relevant transaction, the consequences would after be out of all proportion to the lapse”.

In all the arguments on Order 63 rule 2A one rule or provision seems to have been ignored and that is that under Order 70 of L.N. 140A failure to comply with the Civil Procedure rules (L.N. 140A) does not nullity proceedings, but should be treated as an irregularity. While such irregular proceedings may be set aside they are not vitiated ab initio. Since Order 63 Rule 2A is only  a rule of procedure non-compliance with it should not necessarily vitiate proceedings.

For all these reasons the first main ground must be dismissed.

Another ground of appeal is that the Court of Appeal erred in treating Invoice No. 7169 of 2nd September, 1987 and Invoice No. 739 of 15th October, 1987 respectively as evidence when (a) they were attached to the Statement of Claim and equally wrongfully marked as “exhibits” PSIL (a) and (b) respectively, contrary to the rules on pleading; (b) they were never formally tendered in evidence as required by the Evidence Decree and Civil Procedure Rules; and (c) the Court of Appeal ignored the substantial legal arguments against this type of procedure without giving any reasons but accepted the documents as evidence.

There is much merit in this ground. It has become a practice among some lawyers in this country to attach documents to pleadings and mark them as exhibits, as was done in this case. This is wrong. It is an attempt to adduce evidence through the pleadings but this is not allowed by Ord.19 r. 4 of L.N. 140A.  Judicial evidence must be given by witnesses who before they testify must take an oath or affirmation that they will speak the truth.  Statements made without such oath or affirmation are not to be considered evidence:  See s.61 of the Evidence Decree (NRCD 323). An exception to this rule is to be found in s.62 (2) of the Courts Act, 1993, (Act 459) which allows unsworn evidence to be given by a person whose religious belief does not permit him to take any oath whatsoever or who is of immature age. Another exception is s.63 of NRCD 323, which allows the accused in a criminal trial to make an unsworn statement.  Evidence may also be given by affidavit if the rules permit, such as in an action commenced by originating summons or evidence contained in an affidavit in support of or in opposition to a motion or summons. The attachment of a document to a pleading and marked “exhibit” does not fall into any of these exceptions to the general rule in s.61 of NRCD 323.  

The Court of Appeal therefore erred when it referred to the two documents attached to the statement of claim as evidence. They should have been excluded from the evidence by the Court of Appeal and should be excluded from evidence before this Court.

But even without these two documents marked Exhibits PSIL (a) and PSIL (b) there is ample evidence on which the Court of Appeal could and did rely, and on which this Court can rely, to come to the determination that there was a sale of the goods the subject-matter of the appeal before us.

The document wrongly marked as Exhibit PSIL (a) is the same as Exhibit 2, which was tendered in evidence by the defendant.  It is an invoice showing that the Plaintiffs shipped the goods to the Defendants whose Managing Director was one Godwin K. Anagbo and who gave evidence as the Defendants representative, as per Invoice No. 7169 dated September 2, 1987.

According to this document the consignment consisted of (a) 38,491 pairs of used Green Olive Green Ladies Shorts at S1.20 per unit for a total sum of US$46,189; and 25 pairs of used soccer boots at $1.00 a unit for a total sum of $25.00.  The Grand Total of the price of the consignment came to US$46,214.

The Bill of Lading shows Godwin Anagbo, Godka Group of Companies, as Consignee and Paul Penu as the notifying party. It also shows that the goods were shipped in a 20 feet container No. CTIU 321373-5 Seal No. 0002008 and contained 141 Bales and 1 Box of Used Wearing Apparel (Ladies Shorts)

Exhibit 2 is clear evidence of the sale of used olive green ladies shorts by the Plaintiffs to the defendants. Apart from this, the defendants representative and its Managing Director himself, in his evidence testified that he received a consignment of used clothing, biscuits and some green “shorts” from the plaintiffs. He said the defendants bought the used clothing and biscuits but as regards the green shorts his duty was to clear the goods and keep them in the warehouse for Penu.

In their statement of defence the defendants also denied that the olive green ladies shorts were sold to them. According to them it was agreed that the ladies shorts be shipped to their address for details of distribution; when the shorts arrived in Ghana the European manager of the Plaintiffs to Ghana and it was agreed the Defendants should try to sell or return the goods. 

From all these pieces of evidence one thing is clear:  the Defendants received from the plaintiffs a consignment of used clothing, biscuits and used olive green ladies shorts. It is also not in dispute that the used clothing and biscuits were sold to the Defendants. The only real issue between the parties is whether the used olive green ladies shorts were sent to the Defendants on a sale – or return basis.

Both the trial High Court Judge and the Court of Appeal had no difficulty in concluding that the shorts were sold to the Defendants and not sent to them on a sale-or-return basis. We agree with them.  As the trial judge said, if the goods were not sold to the Defendants or if they were rejected how did it come about that they made part payment for their value?  For payment for the goods is inconsistent with the Defendants’ assertion that the goods were rejected by them. Also the Defendant’s failed to demonstrate by way of adduced evidence that they rejected the goods upon delivery to them.

The Court of Appeal on its part, also considered  two messages from Defendants to the Plaintiffs and came to the conclusion that “there is no indication in these messages that the appellants (Defendants) were mere warehousemen and that the goods were meant to be stocked and be sold by Mr. Penu the agent of the respondents (plaintiffs).” The court concluded the appellants imported and took delivery of the goods as purchasers and not as warehousemen.

We think there was ample evidence to support and justify the conclusions the courts below came to. There is nothing in the lengthy arguments of counsel for the appellants which will justify our interfering in any way with those conclusions. This ground too should also be dismissed. 

The Defendants have vigorously challenged the validity of the appointment of Dr. A.Q.A. Archampong as the attorney for the plaintiffs. They contend that the Court of Appeal erred in its view that Brower (Vice President, Finance) of P.S. International Limited acting alone could under the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) grant a power of attorney to anybody in Ghana to sue on behalf of P.S. International Limited thereby misinterpreting section 137(1) of the Companies Code, 1963 which it held was the applicable law.

Basing his arguments on Sections 137(1) of the Companies Code (Act 179) and Regulation 77(1) of the Second Schedule to Act 179 Part I Table A – Regulations for a Private Company Limited by Shares, counsel for the Defendants has submitted that in Ghana for a company to grant a power of attorney to somebody to act on its behalf, it must be either through a resolution of the board of directors, or members at a general meeting.  A fortiori before a person can initiate legal proceedings as the lawful attorney of a company in Ghana he must have been so appointed either at a general meeting, or by the company acting through its board of directors.  In both situations a resolution is required.

With respect, the statement that in both situations a resolution is required is not correct. It is not supported by the texts of section 137(1) of Act 179 and Regulation 77(1) of Table A part I of the Second Schedule to Act 179 or any reasonable interpretation of them or the general principles of Ghana Company law.  Section 137 of Act 179 provides:—

“A company shall act through its members in general meeting or its board of directors or through officers or agents appointed by, or under authority derived from the members in general meeting or the board of directors.”

This provision codifies an established rule that a company, being an artificial person, must act through human agents. S. 137 of Act 179 is mainly concerned with the division of powers between the general meeting and the board of directors. It says nothing about the mode of appointment of the organs of the company and its officers and agents.

Regulation 77(1) of Table A Part I also provides:

“The board of directors may from time to time appoint officers and agents of the company and may appoint any body corporate, firm, or body of persons, whether nominated directly or indirectly, by the board of directors, to be the attorney or attorneys of the company for such purposes and with such powers, authorities and discretions, not exceeding those vested in or exercisable by the directors under these regulations, and for such period and subject to such conditions as they may think fit”.

The clear intendment of this provision is to vest the power to appoint officers and agents of the company in the board of directors (rather than the general meeting). It does not specify the mode of appointment. It does not say, and there is nothing in it which will justify the interpretation, that for any such appointment to be valid a resolution of the board must be produced or it must be proved that the board passed a resolution to appoint the agent.

Under s.144 of Act 179 a company may make a contract in the same way as an individual may.  If the law requires that a contract made between individuals ought to be in writing under seal or should be in writing or evidenced in writing signed by the parties, a company will be bound to contract in the same way. If a contract between individuals can be made by parole only so can a contract by a company. In other words a company may make a contract with no more formality than is required in the case of an individual.

In any case a person contracting with a company is not required to demand the production of a resolution authorizing the board, the general meeting, an officer or agent of the company, as the case may be, to enter into the contract.  It has been established since the case of the Royal British Bank v. Turquand (1856) 6 E and B 327; [1843-60] All E.R. Rep. 435 [Exchequer Chamber] that a person dealing with a company is entitled to assume, in the absence of facts putting him on notice or inquiry, that there has been due compliance with all matters of internal management and procedure required by the Regulations of the company.  This is the Rule in Turquand’s case or the “Indoor Management” Rule. This rule is codified by our Companies Code, Act 179, in sections 139 to 143. Under s.142 (2), if the company has held out some one as its agent it is estopped from denying the appointment; and a de jure or de facto officer of the company can be assumed to have the usual powers and duties of that sort of officer.

Section 142(2) is also in accordance with normal agency principles. Where a person enters into a contract with an officer or agent of a company who has apparent or ostensible authority of the company to enter into the contract on its behalf it will be estopped from denying the authority of the officer or agent. Since the case of Freeman and Lockeyer v Buckhust Part Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 Q.B. 480]  [1964] 1 All E.R. 630 (C.A.)  The courts have preferred to deal with such cases according to agency principles rather than in accordance with the Rule in Turquand’s Case. In the Freeman and Lockeyer Case (supra) Diplock, L.J. (as he then was) defined apparent or ostensible authority as follows:

“An “apparent” or “ostensible” authority……….is a legal relationship between the principal and the contractor created by a representation made by the principal to the contractor, intended to be and in fact acted upon by the contractor that the agent has authority to enter on behalf of the principal into a contract of a kind within the scope of the “apparent” authority, so as to render the principal liable to perform any obligations imposed upon him by such contract.”  [1964] 2QB at p. 503.

In Hely – Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 Q.B. 549; [1967] 3 All E.R. 98 (C.A.) Lord Denning, M.R., defined it tersely as follows:

“Ostensible or apparent authority is the authority of an agent as it appears to others”

[1968] 1 Q.B. at 583.

Applying all these principles to the instant case, we have no doubt that Dr. Archampong’s appointment as the attorney of the plaintiffs was proper and valid. He was engaged by a representative of the plaintiffs, one Paul Penu, who had been asked by the plaintiffs to engage a lawyer to handle the Plaintiffs’ claims against three Ghanaian companies. Penu gave him documents from P.S. International Limited, the plaintiffs, dated 13th December, 1988. Among the three debtor companies were the defendants. When he agreed to act for the plaintiffs he was given the power of attorney. 

The power of attorney reads as follows:

“POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT I, JOSEPH N. BROWER, being the VICE PRESIDENT (FINANCE) OF P.S. INTERNATIONAL LIMITED specializing in International Trading, with registered place of business at 8910, Purdus Road, Suite 260, Indianapolis, Indiana, in the United State of America, 46268 DO HEREBY APPOINT and constitute DR. ALFRED QUAO-ASHONG ARCHAMPONG, Barrister-at-Law, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Ghana and Notary Public, of JOY CHAMBERS, D.896/3, Selwyn Market Street, Accra, Ghana, an ATTORNEY of P.S. International with General Powers and specifically to employ all legal process to recover debts due and owing to P.S. International by :-

(a) Godka Group of Companies

(b) ……………………………………….

(c) ……………………………………….

(d) ……………………………………….

And to do all manner of things lawfully for the full realization of purposes for which the power herein is granted.”

It was signed, sealed and delivered by Joseph N. Brower on behalf of P.S. International Limited in the presence of one Peter Tay. It was similarly signed, sealed and delivered by Dr. Archampong in the presence of Peter Tay. It was notarized.

The power of Attorney complied with the common law rules relating to the making of a power of attorney which is the applicable law in this aspect of powers of attorney in this country: See Da Rocha and Lodo Practical Draftsman Chapter 28 pages 319-325.

It is clear from the document that Brower was (1) a Vice-President of the plaintiff company.  (2) He signed, sealed and delivered the document for and on behalf of the plaintiff company – and not in his personal capacity. (3) From the evidence on record he had been sent to Ghana by the plaintiff company to pursue the debts. While here he held discussions with the defendants who unsuccessfully tried to persuade him to do something about the price. It was while he was in Ghana that the power of attorney was given to Dr. Archampong.

In our opinion Brower had apparent or ostensible authority on behalf of the plaintiff's company to appoint Dr. Archampong as the plaintiff’s attorney. Even if he had no actual authority to do so there was nothing to put Dr. Archampong on inquiry about his lack of authority. Dr. Archampong was viz-a-viz P.S. International Limited an outsider, in the sense that he had no actual knowledge of Brower’s lack of authority; nor in a position or relationship to the company from which he ought to have known that he had no authority to give the power of attorney – See proviso (a) to Section 142 (d) of Act 179.

In terms of the Power of Attorney granted to him by the Plaintiff he had authority to institute the proceeding against the defendants. We do not see anything wrong with the endorsement that should vitiate the proceedings.

The appeal should be dismissed.

D.K. AFREH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

KPEGAH, J.S.C.:

In view of my position in the case of the Republic v. High Court, Ex-Parte Expandable Polythrene Products Limited Civil Motion 21/2002/ dated 24th July, 2001.  I will go along with my colleagues that the appeal be dismissed.

F. Y. KPEGAH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

BAMFORD-ADDO (MRS), J.S.C.:

I agree.

J.A. BAMFORD-ADDO (MRS)

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

ADJABENG, J.S.C.:

I agree.

E.D.K. ADJABENG

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

ATUGUBA, J.S.C.:

I agree.

W.A. ATUGUBA

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

COUNSEL

Dr. A.Q.A. Archampong for Respondent.

Mr. Djabanor for the Appellant.

 
 

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