West African Court of
Appeal-Rules
10 and ll-Different times
within which Application for
leave to Appeal may be
Entertained Interpretation.
The fact that a party may apply
to the Court of Appeal for leave
to appeal at any time within six
months from the date of the
judgment does not mean that he
must allege any special reason
for his failure to obtain leave
from the Court below within the
three months allowed by Rule 10.
C. ].
Kempson
for Plaintiffs.
S. J. S. Barlatt
for Defendant.
The following judgments were
delivered :-
DEANE, c.J. THE GOLD COAST
COLONY.
This is an application for leave
to appeal to the Court from a
final judgment delivered by Tew
C.J. on the 5th of March,
1931. As the date of application
is the 4th of September, 1931,
it will be seen that it has been
made within six months of the
date of judgment.
The rules limiting the time
within which application for
leave to appeal must be made are
10 and 11 of the Rules of the
West African Court of Appeal.
Rule 10 reads: "After three
months from the date of a final
judgment or decision application
for leave to appeal shall not be
entertained by the Court below,"
and rule 11 reads: "After six
months from the date of final
judgment or decision application
for leave to appeal shall not be
entertained by the Court,"
meaning the West African Court
of Appeal. The time therefore
within which an application for
leave must be made differs
accordingly as the application
is made to the Court below or to
this Court, and the argument has
been founded on this difference
that inasmuch as no good purpose
can be shown for making the
distinction between the two
Courts it must be taken that the
Legislature meant that if a
litigant failed within three
months to get leave from the
Court below he should only be
entitled to get leave, if he got
it, from this Court, and it was
fair, therefore, to suppose that
the' Court would only grant such
leave in special cases.
This argument ignores, it seems
to me, the plain meaning of the
language used which allows of
applications being made to this
Court at any time within six
months, and in no wise
distinguishes between such an
application if made within three
months and one made after that
time if made within six months,
and draws no distinction between
the kind of leave to be granted
by the two Courts. If the
Legislature had in fact intended
that the West African Court of
Appeal should deal only with
applications for special leave
to appeal, it would, it seem" to
me, have said so and the word"
special" would have been
inserted before the words "leave
to appeal" in rule 11. The
argument, moreover, is not well
founded inasmuch as it leaves
out of account section 3 of
Ordinance No.9 of 1929 (as
amended by section 3 of
Ordinance No. 29 of 1929), which
does supply a good reason for
the distinction made between the
two Courts. The section as
amended reads " subject to the
provisions of the next section
an appeal shall lie to the Court
of Appeal-
"(a)
From all final judgments and
decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Circuit Court (I) given
in respect of a claim exceeding
the sum of fifty pounds or (II)
determining directly or
indirectly a claim or question
respecting money goods or other
property of any civil right or
other matters above the amount
or value of fifty pounds, and by
leave of the Judge making the
order but not otherwise from all
interlocutory orders or
decisions made in the course of
any suit or matter. Provided
Always that no appeal shall lie
except by leave of the Court
making the Order
(a)
from an Order as to costs only
or
(b)
from an Order made by consent of
parties. "
From this it appears that
applications for leave to appal
in matters mentioned in this
proviso can only be made to the
Court below which dealt with the
matter, and it is clear that the
limitation period for such
applications is fixed at three
months because it is desirable
that such an application should
be made at an early date when
the matter is still fresh in the
mind of the Judge so that he may
deal with it adequately and not
after the lapse of a period
which would probably impair his
ability to decide whether or no
it was a case where he should
grant special leave.
The argument, therefore, that
this Court should only grant
leave as an indulgence fails and
the applicant i~> in my opinion
entitled to be granted
Conditional Leave to appeal,
provided that he brings his case
within the terms of section 3
sub-sectio.1:3 (1) and (11) of
Ordinance No.9 of 1929. On the
affidavit, however, that has
been filed by him in support of
his application, I can find no
unequivocal statement showing
either that the decision has
been given (1) in respect of a
claim exceeding the sum of fifty
pounds or (2) determining
directly or indirectly a claim
or question respecting money
goods or other property or any
civil right or other matters
above the amount or value of
fifty pounds. At the most it may
be said that the affidavit might
-raise an assumption that the
value of the land, the subject
matter of the decision, is above
the value of fifty pounds, but a
mere suggestion in my opinion is
not enough and the necessary
fact must be clearly shown
before the