Property - Ownership -
Possession of - Auction sale -
Validity - Writ of Fi.fa -
Attachment of the property. -
Terms of settlement - Whether
there were breaches of the
auction laws or not - Whether or
not the judgment debtor had no
title to the property - Whether
the whole exercise was void and
illegal and in law -
HEADNOTES
In 1995,
the 3rd defendant, a
German pharmaceutical company,
through its lawyer, brought an
action in the High Court, Accra
against Bikkai Laboratories Ltd,
a sister company,The action was
to recover certain sums of money
owed for pharmaceutical products
supplied on credit to Bikkai
Laboratories Ltd., judgment was
entered in favour of 3rd
defendant. Upon application by 3rd
defendant the Registrar of the
High Court, Accra sealed a writ
of fi.fa dated 24th
May, 1995 for the attachment of
the property in dispute to be
sold in satisfaction of the
judgment. More than one year
after the fi.fa was issued the
Registrar wrote to the 2nd
defendant by letter dated 28th
May, 1997, appointing him as the
auctioneer to sell the property.
About the same time 2nd
defendant published notice of
the auction in the 6th
June, 1996 edition of ‘The
Pioneer’ newspaper in Kumasi.
About the same time 2nd
defendant published notice of
the auction in the 6th
June, 1996 edition of ‘The
Pioneer’ newspaper in Kumasi.
The Registrar therefore wrote to
2nd defendant dated 5th
June, 1996 requesting him to
suspend the sale because a
Notice of Claim had been filed.
The Notice of Claim in which 1st
defendant claimed ownership of
the property as against Bikkai
Laboratories Ltd3rd
defendant then decided to
change its lawyer and engaged
the law firm to act for it.
Hesse and Larsey immediately
conducted a search in the
Registry of the High Court,
Accra and it was detected that
the writ of fi.fa had expired at
the time of the attachment of
the property. Thereafter the new
lawyers of 3rd
defendant decided to settle
their differences with 1st
defendant and Bikkai
Laboratories Ltd by entering
into an agreement for the sale
of the property by private
treaty dated 15th
August, 1998. The 1st
and 3rd defendants
also filed terms of settlement
.HELD
-
The judgment debtor had no title
or interest whatsoever in the
property put up for sale by
auction so 5th defendant bought
nothing. On the other hand, when
plaintiff was contacted to buy
the property he took all the
requisite precautions before
purchasing and paying for it.
The money he paid was used to
satisfy the judgment debt and 3rd
defendant gave a receipt to that
effect. The purported auction
sale did not in any way affect
the title of 1st
defendant in the property so
plaintiff acquired the legal
title to the property
unencumbered. As has been
explained above, the
relationship between 1st
defendant and Bikkai
Laboratories Ltd in their
dealings with 3rd
defendant regarding the property
could not have influenced 5th
defendant’s decision to purchase
at the auction. Consequently no
fraud was perpetuated against 5th
defendant on account of the
separate corporate personalities
of 1st defendant and
Bikkai Laborarories Ltd to
warrant a piercing of the
corporate veil. For the reasons
stated above, we allow both
appeals. We set aside the
judgment of the Court of Appeal
and restore the judgment of the
High Court. The money paid by 5th
defendant is to be refunded to
it.
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
High Court ( Civil Procedure )
Rules 1954 LN 140A
Conveyancing Act, 1973, (NRCD
175)
Mortgages
Act, 1972 (NRCD 96)
Sale of
Goods Act, 1963 (Act 137)
Lands
Registry Act 1962 (Act 122).
Sarpong v
Atta Yaw and Anor [1964] GLR
419, SC
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Nkrumah V
Ataa [1972] 2 GLR 13
Tuakwa V
Bosom [2001-2002] SCGLR 61.
Azinogo v
W E Augustt [1989-90] 2 GLR 278
Amoako V
Hansen [1987-88] 2 GLR 26.
Ofori v
Lartey [1978] 1 GLR 490
Donkoh v
Nkrumah [1964] GLR 739 S C.
Chandirams v Ghana Commercial
Bank [1960] GLR 178,
Afari v
Nyame [1961] GLR 599,
Kuma v
Hima[1977] 1 GLR 204
Hammond v
Lamptey[1987-88]1 GLR 327
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
PWAMANG,
JSC.
COUNSEL
KWABENA ASANTE KROBEA ESQ. FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/1ST
RESPONDENT/ APPELLANT
STEPHEN OPPONG ESQ. FOR THE 1ST
DEFENDANT /2ND
RESPONDENT/ APPELLANT.
THADDDEUS SORY ESQ. WITH HIM SEAN
POKU FOR THE 5TH
DEFENDANT/ APPELLANT/RESPONDENT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PWAMANG, JSC.
By a
certificate of Purchase issued
by the High Court Registrar,
Accra dated 12th
October, 1998 Silvercrest
Investments Ltd acquired the
title and interest of Bikkai
Laboratories Ltd in H/No. BA
181/182, Bantama, Kumasi. Then
by an indenture dated 27th
October 1998, Partners Health
Services Ltd acquired the title
and interest of Bikkai Ltd in
the same property.
In the
appeals before us we are called
upon to determine which of the
two purchasers stated above is
entitled to ownership and
possession of the property in
dispute. In this judgment the
plaintiff/respondent/appellant
shall be referred to as
“plaintiff”, the 1st
defendants/respondent/ appellant
shall be referred to as “1st
defendant” and 5th
defendant/appellant/respondent
as “5th defendant”.
The 2nd, 3rd
and 4th defendants
are not parties to this appeal
and will continue to be referred
to as such.
Having
regard to the fact that the
validity of the auction sale as
well as the bona fides of
the parties have been raised in
this case, we deem it necessary
to set out the detailed facts in
a chronological order for ease
of analysis. So here we go; In
1995, the 3rd
defendant, a German
pharmaceutical company, through
its lawyer, Kwaku Ansa-Asare of
Hencil Chambers, brought an
action in the High Court, Accra
against Bikkai Laboratories Ltd,
a sister company of 1st
defendant. The action was to
recover certain sums of money
owed 3rd defendant
for pharmaceutical products
supplied on credit to Bikkai
Laboratories Ltd. On 26th
April, 1995 judgment was entered
in favour of 3rd
defendant. Upon application by 3rd
defendant the Registrar of the
High Court, Accra sealed a writ
of fi.fa dated 24th
May, 1995 for the attachment of
the property in dispute to be
sold in satisfaction of the
judgment. More than one year
after the fi.fa was issued the
Registrar wrote to the 2nd
defendant by letter dated 28th
May, 1997, appointing him as the
auctioneer to sell the property.
All this
while the writ of fi.fa had not
been executed by attachment of
the property in dispute. It was
when 2nd defendant
received the authorization from
the Registrar that he went to
effect the attachment on 30th
May 1996 and served the judgment
debtor with a Notice of Auction
to be held on 27th
June, 1996. About the same time
2nd defendant
published notice of the auction
in the 6th June, 1996
edition of ‘The Pioneer’
newspaper in Kumasi.
Upon the
attachment 1st
defendant immediately filed a
Notice of Claim, claiming
ownership of the property. The
Registrar therefore wrote to 2nd
defendant dated 5th
June, 1996 requesting him to
suspend the sale because a
Notice of Claim had been filed.
The Notice of Claim in which 1st
defendant claimed ownership of
the property as against Bikkai
Laboratories Ltd was served on
the 3rd defendant,
the judgment creditor. The
parties attended court on the
Notice of Claim and 1st
defendant was ordered to file a
statement of claim in order for
the interpleader to be
determined. He failed to do so
and on 31st January,
1997, the interpleader was
struck out.
No
further steps were taken till 28th
November, 1997 when the High
Court Registrar, Accra wrote to
inform 2nd defendant
that the interpleader had been
struck out so he should proceed
with the sale of the property.
However, on 3rd
December, 1997 the Registrar
again suspended the sale by a
letter to 2nd
defendant on the basis that a
motion for stay of execution had
been filed. By another letter
dated 10th December,
1997 he wrote back to 2nd
defendant indicating that the
motion for stay of execution was
in fact not affecting this case
so he should proceed and sell.
In the meantime 2nd
defendant had published a notice
of auction in ‘The Pioneer’ of
December, 4, 1997 for the
auction to be held on December,
12, 1997 (p.617).
Apart
from the interpleader, the 1st
defendant had taken other
proceedings in the High Court,
Accra, including Suit No.
L610/97, to prevent the sale of
the property but did not
succeed. So the auction took
place on 12th
December, 1997. There was a
large crowd at the premises
including the Managing Director
of 1st defendant. Workers of
1st defendant resisted the
auction and nearly disrupted it
but for the presence of security
personnel. 5th
defendant emerged as the highest
bidder and the hammer was
brought down for him. Though 5th
defendant bought the property at
GH¢59,000.00, he did not pay the
total amount on account of the
circumstances of the auction. He
paid only GH¢2,000.00 to Lawyer
Kwaku Ansa-Asare on behalf of 3rd
defendant on 15th
December, 1997. The auctioneer
did not file any report of the
sale with the registrar as
required by the rules of court
and he kept the keys to the
premises.
After the
auction 1st defendant
filed a number of suits in the
High Court, Kumasi, against the
other defendants all in a bid to
recover the property. As these
suits were pending 5th
defendant held back further
payments of the purchase price
so 3rd defendant was
not paid anything. 3rd
defendant then decided to
change its lawyer and engaged
the law firm Hesse and Larsey of
Accra to act for it.
Hesse and
Larsey immediately conducted a
search in the Registry of the
High Court, Accra and it was
detected that the writ of fi.fa
had expired at the time of the
attachment of the property. The
new lawyers brought this fact to
the attention of the Registrar
who conceded that the writ had
expired. The lawyers on 7th
August 1998 therefore wrote on
behalf of 3rd
defendant requesting the
Registrar to release the
property from attachment which
he did by writing to 2nd
defendant. 2nd
defendant thereupon handed over
the keys to the disputed
premises to 1st
defendant.
Thereafter the new lawyers of 3rd
defendant decided to settle
their differences with 1st
defendant and Bikkai
Laboratories Ltd by entering
into an agreement for the sale
of the property by private
treaty dated 15th
August, 1998. The 1st
and 3rd defendants
also filed terms of settlement
in Suit No. 610/97 which were
adopted by the High Court,
Accra.
Armed
with the agreement and the
release letter, 1st
defendant offered the property
to plaintiff herein for sale.
Plaintiff’s managing director
met with 2nd
defendant who confirmed the
availability of the property for
sale. Plaintiff conducted a
search at the Lands Commission
on 18th August, 1998
and the report was that the
property was in the name of 1st
defendant. After inspecting the
property, plaintiff proceeded to
purchase it by contract of sale
dated September 28, 1998 from 1st
defendant. 1st
defendant paid the 3rd
defendant the judgment debt plus
an agreed top up. A deed of
conveyance dated 27th
October 1998 was executed for
plaintiff which has been
registered and it was put in
possession.
However,
unknown to 1st and 3rd
defendants, 2nd
defendant after meeting
plaintiff, made contact with 5th
defendant. He collected the
balance of the auction purchase
price and paid it to the
Registrar in Accra and filed
statement of account on 21st
September,1998. Notwithstanding
the fact that he had revoked the
attachment of the property, the
Registrar issued a Certificate
of Purchase dated 12th
October 1998, to 5th
Defendant. The Registrar
further sealed a writ of
possession, without leave of the
court, for 5th
Defendant and same was executed
by ejecting the plaintiff from
the premises.
Plaintiff
therefore brought an action in
the High Court, Kumasi for
declaration of title, recovery
of possession, damages,
injunction and cancellation of 5th
defendant’s certificate of
title. The High Court gave
judgment in favour of plaintiff
and 1st defendant who
counterclaimed for a
nullification of the auction
sale and damages. 5th
defendant appealed against the
judgment and the Court of Appeal
allowed the appeal and set aside
the judgment of the trial court.
Being aggrieved, the plaintiff
and 1st defendant
have appealed against the
decision of the Court of Appeal
to this court.
It is
trite learning that an appeal is
by way of re-hearing which means
the appellate court is required
to peruse the whole record and
come to its own conclusions and
findings on the evidence and the
applicable law and decide
whether the findings in the
judgment appealed against are
justifiable. See. Nkrumah V
Ataa [1972] 2 GLR 13 and Tuakwa
V Bosom [2001-2002] SCGLR 61.
In the
appeals before us a number of
issues arise for determination
from the facts as narrated
above, the grounds of appeal and
the submissions of the three
lawyers. In the first instance,
questions have been asked by the
plaintiff and first defendant as
to whether the auction that took
place on 12th
December 1997 was carried out in
accordance with law. The follow
up question to that is; if
breaches of the laws on auctions
occurred did they invalidate the
auction? In the second instance,
the plaintiff and 1st
defendant argue that, whether
there were breaches of the
auction laws or not, the
judgment debtor had no title to
the property so the whole
exercise was void ab initio
and illegal and in law conferred
no title on 5th
defendant. On behalf of 5th
defendant, the defence of
innocent purchaser for value
without notice has been raised
and we need to consider whether
the principle is applicable in
this case.
On the
first issue, the execution was
carried out under the provisions
of the High Court ( Civil
Procedure ) Rules 1954 LN 140A
which, just as the current
rules, provide that the life
span of a writ of execution
shall be twelve months subject
to renewal before it expires. It
is not in dispute that the writ
of fi.fa in this case expired
before it was executed without
being renewed. The decisions of
the courts on non-compliance
with provisions of LN 140A
maintained a distinction between
provisions, breaches of which
were considered irregularities
rendering proceedings only
voidable and those that made
proceedings void ab initio. See
Azinogo v W E Augustt
[1989-90] 2 GLR 278 and Amoako V
Hansen [1987-88] 2 GLR 26.
In Ofori v Lartey [1978] 1
GLR 490 the Court of Appeal
held, basing on the provisions
of LN 140A, that an expired writ
of summons was dead and could
not form the basis of any
proceedings. That holding, which
would be applicable to a writ of
fi.fa, was the law in force at
the time of the attachment in
this case. What that means is
that the attachment of the
disputed property in this case
was void ab initio so the
auction sale was illegal.
In
Donkoh v Nkrumah [1964] GLR 739
S C. the respondent’s farm
was sold by a writ of fi.fa
to satisfy a judgment against
him. In a suit in the High Court
several years later to recover
the farm from the successor of
the purchaser, it emerged that
no writ of fi.fa was ordered by
the local court that gave
judgment against respondent. The
writ that was ordered to be
issued was a writ of Ca.Sa
(capias ad satisfaciendum)
by which the person of the
judgment debtor was to be seized
until he paid the judgment debt.
The Supreme Court held that
since the local court order was
for a writ of Ca.Sa, the
sale under a writ of fi.fa
was illegal. Where the auction
sale is illegal, the purchaser
gets nothing and there is no
time limit to set same aside.
The 5th
defendant is right when it
stated in its statement of case
that at an auction, the sale is
completed when the hammer is
brought down on the highest bid.
That is the law but since we
have held that the sale in this
case was illegal, that position
does not advance the case of 5th
defendant. All the proceedings
in execution taken by the High
Court Registrar and the
auctioneer on the back of the
expired writ of fi.fa
were null and void so a
discussion of whether they were
regular or not will be an
academic exercise that we do not
intend to engage in.
Even if
we are wrong in holding that the
sale was void and illegal on
account of the expired writ of
fi.fa, the evidence that the
property that was attached
belonged to 1st
defendant cannot be disputed.
The law is well-settled that a
purchaser of property sold upon
a writ of fi.fa gets only such
title as the judgment debtor had
in it. This is based on the
principle nemo dat quod non
habet. The provisions of
Or 51 R.21 of LN 140A are as
follows;
“After a
sale of immovable property shall
have become absolute in manner
aforesaid, the Court shall grant
a certificate to the person who
may have been declared the
purchaser at such sale, to the
effect that he has purchased the
right, title, and interest of
the judgment debtor in the
property sold and such
certificate shall be taken and
deemed to be a valid transfer of
such right, title, and
interest.”
(Or 45 R
11(3)&(4) of the current High
Court Rules 2004 C.I.47 are
in pari matera with Or 51 R.
21 of LN 140A). For that
reason the Certificate of
Purchase that was issued to 5th
defendant stated in unambiguous
terms that it purchased the
title, rights and interests of
Bikkai Laboratories Ltd in the
property in issue.
There is
a long line of authorities on
this position of the law. See
Chandirams v Ghana Commercial
Bank [1960] GLR 178, Afari v
Nyame [1961] GLR 599, Kuma v
Hima[1977] 1 GLR 204 and Hammond
v Lamptey[1987-88]1 GLR 327.
The principle of nemo dat
is so well rooted and
fundamental in the law that it
cannot be disregarded by a court
except on well-settled legal
grounds. It is the foundation
for the protection of property
rights by the law and finds
expression in Section 13(3) of
the Conveyancing Act, 1973,
(NRCD 175), Section 4(1)
Mortgages Act, 1972 (NRCD 96)
and Section 28 the Sale of Goods
Act, 1963 (Act 137).
What the
5th defendant has to
prove in this case is the nature
of title or interest in law, if
any, Bikkai Laboratories Ltd had
in the property that was
attached. This is so because in
law 5th defendant
derives its title from Bikkai
Laboratories Ltd and a party
relying on a derivative title
must prove the title of his
grantor.
DW1 for 5th
defendant, Emmanuel Owusu Ansah
(of blessed memory) who at one
time acted as lawyer for 3rd
defendant admitted that 1st
defendant is the owner of the
property. He however alleged
that 1st defendant used the
property as security for a
credit facility extended to
Bikkai Laboratories Ltd by 3rd
defendant. That contention was
denied under cross examination
and he offered to produce
documents in proof. He later in
the trial tendered a letter from
the Registrar-General’s
department dated 18th
November 1996, a certified copy
of Certificate of Registration
of Mortgage or charge dated 15th
November 1996 and an uncertified
and undated particulars of a
Mortgage. The document that the
witness claimed was the actual
mortgage deed was rejected when
he sought to tender it and it
was marked “ R 1”.
The
documents tendered do not in any
way defeat 1st
defendant’s ownership of the
property. S.107 of the Companies
Code 1963, Act 179, pursuant to
which the alleged charge was
registered, provides that every
charge as security on a
company’s property shall be
void unless the particulars of
the charge together with the
original or a certified copy
are registered with the
Registrar of Companies within 28
days of its creation. The
important question here is; does
the property belong to Bikkai
Laboratories Ltd? If A permits B
to use his property as security
for credit, does that create an
interest in the property in
favour of B? We do not think so.
There are clear rules in law by
which interests in immoveable
property are created and none
has been proved in favour of 5th
defendant.
We notice
an attempt by the 5th
defendant and the Court of
Appeal to argue that because
the uncertified particulars that
were tendered by 5th
defendant’s witness stated the
property against the name of
Bikkai Laboratories Ltd, then it
belongs to them. But that, with
respect, is a circular argument.
Where there is undisputed
evidence as to the true owner of
the property, there is no basis
for relying on conjecture and
presumptions.
Lawyer
Emmanuel Owusu Ansah in his
evidence under cross-examination
contended that the Managing
Director of 1st
defendant delivered the title
deeds on the property to his
senior partner, Kwaku
Ansa-Asare, as security for the
credit extended to Bikkai
Laboratories Ltd. If that were
so then 3rd defendant
through its lawyer knew all
along that the property belonged
to 1st defendant and
not Bikkai Laboratories Ltd. We
therefore fail to see any
misrepresentation or fraud
committed by 1st
defendant on anyone. Granted
that it used its property to
secure a credit facility for a
sister company, it does not lose
its ownership of the property
thereby.
In the
absence of evidence that 1st
defendant surrendered its
interest in the disputed
property to Bikkai Laboratories
Ltd, we are unable to hold that
the company had any interest
that could pass to 5th
defendant upon the auction sale.
The issue
about the property being subject
to a mortgage was not pleaded
before the trial court but came
up when 5th
defendant’s witness was in the
witness box. If there indeed
existed a valid mortgage that 3rd
defendant wanted to rely on then
it ought to have brought an
action for judicial sale under
the Mortgages Act and 1st
defendant would have been made a
party as the mortgagor. If that
had been done the court would
have been able to investigate
the validity of the deed relied
upon with regard to the
provisions of the Mortgages Act
and the Lands Registry Act 1962
(Act 122). In that case 1st
defendant as mortgagor would
have been entitled to seek
relief against foreclosure under
Section 18 of the Mortgages Act.
To base a decision of this case
on the alleged mortgage, which
was not sufficiently proved any
way, would do injustice to the 1st
defendant by denying it
statutory rights it otherwise
would have been entitled to.
All the
maters that 5th
defendant is raising in answer
to the question of the interests
that Bikkai Laboratories Ltd had
in the property are matters
that, strictly speaking, only 3rd
defendant might have been
entitled to raise and not 5th
defendant. 5th
defendant was never a party to
any of the alleged dealings in
the property involving 1st
defendant, Bikkai Laboratories
Ltd and 3rd Defendant
before the auction. 5th
defendant came into the picture
only upon reading the
publication in ‘The Pioneer’
that there was going to be an
auction. At that time 1st
defendant did not do anything to
mislead 5th
defendant. The notices in ‘The
Pioneer’ actually stated that it
is the property of Bikkai Ltd
(not Bikkai Laboratories Ltd)
that were to be sold at the
auction. It is totally out of
place for 5th
defendant to talk of any form of
estoppels against 1st
defendant.
3rd
defendant through its first
lawyer knew from the word go
that ownership of the property
was in 1st defendant
and not Bikkai Laboratories Ltd.
As a lawyer he could not have
been misled as to the
significance of the separate
corporate identities of the
companies. When 3rd
defendant changed lawyers the
new lawyers were quick to notice
the flaws and took remedial
steps by dealing with 1st
defendant.
If 5th
defendant were a prudent
purchaser he would have
conducted some preliminary
investigations as to the
propriety of the auction before
attending and making an offer.
If he had checked from the
Registrar of the court or the
auctioneer he would have known
that there was a judgment
against Bikkai Laboratories Ltd
and a simple search in the
records of the Lands Commission
would have informed him that the
property did not belong to
Bikkai Laboratories Ltd but 1st
defendant.
According
to 5th defendant’s
managing director, he knew 1st
defendant so he could have
enquired from their office
whether it was safe to buy the
property at the auction. He did
none of these. Furthermore,
when he attended the auction the
workers of 1st
defendant were struggling with
the auctioneer. 5th
defendant nevertheless bid for
the property. He stated in his
evidence that after his bid was
accepted he became anxious
having regard to the attitude of
1st defendant’s
workers but the 2nd
defendant herein urged him to
make payment immediately. He
obviously was not comfortable so
he paid only GH¢2000.00 three
days after the auction and
waited until after about a year
later that 2nd
defendant led him pay the
balance.
In
Sarpong v Atta Yaw and Anor
[1964] GLR 419, SC, a
purchaser of a house at a public
auction which turned out to have
been carried out upon a void
writ of fi.fa lost the house in
an action by the original
owners, his status as a bona
fide purchaser for value without
notice notwithstanding.
At page 421 of the Report Apaloo
JSC said as follows;
“True, this may cause great
disappointment and possibly
hardship to purchasers in some
case but people who speculate in
the purchase of property put up
for sale by the sheriff
invariably take a certain amount
of risk and must take the
consequences of the sale turning
out to be invalid.”
Such is
the fate of 5th
defendant in this case. The
judgment debtor had no title or
interest whatsoever in the
property put up for sale by
auction so 5th defendant bought
nothing.
On the
other hand, when plaintiff was
contacted to buy the property he
took all the requisite
precautions before purchasing
and paying for it. The money he
paid was used to satisfy the
judgment debt and 3rd
defendant gave a receipt to that
effect. The purported auction
sale did not in any way affect
the title of 1st
defendant in the property so
plaintiff acquired the legal
title to the property
unencumbered.
As has
been explained above, the
relationship between 1st
defendant and Bikkai
Laboratories Ltd in their
dealings with 3rd
defendant regarding the property
could not have influenced 5th
defendant’s decision to purchase
at the auction. Consequently no
fraud was perpetuated against 5th
defendant on account of the
separate corporate personalities
of 1st defendant and
Bikkai Laborarories Ltd to
warrant a piercing of the
corporate veil.
Before we
are done, we wish to associate
ourselves with the observations
by the trial judge concerning
the dishonest behavior exhibited
by 2nd defendant, the
auctioneer in this case. The
record shows that his conduct as
an auctioneer left much to be
desired. The courts are, as far
as possible, to avoid dealing
with him with regard to auction
sales.
For the
reasons stated above, we allow
both appeals. We set aside the
judgment of the Court of Appeal
and restore the judgment of the
High Court. The money paid by 5th
defendant is to be refunded to
it.
(SGD) G.
PWAMANG
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD)
W. A. ATUGUBA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD)
A. A. BENIN
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD)
J.
B. AKAMBA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD)
YAW APPAU
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL
KWABENA ASANTE KROBEA ESQ. FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/1ST
RESPONDENT/ APPELLANT
STEPHEN OPPONG ESQ. FOR THE 1ST
DEFENDANT /2ND
RESPONDENT/ APPELLANT.
THADDDEUS SORY ESQ. WITH HIM SEAN
POKU FOR THE 5TH
DEFENDANT/ APPELLANT/RESPONDENT. |