Appeal Court.
15th Dec., 1938.
Claim
for damage for malicious
prosecution-Onus not discharged.
The plaintiff and defendant were
in dispute over land and the
dispute terminated in the
former's favour. Thereupon he
entered the land and removed
growing crops ·contrary to
native. custom. He was
criminally charged before the
Native Court with stealing and
destruction, convicted on both
charges, and sentenced to
imprisonment and a fine,. He
appealed and was acquitted on
the first charge but· as to the
second the appellate tribunal
was. silent. He then brought a
successful action for malicious
prosecution ill the Supreme
Court from which the defendant
appealed.
Held: The
plaintiff failed
(1) to
negative reasonable and probable
cause for his prosecution;
(2) to prove
that the criminal proceedings
brought against him ultimately
ended in his favour;
.
(3) to prove
malice;
and appeal
allowed.
H. A. H.
Benjamin for Appellant.
E.
O. Asafu-Adjaye for
Respondent.
The following
joint judgment was delivered:-
KINGDON,
C.d.; NIGERIA, PETRIDES, C.J.,
GOLD COAST AND WEBB, C.J.,
SIERR.A:LEONE.
In this case the
plaintiff-respondent and
defendant-appellant had a
dispute over land and there were
proceedings between them in the
Kumawu Native Court which
resulted in defendant
appellant's favour, but on
appeal to the Asantehene's Court
at Kumasi the decision was
reversed. There were some
growing crops on the land and
the plaintiff-respondent, having
got the judgment of the
Asantehene's Court in his
favour, went on the land and it
is alleged reaped the crops and
took them away and also damaged
the crops. The
defendant-appellant complained,
and as a result the
plaintiff-respondent was, with
five others, prosecuted in the
Native Court of Rumawu on the
following two charges: -
(a) For that you accused
persons on or about the 29th day
of May, 1936, at Wamasi on
Dodomasi Stool land, E.P.A.
within the jurisdiction of this
Native Court did unlawfully
commit larceny by stealing
foodstuff (cocoa yams and
plantains) from the complainant
Kwadjoe Bandoh's farm lies at
Wamasi.
Contrary to section 103 Cap. 29
Volume] of the Laws of the Gold
Coast Colony, 1928.
(b) For that you accused, on
or about the 29th day of May,
1936, at WamaBP on Bodomase
Stool land E.P.A. within the
jurisdiction of this Native
Court did unlawfully damage
crops in complainant Kwadjoe
Bandoh's farm lies at Wamasi,
viz:plantain, cocoa yams and
pepper trees by means of
destroying 'lame by cutlasses
unwantonly.
Contrary to section 93 Cap. 29
Volume 1 of the Laws of the Gold
Coast Colony, 1928.
After hearing
the evidence the Native Court
gave the following judgment:-
"This is a
criminal case brought by Opaning
Kwadjoe Bandoh "(Krontihene of
Bodomase) against the accused
persons herein for " stealing
and damaging his foodstuffs
(cocoa yams, plantain trees and
" pepper trees) in his farm lies
at Wawase.
" The first
accussed person Peter Kwakyi
admitted that he ordered •• the
other five accused persons to
fetch cocoa yams from the farm
in "dispute which was tilled by
the complainant Kwadjoe Bandoh
which " farm he the first
accused has taken possession off
on the ground that " he has
obtained judgment in an appeal
case before Nana Asantehene's "
Court between the complaina!1t
Kwadjoe Bandoh versus
himself over " the land on which
lies the farm in dispute.
" The
complainant Kwadjoe Bandoh on
the other hand contended " that
although the first accused has
obtained judgment in their
recent " litigation over the
land on which lies the farm in
dispute but no order " from Nana
Asantehene's Court which
empowers him to take possession
"of his farm containing
foodstuffs, etc., and before the
accused can "take possession of
his farm there should be a
notice from the first " accused
to him given him certain time to
pick his foodstuffs.
" After
having heard the evidence
adduced by both parties and
their "witnesses, this Native
Court found no grounds upon
which the first " accused can
clear himself from the charges
preferred against him by " the
complainant. Although he
explained that he sent a verbal
notice " to the complainant per
his uncle Kofi Basoah telling
him to quit from " the land. The
said notice complainant denied
knowledge' of and this " Court
also did not take the said
verbal notice into
consideration.
" The
previous matter was heard by
Asantehene's Court " A " and "
if the accused meant to give
notice of removal to the
complainant he " should have
passed the notice through the
said Court.
" Secondly
the alleged bearer Kofi Basoah
was involved in the recent "
dispute between the accused and
the complainant. He Basoah being
"an uncle to the accused who was
then the defendant-appellant and
" it is hard for him to carry
such a notice to the complainant
who was "also the
plaintiff-respondent.
" The point
now for this Native Court to
decide is whether it is lawful
for the accused Peter Kwakyi to
deprive the complainant "
Kwadjoe Bandoh of the farm in
dispute· without previous notice
or not.
"In the
opinion of this Native Court the
action of the accused " Peter
Kwakyi towards the complainant
Kwadjoe Bandoh is unlawful. " If
the accused has obtained
judgment in their recent dispute
over the •• 'land on which the
farm in dispute lies he ought to
have given notice ",in writing
to the complainant given him
some days to clear from the land
and if he fails then the accused
is at liberty to enter into the
farm in dispute for possession
but as there was no such notice
this Native Court found the
accused guilty.
Findings:
" First
accused found guilty and
sentenced to three months I.H.L."
on the first count and a fine of
£15 or in default three months
I.H.L.
" on the
second count. Sentences to run
consecutively. Second, third, "
fourth, fifth and sixth accused
persons warned and discharged."
This was
reviewed by the District
Commissioner, Captain Dickinson,
in the following terms:-
" Sentences
too severe. Reduced in each case
to a fine of £5 or one " month
to run concurrently."
The
plaintiff-respondent appealed to
the Magistrate's Court at.
Kumasi; hut. in the meantime
suffered imprisonment for tell
days before he was admitted to
hail. The appeal was heard by
Captain Dickinson who had
already reviewed it, in his
capacity as District
Commissioner. He gave the
following judgment;-
The
respondent and appellant have
been in litigation for some time
" over the ownership of a farm.
Respondent first won the case in
the •• KUll1awu Court and then
appellant succeeded on appeal to
the "Asantehene's Court.
Appellant went and took growing
crops which " are the subject of
the theft. In my opinion 'the
act of the appellant " does not
in entry respect fulfil the
terms in the definition of
stealing " in that he had a
claim of right.
" Judgment in
the Kumawu Court is reversed and
the conviction "quashed. No
order as to costs."
The whole
record of that appeal was not
put in in the Court below and is
not before us. So that we are
unable to say definitely whether
the appeal was against both the
convictions, viz: -(a)
for stealing and (11) for
unlawful damage, or against that
of stealing only. At any rate
the reasons' given for the
judgment apply only to the
conviction for stealing.
The
plaintiff-respondent then caused
to issue his writ in the present
suit claiming £200 as damages
for malicious prosecution. After
hearing the evidence the learned
trial Judge delivered the
following judgment;~
In this
case I am satisfied that there
was no reasonable and "probable
cause for the prosecution which
was instituted by the "defendant
against the plaintiff before the
Kumawu T'ribunal.
"I have read
the whole of the proceedings
before the Tribunal, " and I
have also read the judgment of
Captain Dickinson before whom
"the plaintiff lodged an appeal
against his conviction. Captain
"Dickinson's finding in favour
of the plaintiff entirely
accords with " my own view.
" I am
'definitely of the opinion that
the plaintiff's act in taking
"some of the crops from the farm
did not amount to stealing. He
"took the crops openly and under
a genuine claim of right, and
the " defendant was perfectly
aware that the farm or the land
was a bone " of contention
between himself and the
defendant.
"At the most,
the defendant should have
instituted civil " proceedings
against the plaintiff.
"The
defendant in my opinion, was not
in the least justified in "
setting the criminal law in
motion in this arbitrary manner.
" Judgment
for the plaintiff for
thirty-three pounds two
shillings"£25 as general
damages and £8 2s. as special
damages, with costs " to be
taxed."
We do not
agree with this judgment for the
following reasons:-
(a)
The plaintiff failed to
discharge the onus which was
upon him to prove that the
criminal proceedings terminated
in his favour. So far as was
proved in the lower Court or has
been shown to this Court the
conviction and sentence for
unlawful damage still hold good.
(b) We
do )Jot agree with the finding
of the learned trial Judge that
there was no reasonable and
probable cause for the
prosecution.
" In
determining whether or not there
is an absence of "reasonable and
probable cause, the judge has to
ask c. himself, whether a
reasonable man, in the position
of the " defendant, and having
the knowledge which the
defendant " in fact had or could
and ought to have had, would
have " supposed at the time of
the prosecution that the
prisoner " was guilty? If this
question is answered in the
affirmative, " there is no cause
of action."
(Addison's
Law of Torts, 8th Edition, p.
249.)
How can it
possibly be said that there was
no reasonable and probable cause
in view of the following facts:-
(i)
The Native Tribunal before whom
the prosecution was had, and
whose members would certainly
have the same mental outlook as
the defendant-appellant,
convicted upon both charges.
(ii)
Neither conviction was
interfered with by the District
Commissioner upon review.
(iii)
No reason has been suggested in
any judgment for upsetting the
conviction on the second charge.
(iv)
The conviction upon the first
charge was quashed upon a point
of law which it may well be
difficult for an illiterate
African, or indeed any untrained
person, to understand.
We are
of opinion that the question "
Was there reasonable and
probable cause" should be
answered in the affirmative.
(c)
But even if that question were
properly answered in the
negative, and if the
plaintiff-respondent had
discharged the onus of proving
that the proceedings had
terminated in his' favour, there
would still remain the question
of malice; the plaintiff
respondent would have to prove
that the defendant appellant
instituted the proceedings
maliciously. we think that he
failed to prove this and it is
noteworthy that there is no
express finding by the learned
trial Judge that the
defendant-appellant acted
maliciously.
For these
reasons the appeal is allowed,
the judgment of the Court below,
including the order as to costs,
is set aside and it is ordered
that judgment be entered in the
Court below dismissing the
plaintiff's claim with costs to
be taxed. The appellant is
awarded costs in this Court
assessed at £28 15s. 9d.