Execution - Stay pending appeal
- Refusal of, - Trial court
granting stay upon onerous
conditions - Whether amounting
to refusal.
Execution - Stay pending appeal
- Principles for grant - Trial
court entering summary judgment
notwithstanding triable issues
on record - Appeal not frivolous
- Stay granted in circumstances.
In the plaintiff’s application
for summary judgment against the
defendant the issue that emerged
was whether at a settlement out
of court, outstanding debts owed
by the defendant to the
plaintiff were negotiated and
settled. It was agreed between
the parties that there were two
meetings for settlement. The
plaintiff claimed that at the
second meeting the defendant
offered a factory shed in full
settlement of the outstanding
indebtedness but the offer was
rejected as insufficient. On the
other hand, the defendant
claimed that the offer of the
factory shed was accepted by the
plaintiff in full settlement of
the debt. The trial court
entered judgment for the
plaintiff. Pending the appeal
the trial court granted the
defendant’s application for stay
of execution subject to the
condition that the defendant
paid into court half the
judgment debt totalling $125,000
and ¢10,000,000 and costs of
¢500,000 within one month from
the date of the order. On a
repeat application by the
defendants in the Court of
Appeal the defendant contended
that the trial judge erred in
granting the plaintiff’s
application for summary judgment
notwithstanding that there were
triable issues on record. The
plaintiff, on the other hand,
resisted the application
contending that the defendant
having been granted a stay of
execution in the High Court, it
was not open to it to bring a
fresh application to the appeal
court as the High Court did not
refuse the application.
Held
- (1) The conflicting claims
raised a triable issue that
could only have been resolved by
evidence. In the circumstances
the appeal could not be said to
be frivolous and the application
for stay of execution would be
granted. Duncan v
Kawoaco Ltd [1981] GLR 476
cited.
(2) The argument that, having
been granted a stay in the High
Court, it was not open to the
defendant to bring a fresh
application to the Court of
Appeal was of no merit. The
conditions were so onerous as to
amount virtually to a refusal.
Republic v Court of Appeal,
Accra, ex parte Sidi
[1987-88] 2 GLR 170 applied.
Cases referred to:
Duncan v Kawoaco Ltd
[1981] GLR 476.
Republic v Court of Appeal,
Accra, ex parte Sidi
[1987-88] 2 GLR 170, SC.
APPLICATION to the Court of
Appeal for stay of execution of
judgment of the High Court
following a conditional grant in
the High Court.
Amarkai Amarteifio
for the applicant.
S K Matanawui
for the respondent.
FORSTER JA.
The defendant company applied to
the High Court, Tema for stay of
execution of that court’s
summary judgment of 2/7/92
wherein judgment was entered for
the plaintiff company as claimed
by the writ of summons for (a)
$250,000 (b) ¢20,000,000 (c) 32%
interest p.a. on (a) and
(b). Costs of ¢500,000 was
awarded in favour of plaintiff.
The defendant appealed. The High
Court on 28/7/92 granted
defendant’s application for stay
of execution pending the
determination of appeal and
subject to conditions. The
defendant was to pay into court
half the judgment debt and costs
within one month from the date
of the order. Thus, the
defendant was required to pay
into court the sum of $125,000
and ¢10,000,000 plus costs of
¢500,000.
Dissatisfied with the conditions
set by the High Court, defendant
repeated the application for
stay of execution before this
court. Arguing the application,
counsel for the defendant first
contended, by reference to
supporting affidavits and the
grounds of appeal, that the
defendant’s statement of defence
raised triable issues and
therefore the entry of summary
judgment in this case was wrong.
The plaintiff on the other hand
submitted that the defence
raised no triable issues and
that the entry of the summary
judgment was in order.
We have read the judgment of the
court and the statement of
defence and we are of the view
that there were triable issues
which required to be resolved at
a trial. The matter was fought
on affidavits. The issue
disputed between the parties was
whether at a settlement
out-of-court, outstanding debts
owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff, were negotiated and
settled. It was common cause
between the parties that there
were two meetings during the
negotiations for settlement. As
the trial judge found there was
a second meeting on 4/9/91. The
plaintiff claimed that at that
meeting the defendant offered a
factory shed in full settlement
of the outstanding indebtedness.
Plaintiff contended in a
supporting affidavit that that
offer was rejected as
insufficient. On the other hand,
the defendant’s defence and the
affidavit filed in opposition to
the plaintiff’s application for
summary judgment claimed that
the offer of the factory shed
was accepted by the plaintiff in
full settlement of the debt.
Thus, there were two conflicting
claims; the plaintiff claiming
that the shed was not accepted
in settlement of the debt; the
defendant on the other hand
maintaining that the offer was
accepted by the plaintiff. In
the circumstances the
conflicting claims raised a
triable issue. For if, to quote
Taylor J (as he then was) in
Duncan v Kawoaco Ltd
[1981] GLR 476 at 481:
“When all the circumstances are
looked at, what emerges is that
the defendant has put forward a
defence, which if it can be
proved, the action against him
must fail. It may be that he
will not be able to prove it at
the trial, that is not the
question. The question is the
outcome of the action on the
assumption that he is able to
prove what he alleges.”
We therefore think there were
triable issues raised by the
defence and which could only
have been resolved by evidence.
We are satisfied that the appeal
of the defendant cannot be said
to be frivolous.
The plaintiff resisted the
instant application contending
that the defendant having been
granted a stay of execution by
the High Court it was not open
to it to bring a fresh
application to this court, for
the High Court did not refuse
the application. That argument
is now of no merit. In similar
circumstances in the Republic
v Court of Appeal, Accra; ex
parte Sidi [1987-88] 2 GLR
170, the Supreme Court held that
such onerous and stringent
conditions were just as good as
an outright refusal. As was
bluntly put by Taylor, JSC:
“... clearly if within three
months, the applicant was unable
to obtain the colossal sum of
¢1,000,000 to be paid into
court, then the order for stay
would lapse and the
judgment-creditor would be
entitled to go into execution.
How in such a situation it can
justly be said that a stay of
execution was granted is in my
respectful view difficult to
appreciate.”
In the instant case, half the
judgment debt being $125,000 and
¢10,000,000 and ¢500,000 costs
was ordered to be paid within
one month. In default thereof
the judgment-creditor was
entitled to go into execution.
We think that the conditions
were so onerous as to amount
virtually to a dismissal.
In all the circumstances of the
case, it is our respectful view
that the application for stay of
execution of the judgment of the
High Court, Tema must succeed.
(sgd) AMPIAH JA.
(sgd) ESSIEM JA.
Application granted.
Kizito Beyuo, Legal
Practitioner.