Appeal
Court. 8th Dec., 1938.
Conviction
for Murder following 'visit by
the Court and jury to locus when
statements by witnesses was made
in absence of Accused.
Held:
The" view" having become part of
the trial and the accused being
absent therefrom the trial was
irregular and appeal allowed.
There is no need to set out the
facts.
Ladepon
Thomas for Appellant..
T. A.
Brown for Crown.
The following joint. judgment
was delivered:-
KINGDON, C.tT.,
NIGERIA, PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD
COAST .AND YATES, J.
This is an appeal from a
conviction for murder. The
appellant was tried by the Chief
Justice of Sierra Leone and a
jury at Freetown in the month of
September, 1938.
Four grounds of appeal have been
filed but this Court is
satisfied that. only one of them
has any substance. This is
ground 2 which is as follows:-
" The trial was irregular in
that the Court moved to the
"locus in quo with the jury,
counsel for the " prosecution
and the defence and two
witnesses for " the prosecution
after the case for the
prosecution "had closed and the
accused was half-way in his
"evidence and there demonstrated
part of the " evidence of the
prosecution in the absence of
the " accused."
In order to
assist this Court affidavits
have been filed by counsel for
the prosecution and the defence
setting out what actually took
place when the Court and jury
went to view the locus in
quo, and the learned Chief
Justice has reported to this
Court that the contents of those
affidavits are substantially
correct ..
On' the third day of the trial,
the jury made a request for a
view of the locus in quo
and were told by the learned
Chief Justice to wait until the
end of the prosecution when, if
they still desired it,
arrangements would be made
accordingly. On the fourth day
when the appellant was giving
his evidence on oath, the jury
repeated their request and asked
that three witnesses-Tuach
Thomas and Palmer-should be
present. The learned Chief
Justice acceded to their request
but informed them that the
presence of the witness Palmer
was unnecessary.
Counsel for
the defence then asked that the
accused should be allowed to
attend. The learned Chief
Justice however ruled his
presence was unnecessary, and
the accused was not present at
the View.
The next day
the Court and jury together with
the two witnesses proceeded to
the locus in quo, which
is situate some nineteen miles
away from Freetown. After
inspection of the premises, the
witness Tuach was asked eleven
questions, six of which appear
to be most material
They are as
follows:-
1.
He was
asked to point out where the
accused had
said he had
found the body?
2.
Where
the accused said he had removed
it to?
3.
How
the furniture was?
4.
To
demonstrate what the accused
said about the only chair?
5.
How
the chair was " disturbed"?
6.
To
show the window which the
accused said was opened?
The witness
did so.
In addition
to these questions being put to
the witness, the learned Chief
Justice called the jurors in to
a room with both counsel for the
prosecution and the defence and
then and there demonstrated with
the lock of the door "how the
prosecution alleged the lock was
supposed to have been forced and
the impossibility of its being
so forced, pointing out that
that was not the type of lock
supposed to have been so
forced."
Upon the
above facts learned counsel for
the appellant has submitted that
the" view" was not merely a "
view" within the accepted
meaning of the word-and that by
reason of questions being put to
a witness and answers given, and
a demonstration given by the
learned Chief Justice, that this
"view" became part of the trial,
because evidence was led; and as
this part of the trial took
place in the absence of the
accused the proceedings were
irregular and' the irregularity
was such that it might have
affected the minds of the jury
to such an extent as to affect
their decision and amounted in
fact to a miscarriage of
justice.
In
Lawrence v. The King, 1933
A.C. p. 699 at p. 708, Lord
Atkin says, " It is an essential
principle of our criminal law
that " the trial of an
indictable offence has to be
conducted in the " presence of
the accused; and for this
purpose trial means the whole of
the proceedings. There is
authority for saying that in
"cases of misdemeanour there may
be special circumstances " which
permit a trial in the absence of
the accused but on trial " for
felony the rule is inviolable."
We are
satisfied that what took place
at the "view" constituted part
of the trial because a witness
was asked material questions and
answered them, and a
demonstration was given by the
learned Chief Justice, and as
this was done in the absence of
the accused, the form of legal
process was disregarded, and the
trial for that reason was
irregular.
We have not
been able to find any authority
which lays down that a " view"
is part of the trial and as such
must, in cases of felony, be had
in the presence of the accused.
But we have no doubt that, once
anything more takes place than
the jury merely using their eyes
to see things for themselves,
for instance if questions are
asked and answered or anything
in the nature of a demonstration
takes place, the so-called"
view" at once becomes something
more than a view and is
definitely part of the trial. As
experience shows that, in
practice, it is almost
impossible to confine a " view"
to a mere looking and seeing, it
follows that it is prudent that
an accused person should always
be present. It is also fair that
he should be, for if he is
present he may be able to give
evidence refuting what is said
or demonstrated.
Learned
counsel for the Crown has
admitted that evidence was
adduced at the view and that
this was irregular, but he
argues that when the questions
were asked it was the duty of
counsel for the defence to
object and to ask the learned
trial Judge to correct the
illegality; and in support of
this argument cites Regina v.
Martin 4" Webb, L.R.
C.C.R. Vol. 1, p. 378. In that
case it was held that where the
jury upon a view have received
evidence in the absence of the
Judge and the prisoner, it is
for the Court before which the
trial takes place to investigate
the facts and to ascertain
whether the alleged irregularity
has occurred or not, and to
correct the irregularity; and he
argues further that an appeal on
this point would only lie to
this Court after the refusal of
the Judge to do so. Regina v
. Martin 4" TV ebb
is distinguishable from
this case in that in that case
the learned trial Judge was not
present at the view, whereas in
this case he was; and Bovill,
C.J. at p. 381 says: "It is
always in the discretion of the
" Court to allow a view or not
though such precautions as may "
seem to the Court necessary
ought to be taken to secure that
the " jury shall not improperly
receive evidence out of Court."
It seems
obvious that in this case the
Judge being present could have
himself stopped anything
happening which he deemed to be
irregular. Regina v .
Martin 4" Webb is
further distinguishable by the
fact that that case was one of
misdemeanour which may be tried
in certain circumstances in the
absence of the accused whereas
this is a felony where the
accused must be present
throughout-vide Lawrence v. The
King (supra).