Appeal Court. 13th March, 1939.
Trial with Assessors-Assessors
not directed that it was duty of
Appeal Court. from
prosecution to establish the
charge beyond reasonable doubt-
section 43 (3 of Protectorate
Courts Jurisdictionon
Ordinance
Held: As decision vested
exclusively in the trial Judge.
his omission to direct the
assessors made no difference to
his decision and was immaterial.
Rex versus Annan
quoted and distinguished
(Gold Coast F.C.
1926-29).
Appeal dismissed.
A. S. Bodley
for Crown.
S. A. Benka-Coker
for Appellant.
The following joint judgment was
delivered :-
KINGDON, c.J., NIGEI{IA,
PETRIDES, c.]., GOLD COAST AND
LANE, J.
In this case the appellant was
convicted in the Circuit Court
of the Protectorate of Sierra
Leone of the murder of one
Karimu.
The trial was had before a Judge
assisted by two Assessors in
accordance with the provisions
of Section 43 of the
Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction
Ordinance, 1932. The appellant
has appealed on four grounds of
law. But there is no substance
in any of them and there is only
one with which it is necessary
to deal, namely Ground 2 (c)
which reads-
"Misdirection of the
Assessors--omitting to direct
the Assessors as to prisoner
being entitled to benefit of
reasonable doubt. "
The learned Chief Justice, who
was the Trial Judge, summed up
to the Assessors before calling
upon them for their opinions,
and the words of his summing up
are recorded: I t is true that
there is no instruction therein
that the accused was entitled to
the benefit of the doubt or that
it was the duty of the
prosecution to establish the
charge beyond reasonable doubt,
if, therefore, the trial had
been had with a jury and the
same omission had occurred in
the summing up, it might have
been necessary for this Court to
quash the conviction (Lawrencev.
The King, Law Reports A.C.
1933, p. 699 at p. 707).
But trial by a Judge assisted by
Assessors is essentially
different from trial by a jury.
Lawrence v. The King laid
down that it is essential that
the Tribunal of fact should
understand the principle that a
criminal charge has to be
established by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt. In a
jury case the jury is the
Tribunal of fact, but in a case
with Assessors Section 43 (3) of
the Protectorate Courts
Jurisdiction Ordinance, 1932,
provides that" the decision
shall be vested exclusively in
the Judge," to whom of course
the principle is well known. The
present case is distinguishable
from the Gold Coast case of
Rex v. Annan (Gold Coast F.C.
1926-29) to which our attention
was very properly drawn by
Counsel for Appellant, since in
that case the Trial Judge, after
misdirecting the Assessors,
evidently based his decision
entirely on their opinions and
it was impossible to say what
the decision would have been but
for the misdirection.
In the present case there can be
no doubt that the learned Chief
Justice's omission to direct the
Assessors upon the question of
the benefit of the doubt made no
difference whatever to his
decision.
There is therefore, as we have
said, no substance in the ground
of appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.