Manslaughter contrary to Section
325 of Criminal
Code--Definition of Manslaughter
in Section 310 of
Criminal Code-Juju causing
inevitable and irresistible
apprehension of serious harm or
death.
Held: No evidence that the
particular juju used had ever
resulted in a person committing
suicide, and no evidence that
the accused had knowledge that
the invoking of this" juju"
would be reasonably likely to
cause the deceased to take her
own life.
Appeal allowed and conviction
and sentence quashed. The facts
are sufficiently set out in the
judgment.
E. Hallinmr
for Crown.
Appellant
in person.
The following joint judgment was
delivered.
BUTLER LLOYD, AG. C.]., NIGERIA,
GRAHAM PAUL AND BROOKE, ].J.
The appellant was charged with
the murder of one Nwoacha ; was
convicted of manslaughter and
sentenced to. ten years
Imprisonment with Hard Labour.
Against that conviction he has
appealed to. this Court ..
The facts of the case are
simple, and not seriously in
controversy.
The woman Nwoacha was at one
time the wife of the accused.
She refused to. continue living
with the accused and in
consequence the accused demanded
the repayment of. n 1 Os. " head
money" which he had paid.
Nwoacha, and apparently her
mother, promised to. repay the
money as soon as they could do.
so., but the accused was not
satisfied with these promises.'
He brought a " Juju" called "Onye
Uku," pointed it towards Nwoacha
and said something to the
following effect :-
Since you refuse to pay me my
money this juju will kill you or
since you refuse to pay me you
shall no more eat or drink."
He left the juju at the house
where the deceased lived.
It is proved that Nwoacha was
much affected in mind by. this
juju and the threat. She became
very depressed, though there is
no. evidence that she stopped
eating or drinking, or that her
physical health was in any way
affected.
Six days after the bringing of
the juju by the accused the
woman Nwoacha went out and
hanged herself by the neck with
a cloth from a.. tree, so high
that her feet hung six feet
above the ground-·a method of
suicide requiring considerable
strength, deliberation and
determination.
The learned judge applied to
these facts section 310 of the
Criminal Code which is in these
terms :-
A person who, by threats or
intimidation or by deceit,
causes another person to do an
act or make an omission which
results i!1 the death of that
other person, is deemed to have
killed him," and found the
accused guilty of the
,manslaughter of Nwoacha.
In
so finding, the learned Judge
expressly pointed out that the
case was not within the English
decisions as to the effect in
this branch of the Criminal Law
of acts directly causing death
and induced by a well-grounded
apprehension of immediate
serious violence. He held
however that to the native mind"
juju may be a well-grounded
apprehension of serious harm and
even of death-- if not
immediate, yet inevitable and
irresistible."
The learned Judge expressly
found this case analogous to the
case of the man who is so
terrified by another that he
jumps out of a window.
We are unable to agree with the
conclusions at which the learned
Judge arrived on the facts of
this case. The evidence as to
the juju in question is very
vague. There is no really
independent evidence about this
juju or its reputed powers. It
is variously described by the
deceased's relations but neither
in their evidence nor in the two
different versions of the
alleged threats by the accused
is there the slightest
suggestion that the juju is
designed to persuaoe a person to
take his or her own life. There
is no suggestion in the evidence
that the invoking of this
particular juju has ever
resulted in a person committing
suicide.
There is no evidence whatever
that the invoking of this juju,
to the knowledge of the accused
at the time he invoked it, would
he reasonably likely to cause
the deceased to take her own
life, and in our opinion that
element of reasonable likelihood
must be present in order to make
section 310 applicable.
In this case there was between
the threat and the death of the
woman the interposition of an
act of the woman herself, an act
which we are unable to say was
the
immediate
consequence of the accused's
invocation of the juju. The case
of a terrified person jumping
out of a window to avoid the
terrifying danger is to our mind
quite different in fact and
principle from the ,present
case.
If the accused had locked the
woman in an upstairs room with
the juju and the threat that if
she remained in the room with
the juju it would kill her and
to escape that threat of death
she had fatally jumped in fear
out of the window that set of
facts would have come near to
the analogy to which the learned
Judge refers, but there is
nothing like that set of facts
in the present case.
In our opinion the appeal should
be allowed and the conviction
and sentence appealed from
should be quashed.
