Perjury
contra. sec. 41 of
Criminal Procedure Ordinance.
The
appellants were summarily
convicted for perjury committed
in the ('ourse of a civil
action, and appealed.
There is no
need to set out the facts.
C. N. S.
Pollard for Crown
preliminarily submitted no
appeal lay.
O. Alakija
for Appellants opposed.
Held: An
appeal lies.
The following
joint decision was delivered:-
KINGDON, C.J.,
NIGERIA, PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD
COAST AND WEBB, C.J., SIERRA
LEONE.
The
appellants in this case have
been committed to prison as for
Contempt of Court under section
41 of the Criminal Procedure
Ordinance-the first for three
months I.H.L., the second for
one month I.H.L.-by Graham Paul,
J., sitting as a Judge of the
High Court in the Ibadan
Judicial Division.
Before so
committing the appellants the
learned trial Judge placed upon
record that it appeared to him
that the respective appellants
had been guilty of perjury in
proceedings before him and he
duly complied with the
provisions of section 42 of the
Ordinance. Upon the appeal being
called the learned Crown Counsel
has taken the objection that no
appeal lies to this Court
against a committal as for
contempt by a High Court Judge
under section 41 of the
Ordinance.
He admits
that the committal. follows upon
what is technically a summary
conviction, but points out that
it is well established law that
in England no appeal lies
against a committal by the High
Court where the contempt is
criminal, save upon the question
of jurisdiction, and submits
that the law is the same here.
But in our View this is not so.
The reason
why no appeal lies in England is
the general rule that no appeal
on the merits lies from a
summary conviction for a
criminal offence in the High
Court. But here the law on this
point is the opposite, having
been changed in 1933. By the
wide terms of section 9 of the
West African Court of Appeal
Ordinance (No. 47 of 1933), viz:
"A person convicted by or in the
Supreme Court or the High Court
or a :Native Court may appeal to
the Court of Appeal • • • .,"
the legislation has deliberately
conferred upon all convicted
persons the rights given by the
section, regardless of whether
the conviction be had upon
information or summarily. It is
true, as the learned Crown
Counsel . points out, that
section 41 of Chapter 20 does
not contemplate appeal except in
accordance with its own express
terms and limitations; but at
the time of its enactment no
appeal (save by way of case
stated) existed in criminal
matters from the High Court to
this Court. The legislature,
when creating a right of appeal
in and 1933, must be presumed to
have had in mind its effect,
inter alia,. upon the
provisions of that section.
We are
therefore of opinion that an
appeal lies from the convictions
in the present case in just the
same way as it lies from any
other conviction. The
preliminary objection is
accordingly overruled.