Criminal
Law-Case Stated-Section
366 (1) (a) of Criminal Code,
compelling action by
intimidation-Not limited to
trade disputes.
Accused sent an anonymous letter
to a legal practitioner with the
intent of preventing him from
exercising his profession. There
were threats of injury to person
and reputation.
The Court held that as it was in
a matter unrelated to a trade
dispute, an offence had not been
committed within the meaning of
section 866 of the Criminal
Code.
Held: That the construction of
section 366, though it bears a
close resemblance to section 7
of the English Conspiracy and
Protection of Property Act of
1875, is not to be limited in
the way suggested.
Sir William Geary
for Payne.
Mckinstry
for Crown.
The following joint judgment was
delivered:-
KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA, BUTLER
LLOYD AND BAKER, JJ.
This is a case stated by Brooke,
J., sitting in the Kaduna
Judicial Division of the High
Court.
The accused was charged with
compelling action by
intimidation contra. section 366
(1)
(a)
of the Criminal Code.
The facts found by the learned
trial .Judge were that the
accused typed and sent an
anonymous letter to a legal
practitioner with the intent of
preventing or hindering him from
doing an act which he was
lawfully entitled to do, viz:
freely to exercise his
profession, and that the letter
contained threats of injury to
the recipient's person and
reputation.
The learned trial Judge held
subject to t he opinion of this
Court that these facts did not
constitute an offence within
section 366 of the Code. The
question we are asked is as
follows:-
" 'Vas the Court correct in
coming to a ,decision that a "
person who by himself sends a
letter to a person threatening "
him with injury to his person
and reputation with the intent
pg18
of preventing or hindering him
from doing an act which he " was
lawfully entitled to do, in a
matter unrelated to a trade "
dispute, does not commit an
offence within the meaning of "
section ;j6G of the Criminal
Code."
The whole of our section a66
hears a close resemblance to
section 7 of the English
Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act of 1875 and clauses
1 (b), (c), (d) and
(e) were undoubtedly
adopted verbatim from that Act
when section 366 was amended by
Ordinance 40/1H38, hut it
is worthy of note that, although
the punishment was reduced by t
he same Ordinance from five
years with or without whipping,
to one year, with or without
whipping, the offence remains a
felony whereas an offence
against the English section is
punishable by a fine of £20 or
imprisonment for three months.
It is also to he noted that our
section 1 (a) is much
wider in its scope than the
corresponding section 7 (1) of
the English Act and that our
section 1 (f) has no counterpart
in the latter.
Counsel for the accused argues:
(I) that the English Act of 1875
01' at least section 7 of that
Act applies only to matters
arising out of trade disputes;
(II)
that section 366 of the Criminal
Code being closely analogous to
and partly actually adopted from
section 7 of the English Act
should be construed as being
similarly limited.
We are of opinion that neither
of these arguments is sound.
Although the reported cases in
connection with the English Act
appeal' to have all arisen in
fact out of trade disputes,
there is nothing either in the
Ad itself 01' those decisions to
show that its construction is to
be limited in the way suggested.
Nor if then' was should we feel
bound to construe section 366
with its different wording as
similarly limited.
We accordingly answer the
question asked· by the learned
trial Judge in the negative.
