Judicial corruption contrary to
section
114 (I) of the Criminal Code
Asking for and receiving of bribe
separate offences-Corroboration of
accomplices-Actus reus and mens
rea with regard to accomplices.
HELD: That the learned Judge had
sufficiently directed himself as
to the separation of the two
different acts of " asking" and of
" receiving" which were combined
in one charge, and that the act of
" asking" was complete before a
bribe was offered.
SEMBLE : that a spy who paid a
bribe was not an accomplice as his
act extended to the
actus reus
and not to the
mens rea. Rex versus George
4
.L.R. distinguished. Appeal
dismissed. There is no need to set
out the facts.
C.
N. S. Pollard
for Crown.
O. Alakija and
O.
Martins
for appellants.
The
following joint judgment was
delivered.
BUTLER LLOYD, AG. C J., NIGERIA,
GRAHAM PAUL AND BROOKE, JJ.
This was-, an appeal against a
conviction for an offence against
section 114 (1) of the Criminal
Code. The trial Judge in finding
the accused guilty of judicial
corruption records his reasons
that ~'in my opinion the section
under which the charge is laid
makes " asking" for a bribe an
offence and the "receiving" of a
bribe another separate offence.
The particulars charge the accused
with " asking and receiving" a
bribe ... I shall cure the
irregularity, if irregularity it
be, by finding him guilty of
corruptly asking for the sum of £2
and excluding the receiving."
The grounds of appeal are :---
1.
No sufficient and legal evidence
to justify the conviction.
2.
No corroborative evidence to
support the conviction.
3. The learned Judge misdirected
himself by holding that there was
sufficient corroboration of the
evidence of accomplices.
4.
Verdict against the weight of
evidence.
5. The learned trial Judge
misdirected himself by holding
that although there was a
political conspiracy by the
witnesses for the Crown against
the appellant, yet that it has no
bearing or weight to discredit
their evidence .
6. Conclusive evidence of a trap
laid for the appellant by the
witnesses for the Prosecution
Further grounds were added :-
7. Misdirection by
trial Judge as to the evidence
given by the
witness T. E. R. A. Green
8. As an act of
omission forming the consideration
of the
bribe.
9. Misdirection and non-direction
as to the defence generally put
forward.
The learned Counsel for the
appellant referred to the
embarrassment caused by the
combination of the two different
acts of " asking" and" receiving"
in the one charge but the trial
Judge particularly directed
himself to the separation of the
two offences in the passage of his
judgment quoted above.
The learned Counsel for the
appellant referred to the
embarrassment caused by the
combination of the two different
acts of " asking" and" receiving"
in the one charge but the trial
Judge particularly directed
himself to the separation of the
two offences in the passage of his
judgment quoted above.
The main argument was directed to
the fact that the witness Lawani
Dawodu was an accomplice and
reliance was placed on the case of
R. v. George
4
N.L.R. 5: Corroboration, it is
therefore contended, was necessary
and there was in fact none in this
case. The decision in this much
quoted case cannot however be
extended to a case in which there
was no approach made by the
alleged accomplice and the
judgment therein carefully
distinguishes the " receiving of
the money." In the present case
the accused was found guilty of "
asking" and the offence was in
fact completed before the payment
of the £2. But even assuming that
the payment of the money would
normally have brought the witness
within the category of accomplices
one must go further and observe
that the witness ,was acting in
the capacity of a spy and that his
act extended, in the words of
Professor Kenny, to the
actus reus
and not the
mens rea.
There are the cases of
R. v. Mullins, R. v. Bickley
and the 1910 case of
R. v. Heuser
6
C.A.R. 76 quoted by Crown Counsel,
to support this.
As regards the other grounds of
appeal the learned trial Judge
fully considered the question of a
conspiracy and also dealt with all
other points raised in the defence
such as that the delays were due
to the absence of the defendants:
he in fact says " it is quite
clear that his intentions were
corrupt and that this was intended
by him to be a "greasing of his
hand" before he should give
judgment in the case of Green
against a number of other
persons."
The attention of this Court was
drawn to the cases
R. v. Richards
4
C.A.R. 161 where the defence was
not properly put to the jury, to
R. v. Dinnick
3
C.A.R. 77 holding that a defence
however weak must be put before
the jury and finally to
R. v. Wolff
10 C.A.R. 107. With regard to
misdirection and to omission to
direct himself we find that there
is nothing in the way of either in
the Judge's reasons for his
finding which were fully set out,
on which a reasonable ground of
complaint can be founded, and we
are satisfied that he sufficiently
directed himself to all the points
raised by the defence.
This appeal must accordingly he
dismissed.
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