JUDGMENT:
On 28th day of July,
2009, plaintiff caused a writ of
summons together with an
accompanying statement of claim
to be issued against the
defendants.
Plaintiff’s case as gleaned from
the pliant is that, it is a
United Kingdom based student
recruitment agency with offices
in Ghana, Kenya Nigeria and the
United Kingdom (U.K).
The 2nd defendant was
described as the Managing
Director of 1st
defendant organization and that,
she was in the employment of
plaintiff as it’s office Manager
from May, 2006, to May 2009.
Furthermore, it was alleged
that, whiles, 2nd
defendant was working for
plaintiff, she had been given
both verbal and written warnings
to improve her performance but
she failed or refused to do so.
And that as a result she was
dismissed in April 2009.
It is plaintiff’s case that the
2nd defendant has
breached the confidentiality
clause contained in its contract
with plaintiff by establishing
the 1st defendant
company within three (3) years
after leaving plaintiff’s
employment.
On the other hand,
the defence has alleged that
following an advertisement in
the Daily Graphic, a Ghanaian
newspaper, by the plaintiff in
2005, advertising a vacancy for
Office Manager, 2nd
defendant applied and was
invited for an interview. It
has been alleged that 2nd
defendant was selected after the
interview conducted by Directors
of plaintiff company, and she
was given the job of Office
Manager, by word of mouth, and
without a formal contract, with
a promise that a formal contract
will be worked on upon the
arrival of the Directors in
United Kingdom (U.K).
Furthermore, 2nd
defendant, alleged she started
work without a formal contract,
in May 2005, and that an
unsigned letter was sent to her,
offering her the job, and that
upon reading the letter, she did
not accept some terms in the
letter, and this was made known
to plaintiff, who withdrew the
offer letter. The fact that 2nd
defendant’s name was wrongly
stated, lack of provision of
SSNIT – i.e. pension payments,
as required by the National
Pension’s Act, 2008, Act 766.
The requirement that 2nd
defendant was to use her
personal phone for official
duties and unrealistic targets
set in the letter, which 2nd
defendant was asked to meet, the
defence stated as the reasons
for not signing or accepting the
offer for the job contained in
the letter.
Still on the
contract of employment, the
defence alleged that, when, the
first letter was withdrawn,
another letter was sent to 2nd
defendant, with a cover letter.
This second letter it was
alleged was headed as a new
contract, but did not remedy the
deficiencies stated above, and
was therefore, not accepted by 2nd
defendant.
Then the allegation of a third
letter on conditions of service
was made and that even though
there was no concluded contract,
plaintiff’s Director spoke to 2nd
defendant on phone and
encouraged her to continue to
work until a contract acceptable
to all sides was made.
It is the case of the defence
that, 2nd defendant
continued to work on the mutual
understanding reached which at
best could be described as
contract for services where her
expertise were offered as an
independent provider of services
for remuneration and not as a
contract of service, where she
would have been seen as a bona
fide employee of
plaintiff/company placed on
salary and strictly subject to
the terms of a valid concluded
employment contract as well as
the code of the plaintiff
organization.
Further still, it is
the defendants case that the
Directors of plaintiff/company
urged her to continue to work,
and that it was based on her
performance and output that
plaintiff sought to renew her
contract and also sponsored her
daughter to U.K, and therefore
the allegation of
non-performance against her is
borne out of malice. It was
alleged that plaintiff accused 2nd
defendant of reporting it to
Internal Revenue Service. And
that she was a trade unionist
and as a result, plaintiff
sought to find fault thereafter
with everything she did, are the
other averments made.
The 2nd defendant
averred that there is no valid
contract between her, and
plaintiff and that the
confidentiality clause put in
the last letter is
unconscionable and constitute an
infringement on 2nd
defendant’s human rights.
The under listed are
the issues set down for
determination, when direction
was given by the court, after
the close of pleadings:
1. Whether or not the 2nd
defendant was in the employment
of the plaintiff organization
from April, 2006 to April 2009.
2. Whether or not the
employment contract between the
plaintiff and 2nd
defendant contained a
confidentiality clause
preventing the 2nd
defendant from working for or
trading as a competitor agency
for a period of three (3) years
commencing from the date of
termination of the contract of
employment.
3. Whether or not the 2nd
defendant has breached the
confidentiality clause in the
contract of employment between
her and the plaintiff.
4. Whether or not the 2nd
defendant has formed a
competitor agency or
organization (i.e. the 1st
defendant) within three (3)
years from the termination of
the 2nd defendant’s
contract with plaintiff in
April, 2006.
5. Any other issues that
may emanate from the pleadings
filed.
The first issue
listed above, which is about the
status of 2nd
defendant when she worked for
plaintiff, shall be taken
first. It is very fundamental,
and the resolution it will
affect the other issues.
Evidence adduced by plaintiff’s
representative and its only
witness shall be reviewed, this
will include answers they gave
whiles under cross-examination.
Plaintiff has alleged that 2nd
defendant was its employee, it
follows that, it must tender
cogent evidence that is
sufficient, so as to have a
favourable finding made in its
favour.
In other words, plaintiff has to
discharge the burden of proof on
issue one (1), which shall be
considered first. This is an
issue which is capable of
positive proof. Therefore,
plaintiff is under a legal duty
to prove the issue.
The defence will also be
required to establish the
converse of issue (1) one,
because it is their case that 2nd
defendant was never an employee
of plaintiff.
Martha Quainoo
Amankwah, representing
plaintiff, testified as
plaintiff, she described herself
as the Office Manager and that 2nd
defendant – Mrs. Appaih-Agyekum
who was formerly the Office
Manager of plaintiff is known to
her.
Her first material
assertion on the status of 2nd
defendant as an employee, took
the form of EXHIBIT “A”, which
she tendered to support the fact
that she was such an employee as
alleged.
EXHIBIT “A” entitled “LETTER OF
EMPLOYMENT WITH BICE – IN
REPRESENTATIVE INTO” it is
addressed to Brandford Bervell
Jnr. of Achimota – Accra, Ghana.
It is clear, it is not 2nd
defendant’s letter of
appointment that has been
tendered. Somehow, plaintiff
succeeded in tendering EXHIBIT
“A” again as EXHIBIT “B” on the
blind side of the court.
In continuation, the
plaintiff testified to the
effect that, 2nd
defendant started work in June
2005 as Acting Manager and
served a period of probation and
was later confirmed in 2007, and
EXHIBIT “N” was tendered on
this.
The next significant
assertion made is not on how the
2nd defendant became
an employee, but rather on how
her appointment was alleged
terminated. EXHIBIT “C” was
tendered, and plaintiff
asserted, it was due to
absenteeism, lack of
performance, her behaviour, as a
person who cannot work as team
player.
The reason stated supra are in
EXHIBIT “C” indeed, the evidence
showed that, 2nd
defendant has been dismissed,
and was ordered to refund
£2,000.00 to Mr. Nartey.
EXHIBITS “K” written by one
Mikel Avoke, and “M” written by
one Noah Kwao, contains
complains about 2nd
defendant, who was described as
not being polite to colleague
workers and clients/students.
Furthermore, the
testimony of Theophilus Tettey
Nartey (PW1), showed that he is
the Country Manager of
plaintiff/organization, and 2nd
defendant is known to him,
because she had worked as an
employee of plaintiff until in
2009, when her appointment was
terminated.
He anchored his assertion that 2nd
defendant was their employee, on
EXHIBIT “N”, which is dated
September 2007.
The next
consideration is what
plaintiff’s representative and
PW1, said whiles under
cross-examination on (issue one)
under consideration.
Martha Quainoo Amankwah was
tested on her assertion that 2nd
defendant was an employee of
plaintiff, she admitted, EXHIBIT
“A” she tendered is not her (2nd
defendant’s) appointment
letter. And promised to furnish
same later on.
When it was put to her, 2nd
defendant was not formally
appointed as an employee of
plaintiff, she stated, she had
worked for plaintiff.
EXHIBIT “1” was tendered through
plaintiff’s representative, and
she was confronted with the fact
that 2nd defendant
did not sign the contract or
offer of appointment letter. It
has been gleaned from the record
that, plaintiff’s representative
said, she does not know why, she
refused to sign the contract.
She also said she will not give
any other comment on EXHIBIT “1”
and failed to produce before the
court 2nd defendant’s
appointment letter as promised
earlier on in the trial.
EXHIBIT “1” consists of a
covering letter, which gave an
indication that a new letter of
employment was being put before
2nd defendant.
The exhibit has not been signed
either by the Directors of
plaintiff/organization or 2nd
defendant.
It is plaintiff’s
case that 2nd
defendant was dismissed for lack
of performance, and its
representative insisted that,
that was the case.
The cross-examination of PW1 –
Theophilus Tettey Nartey also
revealed that, it is plaintiff’s
case that 2nd
defendant has a contract with
plaintiff. He attributes his
position to the fact that he has
personal knowledge of the fact
he was asserting because of his
personal involvement in it.
This witness’s answers are to
the effect that 2nd
defendant has a conclusive
contract with plaintiff, even
though the record also showed
that he admitted there were some
deficiencies with the
agreement. But he expressed
surprise about reasons defendant
gave for not signing the
contract.
Besides the line of
defence disclosed when the
outline of answers given by
plaintiff and PW1 were stated,
it is the case of the defence
that neither was EXHIBIT “A” the
letter of appointment relevant
to the issue under consideration
nor, has there been any evidence
offered to support the
assertion.
The defence cross-examined to
the effect that, the letter of
employment, were not conclusive
and therefore, do not represent
a valid contract of employment
it was asserted, the offer of
employment letter was defective
as it had no provision on
pension, SSNIT payment, had the
name of defendant spelt wrongly,
and required of defendant to use
her personal phone for official
business, hence defendant
rejected same.
Another significant
assertion made by the defence is
that 2nd defendant
left the job in frustration but
not because she was incompetent
and lacked also, leadership
qualities.
The examination also
showed what the defence
described as a contradiction,
where in evidence-in-chief of
plaintiff it was said 2nd
defendant started work in 2005,
and yet 2006, was mentioned in
cross-examination.
Furthermore, it was
said, because defendant insisted
on her rights, she was tagged by
plaintiff a trade unionist and
an agitator, and the work
environment as filled with
hostility, due to the unresolved
complaints she raised with the
offer letter.
The defence hinted that, there
is evidence which showed that on
8th April, 2009, 2nd
defendant was acknowledged as a
successful worker, then in May
2009, plaintiff purport to
terminate her employment citing
incompetent as reason. And
EXHIBIT “6” series with 8th
April, 2009 and EXHIBIT “7” are
the confirmations of the
assertions of defendant.
It was asserted malice and
hostility was what led to that
decision, where a successful
worker became an incompetent
worker, just within thirty (30)
days.
And that defendant left the job,
before plaintiff sought to
dismiss her.
The next stage in
the review and assessment of
evidence led, is what 2nd
defendant said about her status
as a worker of plaintiff, in
terms of the contract of
employment.
Her evidence showed that, she
saw the advertisement for job of
Office Manager of BICE, she
applied, and was invited for an
interview, and later given an
offer of employment contract,
she recounted the defects, (as
has been reviewed supra) with
the offer letter, and the reason
for rejecting same. She
tendered EXHIBIT “2” as her
application.
She testified to the effect that
there was a second offer of
employment letter, which she
rejected for same reasons as the
first one.
And then, a third one, which was
also rejected, because she
refused to sign.
EXHIBIT “3” dated
September, 2006, is a covering
letter and another offer of
employment letter, it has terms
and conditions of service,
stated therein. And EXHIBIT “4”
is dated September, 2007, it is
entitled, Letter of Employment
with BICE – Ghana Office
Manager.
In it the plaintiff wrote as
follows:
“We hereby confirm that we have
extended your contract for a
period of 3 years ending
November 2010”
This exhibit, is just a letter,
when its form is examined from
its beginning as well as its
concluding part. But in terms of
content, conditions of service
have been enumerated. It has
neither been signed nor executed
by any party. And presupposes
there was a valid contract,
which was being extended.
In continuation of
her account defendant stated
EXHIBIT “4” was also rejected
because it did not only fail to
remedy her complaints but
contain for the first time a
confidentiality clause.
Whiles under
cross-examination, when
plaintiff stated defendant
worked for it, and so she was in
its employment, 2nd
defendant asserted she was
encouraged to work even without
a contract, and so she pressed
on and worked for plaintiff.
When questioned on
the duration she worked for
plaintiff, and the length of
relationship being offered as
basis for stating she was in
plaintiff’s employment, 2nd
defendant answers showed that
for two years she had worked for
plaintiff, then the
confidentiality clause was
inserted.
Furthermore, these
primary facts were raised with
defendant, and with them
plaintiff sought to show she was
a bona fide employee.
It was said the contract with
defendant was valid, that she
accepted the confidentiality
clause in the contract, that she
gave same contract to others (or
other employees) and further
still, the acceptance of
salary/income was cited as
evidence that defendant had
accepted the contract in the
offer of employment sent to her.
The following are
the responses offered by the
defendant. She denied that
there was a valid contract, and
that she did not communicate her
acceptance of the offer, and in
respect of her giving the same
contract she is rejecting to
others, defendant stated she did
so just because that was her
schedule and that indeed, she
signed FOR the Directors
(Nazmina Panju and Cliff
Dedynski).
This is how defendant explained
further the issues raised with
her:
“The contract was never
accepted. That is not true I
never accepted it, to me
accepting that contract was for
me selling or forfeiting my
birth right, and my human right,
aptitude, skills, experience
that I got over the years. I
will not accept to throw away…..
I did not accept the contract
the confidentiality clause I did
not accept it.”
The defendant
abhorrence of the
confidentiality clause, and the
other provisions or clauses in
the offer letter is evident in
the answer quoted above.
As noted already
plaintiff has to prove that it
has a valid and subsisting
contract of employment with 2nd
defendant.
In that regard, plaintiff has
raised facts from which its
desires that a presumption of 2nd
defendant being its worker, must
be made, in its favour.
A valid contract
must be rooted in the common law
principles of OFFER and
ACCEPTANCE, CONSIDERATION and an
INTENTION to CREATE LEGAL
RELATIONS.
Therefore, a mere request for
information or an indication of
good intent in respect of a
future conduct, as well an
invitation to treat or an
invitation to make an offer,
will not ground a valid
contract.
The other important
characteristics of a valid
contract are that one party must
agree to perform an undertaking
and the other party must accept
the performance.
The agreement must be supported
by consideration, which is
reciprocal. And the parties
must have the requisite capacity
to enter the agreement, and the
object of the agreement must be
legal, and giving rise to
legally recognized obligations.
Plaintiff has made
averments and assertions of
having employed 2nd
defendant and EXHIBIT “A” and
“B” [which are the same]
proffered in support are most
irrelevant and have no
evidential value. EXHIBIT “N”,
dated September 2007, sought to
extend an existing contract, but
it is a document that has
neither been signed nor
executed. It could be seen that
the document is meant to be an
employment letter, as distinct
from an appointment letter.
In rebuttal the
defence has tendered EXHIBIT “1”
part of which is a letter of
employment dated September,
2006, it sought to offer
conditions of service contained
therein to the 2nd
defendant, it is not signed by
any of the parties.
EXHIBIT “3” is the same as
EXHIBIT “1”, and the covering
letter gave an indication as to
some complaints that the 2nd
defendant has raised, which the
plaintiff sought to address by
the offer of employment letter.
In EXHIBIT “4”, tendered by the
defence, the point was made
that, it was not signed, and a
confidentiality clause was
introduced into the offer of
employment document.
The defence denied
signing or accepting the various
offers made, and reasons for the
rejection have been reviewed
supra.
I have found that
all these documents that relate
to the offer of employment to 2nd
defendant have not been signed,
and are therefore not binding on
2nd defendant.
Besides, plaintiff must convince
the court that its offer of
employment document is in
conformity with the Labour laws
of Ghana. The Labour Act, Act
651/03 in sections 12 (1) and
12(2) provides:
“Contract of employment -
12(1) The employment of a worker
by an employer for a period of
six months or more or for a
number of working days
equivalents to six months or
more within a year shall be
secured by a written contract of
employment.”
“12(2) A contract of
employment shall express
in clear terms
the rights and obligations of
the parties.”
Furthermore, section 13 is also
relevant to the issue under
consideration.
The section provides:
“Subject to the terms and
conditions of a contract of
employment between an employer
and a worker, the employer shall
within two months after the
commencement of the employment
furnish the worker with written
statement of the particulars of
the main terms of the contract
of employment in the form set
out in schedule 1 to this Act,
signed by the employer and
the worker.”
The offer of
employment document has flouted
the essential requirement of a
valid employment contract as
provided for by statute.
Therefore, how can plaintiff
insist that it has a valid
contract with 2nd
defendant?
Plaintiff’s intent is to employ,
2nd defendant on
contract for a specified period
as could be gleaned from the
various employment contract,
tendered (i.e. EXHIBIT “N”,
EXHIBIT “1” and EXHIBIT “3”)
But even that type of contract
should be accepted by both sides
with the material terms
particularized, and the document
signed, signifying approval on
both sides.
Assuming there are
some extenuating factors in
favour of plaintiff, even though
it failed to comply with the
statute, can there be a
presumption of worker, employer
status, in favour of the
employer, just because, the
employee rendered services and
received remuneration in respect
of the employer’s work?
A brief history and
tests used in determining
whether a person is an employee
or not is crucial to the
resolution of this issue.
A contract of
employment as it is known today
evolved out of master-servant
relationship at common law.
Where a master supplies work to
the worker, provides his
medicals and safety at work,
indemnifies the worker and pays
his remuneration, then that
worker is to all intents and
purposes a servant of the
master.
On the other hand, where the
worker obeys lawful orders of
owner of a business, serves that
owner only, accounts to that
owner faithfully and is paid for
the services rendered to that
owner of the business, then that
owner is the master of that
worker.
It is out of this
relationship that the concept of
CONTRACT OF SERVICE and CONTRACT
FOR SERVICE evolved. In a
contract of service, the worker
is employed as a part of the
business. But the contract for
service, the worker is only
accessory to the business.
A well-known example of a
contract for service is the
independent contractor who
undertakes to produce a given
result but he is not under the
control of the employer.
Furthermore, there has been
tremendous legislative in roads
made to regulate the
employee/worker and employer
relationship. Thus in
accordance with statutory
requirements, contracts of
employment are reduced into
writing, and the terms must be
specified.
But whether the contract is one
of service or for service, is
still relevant in determining
whether a particular worker is
an employee of the employer or
NOT.
The test mechanism
fashioned over the years to
determine a worker’s status are
multiple and complex.
Firstly, there is the CONTROL
TEST, where evidence on
supervision direction and
control of work done by the
worker, by the employer is used
to determine the former’s
status.
Secondly, as the size of
businesses became enormous and
complex, and employees have
become more and more
professional the employment
relationship became more
impersonal and the direct
control by the employer becomes
less effective or completely
impossible. So the INTERGRATION
or ORGANISATIONAL Test was
developed by the courts. In
this regard the observation of,
LORD Denning L. J. is important
as found in the case:
STEVENSON JORDAN & HARRISON
VRS.
MACDONALD & EVANS (1952) 1TRL
101
He observed that whether a
person was an employee or not no
longer depended on whether he
submitted to orders but:
“it depends on whether the
person is part and parcel
of the organization. A person
under a contract of
service does his work as
an integral part of the
business whereas a person under
contract for
services although he
might do his work for the
business is not integrated into
it but is only an
accessory to it,”
Thirdly, because of deficiencies
and challenges in the
ORGANISATIONAL test, the INDICIA
TEST which has four factors as
its fulcrum emerged. The
factors are:
(a)
The employer’s power to select
an employee
(b)
The payment of the wages of the
employee
(c)
The right to control the manner
in which work was done, and
(d)
The right of suspension or
dismissal [SHORT VRS. HENDERSON
LTD. 1946, 62 TLR 427] refers.
This third test was also
inadequate as factors (a), (b)
and (d) are only indices of the
existence of a contract and not
the nature of the contract, and
factor (c) is the old control
test.
Aside all these, the
Multiple test has enjoyed
acceptability. It is also
called the Economic Reality
Test.
This test cuts across the
control and integrated test as
well as many other relevant
factors.
The test required the court to
take into consideration the
factors of control of the
worker, ownership of the tools
used by the worker, the chance
of making profit by the worker,
and the risk of loss by the
worker. Lord Wright who
formulated this test in:
MONTREAL
LOCOMOTIVE WORKS LTD
VRS.
MONTREAL
(1947) 1 DLR 161,
did not intend the four factors
to be conclusive. So factors
such as remuneration by way of
wages, salaries, tax and social
security contribution are
relevant determinants as well.
In addition, factors as
membership of company pension
scheme, holiday pay, payment
when absent for illness,
prohibition on working for
competitors and disciplinary
control over the worker are
equally important
considerations.
The Mutuality of
obligation test appears to be
the modern trend and has gain
currency. And under this, a
contract of employment is only
deemed to exist, if there is
formal legal obligation on both
sides.
It is apparent that
no, single test provides a
complete answer to this vexed
question as to whether a worker,
is in a contract of service or
contract for service in modern
employment relationship.
Each relationship must be
considered on its merits, based
on the facts and the
circumstances. All factors must
be weighed in a balance or the
judicial scale, and must not be
applied mechanically.
One “Heavy-weight” or dominant
factor can out weigh four “Light
weight” factors.
Indeed, in the case:
LEE VRS. CHUNG [1990] 2 WLR
1173, the PRIVY Council held
that, the issue is one of fact
and not law.
Plaintiff has
asserted that, it gave a job or
work to 2nd defendant
which she has done over the
years. And that she has been
paid salary, which she had
received, in addition to trips
abroad and medical treatment for
her sick daughter in U. K etc.
Apart from the cost of treatment
of 2nd defendant’s
daughter, which has been
contested, the defendant did not
deny working for plaintiff for
almost three years and receiving
salary.
If the control test
was a sufficient guide, the
assertions made by plaintiff
which were admitted by 2nd
defendant, would have been
enough to hold that, 2nd
defendant was plaintiff’s
employee.
As regards the ORGNISATIONAL
test or integration test, the
aggregated of evidence on the
record showed that plaintiff
resisted paying SSNIT –
contribution in respect of 2nd
defendant’s work. Plaintiff did
not deny the fact that it gave 2nd
defendant names, such as
“AGITATOR” and “TRADE UNIONIST”.
Thus it was unacceptable to
freely organize and belong to a
trade union, if one worked for
plaintiff. It was equally
unacceptable to insist on SSNIT
contribution in respect of
plaintiff’s work.
However by the National Pension
Act, Act 766 section 3 every
employer is enjoined to pay
SSNIT contributions, so as to
provide for the future of its
employees, when they retire.
The Labour Act, Act 651/04,
sections: 10 (d) 79, 80 and 81
has copious provision on workers
rights and the obligation
imposed on employers to permit
workers to freely organize and
belong to unions.
The history of trade Unionism
worldwide showed that but for
unions, industrialist and job
owners, will treat and keep
labour or workers as slaves, and
make them subservient to
capital.
Plaintiff has
evinced an intention to flout
Ghana’s labour laws as well as
the pension laws.
The above is not a mark of an
employer who sought to treat a
worker as part of the
organization.
The evidence on the
record showed that plaintiff’s
has failed the Mutuality of
obligation test, very miserably.
Firstly, it failed to reach
agreement with 2nd
defendant on the material terms
of her engagement, and pretended
there was a contract that it was
extending or re-newing, in
respect of 2nd
defendant’s job.
Secondly, it exercised control
over 2nd defendant in
terms of the work she was
required to do, and tools of
work, in an arbitrary manner,
the record showed that plaintiff
insisted that 2nd
defendant must use her personal
cell phone for official work.
Thirdly, plaintiff determined
when to adjust up or down 2nd
defendant’s remuneration,
without a clear cut criterion
acceptable to both sides. The
demand on 2nd
defendant refund £2,000 is an
example.
There are other
facts on the record that showed
that there was no mutuality of
obligations and so, 2nd
defendant under the arrangement
they had, would have been unable
to successfully pursue any
action against plaintiff as her
employer, whiles the plaintiff
even sought to dismiss her
without following any rules of
procedure.
The material and
heavy weight factor that will
determine the question of 2nd
defendant’s status as an
employee or otherwise is the
fact that, plaintiff failed to
engage 2nd defendant
either as an employee, employed
for a specified period, or as a
permanent staff. This
constitutes grave violations of
the Labour Law, Act 651/04.
Therefore, 2nd
defendant worked and received
remuneration as an independent
contractor. She was a worker
who rendered services under an
arrangement that amount to or
could best be described as a
contract for service. A
contract or an agreement to
render services as an
independent contractor without a
formal agreement [with terms of
engagement specifically provided
for] is not obligatory.
But it is unlawful to seek to
employ a worker for up to three
years without a formal written
contract. In this case section
75 of the Labour law on, legal
presumption of contract after
the expiration of six (6) months
of continuous service of the
worker to the same employer
shall not apply, because 2nd
defendant has raised objection
to the terms of the offer of
employment letter.
BY COURT:
1.
The plaintiff has failed on the
preponderance of the
probabilities to establish issue
“A”, which is essentially about
the status of 2nd
defendant as being plaintiff’s
employee, and by that, plaintiff
has failed to establish the
other issues listed on the
Application for Direction.
2.
Plaintiff’s action/claims as
endorsed on the writ in its
entirety are dismissed.
3.
Cost of GH¢5,000 is awarded
against plaintiff and in favour
of defendant.
(SGD.) N. M. C. ABODAKPI
JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT
SAVIOUR KUDZE FOR PLAINTIFF -
PRESENT
ISSAH ADAM FOR DEFENDANTS –
PRESENT
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