Statute of Limitations-Period
for bar begins from date action
could have been
taken-Application-Sections
14
and 19 Supreme Court
Ordinance-Generally applicable
under Section 14 but excluded in
certain circumstances under
Section 19Discussion of these
circumstance.- Before importing
Native Customary law
it
must be shown that substantial
injustice would result from its
omission-Where both parties are
native.- onus is on party who
wishes to exclude it-where one
party non-native onus un party
who wishes to import it to show
that is exclusion would be
substantially unjust.
The facts are set out in the
judgments.
Held: Appeal allowed. Claim was
statute barred. Judgment of
Court below set aside.
R. E. Phipps
(with him
E. C. Quist )
for Appellants.
K. Adumua Bossman
for Respondent.
The following judgments were
delivered: KINGDON, C.J.,
NIGERIA.
This is an appeal from a
judgment of Deane, C.J., sitting
in the Divisional Court at Accra
and raises the very important
question of the applicability of
the Statute of Limitations. By
his writ the plaintiff claimed
£500 damages for breach of
agreement. There were no formal
pleadings but in his opening
statement the defendants'
counsel expressly pleaded that
the claim was statute barred. )
The facts are very fully set out
by the learned Chief Justice in
his judgment and need only be
shortly summarised here for the
purpose of considering the
question of whether the claim is
statute barred or not. The
plaintiff is an educated African
carpenter, the defendants are a
European Company. The defendants
supplied the plaintiff with a
portable sawing machine which
they obtained from Switzerland
to his order in October, 1924.
On delivery a written agreement
under seal was entered into by
the parties bearing date the 3rd
November 1924. By that agreement
the defendants agreed to sell
the machine to the plaintiff,
but it was expressly provided
that the machine should remain
the property of the defendants
until the full amount of the
purchase money was paid. The
machine turned out to be useless
for the purpose for which it was
intended in spite of genuine
attempts by both parties
to make it work satisfactorily.
The machine was lying idle for
some considerable period owing to
the illness of the plaintiff, but
when its uselessness was finally
established the plaintiff demanded
from defendants the return of the
deposit he had made by way of part
payment. On the 7th November, 1927
he wrote to the defendants asking
to be allowed to return the
machine after going into proper
accounts with them. The defendants
thereupon took the machine back,
but have not returned to the
plaintiff his deposit. The
plaintiff accordingly issued his
writ of summons dated the 26th
September, 1933.
The learned Chief Justice, in
dealing with the question of
whether the claim is barred by the
Statute of Limitations, says: " If
the Statute is applicable it is
clear that the plaintiff can not "
recover, his demand having been
made so long ago as the 7th "
November, 1927 ". The meaning of
this is not clear to me since the
period for bar is six years, and
from the 7th November, 1927, to
the 26th September, 1933 is less
than six years. But the point is
not of importance because the date
from which the period for bar
begins to run is the time when the
plaintiff might have brought his
action
i.e.
in this, as in other actions for
breach of contract, the date when
the contract was broken
(See Chitty on Contract,
18th Edition, pages 908 & 912-13).
The date in this case is October,
1924, considerably more than six
years before the date of the writ.
I agree therefore with the Chief
Justice that if the statute is
applicable the plaintiff cannot
recover.
The question of the applicability
of the Statute of Limitations to
the Gold Coast has received much
consideration from the Courts of
the Colony in the past. The two
material sections of the law are
numbers 14 and 19 of the Supreme
Court Ordinance (Cap. 158).
Section 14 reads as follows:-
"The common law, the doctrines of
equity, and the " statutes of
general application which were in
force " in England at the date
when the Colony obtained a " local
legislature, that is to say, on
the 24th July, " ] 874. shall be
in force within the jurisdiction
of " the Court ".
It was held as long ago as 1889,
in the case of
J. J. Pischer
&'
Co. v. C. P. Swaniker
(Redwar's
Comments on Gold Coast Ordinances
p. 137), that the Statutes of
Limitations are " statutes " of
general application". I have no
doubt that that decision was
correct and I endorse it.
The present wording of section 19
is as follows:-
"
Subject as hereinafter in this
section provided, noting " in this
Ordinance shall deprive the
Supreme Court "of the right to
observe and to enforce the "
observance of, or shall deprive
any person of the " benefit of,
any native customary law, such
native "customary law not being
repugnant to justice,
" equity, or good conscience, or
incompatible either "in terms or
by necessary implication with
any "Ordinance, or any rule,
regulation, order, proclamation
or bye-law made under any
Ordinance " for the time being
in force in the Colony. Such "
native customary law shall, save
where the circum" stances,
nature, or justice of the case
shall otherwise " require, be
deemed applicable in causes and
matters "where the parties
thereto are natives, and
"particularly, but without
derogating from their "
application in other cases, in
causes and matters " relating to
marriage under native customary
law " and to the tenure and
transfer of real and personal
"property~ and to inheritance
and testamentary '.'
dispositions, and also in causes
and matters between " natives
and non-natives where it shall
appear to the " Court that
substantial injustice would be
done to " any party by a strict
adherence to the rules of any
"law or laws other than native
customary law. "Provided
nevertheless that no party shall
be "entitled to claim the
benefit of any native "customary
law if it shall appear, either
from " express contract or from
the nature of the trans"
actions out of which any cause,
matter or question
. " shall have arisen, that such
party agreed or must "be taken
to have agreed that his
obligations in "connection with
such transactions should be "
regulated exclusively by some
law or laws other " than native
customary law. And provided
further, " that in cases where
no express rule is applicable to
" any matter in issue the Court
shall be guided by "the
principles of justice, equity
and good
" conscience " .
For the purposes of this case
there is no material difference
between the present wording and
the wording of the section prior
to
1927 when it was amended (No. 19
of 1927), there being a further
amendment in 1929 (No. 11 of
1929).
Redward in his Comments on Gold
Coast Ordinances at pages
10 and 11 sets out thus his view
of the law as it stood in 1909:-
" The question as to the
application of the Statutes of
"Limitations has more than once
engaged the " attention of the
Gold Coast Courts, but the local
" case law on this subject is
not in a very satisfactory
"condition. The better opinion
is that, except in " cases
coming within a provision in
section 19 of the "Ordinance,
these statutes have no
application as "between natives,
and that a defence of the
Statutes " of Limitations in a
suit between natives, or between
"a native and a European, must
rest entirely, and" can only
succeed, upon evidence of a
contract tl, be " bound
exclusively
by English law, such contract "
being either express, or implied
from the course of " dealing or
the nature of the transactions
between " the parties. In this
view of the matter, the right
"to claim the benefit of the
statutes is not, in "strictness,
a matter of law, but is purely "
conventional or
contractual,
within the provision "of section
19 of Ordinance. In order that
the " Court may be induced to
hold that English law " shall
apply under section
19, it must be satisfied ., that
the parties agreed that their
obligations ., should be
regulated exclusively by
English law, " and not partly
by English law and
partly by native " law
"
.•
Again at page 14 he writes,
referring to Indian law, " there
is " no provision so strongly
worded as section
19 of the Supreme " Court
Ordinance of the Gold Coast, by
which the native is only •• to
be deprived of the benefit of
any native law or custom when it
"can be shown that he has
excluded it by contract, express
or •• implied ".
The view expressed in these
quotations has been accepted in
subsequent cases, notably those
of
Hughes v. Davies
decided in
1909 (Renner's Reports,
549-557), and Kwam,in Aradzie
v. Kobina Yandor &
Another (F .C. 1922, p. 91)
in the first of which Francis
Smith, J. said: "In my opinion
whether the statute is to be
"applied or not must depend on
the circumstances of each "
individual case within the terms
of the proviso to section 19 of
"the Supreme Court Ordinance,
and none of the authorities "
decided by the Supreme Court has
been so determined outside "
that proviso".
It appears to me from these
quotations from Redwar and from
the subsequent cases that the
material distinction which the
section makes between cases
where both parties are natives
and cases where one is a native
and one a non-native has been
overlooked. Where both are
natives native customary law
applies (absolutely under the
law in force when Redwar wrote,
but now " save where the
"circumstances, nature or
justice of the case shall
otherwise " require "). On the
other hand where one party is a
native and one a non-native- the
native customary law only
applies where it shall appear to
the Court that substantial
injustice would be done to any
party by a strict adherence to
the rules of any other law. In
other words, it is a condition
precedent of the application of
the native customary law at all
that there would be substantial
injustice if it were not
applied. It is not until that
condition precedent is fulfilled
that consideration need be given
to the terms of the first
proviso to the present section
whereby a limitation is put upon
the application of the native
customary law.
" equity, or good conscience, or
incompatible either "in terms or
by necessary implication with
any "Ordinance, or any rule,
regulation, order,
pro"clamation or bye-law made
under any Ordinance " for the
time being in force in the
Colony. Such " native customary
law shall, save where the
circum" stances, nature, or
justice of the case shall
otherwise " require, be deemed
applicable in causes and matters
"where the parties thereto are
natives, and "particularly, but
without derogating from their "
application in other cases, in
causes and matters " relating to
marriage under native customary
law " and to the tenure and
transfer of real and personal
"property~ and to inheritance
and testamentary '.'
dispositions, and also in causes
and matters between " natives
and non-natives where it shall
appear to the " Court that
substantial injustice would be
done to " any party by a strict
adherence to the rules of any
"law or laws other than native
customary law. "Provided
nevertheless that no party shall
be "entitled to claini the
benefit of any native "customary
law if it shall appear, either
from " express contract or from
the nature of the tran8"
actions out of which any cause,'
matter or question
. " shall have arisen, that such
party agreed or must "be taken
to have agreed that his
obligations in "connection with
such transactions should be
"regulated exclusively by some
law or laws other " than native
customary law. And provided
further, " that in cases where
no express rule is applicable to
" any matter in issue the Court
shall be guided by "the
principles of justice, equity
and good " conscience ".
For the purposes of this case
there is no material difference
between the present wording and
the wording of the section prior
to
1927 when it was amended (No. 19
of 1927), there being a further
amendment in 1929 (No. 11 of
1929).
Redward in his Comments on Gold
Coast Ordinances at pages 10 and
11 sets out thus his view of the
law as it stood in 1909:-
" The question as to the
application of the Statutes of
"Limitations has more than once
engaged the " attention of the
Gold Coast Courts, but the local
" case law on this subject is
not in a very satisfactory
"condition. The better opinion
is that, except in " cases
coming within a provision in
section 19 of the " Ordinance,
these statutes have no
application as " between
natives, and that a defence of
the Statutes " of Limitations in
a suit between natives, or
between "a native and a
European, must rest entirely,
and " can only succeed, upon
evidence of a contract to be "
bound
exclusively
by English law, such contract
" being either express, or
implied from the course of "
dealing or the nature of the
transactions between
,Union
" the parties. In this view of
the matter, the right "to claim
the benefit of the statutes is
not, in "strictness, a
matter of law, but is purely
" conventional
or
contractual,
within the provision "of section
I!,) of Ordinance. In order that
the " " Court may be induced to
hold that English law " shall
apply under section 19, it must
be satisfied , that the parties
agreed that their obligations
"should be regulated
exclusively
by English law, " and
not partly
by
English law
and
partly
by
native
" law
" .•
Again at page 14 he writes,
referring to Indian law, " there
is " no provision so strongly
worded as section 19 of the
Supreme " Court Ordinance of the
Gold Coast, by which the native
is only " to be deprived of the
benefit of any native law or
custom when it "can be shown
that he has excluded it by
contract, express or " implied
".
The view expressed in these
quotations has been accepted III
subsequent cases, notably those
of
Hughes v.Davies
decided in 1909 (Renner's
Reports, 549-557), and
Kwam.in Aradzie v. Kobina Yandor
~ Another (F.C. 1922, p.
91) in the first of which
Francis Smith, J. said: "In my
opinion whether the statute is
to be "applied or not must
depend on the circumstances of
each " individual case within
the terms of the proviso to
section 19 of "the Supreme Court
Ordinance, and none of the
authorities " decided by the
Supreme Court has been. so
determined outside " that
proviso".
It appears to me from these
quotations from Redwar and from
the subsequent cases that the
material distinction which the
certion makes between cases
where both parties are natives
and cases where one is a native
and one a non-native has been
overlooked. Where both are
natives native customary law
applies (absolutely under the
law in force when Redwar wrote,
but now " save where the
"circumstances, nature or
justice of the case shall
otherwise " require "). On the
other hand where one party is a
native and one a non-native- the
native customary law only
applies where it shall appear to
the Court that substantial
injustice would be done to any
party by a strict adherence to
the rules of any other law. In
other words, it is a condition
precedent of the application of
the native customary law at all
that there would be substantial
injustice if it were not
applied. It is not until that
condition precedent is fulfilled
that consideration need be given
to the terms of the first
proviso to the present section
whereby a limitation is put upon
the application of the native
customary law.
This point was not overlooked by
Hutchinson, C.J. in 1889 when in
the case of
J. J.
Fischer
9'
Co. v. C. F. Swaniker (supra)
he decided " that in an action
between a European and a native
" the Statutes of Limitations
apply", after holding that in
the case before him" no
substantial injustice would be
done to either " party by
adherence to the English law".
Assuming that I am right as to
the necessity for this condition
precedent, it becomes necessary
to examine the case now before
the Court and decide whether
such condition was present. The
learned Chief Justice in the
Court below fully realised the
necessity for this condition as
is clear from the passage in his
judgment: "It " seems to me,
therefore, that in this case,
which is one between " a native
country carpenter and a European
company, if I ,am " satisfied
that a substantial injustice
would be done if English " law
is adhered to the preference
must be given to the native "
unless there is an express
contract that English law shall
apply "exclusively, or unless
the circumstances point to both
parties " having agreed to be
bound exclusively by English
law".
He gave careful consideration to
the question and decided it in
the plaintiff's favour. He says:
"In my view there would be " a
substantial injustice if I
acceded to this plea" .
Now in one sense there must
always be an injustice when a
plea under the statutes is set
up and
succeeds. The plaintiff may or
may not have a good case, but
good or bad it is refused a
hearing on its merits. If I
understand the reasoning of the
statute aright it is that a
greater injustice is likely to
be done by allowing stale claims
than by refusing them a hearing
on the merits. Any plaintiff
against whom the statute is
successfully pleaded must feel a
sense of grievance and that he
has suffered a hardship. But I
think the words of section 19 of
the Ordinance "substantial
injustice" impute something more
than this, something more than
the ordinary hardship which
always accrues when the statute
is enforced. I cannot find that
this" something more" is present
in the case now under appeal.
The case appears to me to be
typical of the cases at which
the statute is expressly aimed
viz: C3ses in which the
plaintiff cannot be expected to
have kept available the evidence
necessary to answer the
plaintiff's case. The plaintiff
is a native of the literate
class, the members of which are,
in my experience, well able to
take care of themselves and
their legal rights. There is
very strong suspicion in this
case that the delay has been
deliberate and I think it would
be a dangerous precedent to
offer encouragement to such
conduct. Moreover are the
equities really all on the
plaintiff's side? It was he who
had the idea of experimenting
with this machine and it was he
who stood to make a profit if
the experiment were successful.
Is it not fair ,that he should
bear the loss when the
experiment failed? Someone has
got to bear the loss and why
should it all fall on the
defendants? They are suffering
some of it anyway. In putting
this point I am aware that the
answer is that the Court below
found as a fact that the
defendants had been guilty of a
breach of contract in supplying
a machine which was not fit for
its purpose. But surely it is
just on this point that the
defendants might have been able
to adduce material evidence if
the action had been instituted
within a reasonable time, and
therefore in justice to the
defendants the statute ought to
be applied.
For these reasons I am of
opinion that the finding of the
Court below that the Statute of
Limitations did not apply to
this case was wrong and ought to
be reversed. But counsel for the
respondent has submitted that
the Statute of Limitations does
not apply in this case which, he
suggests, is within the Civil
Procedure Act of 1833 instead,
because the written agreement
between the parties (Exhibit" B
") is under seal and therefore
the action is for a specialty
debt. But the claim is for
unliquidated damages for breach
of contract and this is not a
specialty debt, so that there is
nothing ill this submission.
For the reasons I have given I
am of opinion that the claim in
this case was statute barred,
and this being so it is
unnecessary to consider the
other grounds of appeal.
In my opinion this appeal should
be allowed and judgment should
be entered for the defendants
with costs in this Court and in
the Court below.
GRAHAM PAUL, J.
The Statute of Limitations has
been pleaded by the defendants
in bar of the claim herein. The
learned Chief Justice in the
Court below has held that the
Statute of Limitations does not
apply to this case, and has
given judgment for the plaintiff
for the sum of £32!) with costs.
Against that judgment the
defendants have appealed to this
Court.
The defendants-appellants
maintain
inter alia
that the learned ,Judge was
wrong in holding that the
Statute of Limitations·· does
not apply to this case, and I
think their contention is well
founded.
The question whether the Statute
of Limitations applies to t his
case depends upon the terms of
sections 14 and 19 of the
Supreme Court Ordinance and upon
the particular facts of this
case.
Section 14 of the Supreme Court
Ordinance lays down that "the
statutes of general application
which were in force in "England
on 24th .July, 1874" shall be in
force within the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. The Statute
of Limitations 1623 is
undoubtedly and admittedly a
statute of general application
which was in force in England on
24th July, 1874.
It follows therefore that the
Statute of Limitations is under
section 14 in force in the
jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, and ill terms of Section
14 it applies to the prel1ent
case.
The plaintiff however sets up
section 19 of the Supreme Court
Ordinance, which provides
inter alia
that nothing in the Ordinance
shall deprive any person of the
benefit of any native customary
law which complies with certain
qualifications-i.e. "not being "
repugnant to justice, equity or
good conscience, or incompatible
" either in terms or by
necessary implication" with the
legislation of the Colony.
Section 19, having indicated the
necessary qualifications of the
native customary laws of which
persons are not to be deprived,
goes on to lay down to what
causes and matters such customs
shall be deemed applicable. It
dealt first with causes and
matters where the parties are
natives, and afterwards with
causes and matters between
natives and non-natives
As
regards causes and matters where
the parties are natives, it is
provided that "such customary
law" shall be deemed applicable,
" save where the circumstances,
nature or justice of the " case
shall otherwise require ".
As regards causes and matters
between' natives and non
natives, it is provided that"
such customary law" shall be
deemed applicable "where it
shall appear to the Court that
substantial " injustice would be
done to any party by a strict
adherence to the " rules of any
law or laws other than native
customary law" .
The distinction the section
draws between the two classes of
causes and matters as regards
the applicability of " such
native "customary law" is as
clear as it is important. Where
the parties to a cause or matter
are natives the
onus
is upon the party who opposes
the application of " such native
customary law" to satisfy the
Court that it should not be
applied. In causes and matters
between natives and non-natives
the
onus
is upon the party seeking to
apply "such native customary
law" to satisfy the Court" that
substantial injustice would be
done to any party by a " strict
adherence to the rules of any
law or laws other than native "
customary law".
There is also a proviso to
section 19 but in my view it has
no application to the facts of
this case. '1'he plaintiff is
seeking under section 19 to
apply to this case the native
customary law that claims are
not barred by lapse of time. The
effect of section 19, as I have
analysed its provisions, ill to
place upon the plaintiff in this
case the
onus
of satisfying the Court that
substantial injustice would be
done to him by a strict
adherence to the rules of the
Statute of Limitations, 1623. In
my opinion he has failed to
discharge that onus.
Re issued his writ in September,
1933, claiming £500 damages for
a breach of contract which he
alleges took place in October,
1924-practically nine years
before. There is a very vague
letter from the plaintiff to the
defendants dated 7th November,
1927, but from that date until
the date of the writ nearly six
years later no demand whatever,
either written or verbal, was
made by the plaintiff to the
defendants.
There is in evidence a written
hire-purchase agreement between
the parties relating to the
sawing machine in question, but
the merits of the claim depend
upon oral evidence as
w
what happened prior to the
execution of that agreement and
afterwards. Owing to the long
delay by the plaintiff the
defendants are unable to produce
the evidence, oral and
documentary, necessary to put
their case fairly before the
Court. They had no notice
whatever " that an action was
pending or threatened by the
plaintiff' so had no reason to
take steps to
preserve evidence to meet such
an action.
'
It had not been proved that the
plaintiff, in delaying the
intimation of his claim for
damages or the issue of his writ
for nine years after the cause
of action arose, was actuated by
the deliberate and dishonest
motive of waiting till he knew
that the defendants' evidence
was no longer available in
answer to his claim. But it
would be practically impossible
to prove that and unreasonable
to expect such proof from a
defendant in any case. It has,
however, been suggested by
defendants' counsel that it was
with that deliberate object that
the plaintiff delayed and it may
have been so. It is a striking
feature of the evidence that the
plaintiff offers no
bona fide
reason or even plausible excuse
for his delay. It seems to me
that the reason for his silence
on that point may well be--as
the defendants' counsel
suggests-that he has. no
bona fide
reason or excuse to give.
If this judgment stands it will
be possible for any native with
a cause of action against a
non-native-without offering any
bona fide reason or excuse
for the delay-to wait until all
the· defendant's evidence, by
death or retrial of witnesses or
loss of documents, has ceased to
be available, and then bring his
action. I am unable to agree to
the creating of a precedent of
that effect.
'1'0 oust the effect of the
Statute of Limitations in this
case I consider that the
plaintiff would have to satisfy
the Court that there was some
bona
fide
reason why he had delayed so
long. For instance, if he had
been ill during the last six or
seven years; if the defendants
had been for the last six or
seven years putting him off with
promises; if he had been for any
other
bona fide
reason prevented from taking his
action. But the plaintiff in his
evidence suggests absolutely
nothing of the kind.
The learned Chief Justice in his
judgment says this claim in the
writ was no new demand. On the
evidence I am unable to agree
with that view. Also 1 am unable
to agree that there is evidence
that the plaintiff was so poor
or so ignorant that he could not
sue for damages within a
reasonable time after the
alleged breach. The plaintiff
himself never suggested anything
of the kind.
The learned Chief Justice
comments on the failure on the
part of the defendants to
produce correspondence. But when
the defendants sought to prove a
most material letter written by
them to the plaintiff by
production of the office copy
the learned Chief Justice
rejected it because the typist
who typed the letter over six
years ago could not specifically
remember posting that very
letter. The plaintiff however
was allowed to prove his letter
of 1927 to the defendants by
production of a copy without
giving evidence of delivery to
the defendants.
In considering whether a case of
substantial injustice is made
out by one party to a suit the
Court must not lose sight
altogether of the interests of
the other party. Substantial
justice or injustice in a suit
to a party in that suit cannot
be done without reference to the
claims to justice of the other
party. I think the learned Chief
Justice lost sight of the
defendants' claims to justice in
confining his attention solely
to the question whether the
plaintiff would suffer a
substantial injustice by the
application of the Statute of
Limitations.
The plaintiff's claim is based
entirely on the English law of
warranty. No evidence was given
as to native customary law on
that point; the plaintiff simply
imported under section 14 of the
Supreme Court Ordinance what he
wanted of English law to support
his claim. that is an element to
be considered in the question of
the justice or otherwise of
applying the English Statute of
Limitations.
From a perusal of judgments on
this point, and from the
arguments adduced before this
Court, I think there is commonly
quite a wrong perspective in
considering the question of
applying the Statute of
Limitations to an educated
native of this country. This
Statute of Limitations is not a
recent invention of modern
civilisation. It was applied to
the state of education and
civilisation which existed in
England in
1623, and I find nothing at all
startling in applying it to an
educated African of to-day.
For the reasons I have given I
think the Statute of Limitations
applies in this ease and the
claim is statute-barred-the
cause of action having arisen in
October, 1924, and the action
not issued till September,
1933.
I cannot accept the argument of
counsel for the respondent that
this is a specialty debt and
therefore unaffected by the
1623
Act.
In my opinion the appeal should
be allowed, and the judgment of
the Court below set aside, with
costs to the appellants in this
Court and in the Court below.
YATES, ACTING C.J., GOLD COAST.
I
concur.
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