State proceedings – Certiorari –
Error of law apparent on face of
record – Meaning of “record” –
Whether affidavits with exhibits
admissible as part of record.
State proceedings – Mandamus –
Nature of, – Whether mandamus
lies to compel tribunal to
decide matter pending before it
in a particular manner.
State proceedings – Prohibition
– Principles for grant – Conduct
of applicant – Applicants’
counsel applying for directions
that oral evidence be dispensed
with at the hearing of matter in
the court below – Whether
application for prohibition to
stop further hearing of matter
proper.
State proceedings – Supervisory
jurisdiction – Nature of, –
Supervisory jurisdiction not
appellate jurisdiction – Extent
of supervisory jurisdiction over
High Court – Error of law
committed by High Court must go
to jurisdiction or result in
nullity – Exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction over
High Court to be with caution –
Constitution 1992, article
140(1).
The respondent companies were
convicted of certain criminal
offences by the National Public
Tribunal and pending reparation
the tribunal restrained the
disposal of their assets without
reference to the tribunal.
Eventually the tribunal accepted
the offer of reparation but
ordered the confiscation of both
companies. The respondents
appealed successfully to the
appeals and review division of
the National Public Tribunal
which ordered reinstatement of
those companies. Meanwhile the
applicants had taken possession
of the assets of the companies
pursuant to an alleged sale to
them by the Official Liquidator
during the pendency of the
appeal. Following the sale the
respondents obtained a High
Court order to take over the
companies. Aggrieved with the
order of the High Court the
applicants invoked the
supervisory jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court for certiorari to
quash the order on the ground of
error of law apparent on the
face of the record, also for
mandamus directing the court to
dismiss the suit before it and a
further order to prohibit the
court from proceeding further in
the action. In the course of the
application the parties filed
various supplementary affidavits
and exhibits.
Held:
(1) The practice of inundating
the court with affidavits and
exhibits in an application must
be strongly deprecated. Counsel
who practiced in the Supreme
Court must be conversant with
its rulesand must abide by them.
It did not speak well for
counsel indirectly to abet a
client into pretending to supply
matter to the court which
properly should have either been
included in affidavits or
statements of case. The “record”
in support of the ground of
error apparent on the face of
the record must be confined to
the document initiating the
proceeding in issue, the
pleadings, if any, and the
adjudication but not the
evidence or the reasons unless
the tribunal chose to
incorporate them. Consequently
all such affidavits, letters and
evidence in the proceedings in
the High Court leading to the
application or offered before
any other tribunal would not be
countenanced. R v
Northumberland Compensation
Appeals Tribunal, ex parte Shaw
[1952] 1 KB 338, Asor II v
Amegboe [1978] GLR 153, CA
referred to.
(2) Mandamus was not available
to compel a judicial or an
adjudicating body to determine a
cause or matter pending before
it in a particular way. The
application for mandamus to
compel the High Court to dismiss
the said suit would accordingly
be dismissed. R v Kingston JJ
18 TLR 477 referred to.
(3) Prohibition primarily lay to
restrain an inferior court from
exceeding its jurisdiction but
it was counsel for the
applicants who implored the High
Court to do away with oral
evidence. It therefore lay ill
in the mouth of the applicants
to seek an order to restrain the
court from concluding the
proceedings. Timitimi v
Amabebe (1953) 14 WACA 374
referred to.
(4) The High Court was the
lowest court in the hierarchy of
superior courts but was a
superior court with jurisdiction
in all matters as under article
140(1) of the 1992 Constitution.
Accordingly nothing was out of
its jurisdiction but that which
specially appeared to be so. If
an error of law appeared on the
face of the record of a superior
court that warranted invocation
of the supervisory jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, it must be
such error as the wrongful
assumption of jurisdiction or
such error as would render the
decision a nullity. Timitimi
v Amabebe (1953) 14 WACA
374, Anisminic v Foreign
Compensation Commission
[1969] 2 AC 147, HL referred to.
(5) It was difficult to
determine the application
without straying into an appeal
as the court was not entitled in
such application to go into the
merits. In any case the High
Court had jurisdiction over the
matters before it and
application before the Supreme
Court would be declined. R v
Northumberland Compensation
Appeals Tribunal, ex parte Shaw
[1952] 1 KB 338, Timitimi v
Amabebe (1953) 14 WACA 374
referred to.
(6) The Supreme Court had noted
the practice, which was gaining
currency, whereby the litigant
by-passed the Court of Appeal
and invoked the supervisory
jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court for speedier justice. Such
applications against superior
courts must be dealt with great
caution. Republic v Accra
Circuit Court, ex parte Appiah
[1982-83] GLR 129, CA
referred to.
Cases referred to:
Amegbe v Tepa
[1960] GLR 7, CA.
Anisminic v Foreign Compensation
Commission
[1969] 2 AC 147, [1969] 1 All ER
208, [1969] 2 WLR 163, 113 Sol
Jo 55, HL reversing [1968] 2 QB
862, [1967] 3 WLR 382, [1967] 3
All ER 986, 111 Sol Jo 374, CA.
Asor II v Amegboe
[1978] GLR 153, CA.
Baldwin and Francis Ltd v
Patents Appeal Tribunal
[1959] AC 663, [1959] 2 WLR 826,
[1959] 2 All ER 433, 103 Sol Jo
451, [1959] RPC 221, HL.
Joseph v Jebeile Brothers
(1969) CC 98, CA.
R v Kingston JJ, ex parte Davey
(1902) 86 LT 589, 66 JP 547, 18
TLR 477, 46 Sol Jo 394, DC.
R v Northumberland Compensation
Appeals Tribunal, ex parte Shaw
[1952] 1 KB 338, [1952] 1 All ER
122, [1952] 1 TLR 161, 116 JP
54, 96 Sol Jo 29, 50 LGR 193,
CA, affirming [1951] 1 KB 711,
[1951] 1 All ER 268, [1951] 1
TLR 270, 115 JP 79, 95 Sol Jo
76.
R v Paddignton North and St
Marylebone Rent Tribunal, ex
parte Perry
[1956] 1 QB 229, [1955] All ER
391, [1955] 3 WLR 744, 119 JP
565, 99 Sol Jo 816, 53 LGR 679,
DC.
Republic v Accra Circuit Court,
ex parte Appiah
[1982-83] GLR 129, CA.
Timitimi v Amabebe
(1953) 14 WACA.
APPLICATION invoking the
supervisory jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court over the judgment
of the High Court.
HAYFRON-BENJAMIN JSC.
The preceding matters leading to
the present application
originated from the National
Public Tribunal before which the
respondents were tried of
certain criminal offences under
the Public Tribunals Law 1984
(PNDCL 78). The respondents, it
appears were convicted by that
tribunal, but the issue of
sentence was not concluded there
and then. This situation arose
because the respondents decided
to take advantage of section
1(1) and (2) of the Public
Tribunals (Amendment) Law 1989
(PNDCL 213) by offering
restitution or reparations to
the State for the losses, if
any, which had been occasioned
by their offences. The matter of
restitution and reparations was
finally settled on 8 October
1990. The respondents’, (except
the 1st respondent’s) plea
bargain was accepted by the
tribunal and orders were made
confiscating the properties
which formed the basis of the
case before Brobbey JA sitting
as an additional judge of the
High Court to the state. The
respondents promptly appealed to
the appeals and review division
of the National Public Tribunal
which on or about 16 October
1992 reversed the judgment of
the National Public Tribunal and
decreed that the assets of the
respondents be returned to them.
It is worthy of note that the
National Public Tribunal in the
orders which it made in the
course of the plea bargain, and
this is conceded by the
applicants, made the following
additional orders in its
judgment:
“(1) That before full
restitution is made by the 1st
accused no property of the 2nd
and 3rd accused companies, ie,
Priorities Ghana Limited and
Holex Timber Products Limited
shall be disposed of by any
person without the consent of
the trial tribunal, and;
(2) That the trial tribunal
shall make such further orders
as it deems fit.” (Emphasis
mine.)
It does not appear that any such
consent was obtained but the
applicants contend that further
to an advertisement in the
Peoples Daily Graphic of 20 May
1991, they bought the properties
in dispute from the Official
Liquidator and they were
therefore the owners of the
properties.
It is agreed that at the time of
the alleged purchase by the
applicants the respondents’
appeal was pending. It is not
the province of this application
to delve into the ramifications
of the various orders of the
National Public Tribunal
culminating in their judgment
but it is true to say that by a
majority decision, and that is
the judgment of the appellate
and review division of the
National Public Tribunal, the
decisions of the National Public
Tribunal were set aside and the
properties restored to the
respondents.
The respondents then sued the
applicants in the High Court,
generally for the recovery of
their properties which the
applicants contended they had
purchased. The applicants having
lost in the High Court have
chosen the path of seeking
relief by the exercise of our
supervisory jurisdiction in
their favour. Hence this
application is presented. It
must be noted that even though
the suits before Brobbey JA were
consolidated the other
plaintiff, the Social Security
Bank is not interested in this
application.
At first blush this application
appears to present complex
issues. The state of affairs has
been largely contributed by the
parties. For since the present
application was filed on 20 June
1994, the parties, contrary to
the rules, have inundated this
court with affidavits and
letters, the latest of these
dated 30 May 1995. This practice
must be strongly deprecated.
Counsel who practice in this
court must be conversant with
our rules and they must abide by
them; nor does it speak well for
counsel indirectly to abet their
clients into pretending to
supply matter to the court which
properly should have either been
included in their affidavits or
statement of case. However I am
satisfied that there has been
sufficient compliance with the
rules and the practice
requirements to merit
consideration being given to the
present application.
There is on the part of the
applicants a certain confusion
over the meaning of what
constitutes the “record” in the
ground that “there is an error
appearing on the face of the
“record”. In Asor II v
Amegboe [1978] GLR 153 at
page 163 the full bench of the
Court of Appeal held that:
“The record is that which the
inferior court or tribunal
physically keeps as a formal
record of its proceedings, and
where it is alleged that there
was an error of law in the
proceedings the superior courts
will not intervene unless the
error is no the face of the
record”: see Baldwin and
Francis Ltd v Patents Appeal
Tribunal [1959] AC 663 HL.”
As was stated in the English
case of R v Northumberland
Compensation Appeals Tribunal,
ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 KB
338 at page 352 the record:
“… must contain at least the
document which initiates the
proceedings; the pleadings, if
any, and the adjudication; but
not the evidence, nor the
reasons, unless the tribunal
chooses to incorporate them, if
the tribunal does state its
reasons, and those reasons are
wrong in law, certiorari lies to
quash the decision”.
In the instant application
therefore the supporting
documents to the application
must be limited to those stated
in ex-parte Shaw,
supra, as necessary to enable
the court to come to a decision
on the
issues raised. Consequently all
other matters such as
affidavits, letters and evidence
either in the proceedings in the
High Court leading to this
application or which were
offered before any other
tribunal cannot be countenanced
and will be rejected.
The applicants herein pray this
court in the exercise of its
supervisory jurisdiction to
grant them:
“… orders of (1) certiorari to
bring up for the purpose of
being quashed and quashing the
judgment of the High Court,
Accra, dated the 3 June 1994,
written reasons in support
whereof were read by His
Lordship SA Brobbey JA sitting
as an additional High Court
judge on 17 June 1994.”
The applicants also pray for
orders of mandamus “directing or
compelling that court to dismiss
the said suit,” and “prohibiting
that court from proceeding
further in that action or
otherwise taking steps to
enforce or implement the said
judgment or any order made
therein.” By their statement
accompanying their application,
the applicants state only two
grounds upon which they are
relying for the grant of the
reliefs which they seek from
this court. These grounds are
tersely stated as:
“(1) The said judgment contains
errors of law on the face of the
record.”
(2) The High Court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the
said suit by reason of the
provisions of PNDCL 325 and the
Transitional Provisions of the
constitution.”
By their statement of case the
applicants contend that:
“although on the 16 October 1992
the National Public Tribunal
(appellate and review division)
had quashed as null and void the
order of confiscation and sale
of Priorities Limited and Holex
Timber Products Ltd, made by the
National Public Tribunal and
ordered those companies to be
restored to their respective
owners, the applicants had
refused, when called upon to do
so, to surrender assets of the
companies which had been sold to
them.
(i) The High Court judgment was
wrong in law so far as it
purported to enforce or sanction
a judgment which the appellate
and review division had no
jurisdiction to give.
(ii) Either the decision of the
High Court ordering the assets
of Priorities and Holex sold to
Eastwood Ltd was on the face of
the record wrong in law or it
was void as based on a judgment
which was itself a nullity as
having been given by the
appellate tribunal which had no
jurisdiction to give it.
(iii) The failure by the High
Court to appreciate the legal
point with regard to the
judgment of the appellate and
review division of the National
Public Tribunal constituted an
error of law on the face of the
record.
Counsel for the applicants
concluded that if the learned
judge, Brobbey JA, had
appreciated the quality of the
judgment of the appeal and
review division of the National
Public Tribunal he would not
have come to the conclusion that
has provoked this application
for the exercise of our
supervisory jurisdiction in
their favour.
It must be noted in parenthesis
that no serious arguments were
advanced on behalf of the
applicants in respect of their
prayers for the orders for
mandamus and prohibition. In any
case the applicants were not
entitled to those two reliefs.
Mandamus may issue to a judicial
tribunal to set it in motion.
But mandamus is not available to
compel a judicial or an
adjudicating body to determine a
cause of matter pending before
such a body in particular way.
See R v Kingston JJ 18
TLR 477 at page 478. In the
instant application this court
is invited to issue an order of
mandamus to compel the High
Court “to dismiss the said
suit.” This prayer cannot be
acceded to and it is accordingly
dismissed.
Prohibition primarily lies to
restrain an inferior court from
exceeding its jurisdiction. In
the matter which came before
Brobbey JA it was counsel for
the applicants – then defendants
– who having submitted to the
jurisdiction implored the court
to do away with the necessity
for offering oral evidence.
Counsel on all sides having
agreed on this course for
determining the case, it lies
ill in the mouth of the
applicants now to proclaim that
the court should now be
restrained from concluding the
proceedings begun before it.
I must at this stage emphasise
that we are concerned with a
judgment of a superior court –
the High Court. In Timitimi v
Amabebe (1953) 14 WACA 374
at page 376 Coussey JA summed up
the difference between the
jurisdiction of a Superior Court
and an inferior court as
follows:
“In the first place want of
jurisdiction is not to be
presumed as to a court of
superior jurisdiction; nothing
is out of its jurisdiction but
that which specially appears to
be so. On the other hand an
inferior court…is not presumed
to have any jurisdiction but
that which is expressly
provided.”
I will in the circumstances also
dismiss the prayer for the
issuance of an order of
prohibition. I will however deal
at length in the course of this
opinion with the scope and
limits of the supervisory
jurisdiction conferred on this
court by the last two
constitutions of our country.
Having thus disposed of these
two prayers, it is obvious that
the gravamen of the applicants’
presentation is that there is or
are errors of law appearing on
the face of the judgment of
Brobbey JA the reasons for which
were delivered on 17 June 1994.
In applicants view this court
should accede to their prayer
and order a certiorari to have
that judgment brought up to this
court and be quashed.
Now as I have indicated it is
only since 1979 that by
constitutional authority the
supervisory jurisdiction had
been conferred on this court. In
the 1992 Constitution that
jurisdiction is conferred on
this court by article 132, which
states:
“The Supreme Court shall have
supervisory jurisdiction over
all Courts and over any
adjudicating authority and may
in the exercise of that
supervisory jurisdiction, issue
orders and directions for the
purpose of enforcing or securing
the enforcement of its
supervisory powers.” (Emphasis
mine.)
What those supervisory
jurisdictions include are
clearly stated in article 161 of
the 1992 Constitution. It is
however necessary to compare the
scope of this jurisdiction with
the similar jurisdiction
conferred on the High Court by
the constitution. In article 141
of the 1992 Constitution the
supervisory jurisdiction of the
High Court shall be exercised
over “all lower courts.” The
difference in the areas for the
exercise of the respective
jurisdiction is clear and need
no amplification.
The issue in this application
therefore is whether in their
instant application the High
Court is such a “lower court”
that an application to quash
errors of law appearing on the
face of its record can be
maintained. True, the High Court
is the lowest court in the
hierarchy of superior courts.
But the High Court is itself a
superior court. Its jurisdiction
has been conferred upon it by
article 140(1) of the
constitution and in recent times
several attacks have been
launched in this court in
attempts to extend its
jurisdiction into areas of law
in which the constitution and
statute expressly exclude the
jurisdiction of the High Court.
But the dictum of Coussey JA in
Timitimi v Amabebe,
supra, still stand correct:
“Nothing (indeed) is out of its
jurisdiction but that which
specially appears to be so.” The
jurisdiction of the High Court
can therefore only be taken away
by specific legislation. If
therefore there is an error of
law appearing on the face of the
record of a superior court which
warrants intervention by this
court by the exercise of our
supervisory jurisdiction, it
must be such an error as goes to
the wrong assumption of
jurisdiction or the error is so
obvious as to make the decision
a nullity.
Most of the English cases upon
which such great reliance has
been placed within our
municipality have emanated from
the excess or want of
jurisdiction or errors of law
appearing on the face of the
records of inferior courts and
tribunals. But the underlying
principle to the exercise of the
supervisory jurisdiction are in
my view applicable to this new
jurisdiction conferred on the
Supreme Court “over all courts.”
The duty of this court then is
to exercise such control over
all other courts and to keep
them within the bounds of their
jurisdiction. The nature of such
control was stated by Morris LJ
in the English case of
Anisminic v Foreign Compensation
Commission [1969] 2 AC 147
HL as:
“The control which is exercised
by the [High Court] over
inferior tribunals (a
categorising but not a
derogatory description) is of a
supervisory but not of an
appellate nature. It enables the
[High Court] to correct errors
of law if they are revealed on
the face of the record…
In all cases similar to the
present one it becomes necessary
therefore, to ascertain what was
the question submitted for the
determination of a tribunal.
What were its terms of
reference? What was its remit?
What were the questions left to
it or sent to it for its
decision? What were the limits
of its duties and powers? Were
they any conditions precedent
which had to be satisfied before
its functions began?”
In the present application three
matters of law are raised. They
are (1) that the learned judge
based his judgment on the
judgment of the appellate and
review division of the National
Public Tribunal which was a
nullity; (2) that in view of the
provisions of PNDCL 325 the
learned judge had no
jurisdiction to embark upon the
enquiry and that (3) in any case
the 1st respondent had no locus
standi to maintain the suit as
plaintiff in the suit now under
attack.
It is difficult to deal with
these matters in an application
such as this without straying
into the field of appeals.
However a critical examination
of the judgment, which forms the
basis of the application,
provides positive answers to the
questions raised in the
Anisminic case, supra. The
final question whether there was
any condition precedent, which
had to be satisfied before the
court could embark upon enquiry
must be clearly answered in the
negative. It has not been
demonstrated that there is any
law, which clearly excludes or
ousts the jurisdiction of the
High Court in that matter.
As to whether the judgments and
orders of the appellate and
review division of the National
Public Tribunal were valid, I am
of the view that in so far as
these judgments and orders were
given by a tribunal which then
had been competently established
under PNDCL 78, neither the
reasoning nor the method which
their conclusions were rushed
could be “questioned” in any
court. See section 24 PNDCL 78.
It stands to reason that the
appellate and review division of
the National Public Tribunal
being the heist in the hierarchy
of the Public Tribunals its
decision was final. In this
application it is rather the
applicants who are questioning
the validity of that judgment.
The issue as to the meaning and
effect of PNDCL 325 was a matter
of interpretation and the High
Court was the pre-eminent forum
in which the matter could be
resolved. It is in respect of
this application neither here
nor there that the court
interpreted the Law in a manner,
which was unfavourable to the
applicants.
The locus of a party to
litigation is a preliminary
issue and must be determined
before the case or application
is heard on its merits. It is to
be determined more by the
adduction of oral or documentary
evidence than by reference to
statute. For a party who
ordinarily may not possess the
requisite standing to litigate
may be invested with the
necessary authority so to do.
Even if such evidence were
available for this court to
determine whether in the
circumstances the learned judge
properly decided the locus
standi of some of the parties
that would be tantamount to
determining the matter as on
appeal.
I have said that the applicants
chose the path of praying this
court for the exercise of its
supervisory jurisdiction. There
was indeed another path, which
haply might have proved
beneficial. In this regard I
must note the practice, which is
recently gaining currency, of
bypassing the Court of Appeal
and approaching this court in an
attempt at obtaining speeder
justice. That may well be so.
There are English authorities,
which counsel that in certain
cases such a course of procedure
may be quick and beneficial. It
must however be borne in mind
that in England such writs go
principally to inferior courts
and administrative tribunals.
This court must therefore
necessarily deal with the
superior courts with great
caution in the exercise of our
supervisory jurisdiction.
Francois JA’s observations in
Republic v Accra Circuit Court,
ex parte Appiah [1982-83]
GLR 129 at page 143 will be
useful guides in the approach to
the exercise of this
jurisdiction. Said His Lordship:
“A court of competent
jurisdiction may decide
questions before it rightly or
wrongly. Procedures for
correcting wrong decisions
exist. The procedure of appeal
is one such avenue for redress.
But the remedies of appeal and
certiorari are different and
must not be blurred. That
certiorari and appeals are not
alternative remedies but rather
are mutually exclusive is
restated in Obeng v Ampofo,
Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled
Judgment, January-June 1958,
143, Again in Amegbe v Tepa
[1960] GLR 7, CA, the Court
of Appeal deplored the
indiscriminate use of
prerogative writs. The
exhortation was that they should
be used carefully and not abused.
In Joseph v Jebeile Brothers,
Court of Appeal, 5 May 1969,
unreported; digested in (1969)
CC 98, a decision that has been
relied upon in this appeal, the
unanimous conclusion, despite
the differences in opinion
restated the rule that “in
certiorari proceedings the court
acts as a supervisory court and
not as an appellate court.
Certiorari cannot be made a
cloak for an appeal.” Azu Crabbe,
JA, as he then was, went on to
say that the supervisory powers
of the court could only be
exercised where an error of law
was disclosed on the face of the
record; unlike an appellate
court, the court does not
interfere merely because the
decision is wrong in law. The
error must be manifest on the
face of the record. Authority
for that proposition was cited
in the case of R v Paddignton
North and St Marylebone Rent
Tribunal, ex parte Perry
[1956] 1 QB 229, DC. (Emphasis
mine.)
In the instant application
either the applicants or their
legal advisers considered that
this application would entitle
us to go into the merits. The
applicants could not be right.
As Morris LJ said in ex parte
Shaw supra, at page 357:
“It is plain that certiorari
will not issue as the cloak of
an appeal in disguise. It does
not lie in order to bring up an
order or decision for rehearing
of the issue raised in the
proceedings. It exists to
correct error of law where
revealed on the face of an order
or decision, or irregularity, or
absence of, or excess of,
jurisdiction where shown. The
control is exercised by removing
an order or decision, and then
by quashing it.”
The application is dismissed.
AMUA-SEKYI JSC.
I agree.
BAMFORD-ADDO JSC.
I agree.
AMPIAH JSC.
I agree.
ADJABENG JSC.
I also agree.
Application dismissed.
S Kwami Tetteh, Legal
Practitioner |