Contempt of court – Offence –
Ingredients ‑ Scurrilous
publication about judge after
judgment – Whether contempt of
court.
Contempt of court – Punishment
– Purpose – Punishment intended
for preservation of sanctity and
dignity of court.
Contempt of court – Scandalising
court– Freedom of speech –
Circumstances in which exercise
of freedom of speech may
constitute contempt of court.
Contempt of court –
Scandalising court – Truth of
scandalous publication not a
defence.
Judgment ‑ Correction – Errors –
Circumstances in which judge may
correct error in judgment after
delivery.
Contempt of court – Offence ‑
Conviction – Whether unanimous
verdict of panel required for
conviction.
The Attorney-General applied to
the Supreme Court for various
orders including the committal
of the respondents to prison for
contempt of court. In the
statement supporting the
application the Attorney-General
alleged that the 1st respondent,
a private legal practitioner,
published in the 3rd
respondent’s newspaper edited by
the 2nd respondent, a matter
concerning a member of the panel
in NPP v Attorney-General
[1994-95] GBR 1 decided by the
Supreme Court, that constituted
contempt of court. The 1st
respondent who heard the
delivery of the opinions in that
case noted that the judge had
wrongfully attributed a
publication in the Daily
Graphic to Dr K A Busia, the
Prime Minister of the 2nd
Republic of Ghana. He procured
an uncertified copy of the
judgment issued out by the
Deputy Judicial Secretary and
wrote to the judge, pointing out
the error at page 28 of his
judgment and copied the press
and the Chief Justice.
Subsequently the respondents
published under the caption “Justice
Abban is a liar” that the
judge had committed a grievous
and unpardonable legal crime
against the media, the Judiciary
and the people of Ghana. He was
accused of displaying political
chicanery and bamboozlement of
Ghanaians in attributing the
publication in the Daily
Graphic to Dr Busia.
Upon receiving his copy of the
letter, the Chief Justice who
had presided over the case
caused a certified copy of page
28 of the judge’s opinion to be
forwarded to the 1st respondent.
The 1st respondent discovered
upon receipt of the certified
copy that it bore no stamp of
certification, besides it had
been doctored in relation to the
publication in the Daily
Graphic. He therefore
replied the registrar that the
judge’s pronouncement in court
differed from the certified
copy. The respondents then
published the reply under the
headline: “Abban scandal¼Abban
scandal
¼Abban
scandal, Mensah-Bonsu tells
Supreme Court: “I heard it all.”
In a further issue under the
headline: “Judicial
Chicanery,” the respondents
published further that in his
zeal to justify the celebration
of the anniversary of 31st
December revolution, the judge
indulged in judicial chicanery
and gross negligence in
attributing the publication to
Dr Busia. He was accused further
of setting an unduly high
standard of proof, not germane
to the issue and that his
judgment was tainted with
politics, and created the image
of a judge bending over
backwards to please the
Government.
In another publication by the
respondents, the headline
stated: “Justice Abban
scandal takes Dramatic turn. He
is accused of doctoring.”
The front-page publication
accused him of doctoring his
judgment as a subterfuge to free
himself from scandal. In yet
another issue of the newspaper
titled: “Abban puts integrity
of the Bench on the line”
the respondents accused the
judge of mischievously
withdrawing his complaint
against the publications from
the National Media Commission,
implying that judges were
lunatics, indeed zombies
expected to twist in the judge’s
favour a case which could not
stand on its mosquito feet
before the Media Commission. The
publication considered it
mischievous, frivolous and
vexations of the judge to make a
fetish of the so-called
certified true copy.
The Attorney-General submitted
that those publications were
scandalous, abusive, and
contumacious and calculated to
bring the administration of the
law into disrepute. The 1st
respondent’s counsel submitted
on the contrary that the copy of
page 28 sent to the 1st
respondent by the Chief Justice
was not genuine; that the
publications were justified and
the 1st respondent was entitled
to call the judge a liar. He
contended in the alternative
that the matter was a fair
criticism of a matter of public
interest without malice.
Although the 2nd and 3rd
respondents offered to
apologise, their counsel
submitted that since the
publications concerned the judge
alone, it could not constitute
contempt of the entire court;
besides the judge could not
correct errors after he had read
his judgment. In any case, it
was contended further the true
judgment of the court was the
oral judgment read and heard in
court. He contended finally that
contempt of court was in the
nature of a crime, and required
a unanimous Bench to convict.
Held,
Adade, Amua-Sekyi and Aikins
JJSC dissenting: (1) The
publications in issue were
scurrilous abuse and constituted
contempt of court. R v
Freeman The Times November
18, 1925, R v Gray [1900]
2 QB 36, Badry v DPP of
Mauritius [1982] 2 All ER
979, R v Vidal (1922)
Times, 14 October Rex v New
Statesman, ex parte Director of
Public Prosecutions (1928)
44 TLR 301 referred to.
Per Adade, Amua-Sekyi and Aikins
JJSC dissenting:
The weight of judicial opinion
is certainly against committal
for scurrilous abuse of a judge.
It was evident that the judge
could not have read page 28 of
the uncertified copy procured by
the 1st respondent as well as
the certified copy sent to him.
One or the other must have been
doctored. There being no
evidence from the judge, it was
impossible to say whether the
attribution to Dr Busia was
deliberate or inadvertent. The
language deployed in criticising
the judge was deplorable, but it
was a matter of public interest
whether Dr Busia had in fact
spoken with approval of the
overthrow by force of arms of
the Nkrumah regime. If Dr Busia
did not, anyone who had the
evidence was entitled to lay it
before the public and comment
thereon. The general thrust of
the publications was to secure
public rejection and
condemnation of the act of
substitution, which did not
qualify as obstructing justice.
On the contrary, they had the
effect of sanitizing the
administration of justice. In
exercising the power to commit
for contempt, our courts must
have regard also to the right of
every person to express himself
freely and openly on all matters
of public concern, whether they
pertain to actions of the
Executive, the Legislature or
the Judiciary.
(2) Article 127(2) of the
Constitution 1992 guaranteed the
independence of the judiciary.
The high premium placed on the
integrity, dignity and
independence of the judiciary
under the Constitution
underscored the importance of
the judiciary in society. The
judiciary was an indispensable
institution in any democratic
society for the administration
of justice. It was therefore of
the utmost importance that the
sanctity and integrity of the
courts and its judges were
preserved to enable them to
perform their judicial functions
peacefully and without
interference from any quarter,
hence the power to commit for
contempt.
(3) Acts that scandalised
the courts eroded public
confidence in the courts by
impairing and weakening the
authority of the courts.
Scandalising the court even
after proceedings had terminated
or subjecting a judge to
scurrilous abuse constituted
contempt. A temperate, fair,
bona fide criticism of a
judgment by a member of the
public or the press was
permissible provided the critic
refrained from imputing improper
motives to the judge. The
freedoms of expression and
speech and of the media could
not be said to be absolute
neither must it degenerate into
licence. R v Gray [1900]
2 QB 36, King v
Almon (1765) Wilm 243,
Ambard v Attorney-General for
Trinidad and Tobago [1936]
AC 322, Reg v Metropolitan
Police Commissioner ex parte
Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 150,
R v Vidal (1922) Times,
14 October, Mcleod v
St Aubyn (1899) AC 5439,
Rex v New Statesman, ex parte
Director of Public Prosecutions
(1928) 44 TLR 301 referred to.
(4) Truth or otherwise of the
publication was no defence and
the court would refrain from
pronouncing on the genuineness
or otherwise of the judgment.
Scandalising the court was an
offence not against the
individual judge but for
bringing the administration of
justice into disrepute. If truth
were a defence it would offer a
platform for the repetition of
the offending scandal and could
be used maliciously to rake up
damaging episodes in a judge’s
past life, which might interfere
with the administration of
justice. The publications
established malice on the part
of the respondents. Re
Martindale [1891-94] All ER
1248, Rex v New Statesman, ex
parte Director of Public
Prosecutions (1928) 44 TLR
301, Ambard v
Attorney-General for Trinidad
and Tobago [1936] AC 322,
R v Metropolitan Police
Commissioner ex parte Blackburn,
(No 2) [1968] 2 QB 150,
Republic v Liberty Press Ltd
[1968] GLR 123 referred to.
Per Amua-Sekyi JSC: I am glad to
find that the affidavit and
visual evidence support my own
recollection of what took place
in court. Unlike the Chief State
Attorney who confesses to having
a poor memory, or the Deputy
Attorney-General who prefers to
remain silent, I did listen
carefully enough to the reading
of the opinion and have a good
enough memory to remember what
the judge said. I heard him say
clearly and distinctly that he
was quoting a passage from a
speech by the late Prime
Minister made in 1970. I reject
as wholly false the suggestion
that the judge said he was
quoting someone or something
called “Graphic View.”
Per Adade, Aikins JJSC: Justice
Abban’s judgment that was read
in open court was tampered with,
and this was done by Justice
Abban himself after he had read
it in open court.
(5) There were two kinds of
errors, typographical or
citation errors, which could be
corrected by the judge or law
reporter. Other errors were
substantial errors, the
correction of which ought to be
made by judicial review. If the
error was a typographical or
citation error, the judge or
editor could correct it. The
error at page 28 of the judgment
was a citation error. R v
Kuczynski [1973] 1 WLR 1230,
Ghani v Jones [1969] 1
All ER 1700 referred to.
(6) It was only for the
conviction for the offences of
murder, treason and high treason
that unanimity was required. In
all other cases including
contempt, a majority decision
sufficed to support a
conviction. Gallagher v
Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238
referred to.
(7) The Supreme Court was duly
constituted by 5, 7 or 9 judges.
A judgment of the court, whether
unanimous or by majority was a
judgment of the court. It was
therefore contempt of the court
when scurrilous abuse was heaped
on a member of the panel or the
entire panel. The view that
because only one member of the
panel was attacked, no contempt
was committed was therefore
erroneous.
(8) Any person who procures
through the back door and
publishes an uncertified copy of
a judgment does so at his own
risk, and may be proceeded
against for contempt since such
conduct, would amount to an
interference with the processes
of the court. Dobson v
Hastings [1992] 2 All ER 94
referred to.
Cases referred to:
A-G v Times
Newspaper Ltd [1972] 3
All ER 1136, [1972] 3 WLR 855,
116 Sol Jo 885, DC on appeal
[1973] QB 710, [1973] 1 All ER
815, [1973] 2 WLR 452, 117 Sol
Jo 188, CA; affd. [1973] 3 All
ER 54, [1973] 3 WLR 298, 177 Sol
Jo 617, HL.
Ambard v Attorney-General for
Trinidad and Tobago
[1936] AC 322, [1936] 1 All ER
704, 105 LJPC 72, 154 LT 616, 52
TLR 335, 80 Sol Jo 344, PC.
Badry v DPP of Mauritius
[1982] 2 All ER 973, [1983] 2 AC
297, [1983] 2 WLR 161, 126 Sol
Jo 819, PC.
Bahama Islands,
In the matter of a Special
Reference from, [1893] AC
138, 62 LJPC 79, 68 LT 105, PC,
16 Digest (Repl) 10.
Bridges v California
314 US 252 (1941).
Calcraft v Guest
[1898] 1 QB 759, 67 LJQB 505, 78
LT 283, 22 Digest 211, 1976.
Director of Public Prosecutions
v Belize Times Press Ltd
(1988) LRC (Const) 579.
Dobson v Hastings
[1992] Ch 394, [1992] 2 WLR 414,
[1992] 2 All ER 94, [1992]
Gazette, 26 February, 27, 141
NLJ 1625, The Independent,
November 12, 1991, The
Guardian, November 13, 1991,
The Times, November 18,
1991.
Doe v Date
(1842) 3 A&B 619.
Evening Newspaper, Re
(1880) 1 NSWLR 211.
Gallagher v Durack
(1983) 152 CLR 238, 45 ACLR 53,
57 ALJR 191.
Gbadago v Tsili
(1955) 2 WALR 11.
Ghani v Jones
[1969] 1 All ER 1700.
Kuruma Son of Kaniu v Reginam
[1955] 1 All ER 236, [1955] AC
197, [1955] 2 WLR 223, 119 JP
157, PC, 22 Digest (Reissue) 52,
310.
Kwakye v Attorney-General
[1981] GLR 944, SC.
Legatt v Tollervey
(1811) 14 East 302, 22 Digest
(Reissue) 331.
Lloyd v Mostyn
(1842) 10 M&W 478, 2 Dowl NS
476, 12 LJEx 1, 6 Jur 974, 22
Digest (Reissue) 64, HL.
McLeod v St Aubyn
[1899] AC 549, 68 LJPC 137, 81
LT 138, 15 TLR 487, 48 WR 173,
PC.
Myers v Director of Public
Prosecutions
[1965] AC 1001, [1964] 2 All ER
881, [1964] 3 WLR 145, 128 JP
481, 108 Sol Jo 519, 48 Cr App
Rep 348, HL, 22 Digest (Reissue)
64, HL.
New Patriotic Party v
Attorney-General
[1994-95] GBR 1, SC.
Nwizuk v Eneyok
(1953) 14 WACA 354.
Perera v R
[1951] AC 482, [1951] 1 TLR 829,
95 Sol Jo 333, PC
R v Almon
(1765) Wilm 243, 97 ER 94, 16
Digest (Reissue) 331.
R v Freeman,
The Times November 18,
1925.
R v Gray
[1900-3] All ER Rep 59, 69 LJQB
502, 82 LT 534, 64 JP 484, 48 WR
474, 16 TLR 305, 44 Sol Jo 362,
DC, 16 Digest (Reissue) 47.
R v Kopyto
(1987) 47 DLR (4th) 213, 39 CCC
(3d) 1.
R v Kuczynski
[1973] 1 WLR 1230, [1973] 3 All
ER 401, 57 Cr App Rep 836, CA.
R v Leatham
(1861) 3 E&E 658, [1861-73] All
ER Rep Ext 1646, 30 LJQB 205, 3
LT 777, 25 JP 468, 7 Jur NS 674,
9 WR 334, 8 Cox CC 498.
R v Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn
(No 2)
[1968] 6 QB 150, [1968] 2 All ER
319, [1968] 2 WLR 1204, 112 Sol
Jo 191, CA.
R v Nicholls
(1911) 12 CLR 280.
Re Blackburn,
See R v Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn
(No 2).
Read and Huggonson,
Re (1742) 2 Atk 469, 26
ER 683, sub nom Roach v
Garvan, Dick 794, 19 Digest
(Repl) 6.
Republic v Accra Circuit Court,
ex parte Appiah
[1982-83] GLR 129.
Republic v Liberty Press Ltd
[1968] GLR 123.
Rex v New Statesman, ex parte
Director of Public Prosecutions
(1928) 44 TLR 301, 16 Digest
(Repl) 23.
Rex v Vidal
(1922) Times 14 October.
Secretary of State for Defence v
Guardian Newspapers Ltd
[1985] AC 339, [1984] 3 All ER
601, [1984] 3 WLR 986, HL.
APPLICATION by the
Attorney-General to the Supreme
Court for the committal of the
respondents for contempt of
court.
M Amidu
(with him Mrs Adusa-Amankwah)
for the applicants.
da Rocha
(with him Brodie-Mends
and Zwennes) for the 1st
respondent.
Nana Akufo-Addo
(with him, Akoto Ampaw
and Kulendi) for the 2nd
and 3rd respondents.
ARCHER CJ.
I have had the opportunity and
privilege of reading beforehand
the opinions of my sister
Bamford-Addo and my brothers
Hayfron-Benjamin and Ampiah JJSC
and I agree with their reasons
and conclusions.
ADADE JSC.
This case commenced with a
motion on notice filed by the
Attorney-General on 10/11/94
asking the court for an order:
“(i) of committal or attachment
of the 1st and 2nd respondents
and to commit them to prison for
contempt of court;
(ii) that the 3rd
respondent pay heavy fines and
also the cost of these
proceedings for contempt of
court;
(iii) that the respondents
publish through the mass media a
full and unconditional
recantation of and apology for
their contemptuous publications
and conduct, upon the grounds
stated in the accompanying
statement and affidavits annexed
hereto and for such further or
other orders as to this
Honourable Court shall deem
fit.”
The statement accompanying the
application described the 1st
respondent, Kwabena Mensa-Bonsu,
as “a private legal practitioner
in da Rocha Chambers, Accra and
a columnist of The Free Press
newspaper.” The statement
goes on:
“(ii) The 2nd respondent is
Eben Quarcoo, Editor of The
Free Press newspaper.
(iii) The 3rd
respondent, Tommy Thompson Books
Ltd of P O Box 6492 is a limited
liability company and printers,
publishers and proprietors of
The Free Press newspaper.
The motion was supported by
several affidavits, sworn
respectively by:
1 Mrs Adusa Amankwa, a Chief
State Attorney in the office of
the Attorney-General;
2 Mr Mustapha Habib Logoh, Ag
Registrar of this court;
3 Mr Kofi Addo-Nkum,
Assistant Superintendent of
Police (CID);
4 Miss Irene Wuaku, a clerical
officer in the Supreme Court
Registry;
5 Mr Emmanuel Ogbarmey
Otoo, a Judicial Officer
attached to the Court of Appeal
registry.
For purposes of convenience only
I shall hereafter refer to these
persons as prosecution witnesses
1 - 5.
On being served with the motion,
each of the respondents deposed
to an affidavit in his defence.
In addition, there were
affidavits from:
1 Mr Okerchiri Adusa Kwabena,
a legal practitioner, based in
Accra;
2 Mr Peter Ala Adjetey, also
a legal practitioner, stationed
in Accra;
3 Mr Joseph Agyenim-Boateng,
the Secretary General of the New
Patriotic Party, a registered
political party;
4 Mr Kwadwo Afram Asiedu,
Assistant Secretary of the Legal
Constitutional and Judicial
Affairs Committee of the NPP;
5 Mr Moses Adu Akai-Nettey, a
private legal practitioner;
6 Mr Ben Annan, a lawyer and
member of the Legal
Constitutional and Judicial
Affairs Committee of the NPP;
7 Mr John Albert Owusu, a
Government-gazetted Documents
Examiner and the Executive
Director of Primus Forensic
Consultancy;
8 Mr Emmanuel Asamoah
Owusu-Ansah, the Deputy Judicial
Secretary, Judicial Service.
I shall also hereafter refer to
the above gentlemen as defence
witnesses 1 - 8, again for
convenience only.
The prosecution says that
certain statements made by the
three respondents in some issues
of The Free Press
newspaper are contemptuous of
His Lordship Mr Justice Abban,
one of the justices of the
9-member panel which heard
New Patriotic Party v
Attorney-General [1994-95]
GBR 1, known as the 31st
December case, and
contemptuous also of the Supreme
Court, and are calculated to
bring the administration of
justice into disrepute. The
prosecution refers to several
issues of The Free Press,
and relies in particular on
certain statements quoted in the
affidavit of PW1, which will be
referred to in due course.
The prosecution says that in
writing those articles, and
making those statements, the
respondents were actuated by
malice. As evidence of malice
PW2 deposes in an affidavit as
follows:
“28 That I got to know during
the course of the publications
referred to in this affidavit
that Mensa-Bonsu [1st
respondent] is a legal
practitioner in da Rocha
Chambers which belongs to B J da
Rocha, the Chairman of the New
Patriotic Party, the plaintiff
in the suit in which the reasons
for judgment were delivered by
the court on 8 March 1994.”
Beyond this no further evidence
of malice was given. It was left
to be inferred from the general
conduct of the respondents, as
may be ascertained from the
publications relied on by the
prosecution.
Needless to say, the respondents
vigorously resist the
application. As is already well
known, the decision of the
Supreme Court in NPP v
Attorney-General [1994-95]
GBR 1 was given on 29 December
1993; but the reasons for the
decision were reserved to be
read at a later date. These
reasons were in fact read on
8/3/94. It would seem that
sometime after this date, Mr
Mensa-Bonsu, the 1st respondent
herein, obtained a copy of the
opinion read by Justice Abban.
It ran into 40 pages. Upon
reading it, the 1st respondent
discovered at page 28 that a
certain statement had been
quoted verbatim from the
Daily Graphic newspaper of
24/2/1970, serial No 6033, and
attributed by His Lordship to Dr
K A Busia, Prime Minister in the
2nd Republic. The 1st respondent
checked the source of the
quotation, and found that the
said quotation was a
reproduction of the editorial
opinion of that newspaper,
entitled “Graphic View”, and not
a reported speech by Dr Busia,
as alleged by the judge.
The 1st respondent therefore
wrote to the judge pointing out
this error. The letter is dated
9/5/94, and features in these
proceedings as exhibit MB3. It
reads as follows:
“P O Box 3456,
Accra
9 May 1994.
Dear Sir,
WRIT NO 18/93: THE NEW PATRIOTIC
PARTY
VERSUS
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF GHANA
There is in your signed Reasons
for Judgment in the above-quoted
suit, a passage, which purports
to be a verbatim speech made by
Dr Busia on 24 February 1970. In
fact, what has been reproduced
in your judgment is the full
text of an editorial of the
DAILY GRAPHIC of the same date.
A report of Dr Busia’s speech is
made in the same issue of the
paper and it is obvious that
what you have done in your
judgment is to misrepresent the
editorial opinion of the GRAPHIC
as a speech made by Dr Busia.
Even if the speech contained
material which might justify the
editorial comment of the
Graphic it is, in my
respectful opinion, an
inexcusable error to quote in
full the editorial of a
newspaper and attribute it to a
person since a very casual
reading of the news paper would
reveal this error.
It is significant that in
lifting the Graphic
editorial you omitted the top
caption which described it, in
bold letters, as GRAPHIC VIEW.
It is difficult to see how this
caption could have escaped your
attention.
Putting aside the question
whether that part of your
reasons is germane to the
issues, that misquotation is
unfair and undermines confidence
in the judiciary.
I enclose for your perusal,
photocopies of the front and
back pages of the Graphic
edition of February 24, 1970, No
6033 which contains the report
of Dr Busia’s speech and the
“Graphic View”. You can see
quite clearly that what appears
in your judgment is Graphic’s
View word for word.
I must mention that I sat
through all the arguments during
this case and I was present in
court on the date the judgments
were read and sat through to the
end.
I have decided, as a concerned
citizen, to bring this error to
your attention and to the
attention of the public,
particularly because the passage
from the Graphic which
was incorporated in your
judgment was not cited to you by
counsel; nor were you invited to
take judicial notice thereof.
You felt justified to refer to
it because, to quote your own
words, “the above-mentioned
newspapers, like textbooks are
available in public libraries in
this country. The publication in
them, like all newspapers, were
made to the whole world and this
court is entitled to take
judicial notice of those
publications.’
I am accordingly releasing a
copy of this letter to the
Press.
Yours truly,
K MENSA-BONSU
Mr Justice I K Abban,
Supreme Court Building,
Accra.
Copy to:
The Chief
Justice
Supreme Court
Accra.”
This letter, as can be seen, was
copied to the Chief Justice. Let
it be observed that, as at now,
there is nothing on the record
before us to show that the
learned Justice, to whom the
letter was addressed, has
reacted to it. On the contrary,
the Chief Justice who is the
President of this court,
directed PW2 (Mr Logoh) to reply
to the letter in terms of
exhibit A dated 12/5/94,
attached to PW2’s affidavit of
10/11/94:
“12 May 94
THE NPP v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
OF GHANA
I am directed by His Lordship,
the Chief Justice to refer to
your letter of 9 May 1994 and to
point out that you have probably
not got a certified copy of the
reasons given by His Lordship
Justice Abban.
In case you have not, then I
attached a copy of the relevant
page of the judgment (page 28)
for your benefit. It was exactly
the “Daily Graphic View” the
judge quoted in his judgment.
(MUSTAPHA LOGOH)
REGISTRAR
SUPREME COURT
MR K MENSA-BONSU
P O BOX 3456
ACCRA
cc: The Hon. Mr Justice
Abban
Supreme Court
Accra”
The page 28 sent along with the
letter is exhibit MH1. Mr Logoh
sent just one page, page 28, and
not the whole judgment. At that
stage, by virtue of exhibit MB3,
Mr Logoh and the Chief Justice
knew that the 1st respondent had
a copy of some sort of Mr
Abban’s opinion, but neither he
nor the Chief Justice could have
been in a position to tell to
what extent the 1st respondent’s
copy was accurate or defective,
judging by their own letter,
exhibit A. Yet they chose to
send only one page (page 28) and
not the whole opinion of the
learned judge. This fact becomes
relevant when we come to assess
the rival merits of exhibit MB1
and exhibit CTC, since the said
single sheet, exhibit MH1
features as page 28 of exhibit
CTC. First respondent
discovered, upon receipt of Mr
Logoh’s letter that the page 28
sent to him differed in a
material particular from what he
had. This was the catalyst for
the subsequent events, which
have culminated in these
proceedings.
The prosecution contend that the
page 28 sent to the 1st
respondent was the original one
written and read by the learned
justice on the 8/3/94, and that
the respondents have no
justification whatever for
criticising the judge, for what
they alleged was a forged or
cooked-up statement, page 28 of
exhibit MB1. It is even
suggested that the alleged
forgery was perpetrated by 1st
respondent, Mr Mensah-Bonsu. In
any case, the prosecution say
that the criticism was too
virulent, scandalous and even
libellous.
The respondents on the other
hand say that page 28 of exhibit
MH1 is a new page 28, a revised,
or as they put it, a “doctored”
version of the original page 28,
and that it was brought into
being in reaction to 1st
respondent’s letter of 9/5/94,
exhibit MB3, and that in
persisting to push exhibit MH1
as the original, the learned
judge was lying, and to that
extent he was a liar, and had
indulged in “judicial chicanery”
etc. etc.
Before going into the merits of
this application let me say a
few words on procedure. As is
normal, the case commenced with
a motion on notice, asking for
certain reliefs to which
reference has already been made.
As the case progressed, it
became clear that the parties
were not in agreement on several
issues of fact. The parties
sought to deal with these issues
on affidavits. The result was
that the court was inundated
with an over-supply of
affidavits from all sides. It
seems to me that as soon as it
became apparent that there were
many important questions of fact
in dispute, it should have
occurred to all (court,
prosecution and defence) that
the case was not suitable to be
tried on affidavits only, and
that some oral evidence was
requisite. The defence did
realise this early, even before
the commencement of the
addresses, for on 13/1/95 the
1st respondent, per his counsel,
applied to subpoena E A
Owusu-Ansah, Deputy Judicial
Secretary, and Mr Tawiah, Senior
High Court Registrar, Accra, to
give oral evidence on the next
adjourned date, 17/1/95. It
appears that the subpoenas were
issued. Somehow the 1st
respondent did not ask leave to
call these witnesses until the
prosecution had completed their
address, and the 1st
respondent’s counsel was on his
feet. The application was turned
down by the court, on a split
decision of 4 to 3.
Besides, the more I listened to
the addresses, the more I
wondered whether the trial
should not have commenced in the
High Court instead of this
court. I concede that this is a
case of contempt of this court.
But the contempt is not in facie
curiae; it is contempt of
scandalising the court, ex facie
curiae.
In the Liberty Press
case [1968] GLR 123, the
contempt was of the Court of
Appeal, but proceedings were
instituted in the High Court. On
objection being taken as to the
forum and mode of trial,
Akufo-Addo CJ, sitting in the
High Court, held inter alia:
“(1) there was one Supreme
Court of Judicature which
consisted of the High Court and
the Court of Appeal. The Court
of Appeal was not a different
Court from the High Court in the
sense in which the old common
law courts of England, namely
the Common Pleas, the Exchequer
and the King’s Bench division
were from each other.
Contempt of the Court of Appeal
was therefore contempt of the
Supreme Court of Judicature and
the High Court being that part
of the Supreme Court of
Judicature that had original
jurisdiction in all matters
ought to be the court with
jurisdiction to deal with it.
The suggestion that the matter
could be dealt with under
Supreme Court (Court of Appeal)
Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), rr.27
and 28 was untenable as the
application before the court was
not an interlocutory matter¼
(2) The common law position had
always been that the procedures
by summary trial and by
indictment were alternative
procedures depending on the
character of the contempt ex
facie curiae. Where the
contempt was clear and
unambiguous the procedure for
trial had always been by summary
trial whereas in a case in which
the contempt was not all that
clear and certain, indictment
had been the appropriate
procedure.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In R v Gray [1900-3] All
ER Rep 59, where the Queen’s
Bench felt obliged to deal with
a case of contempt summarily,
Lord Russel CJ observed at p 62:
“No one would, I think suggest…
that this is not a contempt of
court, and it does not fall –
and nobody has suggested that it
does fall – within the right of
public criticism in the sense
that I have described. I repeat
that it is personal scurrilous
abuse of a judge as a judge.
We have therefore to deal with
it as a case of contempt, and we
have to deal with it brevi manu.
This is not a new-fangled
jurisdiction; it is a
jurisdiction as old as the
common law itself, of which it
forms part - a jurisdiction, the
history, purpose, and extent of
which are admirably treated in
the opinion of Wilmot J
¼It
is a jurisdiction, however, to
be exercised with scrupulous
care, to be exercised only
when the case is clear and
beyond reasonable doubt; because
if it is not a case beyond
reasonable doubt the court ought
not to and will leave the
Attorney-General to proceed by
criminal information
¼“
(Emphasis supplied.)
I have heard it said that a
person brought before the court
on a charge of contempt of court
is presumed guilty, and all that
is required of him is to show
cause why he should not be
committed to prison. I am yet to
hear a more preposterous and
outrageous proposition of law. A
person on trial for contempt is
in no less a privileged position
than any other accused person
before our courts. In our
accusatorial system of trial
every accused person is presumed
innocent until his guilt is
proved. There are only very few
exceptions to this rule, created
by certain statutes, where a
particular statute may place the
burden of persuasion on an
accused person to establish his
innocence. But these often are
situations where, unless the
burden is put on the accused,
true justice may never be
attained, and the general public
may be the worse for it.
A person on trial for contempt
is entitled to say: “I am not in
contempt.” The prosecution must
then prove the contempt. It is
only after the contempt has been
established that the accused may
be called upon to “show cause.”
“Showing cause” is strictly
speaking in the nature of a plea
in mitigation, the accused
attempting to persuade the court
why he should not be punished
either with a fine or with a
term of imprisonment. Like all
criminal trials, the sentence
follows the conviction; a person
who has not been adjudged to be
in contempt (ie convicted of
contempt) cannot be punished,
and therefore cannot be called
upon to show cause (ie plead in
mitigation of sentence).
It happens that where the
contempt is in facie curiae, the
judge himself is a witness to
the offending conduct, and no
further proof may be required.
But where the contempt is ex
facie curiae, eg by scandalising
the court, or refusing to obey a
court order, or interfering with
witnesses, etc then proof of the
conduct complained of is
essential, and the standard
required is that beyond
reasonable doubt, as indicated
in R v Gray, supra.
No two cases are alike in all
respects. This may well be so.
But past cases of contempt both
here and elsewhere have
exhibited certain
characteristics and the courts
have from time to time, obtained
some assistance in dealing with
cases before them. The instant
proceedings are in a class of
their own, the facts being so
different in character from any
other I have come across.
This is not a case where a party
has sought to interfere with the
course of justice, or has
accused a judge of taking a
bribe or has charged the
judiciary generally of being
corrupt, inefficient, etc. Here
a respondent complains that when
he drew the judge’s attention to
an attribution of a certain
statement to the wrong person in
his written judgment, the judge
hurriedly substituted a new page
for the original page to make it
appear that he never made that
attribution at all in the first
place, and that he was being
wrongly, and even dishonestly,
accused. From then on, it was
one person’s credibility against
another’s; honour against
honour. Both of them are
untruthful, or one of them is;
both could not be telling the
truth. The fight to protect
honour led to a series of
writings and articles, the
language of which forms the
subject of the instant
proceedings.
The posture of the two parties
throws up certain basic issues
of fact and of law, which this
court must confront and
determine. These may be shortly
stated as follows:
1 Which pages 28, MB1 or CTC,
was read to the hearing of the
public in open court on 8/3/94?
2 Is a case of forgery
against all or any of the
respondents made out?
3 Is the language of the
statements, articles and other
written material relied on by
the prosecution libellous,
intemperate or scandalous?
4 Has malice or bad faith
been established against the
respondents or any of them?
5 Depending on the answers to
the above or any of them, is a
case of contempt by scandalising
this court made out?
I see issue (1) as fundamental.
I have heard it said that
whether page 28 of CTC or page
28 of MB1 is the genuine one, it
is immaterial, provided the
language complained of is proved
to be scandalous and libellous;
I do not share this view. The
court cannot assess the language
except in the context of all the
surrounding circumstances, which
must include the truth or
otherwise of the allegation
made. Resolving issue (1) is
essential for a number of
reasons:
(a) The case of the prosecution,
as well as that of the defence,
has been built largely around
this issue. Indeed, but for this
issue, we might not be sitting
here at all;
(b) This case has assumed such
public interest proportions that
we in this court owe it a duty
to let the Ghanaian public know
which of the two versions of
page 28 is the true version;
(c) The law reporter needs to
know which version should be
published in the law reports as
the opinion read by his
Lordship. The learned editors
may add whatever editorial
comment they may deem fit;
(d) The allegation of lying or
not cannot be known unless issue
(1) is determined;
(e) Issue (1) casts a shadow
over all the other issues, eg
malice and bad faith, excess of
language, forgery, etc.
To refuse to resolve this
fundamental issue under whatever
guise, subterfuge or pretence
may lay this court open to a
charge of running away from the
truth, which we are not entitled
to do, and expose us to ridicule
and contempt in the eyes of the
public. We must demonstrate for
all to see that our much-vaunted
desire to take justice to the
people is not mere rhetoric. Let
me repeat: this issue of fact
must be determined in these
proceedings, not only because it
is relevant to the present case,
but also because it will
otherwise never be determined.
We have the opportunity to do so
now.
The prosecution says that
exhibit MB1 is not authentic;
that it is not genuine; that it
is not what the learned judge
read on 8/3/94; he read CTC. See
eg, PW2, in his affidavit of
10/11/94, paragraphs 24, 26 and
30:
“24 That Justice Abban
complained bitterly to the Chief
Justice about the fact that
somebody might have stolen
his Reasons for Judgment and
maliciously tampered with it to
bring him and the
administration of justice into
dispute.
26 That after sometime when the
contemptuous publications
continued in The Free Press
newspaper without any response
from the National Media
Commission, it came to my
knowledge that Justice Abban
had requested the Chief Justice
to refer the matter of tampering
with his Reasons for Judgment
and the libellous materials
being printed and published of
him and the judicial system by
Mensa-Bonsu and The Free
Press to the
Attorney-General for
investigation by the police.
30 That the alleged signed
Reasons for Judgment obtained by
Mensa-Bonsu is not the Reasons
for Judgment read in court on 8
March 1994. He could not
therefore have heard what he
claimed to have heard in open
court from a reading of those
reasons for judgment which had
been in my custody thereafter.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
Also PW2’s affidavit of
22/11/94, para 5:
“5 That the said Mensa-Bonsu
has exhibited and marked MB1
supposed Reasons for Judgment
read in court by Justice
Abban on 8th March 1994.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
And as late as 6/2/95, in their
Written Reply Submissions by
Counsel for the Applicant,
the prosecution wrote:
“7 It is our submission that
if one compares the original
with exhibits MB1 and CTC one
would come to the conclusion
that exhibit CTC is the same
document as the original
document. All insertions on CTC
can be found on the original
while this is not so in the case
of exhibit MB1. If your
Lordships come to the conclusion
that exhibit CTC and MB1 are not
the same document by virtue of
the fact that even the
insertions and the signature are
not the same then the affidavit
of John Albert Owusu stands
discredited and ought to be
ignored¼”
All of the above goes to show
that as far as the prosecution
is concerned the whole of
exhibit MB1 is a fake; it is a
forgery.
I must confess I fail to see the
point in this line of reasoning.
Long before CTC was filed, the
defence had produced MB1 bearing
a signature which they alleged
was the judge’s signature. The
prosecution did not challenge
this signature. Later CTC was
produced, not by the
prosecution, but again by the
defence. They had obtained it
from PW2. Mr Logoh, and
therefore obviously the
signature was accepted by the
prosecution as that of the
judge. If upon comparing CTC
with MB1 the prosecution had
reason to doubt the genuineness
of the signature on MB1, all
they needed to do was to ask the
learned judge to disown that
signature, either orally or by
an affidavit. Nothing like this
has happened. So why this
curious submission about the two
signatures?
Besides, when in the context of
this case, it is said that MB1
and CTC are the same (except, of
course, for page 28 of each), I
understand the comparison to go
to type characters, letters,
typed corrections, erasures,
handwritten insertions,
corrections, punctuation marks,
paging, paragraphing,
composition and construction,
language, signature and so on.
The size of the pages or colour
of paper will, in this respect,
be completely irrelevant. We
must remember that in this day
and age, any size of paper can
be reproduced in a bigger or
smaller form, without effecting
any change in the content or
character of that document.
The submissions in the reply of
6/2/95, in so far as they relate
to the alleged differences
between MB1 and CTC, seem to me
to be disingenuous, irrelevant,
and even misleading. The
so-called differences, far from
damnifying the defence, rather
go to prove that
something happened to the
original in the possession
of PW2 after MB1 had been
obtained by the 1st respondent.
And when the prosecution finds
itself constrained to seek
solace in smudges and stains on
MB1, as indicating
differences with CTC, it
becomes apparent that they have
either lost faith in their case,
or else they have completely
missed the substance of the
matters in issue.
I here refer to paragraph 8(3)
of the affidavit of PW1, of
2/2/95:
“(3) A number of short vertical
lines/marks, can be found on all
the pages on the document marked
exhibit MB1 but they cannot be
found on the document marked
exhibit CTC or the original
document. That also suggests
that one document is not an
exact photocopy of the other.’
From their character and
position on virtually all the 40
pages, these “short vertical
lines/marks” on MB1 are
obviously marks made in the
course of photocopying, as a
result of using a photocopying
machine or process which must be
less efficient than that used in
reproducing CTC. These marks
cannot have any role whatever in
resolving the issue of substance
such as is being contested in
this case.
The same may be said of the
so-called “lay man’s”
observations, contained in the
rest of paragraph 8 of PW1’s
affidavit already referred to,
as to length of signature, size
of “type faces’, the length of a
page 33 etc. These are all
inconsequential minutiae, which
are best ignored by this court.
The prosecution present the
spectacle of not being sure
whether to say, “yes” or “no”,
to MB1. In court they continued
to give conflicting signals
about their stand. When pressed
to take a stand, they took the
view that they were being
cross-examined, or that words
were being forced into their
mouth, forgetting that in these
matters absolute candour can be
an asset. From what appears
presently, all else
notwithstanding, I am prepared
to assume in favour of the
prosecution that their challenge
to MB1 is not to the document as
a whole, but to page 28 only.
Which script, then did the
learned judge read on 8/3/94,
MB1 or CTC? In his supplementary
affidavit of 22/11/94, PW2 (Mr
Logoh) intimated in paragraph 7
that he had in his possession
“the Reasons for Judgment read
in court on 8 March 1994 by the
Chief Justice, Abban and Adade
JJSC¼“
This was after he had earlier in
the same affidavit castigated
1st respondent’s “copy,” exhibit
MB1, as “a supposed Reasons for
Judgment.” Mr Logoh, however,
did not see it fit to let the
court and the defence have sight
of the original and the
prosecution did not see it fit
to let the court and the defence
have sight of this original. The
prosecution closed their address
without producing the original.
All this while, they had in
their possession MB1 which the
respondents had exhibited to
their defence as far back as
21/11/94. From PW2’s affidavit
just referred to, it is plain
that the prosecution had, by the
22/11/94, compared MB1 with
their original. If they had
reason to believe that MB1 was a
forgery, as they continued to
press on us, they certainly
would have produced their
original to prove this.
As the party having the burden
of proof, especially as they had
also alleged forgery, the
non-production of the “genuine”
copy could not have been but
prejudicial to their case. The
defence, however, produced the
“original”, having obtained it
from PW2, certified, and
exhibited it as CTC. Even if the
prosecution had never seen the
original before (which is not
the case), as soon as CTC was
served on them, they should
immediately have discontinued
all challenge to MB1 (including
page 28) and apologised to the
court and the defence, because
it then must have occurred to
them that any such challenge had
not the slightest chance of
success, and was likely to
expose the prosecution to an
allegation of want of candour in
their conduct of the case.
Exhibit CTC is what the
prosecution says was read by the
judge on 8/3/94. If so, then the
prosecution cannot deny that MB1
(except perhaps page 28) must be
what the judge read on 8/3/94.
The typed script of pages 1-27
and pages 29-40 of MB1,
including the signature of the
learned judge on page 40
thereof, are exact photocopies
of the corresponding pages of
CTC, and, for emphasis, let me
add, page for page, typing error
for typing error, erasure for
erasure, typed correction for
typed correction, spelling
mistake for spelling mistake,
omission for omission (page 14
[of]; humil[i]ating; page 18,
sub[v]ersion; p 34 pe[r]tinent;
etc. Indeed, the typed script of
the said pages are duplicates of
the original, within the meaning
of section 164 of the Evidence
Decree 1975 (NRCD 323).
Then there are the handwritten
corrections, several of them, on
the said pages of MB1, all
of which appear also on CTC,
including even the punctuation
mark [;] at page 32. But there
are a few such handwritten
corrections, about 4 only, which
appear on CTC but do not appear
on MB1; these only go to show
that after the photocopy MB1 had
been taken, and the original
returned to the custody of the
court, some further amendments
were made. Given that the
prosecution accepts the
signature of page 40 of CTC as
that of the judge, having
certified CTC as the original,
it follows that the signature of
MB1 cannot be denied. They are,
even to the most casual or lay
observer, the same; the two are
photocopies of the same original
in the custody of PW2.
I have a recollection, and my
notes support this, that at the
hearing on 2/2/95 the
prosecution conceded that the
handwritten corrections in CTC
are all in the handwriting of
the learned judge. In their
Written Reply Submissions
filed on 6/2/95 the prosecution
seems to suggest that this
concession if it was ever made
was, as it was, extorted from
them. The prosecution need only
to be reminded that having
vouched, by the certification,
that the signature on CTC is
that of the judge, the
presumption is that all
the handwritten corrections in
that document were made by him,
until the contrary is proved.
And no such proof has been
offered. Besides, the
certification goes to the
whole document CTC, the
typed as well as the handwritten
parts. The whole of that
document is the certified
original, in which case the
authorship of the handwritten
corrections becomes even of
little moment.
The question therefore is: if
indeed MB1 is not genuine, how
did it happen that 1st
respondent, sitting somewhere,
conceived the idea of forging
MB1, obtained the same
typewriter to put his designs
into effect, committed the same
errors, and managed to get the
same person, judge or otherwise,
to make the same corrections for
him. The prosecution has not
attempted to supply the faintest
clue as to how such an
extraterrestrial feat could have
been performed.
This brings me now to page 28 of
MB1 and CTC. The issue here also
is: Which of the two versions
was read by the judge on 8/3/94?
I remind myself that here too
the burden is on the prosecution
to prove beyond doubt that page
28 of CTC is the genuine one,
and that, by necessary
inference, page 28 of MB1 is a
fake. The proof offered by the
prosecution is that page 28 of
CTC is the official certified
version; page 28 of MB1 is not
known to them. This carries the
presumption, a rebuttable one,
that page 28 of CTC is what was
read on 8/3/94. The prosecution
has also put in affidavits by PW
5 (Mr Otoo) and PW3, Addo-Nkum
of the Criminal Investigations
Department of the Ghana Police
Service.
The prosecution seems to rely
entirely on the fact that page
28 of CTC is certified,
whereas page 28 of MB1 is not,
to imply that that conclusively
discharges the burden on them.
In this, the prosecution,
respectfully, are mistaken. The
certification is no more than
proof beyond doubt that the
certified extract is an exact
copy of what is on the office
file; it agrees in every respect
with what the office has. (See
section 175(1) of the Evidence
Decree 1975 (NRCD 323). But it
does not answer the question:
what did the judge read on
8/3/94? It is as though the
prosecution are saying: “This is
what we have as the official
document;” to which the defence
answer: “Yes, we agree, but this
is not what the judge read.”
The establishment of the primary
fact, by the certification
merely raises a presumption that
the document is what was read,
and throws on to the defence the
burden of persuasion that the
contrary is the case. The
standard of proof on the defence
is the balance of probabilities,
not proof beyond reasonable
doubt. (See section 12 of NRCD
323). In this context, the
evidence is evaluated by the
likes of “reasonable minds”.
(See section 13(2) and section
21 of NRCD 323).
To rebut the presumption the
defence relies essentially on
page 28 of MB1 to be its own
justification. The said page
agrees in typescript with all
the other 39 pages of both CTC
and MB1. On the contrary, page
28 of CTC is different. PW5’s
affidavit, seeking to explain
this difference is, to say the
least, unconvincing; for if
different typewriters were used
to type CTC, then one would
expect that not only one page,
but several pages would have
different type faces. But this
is not the case.
Besides, page 28 of MB1 carries
handwriting, which is the same
as that on many other pages of
CTC and MB1. The prosecution has
not attempted to explain how
this handwriting appeared on
page 28 of MB1, correcting the
typed “erra” to read “era.” That
handwriting has not been
rejected by the learned judge.
Any reasonable mind looking at
page 28 of MB1 in relation to
page 28 of CTC will necessarily
conclude that page 28 of MB1 is
the genuine one. Page 28 of MB1
is the same in every respect as
page 28 of CTC save that the
latter introduces the “Graphic
View.” If this had been
contained in the original
version, what reason would 1st
respondent have had to write his
letter of complaint of 9/5/94? I
am satisfied that page 28 of MB1
(and not page 28 of CTC) is the
original page, and the one read
by the learned judge on 8/3/94.
Thus on the fundamental issue of
fact as to which of the two
documents was read by the
learned judge on 8/3/94 I do not
hesitate to say (as indeed I
have never had any doubt
whatever on this) that it was
MB1, with its page 28. This
means that I find that page 28
of CTC is not the original page
28, and, as contended by the
defence, it was brought into
being purposely to answer and
defeat the query raised by the
1st respondent in his letter of
9/5/94, exhibit MB3. This means
that I find the charge of
forgery or tampering made
against the respondents or any
of them unproven, and I reject
same.
The said page 28 of MB1 quotes a
passage from the Daily
Graphic newspaper of
24/2/70, which the learned judge
said was part of a speech by Dr
Busia. That attribution is an
error. But which human being
never makes a mistake? An
innocent misstatement of a fact
is a mistake - an ordinary
mistake. A deliberate
misstatement of fact is not just
an ordinary mistake; it is a
lie. Short of an admission by
the prosecution that the mistake
was deliberate, the question
whether it was deliberate or
unintentional must be determined
by inference, having regard to
the whole of the evidence before
the court. The evidence shows
that:
(a) when the mistake was pointed
out by 1st respondent, by his
letter of the 9/5/94, it was
denied, and it continues to be
denied up to this date, when
everything points in one
direction, that the denial
cannot be sustained;
(b) an attempt was
made to cover up the mistake, by
hurriedly typing a corrective
page, and substituting it for
original;
(c) the passage
complained of was copied from
the Daily Graphic, which
paper must have been lying
before the judge at the time of
copying. He could not therefore
have failed to notice the
caption, “Graphic View”. This
caption was omitted in the
course of copying: the omission
has not been explained. The
inference therefore is that it
was deliberate, and not
accidental;
(d) the tenor of the passage was
enough to inform any reasonable
reader that it could not be a
reproduction of a speech, but
rather a general comment and
exhortation by the Daily
Graphic newspaper.
All the above, and in particular
the continued denial by the
prosecution even in this court
that there had been a mistake,
when with all the evidence
available, a denial was simply
not open to them, gives the
impression that the original
mistake must have been
deliberate; it is a lie. It is a
painful conclusion to come to,
but, I am afraid, it is an
inescapable conclusion.
This finding does not
necessarily answer the charge of
contempt. The prosecution says
that the articles and other
writings of the respondents went
far beyond the bounds of fair
criticism; the language was
intemperate, insulting,
scurrilous and scandalous, and
constitutes contempt.
There are different forms of
contempt. Underlying all of
them, however, is one basic
notion, that the roadways and
highways of public justice
should at all times be free from
obstruction. Conduct which tends
to create such an obstruction
constitutes contempt. Thus
interfering with witnesses or
jurors; frightening off parties
to pending proceedings in such a
manner as to prejudice the
outcome; running down the courts
and the judges; refusing to obey
an order of a court - any of
these, if calculated to, or tend
to, impede or obstruct the
course of justice will
constitute contempt. Any conduct
complained of therefore must be
viewed and assessed against the
backdrop of this basic
principle.
In vol 9 Halsbury’s Laws of
England, 4th edition page 21
paragraph 27 the learned author
tells us that:
“Any act done or writing
published which is calculated to
bring a court or a judge into
contempt, or to lower his
authority, or to interfere with
the due course of justice or the
lawful process of the court, is
a contempt of court. Thus
scurrilous abuse of a judge or
court, or attacks on the
personal character of a judge,
are punishable contempts. The
punishment is inflicted, not for
the purpose of protecting either
the court as a whole or the
individual judges of the court
from a repetition of the attack,
but of protecting the public,
and especially those who either
voluntarily or by compulsion are
subject to the jurisdiction of
the court, from the mischief
they will incur if the authority
of the tribunal is undermined or
impaired. In consequence, the
court has regarded with
particular seriousness
allegations of partiality or
bias on the part of a judge or a
court.
On the other hand, criticism of
a judge’s conduct or the conduct
of a court, even if strongly
worded, is not a contempt
provided that the criticism is
fair, temperate and made in good
faith and is not directed to the
personal character of a judge or
to the impartiality of a judge
or court.”
I may here mention the case of
In the matter of a Special
Reference from the Bahama
Islands [1893] AC 138. This
is not a judgment, it was an
advisory opinion of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council
tendered in response to an
invitation by the Secretary of
State for the Colonies on an
issue, which had arisen in the
Bahamas. Advice 1(a) at page 148
of the report defines the
offence of contempt and reads as
follows:
“1(a) That the letter signed
“Columnist” in The Nassau
Guardian though it might
have been made the subject of
proceedings for libel was not,
in the circumstances,
calculated to obstruct or
interfere with the course of
justice or the due
administration of the law,
and therefore did not constitute
a contempt of Court.”
The test is stated as follows in
the Canadian case of R v
Kopyto (1987) 47 DLR
213 at 214, per Goodman JA:
“The expression of an opinion
which may be lawfully expressed
in mild, polite, temperate or
scholarly language does not
become unlawful simply because
it is expressed in crude,
vulgar, impolite or acerbic
words. However, the statements
by the accused that the courts
were warped in favour of the
police were clearly the type of
statement calculated to bring
the administration of justice
into disrepute.”
And he goes on later at pp
215-217:
“If the utterances made by the
person bring the administration
of justice into disrepute in the
eyes of the reasonable man,
dispassionate and fully apprised
of the circumstances of the case
and the fact that justice has
been brought into disrepute
results in a clear, significant
and imminent or present danger
to the fair and effective
administration of justice, then
the utterances would properly
constitute contempt of court and
such offence would be a
reasonable limit on the right to
freedom of expression. The
offence moreover would not have
to be limited to utterances made
with reference to a case still
pending before the court.
Rather the important question
would be whether the utterances
created a real, significant and
present or imminent danger to
the fair and effective
administration of justice.
The utterances in this case
however fell far short of
meeting that test
¼
A person is not guilty of
contempt of court merely on the
assumption that the words used
would bring the court into
contempt or lower its authority,
nor could he be convicted where
the words complained of could
have little or no effect on the
administration of justice. The
offence of contempt of court is
not an offence of absolute
liability. The offence would
only be made out upon proof of
an intention to bring the
administration of justice into
disrepute and truth would be a
defence¼
To make out the offence it was
essential for the Crown to prove
that the statement made by the
accused was calculated to bring
the administration of justice
into disrepute. The mere fact
that the words were capable of
bringing the administration of
justice into disrepute does not
suffice. What must be shown
is that by reason of the
statement made by the accused
there was a serious risk that
the administration of justice
would be interfered with. The
risk or prejudice must be
serious, real or substantial.
This is the actus reus of
the offence and can be
determined by application of a
reasonable person test.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
The accused in the Kopyto
case was convicted of contempt.
On appeal, the Ontario Court of
Appeal quashed the conviction
and acquitted him. Will a
reasonable person, looking at
all the evidence in the present
case say that in pointing out
the mistake and, as it were,
expressing, be it vigorously,
their distaste for the manner of
the correction, the respondents
have obstructed the course of
justice? Does their conduct
present “a clear and present
danger to judicial
administration”? See the
Australian case of Gallagher
v Durack (1958) LRC (Crim)
706 at p 712.
In McLeod v St Aubyn
[1899] AC 459 the accused, a
lawyer, had been hauled up
before the Supreme Court of St
Vincent for contempt, for
publishing in a newspaper called
the Federalist an article
severely critical and scandalous
of St Aubyn, who at the time was
the Acting Chief Justice of St
Vincent. Parts of the article,
headed: “The Administration
of Justice” said at page
552-553:
“All the other islands do not
appear to be as fortunate as
Grenada. St. Vincent especially
has suffered more perhaps, than
any other from maladministration
of justice. In Mr. Trafford the
public had no confidence, and
his locum tenens, Mr. St. Aubyn,
is reducing the judicial
character to the level of a
clown. Law and order will only
be observed when the tribunals
of justice is (sic) pure and
impartial.
It does not seem from the
letter of ‘Fairplay’
which appears in another column
that the Acting Chief Justice of
St. Vincent is capable of
maintaining the noble traditions
of the British Bench. He has
apparently been too wrapped up
and intermingled with personal
disputes and squabbles of a
questionable character to allow
him to deal honestly and
impartially with questions which
come before him to be judicially
settled. To nod and wink to
counsel engaged in cases is not
at all dignified in a judge; it
becomes doubly criminal when he
who performs these grievances
and gymnastics is solemnly
adjudicating questions of the
utmost importance, involving the
liberty, almost the life, of
British subjects¼”
At page 553:
“If the people can have no faith
in the findings of the Chief
Justice, they may, doubtless, be
tempted to redress their own
wrongs, either of a private or
public nature, with this result,
that he who may be the chief
cause of illegality will escape
scatheless whilst those he has
provoked to an outbreak will
become the victims of martial
chastisement¼
“St Vincent has suffered much
from the maladministration of
justice¼
“Discontent which might have
culminated in riot has only been
prevented by the influence and
exertion of the St. Vincent
editor of this journal, we hope
he may be able to assist in
allaying the dissatisfaction
which prevails, consequent on
the misconduct of the Acting
Chief Justice…”
The article contained even worse
and more scandalous statements
than these.
The Acting Chief Justice himself
tried the accused and convicted
him for contempt. On appeal the
House of Lords quashed the
conviction and acquitted him.
Costs were awarded against the
Acting Chief Justice. The
following passage at page 561 of
the report may be instructive:
“Now, what are the
considerations applicable to the
case? Committals for contempt of
Court are ordinarily in cases
where some contempt ex facie of
the Court has been committed, or
for comments on cases pending in
the Courts. However, there can
be no doubt that there is a
third head of contempt of Court
by the publication of scandalous
matter of the court itself. Lord
Hardwicke so lays down without
doubt in re Read and
Huggonson [2 Atk 471] He
says, “One kind of contempt is
scandalising the court itself.”
The power summarily to commit
for contempt of Court is
considered necessary for the
proper administration of
justice. It is not to be used
for the vindication of the judge
as a person. He must resort to
action for libel or criminal
information. Committal for
contempt of Court is a weapon to
be used sparingly, and always
with reference to the interests
of the administration of
justice. Hence, when a trial has
taken place and the case is
over, the judge or the jury are
given over to criticism.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
The accused was acquitted. In
this case the particular
passages relied on by the
prosecution as constituting
contempt are quoted in
paragraphs 10 and 11 of the
affidavit of PW1 dated 10/11/94
as follows:
“10¼By
the sane and sound conviction of
one of Ghana’s Supreme Court
justices, in the person of Mr
Justice I K Abban in disagreeing
with the majority decision of
the 9-member panel of the
Supreme Court in upholding the
writ filed by the New Patriotic
Party that the government of the
National Democratic Congress has
no legal basis and is highly
unconstitutional to celebrate
the last year’s anniversary of
the 31st December revolution,
the learned Supreme Court judge
committed one of the most
grievous and unpardonable legal
crimes against the media, the
judiciary and the people of
Ghana.
11
¼In
his display of political
[chicanery] and bamboozlement of
Ghanaians, the learned Supreme
Court judge lifted the whole
editorial comment [of the]
Daily Graphic newspaper of
Tuesday February 24, 1970 No
6033 and portrayed it as a
speech made by Dr K A Busia,
Ghana’s Prime Minister in the
Second Republic which to all
intents and purposes is most
outrageous in the field of legal
issues.”
These must be passages against
which the strongest objection is
taken. There is another
quotation in paragraph 22. But
that goes more to contempt by
commenting on a pending
proceeding than by scandalising
the court.
The prosecution relies also
generally on publications in the
issues of The Free Press
newspaper dated 13/5/94,
20/5/94, 27/5/94, 3/6/94 and
4/11/94 and other publications.
All these publications carry
adverse and even insulting
comments against the learned
judge, based on what the
respondents especially the 2nd
respondent believed to be an
attempt by the judge to change
one page of his written and
published opinion in an unfair
manner. The respondents must
have realised that if the judge
succeeded in winning acceptance
for his new page, they, and
particularly the 1st respondent
will be cast in the mould of
criminals, as forgers, and
therefore as dishonest persons,
with consequences they probably
could not predict. As far as the
1st respondent is concerned, a
finding against him that he
forged the page 28 of MB1, and
attributed the forgery to the
judge, might earn him, not only
the stain of a criminal
conviction for forgery, but also
the loss of his professional
career as a lawyer - he could be
disbarred. This only gives an
indication of the degree of
seriousness of the charge of
forgery levelled by the
prosecution against the
respondents.
Here not only has the charge of
forgery not been proved by the
prosecution; on the contrary,
the defence have succeeded in
proving that the
prosecution’s own page 28 of CTC
is not genuine, to say the
least: that page 28 of MB1 is
the original page read in open
court, and page 28 of CTC is a
substituted page. These
proceedings would appear to be a
vindication of the conduct and
actions of the respondents in
drawing public attention to what
is clearly a matter of public
interest.
But for the industry of the 1st
respondent I cannot imagine how
any Ghanaian would have been
interested in checking the
quotation in issue, except
perhaps the editors who tend to
check the source and accuracy of
every quotation or citation in
every reportable judgment, not
so much for the public at large,
as for the purposes of the
professional publication called
The Ghana Law Reports.
Whilst finding, as I have done,
that on the whole, in all the
circumstances, a case of
contempt has not been made out,
I would wish to caution that we
all - the lay public, the legal
profession, and judges
themselves- have a stake in
upholding the integrity,
authority and respect of and for
the judiciary. If these should
collapse, one of the surest
foundations of our democracy
would have vanished, and we
shall all be the poorer for it.
Of course judges, like any other
group of human beings, do make
mistakes, and should, indeed
ought, to be criticised. At
times some of us feel that our
judgments are not criticised
enough, especially by the legal
profession. I expect however,
that the language of criticism
will be tempered and measured.
It is not often remembered that
judges, seen by many as very
strong, are in fact the weakest
members in the society. We
receive blows, we cannot throw
any; a factor to be taken into
account when a member of the
public is inclined to criticise
us. This echoes the appeal of
Lord Justice Edmund Davies in
R v Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn
(No 2) [1968] 2 All ER
319 at 320-321:
“The right to fair criticism is
part of the birthright of all
subjects of Her Majesty. Though
it has its boundaries, that
right covers a wide expanse, and
its curtailment must be
jealously guarded against. It
applies to the judgments of the
courts as to all other topics of
public importance. Doubtless it
is desirable that critics
should, first, be accurate and,
secondly, be fair, and that they
should particularly remember and
be alive to that desirability if
those whom they would attack
have, in the ordinary course, no
means of defending themselves.”
The general thrust of all the
publications complained of in
this case, which I have
carefully studied, is to secure
public acceptance for page 28 of
MB1, and a firm rejection of
page 28 of CTC, and even a
public condemnation of the act
of substitution. I do not read
the articles as general comments
or strictures on the courts, or
the judges therein, or the
administration of justice. They
cannot be interpreted as “an
obstruction to public justice¼“
On the contrary, they have the
effect of sanitizing the
administration of justice. I
will dismiss the application for
contempt against all three
respondents.
In almost all the cases cited to
us, the accused persons, on
being acquitted of contempt were
awarded costs. See, eg McLeod
v St Aubyn [1899] AC 549 at
p 562; Ambard v A-G of
Trinidad [1936] AC 322 at
337 and Pereira v The King
[1951] AC 482 at 489. This court
is not used to awarding costs in
cases involving the state. I
think we can make an exception
in this case, given all the
circumstances, and reimburse the
respondents, at least for their
out-of-pocket expenses. As far
as I am concerned, the
application fails and is
dismissed.
AMUA SEKYI JSC.
On 29 December 1993, this court
constituted by Archer CJ, Adade,
Francois, Abban, Amua-Sekyi,
Aikins, Bamford-Addo,
Hayfron-Benjamin and Ampiah
JJSC, gave judgment in a suit
entitled: New Patriotic Party
v Attorney-General [1994-95]
GBR 1. Reasons for the decision,
which were reserved, were
finally given on 8 March 1994.
Present in court were the nine
judges, Messrs Peter Ala
Adjetey, Samuel Okudzeto, Kwadwo
Asiedu, Benjamin Annan, William
Addo and Miss Gloria Akuffo for
the plaintiffs, and Mr Martin
Amidu, Deputy Attorney-General,
Mrs Louisa Adusa-Amankwaa, Chief
State Attorney, and Mr Avah,
Principal State Attorney, for
the defendant. Also present in
court were members of the
public, including some lawyers
who were not in the case, and
staff of the Judicial Service.
Each judge read his reasons in
open court. Anyone who was
present and cared to listen must
have heard what was read.
On 9 May 1994 Kwabena
Mensa-Bonsu, a lawyer by
profession, wrote a letter to Mr
Justice Abban to complain that
in the course of reading his
reasons the judge had
misrepresented Dr Busia, Prime
Minister from 1969 - 1972, as
having made a speech in praise
of the coup d’etat of 24
February 1966, which said speech
had been reported in the
Daily Graphic newspaper of
24 February 1970. He said that
the alleged speech was not in
fact a speech at all, or by
Busia, but rather the editorial
opinion of the newspaper. He
attached a photocopy of the
publication to his letter and
intimated that he would have the
letter published. A copy of the
letter and the publication also
went to the Chief Justice. It
was evident that if, indeed, the
judge had attributed the
Daily Graphic editorial to
the late Prime Minister, then he
had committed a grave error
which called for an explanation.
Mensa-Bonsu is a columnist of
The Free Press newspaper, a
paper with a reputation for
robust criticism of public
figures. On 13 May 1994 there
appeared in his column which has
the by-line, “Sentiments of K
Mensa-Bonsu,” a reproduction
of the letter he wrote to the
judge. It is couched in firm but
polite language and called on
him to offer an explanation for
what he had done. No serious
objection can be taken to this
letter, and none has been taken.
However, our attention has been
drawn to a short piece with the
headline: “Justice Abban is a
liar,” which preceded the
letter in the paper. It reads:
“By the sane and sound
conviction of one of Ghana’s
Supreme Court justices, in the
person of Mr Justice I K Abban
in disagreeing with the majority
decision of the nine members of
the Supreme Court in upholding
the writ filed by the New
Patriotic Party (NPP) that the
government of the National
Democratic Congress (NDC) has no
legal basis and is highly
unconstitutional to celebrate
the last year’s anniversary of
the 31st December Revolution,
the learned Supreme Court judge
committed one of the most
grievous and unpardonable crimes
against the media, the judiciary
and the people of Ghana.
In his display of political
chicanery and bamboozlement of
Ghanaians, the learned Supreme
Court judge lifted the whole
editorial comment of Daily
Graphic newspaper of Tuesday
February 24, 1970 No. 6033 and
portrayed it as a speech by Dr K
A Busia, Ghana’s Prime Minister
in the Second Republic, which to
all intents and purposes, is
most outrageous in the field of
legal issues.
This is because in the same,
repeat same, issue of the
Daily Graphic, Dr Busia made
a speech with the Headline “Use
Freedom Responsibly’, which was
the newspaper’s front-page
leading story, whilst the
headline for the editorial on
the second page was: ‘Salute The
Gallant Men’.
These two news items - a speech
and an editorial - cannot escape
the mind power of the learned
Supreme Court judge in
delivering his judgment in
favour of the NDC.
And for the benefit of our
numerous readers, The Free
Press deems it highly
patriotic to produce in verbatim
all the sides to the issue ie
the Daily Graphic
editorial comment, Dr Busia’s
speech and the bamboozle
displayed by Mr Justice I K
Abban in the lifting of the
Daily Graphic editorial and
making it a speech delivered by
the late Prime Minister to
support his NDC government, and
lastly the letter written by Mr
K Mensa-Bonsu to the learned
judge drawing his attention to
the mind-raking error of the
century.”
There is no evidence that this
piece was written by Mensa-Bonsu
or that the headline was chosen
by him. It is well known that in
these matters, editors of
newspapers exercise their own
discretion. As far as
Mensa-Bonsu is concerned, what
caused some ruffling of feathers
was an article, which appeared
in his column on 20 May 1994. It
is headed: “Judicial Chicanery”
and reads in part:
“In his zeal to justify 31
December, Mr Justice Abban
indulged in judicial chicanery
by attributing to Dr Busia a
statement he did not make
¼In
going out of his way to find
factual material to support the
case of the government Mr
Justice Abban has abandoned the
noble role of the judge as an
umpire who holds an even balance
between the parties who appear
in court
¼There
is no doubt that Mr Justice
Abban’s judgment is tainted with
politics. The impression created
in his judgment is that of a
judge bending over backwards to
please the government. What is
even more serious is that he has
indulged in what is plain
falsehood. This is bad in a
judge whether it happened by
accident, negligence or design
especially, when the target of
his falsehood, Dr Busia, is no
longer alive to defend himself.
The Fourth Republican
Constitution is in serious
danger if judges, called upon to
interpret the Constitution, are
going to use
the Bench for what is manifestly
politics of undisguised partisan
nature; and in the process do
violence to the truth.”
There is evidence that on the
same day Mensa-Bonsu received
through the post a letter dated
12 May, ostensibly written on
the instructions of the Chief
Justice, and signed by Mustapha
Logoh as registrar of this
court, and to which was attached
what was supposed to be a true
copy of page 28 of the judge’s
opinion. The letter ended thus:
“It was exactly the “Daily
Graphic View” the judge
quoted in his judgment.”
It should be noted that
Mensa-Bonsu had addressed his
letter to the judge with a copy
only to the Chief Justice. It
was the judge, not the Chief
Justice, who was called upon to
explain why he had ascribed to
the late Prime Minister a speech
he did not make. As I shall show
presently, submitting what
stands in the records of he
court as a true copy of the
reasons as delivered was no
answer to the charge. What was
required was an admission or a
denial by the judge of the
allegation made against him.
It appears that following the
publication of 20 May 1994, Mr
Justice Abban lodged a complaint
with the Media Commission
against the paper. In the 27 May
1994 edition of the paper, there
appeared a full report on the
judge’s complaint and the
paper’s reaction to it. This was
that they stood by their
columnist but were prepared to
render an unqualified apology if
the Commission found that the
allegation made against the
judge was groundless. In an
editorial of that same day the
paper expressed surprise that
the judge had not admitted his
error and called upon the
Commission to hold an impartial
enquiry into the matter.
Meanwhile, on 23 May 1994
Mensa-Bonsu sent a reply to
Logoh in which he made it clear
that he did not accept that what
Logoh has sent him accurately
recorded what the judge said in
court. He made out a strong case
that the judge had altered the
text he read to meet the
criticism that had been made of
it. Again, no objection could
have been taken to this letter,
and none has been taken. This
letter was also published in the
3 June 1994 edition of the
paper.
The complaint to the Media
Commission was never gone into
because the judge later withdrew
it and had the matter referred
to the Attorney-General.
Mensa-Bonsu, the editor of the
paper and its publisher were
summoned to the police station
and asked to make statements. It
seemed then that a charge of
criminal libel was contemplated.
Characteristically, the paper in
its 4 November 1994 edition gave
a full account of what
transpired at the police station
to its readers and published an
editorial headed: “Abban puts
Integrity of the Bench on the
Line.” It wondered why he
had withdrawn the complaint from
the Media Commission to seek
assistance from the courts. The
passage in this lengthy
editorial which the applicant
finds offensive reads:
“And, it is this clearly bad
case which Mr Justice Abban
expects the court to twist in
his favour. What Mr justice
Abban may not realise in his
desperation in expecting his
colleagues on the Bench to
behave like lunatics, however,
is that, he is, in fact, putting
the integrity, credibility and
respectability of the Bench on
the line. And whether the men
and women on the Bench would
allow themselves to be reduced
to such depth and also abused to
save the face of a fellow
prodigal benchman, remains to be
seen. Ghanaians are watching
developments with eagle’s eyes.”
The expected charge of criminal
libel was not brought; instead,
the present proceedings for
contempt for scandalising the
court were commenced against the
three respondents. The
application was supported by
affidavits sworn by Mrs
Adusa-Amankwa, Logoh, Irene
Wuaku and the investigating
police officer called Addo-Nkum.
In his affidavit, Logoh said
that after the judge had read
his opinion, he handed it over
to him, that he gave it to Irene
to re-type and that upon
completion she returned it to
him. He said from what he had
the judge did not attribute the
passage to the late Prime
Minister. Irene confirmed what
Logoh had said in his affidavit.
Upon being served with the
motion paper, statement and
affidavits, the respondents
filed affidavits of their own.
They said that they were present
in court when the judge read his
opinion and that they heard him
attribute the passage to the
late Prime Minister. They
supported their assertion with
affidavits by Messrs Adjetey,
Asiedu, and Annan, legal
practitioners, who were among
counsel who represented the
plaintiffs in the case, and
Moses Nettey, also a legal
practitioner, who although not
in the case was in court. Each
of these gentlemen deposed to
having heard the judge attribute
the passage to the late Prime
Minister. Mr Agyenim Boateng,
Secretary-General of the New
Patriotic Party, the plaintiffs,
also made a similar declaration
on oath. One Okerchiri Kwabena,
also a legal practitioner,
deposed to having obtained a
copy of the opinion as read from
Owusu-Ansah, Deputy Judicial
Secretary, and how with
Owusu-Ansah’s permission he made
it available to Mensa-Bonsu for
the purpose of making a
photographic copy for his use.
One would have thought that
faced with this formidable array
of witnesses, the applicant
would file an affidavit by the
judge or other persons who were
in court to deny that he
attributed the passage to the
late Prime Minister. Mrs
Adusa-Amankwa did file another
affidavit, but all she said was
that she could not remember what
the judge said. One can only
wonder why she deposed to the
affidavit at all if she was not
in a position to assist the
court to arrive at the truth.
Logoh also filed an affidavit
impugning the authenticity of
the copy Owusu-Ansah was alleged
to have given out to Kwabena and
Mensa-Bonsu. Surely, if the
truth were what the applicant
was after, the better course
would have been to ask
Owusu-Ansah who, as the Deputy
Judicial Secretary, occupies a
more responsible position in the
Judicial Service than Logoh, to
depose to an affidavit. The
impression created was that
whereas Logoh could be
manipulated Owusu-Ansah could
not.
In the course of the argument,
an attempt was made by Mr da
Rocha, counsel for Mensa-Bonsu,
to correct this regrettable
state of affairs. However, the
application to call Owusu-Ansah
and one Tawiah who at one time
acted as registrar of this court
was turned down. It is a measure
of the importance of getting to
the bottom of this matter that
three out of the seven judges
refused to associate themselves
with the decision to exclude
oral evidence by the court’s own
officers.
At this stage, Nana Akufo-Addo,
counsel for the second and third
respondents, obtained and filed
an affidavit by Owusu-Ansah and
a forensic expect called Owusu.
It seems Tawiah declined to
depose to an affidavit. Why he
refused to do is now a matter
for speculation. An attempt by
Mr Amidu to have the two
affidavits excluded failed. So
we have before us the
all-important affidavit of
Owusu-Ansah. In it, he confirmed
that it was he who made a copy
of the opinion available to the
first respondent. He stated in
paragraphs 3 - 9 as follows:
“3 That after the Supreme
Court delivered its judgment in
writ No 18/93, New Patriotic
Party v Attorney-General on
8 March 1994, I obtained copies
of the reasons for judgment of
the judges of the court,
including that of Mr Justice
Abban, from Mr J D Tawiah, who
was then Acting Registrar of the
Supreme Court.
4 That later Mr Kwabena
Mensa-Bonsu, the 1st respondent
in SCM 77/93, came to me to ask
for a copy of Mr Justice Abban’s
reasons for judgment. I told him
I had copies of the judgments
some of which I had given to Mr
Okerchiri Adusa Kwabena, an
Accra legal practitioner,
including that of Mr Justice
Abban, and directed Mr Kwabena
Mensa-Bonsu to go for the copy
from Mr Okerchiri Adusa Kwabena.
5 Subsequently, Mr Kwabena
Mensa-Bonsu returned the copy of
Mr justice Abban’s reasons for
judgment, which I had given to
Mr Okerchiri Adusa Kwabena, to
me.
6 That I read the reasons for
judgment of Mr Justice Abban as
I did the reasons for judgment
of the other Justices of the
Supreme Court in that case.
7 That subsequently, I read a
publication in the May 27 to
June 2 1994 issue of The Free
Press weekly showing two
competing versions of page 28 of
the reasons for judgment of Mr
Justice Abban. One version
corresponded with page 28 of the
reasons for judgment of Justice
Abban which Mr J D Tawiah had
given to me; the other version
did not and was new to me.
8 That I therefore called on
Mr J D Tawiah to find out
whether he could explain the
emergence of two competing
versions of page 28 of the
reasons of judgment of Mr
Justice Abban.
9 That Mr J D Tawiah stated
that the page 28 with which I
was familiar was the one Mr
Justice Abban handed over to him
after delivery in court, and
further that, subsequent to his
giving me that copy, Mr Justice
Abban called for and collected
from him his Reasons for
Judgment.”
In the other affidavit, the
forensic expert offered an
opinion that the copy marked
MB1, which he obtained from the
first respondent, and CTC, which
came from Logoh, were the same
except that a different
typewriter was used to type page
28 of CTC. The inference was
clear; after the opinion had
been read and a copy, MB1 made,
page 28 was extracted and
replaced with another.
By leave of the court the
applicant filed further
affidavits. One was by Logoh to
prove that he was appointed
registrar of this court in March
1993. However, paragraph 6 of
the affidavit shows that in
October of that year he left the
country for a course abroad. He
did not give any indication as
to when he returned to the
country to resume duty, but said
he was in court when the judges
read their opinions on 8 March
1994. On the crucial issue of
what Mr Justice Abban said when
reading his opinion, he was
strangely silent. The impression
Logoh sought to convey was that
Owusu-Ansah’s statement that he
obtained a copy of the opinion
from Tawiah could not be true.
But it is a matter within our
own knowledge that before Logoh
was appointed, Tawiah had acted
as registrar of this court for a
number of years and that after
his appointment Logoh was
required to work under Tawiah’s
supervision for several months.
The documentary evidence he
submitted to prove when he
became registrar tells only half
the story.
There was also an affidavit by
Emmanuel Otoo, an officer of
this court, who admitted to
being the person who typed the
opinion read by the judge. Faced
with the fact that one page had
a different type-face from the
rest, he offered the
unconvincing explanation that he
began the typing of the
manuscript in an office on the
third floor of these premises
and continued the typing in his
own office on a different
typewriter. Here, too, we have
matter, which needed to be
investigated. For, if the story
were true, one would expect to
see several pages of CTC having
the same typeface as page 28.
Mrs Adusa-Amankwa came up with
yet another affidavit. This time
she offered her inexpert opinion
that CTC and MB1 were not the
same document. Addo-Nkum also
deposed to another affidavit to
which he attached the police
statements made by the three
respondents when they faced a
charge of criminal libel. He
alleged that there were
inconsistencies between the
matters deposed to in the
affidavit of the first
respondent and the statements he
made to the police. Also that
the second and third respondents
had told an untruth when they
said in their affidavits that
they were in court when the
judge read his opinion. I am
satisfied that if counsel or the
witness had taken the trouble to
read the statements these
irresponsible and reckless
charges would not have been
made. There is no inconsistency
between the affidavit of the
first respondent and his
statement to the police, and the
second respondent did say, in
support of the first
respondent’s assertion that he
was in court, that “we were also
in court.” The publisher said
that he stood by what the editor
of the paper had said. Nothing
can be clearer than this.
What I find surprising is that
even at the late stage it was
not found necessary to persuade
Tawiah or the judge whose
conduct was in issue to depose
to affidavits. If counsel were
serious that regardless of what
the judge actually said in
court, we are bound to accept
whatever appears in the
Judgments Book as a true
reflection of what took place in
the court-room, they ought to
have come clean on what the
judge actually said in court.
The position is that on one side
there are affidavits deposing to
what the judge said in court,
while on the other there is
complete silence.
I have examined CTC which Logoh
has certified as a true copy of
the opinion read by the judge
and MB1 which Owusu-Ansah
obtained from Tawiah and made
available to Okerchiri Kwabena
and Mensa-Bonsu. The task of
determining whether the two
documents are one and the same
has been made rather easy by the
large number of spelling and
typing mistakes and corrections
made in ink or with a
typewriter. Among those which
are to be found in both CTC and
MB1 are the following:
Page 1 Line 1 - “original”
mistyped as “oroginal”
Page 2 Line 14 - “the”
written in ink above typed
“and”.
Page 5 Line 36 - “judgment”
mistyped as “juedment”.
Page Line 29 -
“adaptations” mistyped as
“adoptations’.
Line 32 - “that” typed and
placed between “reliefs” and
“this”.
Page 13 Line 23 - “A” written
in ink above mistyped “A” in
“JA”
27 - “d” written in ink above
mistyped “d” in “learned”.
Page 14 Line 19 - “atrocities”
misspelt as “attrocities”.
20 - “humiliating” mistyped as
“humilating”.
Page 15 Line 10 - “have”
written in ink above typed
“has”.
Page 16 Line 18 - “be”
written in ink and placed
between
“to” and “void”.
Page 18 Line 15 - “exonerated”
mistyped as “exnrated”.
31 -
“subversive” mistyped as
“subersive”.
Page 20 Line 19 - the name
Limann misspelt as “Liman”.
Page 21 Line 2 - “criticism”
misspelt as “criticizm’,
Line 4 -
-ditto-
Line 10 - “celebrations”
mistyped as “celebtations”.
22 - “coup d’etat” mistyped as
“coup de tat”.
Page 22 Line 17 - “coup
d’etat” mistyped as “coup de
tat”.
Page 23 Line 6 - “create”
mistyped as “creat”.
27 - “persuasive” misspelt as
“persuassive”.
34 -“repercussions” misspelt as
“repucursions”.
Page 24 Line 22 - “rallied”
mistyped as “rellied”.
23 - “Britannica” misspelt as
“Britanica”.
34 - “atrocities” misspelt as
“attrocities”.
Page 25 Line 5 - “atrocities”
misspelt as “attrocities.’
7 - “reminds” mistyped as
“remids”.
11 - the letter “i” written in
ink above first “o” in typed
“hostoric”.
Line 15 - “interpret” misspelt
as “interprete”.
26 - “atrocities” misspelt as
“attrocities”.
Page 26 Line 6 - “atrocities”
misspelt as “attrocities”.
7 - “on” written in ink above
typed “of”.
Page 27 Line 26 - “Liberation”
misspelt as “Libration”.
29 - -ditto-
35 - -ditto-
Page 28 Line 2 - “Liberation”
misspelt as “Libration.’
10 - -ditto-
Page 29 Line 10 - “reported”
misspelt as “repported”.
Page 30 Line 3 - “Liberation”
misspelt as “Libration”.
Line 16 - the name Limann
misspelt as “Liman”.
23 - -ditto-
28 - “Liberation” misspelt as
“Libration.’
29 - “Liberation” misspelt as
“Libration”.
32 - “others” written in ink
above typed word
“other”.
Page 31 Line 16 - “what”
written in ink above typed word
“what’, which word is underlined
in ink.
Line 19 - “hopelessness”
mistyped as “hoplessness”.
Line 29 - the letter “c” written
in ink above mistyped
“evidence”.
Page 32 Line 5 -
“incarcerated” misspelt as
“incacerated”.
Line 18 - “eminent” misspelt as
“emminent”.
Line 21 - semi-colon punctuation
mark made in ink.
Page 33 Line 32 - “between” in
ink above mistyped
“tobween” which is cancelled and
underlined in ink.
Page 34 Line 6 - “pertinent”
misspelt as “petinent”.
Page 35 Line 14 - “out” typed
and placed between “pointed”
and “elsewhere”.
Line 23 - “C” written in ink
above “O” in mistyped
“Oolonial”.
Line 29 - “no” typed and placed
between “have” and
“significance”.
Page 36 Line 13 - “amount”
written in ink above mistyped
“amount”.
Line 26 - “whereby” mistyped as
“wherby”.
Line 33 - “holidays” written in
ink above mistyped
“holidays”.
Page 39 Line 33 - “towards”
typed and placed between
“directed” and “the morality
of”.
Below all these, at page 40,
appears a signature. Instead of
trying to persuade us in
argument that the signatures on
CTC and MB1 are not identical,
Mr Amidu would have done well to
call the judge to testify on
oath that the signature on MB1
was not his. I think Mr Amidu
misconceived his duties as
counsel in a case of this nature
when he decided not to call the
principal actor in the
melodrama.
Mr Amidu drew attention to the
fact that there are a few
corrections in ink on CTC which
do not appear on MB1. I have
found the following:
Page 14 Line 20 - letter “i”
written in ink and inserted
between “1” and “a” in mistyped
“humilating”.
34 - word “of” written in ink
and inserted
between “cerebration “and “14.’
Page 18 Line 31 - Letter “v”
written in ink and placed
between “b” and “e” in
mistyped “subersive”.
Page 23 Line 6 - letter “e”
written in ink and placed after
“t”
of mistyped “creat”.
Page 25 Line 7 - letter “n”
written in ink and placed
between
“i” and “d” in mistyped
“reminds”.
Page 34 Line 6 - letter “r”
written in ink and placed
between
“e” and “t” in mistyped
“petinent”.
But far from these corrections
indicating that MB1 is a
forgery, they rather confirm the
statement in Owusu-Ansah’s
affidavit that the judge at some
point took back the opinion read
by him. Looking at the further
corrections, I have no doubt in
my mind that they were made by
the same person who made the
corrections to be found in both
CTC and MB1.
It is only at page 28 of MB1 and
CTC that any real differences
are discernible. They are five
in number. First, at line 1 of
MB1 the mistyped word “erra” has
been corrected in ink by writing
“era” above it. In CTC the word
“era” is correctly typed. There
is no correction in ink.
Secondly, at line 7 MB1 the word
“Government” has been mistyped
as “Goovernment.” This error
does not appear in CTC which has
the word correctly typed.
Thirdly, the sentence about the
Daily Graphic and the
late Prime Minister in MB1
reads:
“The Daily Graphic of
Tuesday 24 February 1970 No
6033, carried the speech of Dr
Busia on that day; and I will
quote a few extracts from it.”
In CTC the same sentence reads:
“The Daily Graphic of
Tuesday 24th February 1970 No
6033, carried the speech of Dr
Busia on that celebration. I
will however quote a few
extracts from the “Daily Graphic
View” that day…”
Fourthly, in MB1 the title of
the extract is given in line 16
as, “Salute the gallant men”,
whereas in CTC it is: “Salute to
the gallant men”. Finally, in
MB1 at line 39 the words “and
police took” have been
underlined, whereas in CTC they
have not been underlined.
It is evident that page 28 of
MB1 and CTC cannot both be what
the judge read in court. One or
the other must have been typed
and inserted in the opinion as
read at some later date. The
question is: Which one? First of
all, I ask myself: Is it at all
likely that a person who
mischievously alters the typed
document of another person will
make a correction thereon in ink
in his own handwriting? I think
not. Secondly, placed in the
context of the previous sentence
where it was stated that “Busia
Government actually celebrated
it [24 February] as a
“Revolution Day” and the
statement that in its edition No
6033 of 24 February 1970 the
Daily Graphic newspaper
“carried” the speech of the late
Minister, the writer was clearly
preparing the listener or reader
to receive a quotation from the
speech of the Prime Minister and
not the editorial opinion of the
paper.
There is, however, an even more
cogent reason for believing that
page 28 of CTC is not what the
judge read in court. A careful
examination of MB1 and CTC shows
that pages 1 - 27 and 29 - 40
have the same typeface. When we
come to page 28 the typefaces
are different. Whereas the
typeface of page 28 MB1 is the
same as pages 1 - 27 and 29 - 40
of MB1 and CTC, page 28 of CTC
is markedly different. This can
be demonstrated beyond argument
by comparing the figures 1, 3,
4, 6 and 7 at page 28 of CTC
with the same figures on any
other page of CTC or the whole
of MB1. The differences are
obvious to the naked eye. Only
the blinkered would baulk at
them. I am satisfied that any
impartial assessment of the
visual evidence must lead to the
inescapable conclusion that the
original page 28 of CTC was
extracted and replaced with what
now appears therein.
I am glad to find that the
affidavit and visual evidence
support my own recollection of
what took place in court. Unlike
Mrs Adusa-Amankwa who confesses
to having a poor memory, or Mr
Amidu who prefers to remain
silent, I did listen carefully
enough to the reading of the
opinion and have a good enough
memory to remember what the
judge said. I heard him say
clearly and distinctly that he
was quoting a passage from a
speech the late Prime Minister
made in 1970. I reject as wholly
false the suggestion that the
judge said he was quoting
someone or something called
“Graphic View.” That term means
nothing to us today. Anyone who
wanted to quote the editorial
opinion of the paper would refer
to it as such and not “Daily
Graphic View” which was
apparently the by-line used in
those days.
Before I proceed any further,
let me answer those who may
think that a judge is not
entitled to rely on his own
observations in coming to a
decision. Nwizuk v Eneyok
(1953) 14 WACA 354 was a land
suit in which the plaintiff
claimed ownership of some
eighteen islands. The trial took
place in Port Harcourt, Nigeria.
After the parties and their
witnesses had given evidence in
court, the judge decided to
inspect some of the islands in
dispute. At the inspection, at
which both parties were
represented, it became obvious
that much of the oral evidence
was untrue. Two of the
plaintiffs admitted to the judge
that the evidence adduced on
their behalf as to as least four
of the islands was false in
material particulars, and one of
the defendants also admitted
that their evidence as to two of
the islands was false. The judge
was astounded. In his judgement
he referred to what took place
at the inspection and branded
both parties as liars. On
appeal, it was argued that the
admissions that parties made at
the inspection were not part of
the proceedings since those who
made them were not put into the
witness box for
cross-examination. It was held
that the judge was entitled to
make use of what he saw and
heard at the inspection. In this
case, no affidavit has been
filed to contradict those who
say they heard the judge ascribe
the quotation to the late Prime
Minister. I am not surprised at
this as I can also vouch that
that was precisely what he did.
Article 126(2) of the
Constitution gives the courts of
this country power to commit for
contempt to themselves. It
states:
“The Superior Courts shall be
superior courts of record and
shall have the power to commit
for contempt to themselves and
all such powers as were vested
in a court of record immediately
before the coming into force of
this Constitution.”
This provision has been repeated
in section 36(1) of the Courts
Act 1993 (Act 459). It is also
to be found in the 1969
Constitution and in the Courts
Act 1971 (Act 372). No one
doubts that it includes the
power to commit for words spoken
or actions taken with intent to
prejudice the outcome of pending
judicial proceedings. What we
are concerned with here is
whether it includes what, in
Re Read and Huggonson (1742)
2 Atk 291, 469, Lord Hardwicke
LC described as “scandalising a
court or a judge”, and in R v
Gray [1900] 2 QB 36 at 40,
Lord Russell of Killowen CJ
described as “personal
scurrilous abuse of a judge as a
judge”.
In McLeod v St Aubyn
[1899] AC 549 PC it was said
that this class of contempt has
become obsolete in England
although, as they put it, it
might still be needed “in small
colonies, consisting principally
of coloured populations.” Looked
at even from that jaundiced
point of view, the Privy Council
thought that the respondent
Acting Chief Justice of St
Vincent, was not justified in
committing the appellant to
prison, and he was ordered to
pay the costs of the appeal.
Their Lordships said at 561:
“The power summarily to commit
for contempt of court …is not to
be used for the vindication of
the judge as a person. He must
resort to action for libel or
criminal information...Hence,
when a trial has taken place and
the case is over, the judge or
the jury are given over to
criticism.”
The weight of judicial opinion
is certainly against its use. In
The Matter of a Special
Reference from the Bahama
Islands [1893] AC 138 the
Privy Council held that although
the offending newspaper article
might have been made the subject
of proceedings for libel, since
it was not calculated to
obstruct or interfere with the
course of justice or the due
administration of the law it did
not constitute a contempt of
court. And in Ambard v
Attorney-General for Trinidad
and Tobago [1936] AC 322, an
appeal against a conviction for
an article criticising alleged
disparities in sentences passed
by the courts for similar
offences, the Privy Council said
at page 335: “Justice is not a
cloistered virtue: she must be
allowed to suffer the scrutiny
and respectful, even though
outspoken, comments of ordinary
men.”
In the United States of America,
so dear do they hold the right
to freedom of speech that even
the power to commit for words
calculated to prejudice the
outcome of pending proceedings
is severely restricted.
In Bridges v California
314 US 252 - 305 Mr Justice
Black said at 270 - 271:
“The assumption that respect for
the judiciary can be won by
shielding judges from published
criticism wrongly appraises the
character of American privilege
to speak one’s mind, although
not always with perfect good
taste, on all public opinion.
For it is a prized American
public institution. And an
enforced silence, however
limited, solely in the name of
preserving the dignity of the
Bench, would probably engender
resentment, suspicion, and
contempt much more than it would
enhance respect.”
Mr Justice Frankfurter also said
at 289:
“Judges as persons, or courts as
institutions, are entitled to no
greater immunity from criticism
than other persons or
institutions …There have
sometimes been martinets upon
the Bench as there have also
been pompous wielders of
authority who have used the
paraphernalia of power in
support of what they called
their dignity. Therefore judges
must be kept mindful of their
limitations and of their
ultimate public responsibility
by a vigorous stream of
criticism expressed with candour
however blunt.”
He continued at 291 and 292:
“A publication intended to teach
the judge a lesson, or to vent
spleen, or to discredit him, or
to influence him in his future
conduct, would not justify
exercise of the contempt power
¼The
power should be invoked only
where the adjudicatory process
may be hampered or hindered in
its calm, detached, and fearless
discharge of its duty on the
basis of what has been submitted
in court.”
On the extension by some English
judges of the power to cover
scandalising the court, he said
at 287:
“Such foolishness has long since
been disavowed in England and
has never found lodgement here.”
The example of the tiny State of
Belize, formerly the colony of
British Honduras, where such
“foolishness” is firmly
entrenched in their constitution
is hardly one that should be
held up to us for emulation; see
Director of Public
Prosecutions v Belize Times
Press Ltd (1988) LRC (Const)
579.
In the United States, no one
would have taken notice of Mr
Gray when he described Mr
Justice Darling in the
Birmingham Daily Argus as
“an impudent little man in
horse-hair” who was “a microcosm
of conceit and
empty-headedness.” Again, it
would have been considered no
more than an exercise of the
citizen’s right to free speech
for the New Statesman to
say of a libel action against an
advocate of birth-control who
had suggested that the editor of
a paper which had declined to
publish her advertisements was
under Roman Catholic influence
that she was unlikely to get a
fair trial from a judge who
subscribed to the Roman Catholic
faith: see Rex v New
Statesman, ex parte Director of
Public Prosecutions (1928)
44 TLR 301. But even in England
the eighteenth century attitudes
which permitted the courts to
attempt to silence advocates of
press freedom like John Wilkes
have slowly but surely given way
to a greater regard for the
liberty of the individual. In
Secretary of State for Defence v
Guardian Newspapers Ltd
[1985] AC 339 at 347 Diplock LJ
described the offence of
scandalising the court as
“virtually obsolescent in the
United Kingdom”, adding that it
has not been used for fifty
years.
It seems that these proceedings
were mounted in the belief that
the court was precluded from
looking beyond the official
records of the court in deciding
the issue as to what the judge
said. In other words, the mere
production of what purports to
be a true copy of the
proceedings is conclusive of
matters in dispute. This is by
no means the case. In Gbadago
v Tsili (1955) 2 WALR 11,
219, the Native Appeal Court of
Anlo State gave judgment orally
in favour of the plaintiff in a
land dispute. When the plaintiff
obtained a copy of the judgment
he discovered that it differed
materially from that delivered
orally in court, and to the
advantage of the defendant. The
plaintiff then brought an action
in the Native Court for
rectification of the judgment.
This succeeded and the
extraneous matter was deleted
from the record book. An appeal
to the Land Court failed, as did
a further appeal to the West
African Court of Appeal.
Therefore, in the case before
us, even though Logoh has
certified CTC as a true copy of
the opinion of the judge, it was
open to the respondents to
challenge the authenticity of
page 28.
There being no evidence from the
judge, it is impossible to say
whether the attribution to Dr
Busia of a speech he did not
make, and which his admirers
would consider as quite out of
character, was deliberately done
or was inadvertent. I think
there was a need to admit the
error, if error it be, and offer
an explanation. If this had been
done, this unfortunate episode
would have blown over long ago,
and this court would have been
spared the embarrassment of
sitting in judgment over the
actions of one of their number.
We may, indeed we must, deplore
the vehemence of the language
used in criticising the judge,
but it was a matter of public
interest whether Dr Busia had in
fact spoken with approval of the
overthrow by force of arms of
the Nkrumah regime. If Dr Busia
did not, anyone who had the
evidence was entitled to lay it
before the public and comment
thereon.
In the Australian case of
King v Nicholls (1911) 12
CLR 280 a newspaper published an
article alleging that a judge
owed his appointment to his
affiliation to a political
party. A motion to commit the
editor for contempt was
dismissed. In it’s ruling, the
court said at 286 per Griffith
CJ:
“I am not prepared to accede to
the proposition that an
imputation of want of
impartiality to a judge is
necessarily a contempt of court.
On the contrary, I think that,
if any judge of this court or of
any other court were to make a
public utterance of such
character as to be likely to
impair the confidence of the
public, or of suitors or any
class of suitors in the
impartiality of the court in any
matter likely to be brought
before it, any public comment on
such an utterance, if it were a
fair comment, would, so far from
being a contempt, be for the
public benefit, and would be
entitled to similar protection
to that which comment upon
matters of public interest is
entitled under the law of libel.
The only question for us to
determine here is whether these
words are calculated to obstruct
or interfere with the course of
justice or the due
administration of the law in
this court. It being impossible
to answer that question in the
affirmative, no order should be
made upon the motion.”
Here, too, it cannot be said
that the words were calculated
to obstruct or interfere with
the course of justice or the due
administration of the law in
this court.
There is also the more recent
Canadian case of R v Kopyto
(1987) 47 DLR 213, where a
lawyer whose client had lost a
case granted an interview to a
newspaper in which he said among
other things: “This decision is
a mockery of justice. It stinks
to high hell.” He wondered if
there was “any point in
appealing and continuing this
charade of the courts in this
country which are warped in
favour of protecting the
police.” He was convicted of
scandalising the court. On
appeal to the Ontario Court of
Appeal, it was held that
although the words uttered by Mr
Kopyto came within the
definition of the offence of
contempt of court in the
Canadian Criminal Code, he had
done no more than express his
strongly-held views on a matter
of public interest. Accordingly,
he could seek protection under
the provision in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guaranteeing freedom of
expression.
In countries like England and
Australia where the right to
freedom of speech is not a
constitutionally guaranteed
right, it is still possible for
the judges to claim that they
have power to determine which
kinds of criticism of themselves
they will permit. It is this
fact that explains, for example,
the decision in Gallagher v
Durack (1985) LRC (Crim) 706
where the Australian courts
showed their muscle by
sentencing to a term of
imprisonment a man whose
conviction for contempt had been
set aside by an appellate court.
His crime? After his acquittal
he told a press interviewer that
he thought the court had been
influenced by the public
demonstration of support he had
had from members of his trade
union! In other jurisdictions
such a statement would have been
ignored. The reaction of the
courts of Australia shows that
the liberty of the individual
may be threatened as much by
judicial as by executive or
legislative action.
Article 12(1) of our
constitution enjoins the
executive, legislature, the
judiciary and all other organs
of government and its agencies
to uphold the fundamental human
rights and freedoms. One of
these, as indicated in article
21(1)(a), is freedom of speech
and expression, which includes
freedom of the press and other
media. The only curb the
constitution permits on this
fundamental human right is to be
found in clause 4(e). These
provisions read:
“21 (1) All persons shall have
the right to -
(a) freedom of speech and
expression, which shall include
freedom of the press and other
media;
(4) Nothing in, or done under
the authority of, a law shall be
held to be inconsistent with, or
in contravention of, this
article to the extent that the
law in question makes provision
-
(e) that is reasonably required
for the purpose of safeguarding
the people of Ghana against the
teaching or propagation of a
doctrine which exhibits or
encourages disrespect for the
nation-hood of Ghana, the
national symbols and emblems, or
incites hatred against other
members of the community;”
Under our constitution, the
right to freedom of speech and
expression may be curtailed for
the purpose of safeguarding our
people against the teaching and
propagation of doctrines, which
incite hatred against other
members of the community. What
may be proscribed under this
head are religious and political
doctrines, which tend to divide
the nation and turn one section
of the community against
another. The provision does not
sanction the curtailment of the
right to freedom of speech and
expression for the purpose of
maintaining the dignity or
authority of the court.
In exercising the power to
commit for contempt, our courts
must have regard also to the
right of every person to express
himself freely and openly on all
matters of public concern
whether they pertain to actions
of the executive, the
legislature or the judiciary.
One can understand why it is
that while a case is pending in
court the right to comment
thereon ought to be curtailed in
the interest of a fair trial
which the constitution
guarantees for every individual;
but it can hardly be said that
when a verdict is given the
judges, or the jury for that
matter, should be shielded from
criticism. The ordinary laws of
libel, which prohibit the making
of false defamatory statements
about other members of the
community, are the only check on
any abuse of the right of free
speech in circumstances such as
these.
I would dismiss the motion.
AIKINS JSC.
This motion asks for the
committal of the respondents for
their contempt of one of the
Justices of this court (Mr
Justice I K Abban) who sat and
heard arguments from counsel in
the case titled New Patriotic
Party v Attorney-General
[1994-95] GBR 1 and of this
court, by scandalizing both
Justice I K Abban and this
court, in respect of the
publication of some articles in
The Free Press. The
judgment in that case was
delivered on 29 December 1993
and the reasons for the judgment
were delivered on 8 March 1994.
It was a split decision of 5 to
4 in favour of the plaintiff.
The grounds upon which the
applicant seeks the reliefs are
as follows:
“(i) That on 9 May 1994 the 1st
respondent wrote a letter to Mr
Justice Abban entitled: Writ
No 18/93: The New Patriotic
Party versus The
Attorney-General of Ghana in
which he accused Mr Justice
Abban a Supreme Court judge of
misrepresenting the editorial
opinion of the Daily Graphic
as a speech made by Dr Busia in
his reasons for judgment
delivered by the Supreme Court
on 8 March 1994.
(ii) That the Chief Justice to
whom the letter of 9 May 1994
was copied caused the registrar
of the Supreme Court by letter
reference No W18/93/56 of 12 May
1994 to send to the 1st
respondent a certified true copy
of the relevant page of the
reasons given by Justice Abban
and pointed out that Justice
Abban quoted the “Graphic View.”
(iii) That without
waiting for a response to his
letter of 9 May the 1st, 2nd and
3rd respondents caused to be
published in the 13 May to 19
May issue of The Free Press
a report that the judge is a
liar, a criminal and a political
chicane.
(iv) That in The
Free Press newspaper
publications of 20 May to 26 May
1994; and 27 May to 2 June 1994
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents
caused to be printed and
published further scurrilous
abusive materials against
Justice Abban and the
administration of justice.
(v) That by calling Justice
Abban a liar, a criminal and a
political and judicial chicane
the conduct of the 1st, 2nd and
3rd respondents in the said
publications constitutes a gross
contempt of court in so far as
they were calculated to erode
public confidence in the
administration of the law and
impair the authority of the
judiciary as an independent
organ of state.
(vi) That in the
November 4 to November 10, 1994
issues of The Free Press
the 2nd and 3rd respondents
caused to be published an
editorial in which the paper
alleged among other things that
“... it is this clearly bad case
which Mr Justice Abban expects
the court to
twist the case in his
favour…what Mr Justice Abban may
not realise in his desperation
in expecting his colleagues on
the Bench to behave like
lunatics, however, is that he
is, in fact, putting the
integrity, credibility and
respectability of the Bench on
the line. And whether the men
and women on the Bench would
allow themselves to be reduced
to such depth and also abused to
save the face of a fellow
prodigal benchman, remains to be
seen. Ghanaians are watching
developments with eagle’s eyes.
(vii) That the 2nd and 3rd
respondents by casting
insinuations at the independence
and impartiality of members of
the Bench and of the judiciary
in the said editorial were in
contempt of court in so far as
they were calculated to shake
public confidence in the
authority of the law, the courts
and are a baseless attack on the
integrity or impartiality of the
courts and judges.
(viii) That the publications and
conduct of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
respondents have scandalized
both Justice Abban and the
courts of Ghana as they are
particularly outrageous and
constitute contempt of court.”
The learned Chief State Attorney
further stated in paragraph 15
of her affidavit that:
“The 1st, 2nd and 3rd
respondents caused to be printed
and published in the May 20 to
May 26, 1994 issue of The
Free Press newspaper an
article written by the 1st
respondent and entitled
“Judicial Chicanery” accusing
Justice Abban among other things
of being tainted with politics
and that “the impression created
in his judgment is that of a
judge bending over backwards to
please the government.”
The next publication referred to
by her was the one published in
the May 27 to June 2, 1994 issue
of The Free Press which
consisted of two front page news
items entitled: “A Challenge to
Media Commission” and “Media
Commission Called In As Justice
Abban Scandal Takes Dramatic
Turn. He Is Accused Of
Doctoring”, and another article
at page 4 of the said
publication entitled: “The Abban
Scandal - Our Proof” which she
said contained scurrilous abuses
of the judge intended to bring
him and judicial system into
disrepute in the eyes of the
public.”
The learned Chief State Attorney
continued in paragraph 19 of her
affidavit:
“…the 1st, 2nd and third
respondents caused to be printed
and published in the June 3 to
June 9 1994 issue of The Free
Press a reply to a letter
from the registrar of the
Supreme Court forwarding an
authenticated copy of the
reasons of Justice Abban’s
judgment, in which the 1st
respondent cast insinuations and
aspersions on Justice Abban and
the judicial system by alleging
that the certified copy of the
judgment was not the judgment
read by Justice Abban in court,
thus imputing to Justice Abban
and the Supreme Court the
dishonest conduct of interfering
with the reasons for judgment
after it was read.”
She finally referred to a
publication in the November 4 to
10, 1994 issue of The Free
Press mentioned in ground
(vi) of the grounds of the
application above.
Counsel for the applicant
submitted that “by calling
Justice Abban a liar, criminal
and a political and judicial
chicane the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
respondents’ conduct was
contumacious of the judge and
the judicial system as it was
calculated to bring the court
and the judge into contempt and
lower the authority of the law,
the judge and the court as an
impartial and independent organ
of State,” and “that the said
publications also constitute a
scurrilous abuse of a judge of
the Supreme Court, and that such
an attack on the personal
character of the judge is
contumacious of the judge,
courts and judicial system.”
The publication of all these
articles stems from an alleged
misrepresentation in the
judgment of Justice Abban
attributing to Dr Busia an
editorial opinion of the
Daily Graphic issue of
February 24, 1970 praising the
celebration of 24 February 1966
coup d’etat.
This is the gravamen of the
whole action, and has to be
examined in detail. Two
different versions of the
quotation are contained in page
28 of the said judgment.
According to the applicant what
is contained in exhibit MB1
tendered by the 1st respondent
was not the authentic copy of
what was said by Justice Abban,
but rather a forgery by the 1st
respondent. This allegation has
been vehemently refuted by the
1st respondent who avers that he
personally heard Justice Abban
say what is contained in that
page on 8 March 1994 when
delivering his judgment, and
that what was contained in
exhibit CTC tendered by the
applicant was a doctored version
of his speech.
In view of the sharp controversy
on this particular quotation,
the two versions must be
thoroughly examined with a view
to ascertaining which of them is
the authentic original version
that was read on March 8, 1994.
Several persons have filed
affidavits deposing to what they
say they heard in open court on
that day. The applicant has
produced 4 or 5 such affidavits,
and the respondents have also
produced about 8 such
affidavits.
The first person on the list of
the applicant is Mustapha Habib
Logoh, the Acting Registrar of
the Supreme Court. This officer
said that after the Supreme
Court judges had read their
reasons for judgement on 8 March
1994, all the written reasons
were handed to him, and that
later after the Chief Justice
had received a letter dated 9
May 1994 from the 1st
respondent, the Chief Justice
asked him to produce the written
reasons read by Justice Abban.
This he complied with. Then he
said in paragraph 18 of his
affidavit:
“18. That the Chief Justice and
myself went through the reasons
delivered by Justice Abban and
found that contrary to what
Mensa-Bonsu had alleged, Justice
Abban had quoted from the “Daily
Graphic View” and not from Dr
Busia’s speech - it was there in
black and white.”
Later on in paragraph 30 of the
affidavit he said:
“So that the alleged signed
reasons for judgment obtained by
Mensa-Bonsu were not the reasons
for judgment read in Court on
the 8th March 1994. He could
not therefore have heard what he
claimed to have heard in open
court from a reading of those
reasons for judgment which had
been in my custody thereafter.”
(Emphasis supplied).
This is rather strange! An
experienced lawyer who had been
attending court in a case that
interested him, had written to
the judge who read the reasons
for his judgment that contrary
to what was supplied him as
contained in page 28 of his
judgment, he heard the judge
attribute to Dr K A Busia,
former Prime Minister of Ghana,
a statement praising the
celebration of 24 February 1966
coup d’etat which the judge
purported to quote from the
Daily Graphic of Tuesday 24
February 1970. Then a newly
enrolled lawyer who had just
been appointed a District
Magistrate Grade II and an
Acting Registrar of the Supreme
Court whose only interest and
duty is to keep all the written
reasons read by nine Supreme
Court judges spanning over a
period of about 8 hours in open
court from about 10 o’clock in
the forenoon to about 6:10
o’clock in the afternoon, gets
up after six months of the
reading of the written reasons
for judgment to swear that an
experienced and interested
lawyer in the case could not
have heard what he claimed to
have heard in open court. This
is preposterous.
The next person on the list is
Irene Wuaku, a clerical officer,
and the person said to have
“typed the composite reasons for
the judgment in the New
Patriotic Party v
Attorney-General supra.” She
says in paragraph 7 of her
affidavit:
“7. That I have seen a certified
true copy of the composite
reasons for judgment and it is
an accurate and true reflection
of reasons which I typed in
composite form.”
Wonders will never end! How can
such a clerical officer, a
typist, six months after she had
typed the composite reasons of
Supreme Court judges who have
quoted extensively decided cases
to buttress their arguments, the
reading alone of the written
reasons covering a period of
about 8 hours, swear positively
that what had been shown to her
was an accurate and true
reflection of reasons which she
typed in composite form. She
must be telling blatant lies. I
don’t believe what she said.
The next person is Louisa Amie
Adusa-Amankwaa, a Chief State
Attorney and one of counsel for
the defendants in the New
Patriotic Party v
Attorney-General case
[1994-95] GBR 1 and who averred
she “was in court through the
hearing and final disposal of
the case by their Lordships
reading their individual reasons
for judgment.” She said in
paragraph 5 of her affidavit:
“5 That I cannot and verily
believe that it is not humanly
possible for me to remember with
photographic memory that Justice
Abban read from either the
“Graphic View” or Busia’s
speech. It is for this reason
that the Courts Act provides a
mechanism for obtaining
judgments of a court.”
Speaking for myself, I do not
see the value and significance
of this paragraph of her
affidavit. The applicant is
charging the 1st respondent with
forging the judgment of Justice
Abban, and for that matter one
of the reliefs he is seeking is
that the 1st respondent should
be committed to prison for
contempt of court for having
commented on such forged
document to the detriment of
Justice Abban. One would expect
some person to be put forward to
say that he heard Justice Abban
say that he was quoting from the
““Graphic View”.” No such person
was available, and the Chief
State Attorney, one of counsel
in the case comes along simply
to say that she has no
photographic memory to assist
her remember what the judge
said. Where then do we stand?
Next on the list is the
affidavit of Emmanuel Ogbarmey
Otoo, who says he is attached to
the Court of Appeal Registry.
According to him he was the
person who typed the manuscript
of Justice Abban’s reasons for
judgment in the case of the
New Patriotic Party v
Attorney-General supra. He
said he first used a typewriter
in an office at the 3rd floor,
but when he could not finish
typing it there he completed it
in his office with another
typewriter, taking as much as 3
days to complete. He said he
took this typewritten draft
reasons for judgment together
with the manuscript to Mr
Justice Abban, that Justice
Abban made some corrections on
this typewritten reasons and
returned it to him for final
typing. Otoo says that after he
had typed this final draft he
took it to Justice Abban, and it
was this final copy that Justice
Abban read in court on 8 March
1994. He does not say that he
typed this final copy on
different typewriters, nor that
he was in court on 8 March when
Justice Abban read his judgment,
but simply says that what he
finally typed was the one
Justice Abban read in open
court! How could he be all that
sure that the page 28 of the
copy in exhibit CTC was the one
Justice Abban read in court? The
impression Otoo also wants to
create is that the different
typewriters he used in typing
Justice Abban’s manuscript
accounts for why the typescript
of page 28 of exhibit CTC has
different characteristics from
those of the rest of the pages
of the judgment, ie pages 1-27
and 29-40. This cannot be true
because his affidavit was silent
on how he typed the final draft
Justice Abban read in court.
What an abysmal lie! It is
unfortunate that officers of
this institution can be cajoled
to swear to false affidavits.
In contrast to the foregoing
affidavits, we have those filed
on behalf of the respondents by
8 persons. Three of these
persons, Peter Ala Adjetey,
Kwadwo Affram Asiedu and Ben
Annan, were part of the legal
team that appeared for the New
Patriotic Party in Suit No 18/93
- New Patriotic Party v
Attorney General, supra. All
of them say they were in court
on March 8, 1994 when all the
nine judges read their opinions
in open court. They say that in
the reasons read by Mr Justice
Abban in the case, he purported
to be quoting extracts from a
speech allegedly made by the
late Dr Busia and said to have
been carried by the Daily
Graphic of Tuesday, 24
February 1970, in which Dr Busia
was alleged, inter alia, to have
not only praised and commended
the military revolution of 24
February 1970, but also to have
supported the celebration of the
anniversary of the said
revolution. They dispute that on
that day Justice Abban in his
opinion, said he was quoting
from the views of the Daily
Graphic for Tuesday, 24
February 1970.
One other person, Moses Adu-Akai
Nettey, a barrister-at-law, in
his affidavit said that he was
also present in court on 8
March, 1994 when the nine judges
of the Supreme Court read the
reasons for their judgments, and
that he heard Justice Abban say
that he was quoting from the
Daily Graphic of 1970
purporting to show that Dr Busia
supported the 1966 coup d’etat,
and that Justice Abban quoted
extensively in his judgment what
he asserted to be the view of Dr
Busia. He said he was left in no
doubt that the quotation
represented the views of Dr
Busia and not the views of the
Daily Graphic.
The remaining four other
persons, Kwabena Mensa-Bonsu,
the 1st respondent, Joseph
Agyenim Boateng,
Secretary-General of the New
Patriotic Party - the person who
represented the New Patriotic
Party in the New Patriotic
Party v Attorney-General, Mr
Eben Quarcoo, 2nd respondent and
Mr Tommy Thompson, 3rd
respondent all aver that they
were in court on March 8, 1994
when the Supreme Court judges
delivered their reasons for
judgment, and that they heard Mr
Justice Abban in the course of
delivering his opinion read out
a quotation on the anniversary
celebration of the 1966 coup
which he said was from the late
Dr Busia’s speech carried in the
Daily Graphic issue of
February 24, 1970. According to
the 1st respondent he had made
special study of the speeches
and writings of Dr Busia over
the years and it struck him that
the passage he heard Justice
Abban quote did not sound like
Busia, and was very much unlike
his style.
I observe from paragraphs 23 and
24 of the affidavit of Mustapha
Habib Logoh filed on November
10, 1994 that he said he was one
day invited by the Chief Justice
to his office where he met
Justice Abban, the Judicial
Secretary and the Chief Justice
himself. He said “Justice
Abban complained bitterly to the
Chief Justice about the fact
that somebody might have stolen
his reasons for judgment and
maliciously tampered with it to
bring him and the administration
of justice into disrepute.”
(Emphasis supplied) Curiously
enough the applicant did not
think it fit to obtain an
affidavit from Justice Abban to
this effect, nor did Justice
Abban, in whose interest the
action was instituted, think it
worthwhile and necessary to
swear to an affidavit to reveal
this alleged unfortunate
situation and to clear the air
of doubt that the passage he was
quoting in his reasons for
judgment on March 8, 1994 was
from the “Daily Graphic View” of
the Daily Graphic issue
for Tuesday 24, 1970.
I observe also that in
paragraphs 25 and 26 of Logoh’s
affidavit (supra) he talks of
the reference of Justice Abban’s
complaint about this tampering
with his reasons for judgment to
the Media Commission and to the
Attorney-General for
investigation by the police. The
paragraphs state:
“25 That a letter of complaint
by Justice Abban to the Chief
Justice to refer the matter to
the Media Commission and a
letter written by the Judicial
Secretary to the Media
Commission also later became the
subject of scurrilous abuse of
the judge and the administration
of justice in some of The
Free Press newspaper
publications referred to in
paragraph 21 above.
26 That after sometime when the
contemptuous publications
continued in The Free Press
newspaper without any response
from the National Media
Commission, it came to my
knowledge that Justice Abban had
requested the Chief Justice to
refer the matter of tampering
with his reasons for judgment
and the libellous materials
being printed and published of
him and the judicial system by
Mensa-Bonsu and The Free
Press to the
Attorney-General for
investigation by the Police.”
If Justice Abban was so anxious
to have this tampering with his
reasons for judgment
investigated by both the
National Media Commission and
the police (which action was
never pursued), it beats my
imagination why it did not occur
to either Justice Abban or the
Attorney General to file an
affidavit spelling out Justice
Abban’s version of the quotation
from the Daily Graphic
issue of Tuesday, 24 February
1970.
The questions I have to consider
now are whether Justice Abban’s
judgment was tampered with after
he had read it in open court on
8 March 1994, and if so by whom,
and which of the versions on
page 28 of exhibit MB1 and CTC
was actually read in open court
on 8 March 1994.
Page 28 of exhibit MB1 states as
follows:
“It is remarkable to note that
during the era of National
Liberation Council, the latter
decided to do away with 1 July
as a public holiday, even though
it was the day on which Ghana
became the First Republic. Busia
government, by Public Holiday
Instrument 1970 (LI 649) added 1
October as a public holiday - to
be celebrated as Second Republic
Day. Busia Government continued
to exclude 1 July - Republic Day
- from the list of public
holidays, but continued to
celebrate 24 February as a
public holiday under the heading
‘Liberation Day’. but as I
stated earlier on, Busia
Government actually celebrated
it as a ‘Revolution Day’.”
The Daily Graphic of
Tuesday 24 February 1970 No
6033, carried the speech of Dr
Busia on that day; and I will
quote a few extracts from it:
“Salute the gallant men.
Today is the fourth anniversary
of the 24th February 1966
revolution. Exactly four years
ago today a grateful and
surprised Ghana woke up to see
the end of tyranny and
injustice.
As the oppressive CPP regime was
uprooted, a firm foundation for
freedom and fair-play was laid
in its place
As Ghanaians celebrate the
historic event today, there is
no better monument we can erect
in the memory of the fallen
gallant men than to uphold, at
all times, the aims of the
revolution.
We must also pay a tribute to
the living, the gallant NLC men,
who ably did the spade work for
the democratic rule we have now.
However we should accept the
fact that freedom has it limits
and that the elected government
has a national duty to check its
abuses.
Indeed Ghana’s record in the
last four years has vindicated
the revolutionary action the
army and police took…
We can only hope that Ghanaians
will guard jealously the golden
opportunity which now prevails
and resolve to ensure that the
fifth anniversary’
¼”
And page 28 of exhibit CTC also
states as follows:
“It is remarkable to note that
during the era of National
Liberation Council, the latter
decided to do away with 1st July
as a public holiday, even though
it was the day on which Ghana
became the First Republic. Busia
Government, by Public Holiday
Instrument 1970 (LI 649) added 1
October as a public holiday to
be celebrated as Second Republic
Day. Busia Government continued
to exclude 1st July - Republic
Day - from the list of public
holidays, but continued to
celebrate 24 February as a
public holiday under the heading
‘Liberation Day’. But as I
stated earlier on, Busia
Government actually celebrated
it as a ‘Revolution Day’.
The Daily Graphic of
Tuesday 24 February 1970 No
6033, carried the speech of Dr
Busia on that celebration. I
will however quote a few
extracts from the “Daily Graphic
View” that day:
“Salute to the gallant men.
Today is the fourth anniversary
of the 24 February 1966
revolution. Exactly four years
ago today a grateful and
surprised Ghana woke up to see
the end of tyranny and
injustice.
As the oppressive CPP regime was
uprooted, a firm foundation for
freedom and fair-play was laid
in its place…
As Ghanaians celebrate the
historic event today, there is
no better monument we can erect
in the memory of the fallen
gallant men than to uphold, at
all times, the aims of the
revolution.
We must also pay a tribute to
the living, the gallant NLC men,
who ably did the spade work for
the democratic rule we have now…
However we should accept the
fact that freedom has its limits
and that the elected government
has a national duty to check its
abuses.
Indeed Ghana’s record in the
last four years has vindicated
the revolutionary action the
army and police took.…
We can only hope that Ghanaians
will guard jealously the golden
opportunity which now prevails
and resolve to ensure that the
fifth anniversary’…”
No attempt was made by the
applicant in the first instance
to show that exhibit CTC had
been forged or tampered with by
the 1st respondent, or that
exhibit MB1 was not a genuine
copy of the original judgment
read by Justice Abban in open
court on 8 March 1994, until the
1st respondent caused affidavits
to be filed by John Albert
Owusu, a Government gazetted
documents examiner and the
executive director of Primus
Forensic Consultancy, and
Emmanuel Asamoah Owusu-Ansah,
Deputy Judicial Secretary.
In his affidavit filed on 30
January 1995, Emmanuel
Owusu-Ansah deposed that after
the Supreme Court had delivered
its judgment in New Patriotic
Party v Attorney-General on
8 March 1994, he obtained copies
of the reasons for judgment of
the judges of the court,
including that of Mr Justice
Abban, from Mr J D Tawiah, who
was at the material time Acting
Registrar of the Supreme Court.
He said that later the 1st
respondent came to him and asked
for a copy of Justice Abban’s
reasons for judgment. He said he
directed the 1st respondent to
go for a copy from one Mr
Okerchiri Adusa Kwabena, an
Accra legal practitioner, to
whom he had given copies of the
judgments of the judges who sat
on that case. Subsequently, he
said, the first respondent
returned to him the copy of Mr
Okerchiri Adusa Kwabena. He
continued in paragraphs 7, 8 and
9 of his affidavit as follows:
“7 That subsequently, I read a
publication in the May 27 to
June 2 1994 issue of The Free
Press weekly showing two
competing versions of page 28 of
the reasons for judgment of Mr
Justice Abban one version
corresponding with page 28 of
the reasons for judgment of
Justice Abban which Mr J D
Tawiah had given to me; the
other version did not and was
new to me.
8 That I therefore called on Mr
J D Tawiah to find out whether
he could explain the emergence
of two competing versions of
page 28 of the reasons of
judgment of Mr Justice Abban.
9 That Mr J D Tawiah stated that
the page 28 with which I was
familiar was the one Mr Justice
Abban handed over to him after
delivery in court, and further
that, subsequent to his giving
me that copy, Mr Justice Abban
called for and collected from
him his reasons for judgment.”
In his affidavit filed on
January 27, 1995, John Albert
Owusu, who was also a retired
Chief Superintendent of Police,
said that he was contracted by
the law firm, Akufo-Addo,
Prempeh and Co to conduct an
independent forensic examination
of copies of exhibits MB1, MB5,
MH1 and a certified true copy of
exhibit CTC reasons for judgment
of Abban JSC. He averred that he
conducted a very careful
examination of the documents
with the aid of optical and
measuring instruments on the
typescripts of the exhibits
(supra) and wrote a report of
his examination and the results
thereof. The results were as
follows:
(1) All the pages of exhibit MB1
including page 28 were typed on
the same typewriter.
(2) Exhibit MH1 (copy of the
relevant page 28 of the alleged
reasons for judgment of Abban
JSC said to have been read in
open court on March 8, 1994) was
not typed on the same typewriter
which typed all the pages of
exhibit MB1.
(3) Exhibit MB5 and MH1 (page
28) were typed on the same
typewriter.
(4) Page 28 of exhibit CTC was
not typed on the same typewriter
as the rest of the pages of that
judgment.
(5)(a) Exhibits MB1 and CTC are
the same document and were typed
on the same typewriter except
page 28 of CTC which was typed
on a different typewriter.
(b) Furthermore, the same author
made all the corrections in
exhibits MB1 and CTC, and
in fact one is a
photocopy of the other with the
exception of page 28 of CTC.
(6) Page 28 of exhibit CTC and
exhibit MH1 (page 28) are the
same documents typed on the same
typewriter.
(7) The signature on page 40 of
exhibit MB1 is the same
(photocopy) as the signature on
page 40 of exhibit CTC.
In his report attached to his
affidavit, John Albert Owusu
made the following observations:
(1) It was observed that the
typescripts in exhibit “MH1”
(page 28) MB5 and page 28 of CTC
had identical characteristics.
(2) The typescripts on page 28
of exhibit MB1 and the rest of
the pages of MB1 had identical
characteristics.
(3) The typescripts in exhibit
MB1 differed in structure and
identifying characteristics from
the typescripts in exhibits
“MH1” and MH5, and page 28 of
CTC, and note the different
structures in the construction
of the figures 1, 3, 4, 6 and in
the two groups especially
figures 3, 4, and 7.
(4) The typescripts of page 28
of CTC and the rest of the pages
in the CTC were different.
However the rest of the pages of
the CTC had the same identifying
characteristics.
(5) The typescripts of MB1 and
CTC had the same characteristics
except page 28 of the CTC.
(6) It was also observed that
the corrections and marks made
in “CTC’, were the same writing
and exact replica in exhibit
MB1. These occurred in both
exhibits on pages 2, 13, 15, 16,
20, 25, 26, 30, 31, 33, 35, and
36. However the correction and
mark on page 28 of exhibit MB1
line one was not found in page
28 of CTC even though the same
author made the other
corrections.
(7) The signatures in page 40 of
exhibit MB1 and page 40 of CTC
bear the same identifying
characters.”
Mr Okerchiri Adusa Kwabena, a
legal practitioner, in his
affidavit filed on November 21,
1994 confirmed that the Deputy
Judicial Secretary, Mr
Owusu-Ansah gave him signed
copies of the judgments of
Justice Abban and Justice Adade
to photocopy and return to
enable him get the other
judgments of their Lordships,
and that he gave the two
judgments to the 1st respondent
on the instructions of the
Deputy Judicial Secretary.
The learned Deputy
Attorney-General raised a
preliminary objection to the
admissibility and sufficiency of
the independent affidavits of
John Albert Owusu and Emmanuel
Asamoah Owusu-Ansah, but he was
overruled by this court. To
counteract the effect of these
affidavits the applicant filed
two affidavits one by Louisa
Amie Adusa-Amankwaa, Chief State
Attorney and one of counsel for
the applicant and the other by
Emmanuel Ogbarmey Otoo, a
Judicial Service Officer
attached to the Court of Appeal.
As stated above Ogbarmey Otoo
tried to give the impression
that the differences in typing
character of the reasons of
Justice Abban’s judgment can be
attributed to pressure on
typewriters in the Judicial
Service. His reasons were very
flimsy and ridiculous.
The learned Chief State Attorney
stated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of
her affidavit that the
Attorney-General had requested
the Ghana Police Service to have
the exhibits in dispute examined
by its documents examiner and
have the findings, observations
and conclusions filed in this
court, but it was most unlikely
that the report of the police
documents examiner would be
available for submission to this
court due to constraint of time
even though he had examined the
original alongside exhibits MB1,
CTC and MH1.
In the absence of the police
expert opinion, the learned
Chief State Attorney gave an
outline of her own point of view
on exhibits MB1 and CTC, and
stated that the two exhibits
cannot be the same document
typed from the same typewriter
except page 28 of CTC which was
typed on a different typewriter
as deposed to in paragraph 5 of
John Albert Owusu’s affidavit
for the following reasons:
(1) A causal comparison of
exhibits MB1 and CTC shows
clearly that while the hand
scripts in the nature of
insertions or corrections to
exhibit MB1 can be found on
pages 13, 15, 30, 31, 32, 33 and
36, that on exhibit CTC can be
found on pages 2, 8 13, 14, 16,
17, 18, 25, 26, 31, 32, 34, 35
and 36.
(2) The handmade scripts were
made in pen and pencil on the
original of the document which I
studied but on 8, 14, 17, 18, 25
and 34 the hand-made scripts
were made by pen while the
insertions appearing in exhibit
CTC do not disclose the
instrument with which they were
made, and those that appear in
exhibit MB1 do not also show the
instrument with which they were
made.
(3) A number of short vertical
lines/marks, can be found on all
the pages on the document marked
exhibit MB1 but they cannot be
found on the document marked
exhibit CTC or the original
document. That also suggests
that one document is not an
exact photocopy of the other.
(4) Page 33 of the document
marked CTC was found to be
shorter in length than the rest
of the pages/papers of the same
exhibit CTC.
(5) Typeface of exhibit MB1
appears to be bigger than those
on exhibit CTC. That suggests
that one document is not the
same as the other.
(6) The signature on exhibit CTC
and the original document
appears longer than that in
exhibit MB1.
The learned Deputy
Attorney-General has attacked
the affidavit of Asamoah
Owusu-Ansah as hearsay, and has
urged that this court should
ignore it as inadmissible. As
stated above what Owusu-Ansah
said was, first, that he
obtained copies of the reasons
for judgment of the court,
including that of Mr Justice
Abban, from J D Tawiah, who was
then Acting Registrar of the
Supreme Court, and secondly,
that when he called on J D
Tawiah to explain the emergence
of the two compelling versions
of page 28 of the judgment of
Justice Abban after he had read
about this in The Free Press
issue of 27 May to 2 June
1994, J D Tawiah told him that
page 28 with which he
Owusu-Ansah was familiar with
was the one Justice Abban handed
over to him after delivery in
court, and that Tawiah said
Justice Abban later collected it
from him.
The Attorney-General argues that
this is hearsay. This may well
be so. Both Owusu-Ansah and J D
Tawiah are officers of the
Judicial Service. Owusu-Ansah is
the Deputy Judicial Secretary,
and J D Tawiah was the Acting
Registrar of the Supreme Court
for some time, and now Senior
High Court registrar - two very
senior officers in the Judicial
Service. After the Deputy
Attorney-General had finished
addressing this court, counsel
for the 1st respondent applied
to call both Owusu-Ansah and J D
Tawiah to give oral evidence but
this court by a majority of 4 to
3 did not accede to counsel’s
request. Later the respondents
tried to get J D Tawiah to file
an affidavit, but Tawiah, it is
understood, expressed his
unwillingness to swear to any
affidavit unless he was asked to
do so by the court. Considering
the peculiar nature of this
case, one would have thought
that to get to the truth of this
matter, the court would call J D
Tawiah to swear to an affidavit,
more so when it was not deemed
necessary or appropriate for the
applicant to get Justice Abban,
the pivot of the controversy, to
swear to an affidavit to assist
the court, in the words of
counsel for the 2nd and 3rd
respondents, “in coming to a
conclusive determination of this
highly crucial and decisive
point.”
Since the punishment for
contempt of court is of a
punitive character (a fine, a
term of imprisonment or both)
proof of offence must be beyond
reasonable doubt as in all
criminal cases. However, the
learned Deputy Attorney-General
has urged that he carries the
burden only as far as
establishing that the
publications were intemperate
and scurrilous of a judge, and
that once the applicant is
relying on a certified true copy
of a judgment in proper custody
of Logoh, the Acting Registrar
of the Supreme Court, the
applicant does not have to prove
the authenticity of that
document, and that it is for the
respondents who challenge its
authenticity to lead evidence to
the contrary. I think the
learned Deputy Attorney-General
does not fully appreciate the
burden cast on the applicant. If
it is the applicant’s case that
Logoh was the Acting Registrar
at the time that Justice Abban
read his judgment and he was the
one to whom Justice Abban gave
his judgment immediately after
delivering his judgement, and
Owusu-Ansah is also saying that
the judgment was given to J D
Tawiah from whom he collected a
copy thereof, at least the
respondents have been able to
create a doubt and this should
have been resolved by calling
upon Justice Abban to swear to
an affidavit to support Logoh’s
assertion, and that exhibit CTC
was what the judge read in
court. That was not done. Since
exhibit CTC, especially page 28
thereof, is the gravamen of the
applicant’s case, that doubt
tended to cripple his whole
case, and he cannot be heard to
say that the truth of the
genuineness of page 28 of
exhibit MB1 is of no
consequence, and that once
somebody has used strong
language to criticise the judge
that person is guilty of
contempt of court.
As to the first leg of Asamoah
Owusu-Ansah’s affidavit, he says
that at the material time J D
Tawiah was the Acting Registrar
of the Supreme Court to whom
Justice Abban’s judgment was
given on March 8, 1994 after the
learned judge had read it in
open court. As a Deputy Judicial
Secretary he should know who was
the Acting Registrar at the
time. But strange enough the
learned Deputy Attorney-General
is now inviting this court,
which handled the 31st
December case, to say
whether our reasons for judgment
were handed over to Mustapha
Logoh or any other person. This
shows that the Deputy
Attorney-General admits some
doubt is created in this case on
this issue. Considering,
therefore the modus operandi of
the court on this issue, I
refuse to express any opinion
now.
Counsel for the applicant is
also urging that on a proper
interpretation of the affidavit
of Asamoah Owusu-Ansah, exhibit
MB1 does not come from proper
custody and must be rejected,
and Mustapha Logoh’s exhibit CTC
accepted as the genuine judgment
of Justice Abban. In my view
this submission is untenable.
The 1st respondent has explained
how he came by exhibit MB1. This
exhibit is obviously relevant to
the proceedings before the
court. Asamoah Owusu-Ansah has
averred in his affidavit that he
gave the document to the 1st
respondent through Okerchiri
Adusa Kwabena and Okerchiri has
also confirmed this in his
affidavit. By section 51(2) of
the Evidence Decree 1975, all
relevant evidence is admissible
except as otherwise provided by
any enactment. The law has it
that where papers and other
subjects of evidence are even
illegally taken from the
possession of the party against
whom they are offered, or are
otherwise unlawfully obtained,
it constitutes no valid
objection to their
admissibility, provided they are
pertinent to the issue. Because
the court will not take notice
of whether they were obtained
lawfully or unlawfully, nor will
it raise an issue to determine
that question: see Legatt v
Tollervey (1811) 14 East 301
and Doe v Date (1842) 3
AB 619. It does not matter how
one comes by the document, even
if it is stolen it will be
admissible. See R v Leatham
(1861) 8 Cox CC 498 at p 501. In
Kuruma v R [1955] 1 All
ER 236 at 239, PC, Lord Goddard
CJ emphasised that:
“…the test to be applied in
considering whether evidence is
admissible is whether it is
relevant to the matters in
issue. If it is, it is
admissible and the court is not
concerned how the evidence was
obtained.”
Even in the case of original
documents, if a privileged
instrument accidentally strays
into the hands of a stranger,
who makes a copy of it, or if a
solicitor, in violation of his
duty, permits a stranger to take
a copy of an instrument with
which he was confidentially
entrusted, the secondary
evidence so obtained is
admissible if notice to produce
the original is duly given and
the production is resisted on
the ground of privilege: see
Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB
759 and Lloyd v Mostyn
(1842) 10 M & W 478, Republic
v Accra Circuit Court; ex parte
Appiah [1982-83] GLR 129.
The learned Deputy
Attorney-General is arguing that
Mustapha Logoh, Acting Registrar
of the supreme Court, is the
only person who can produce and
tender Justice Abban’s reasons
for judgment in evidence. He
contends the custody of it
should properly be in the said
registrar, and that admission of
the judgment into evidence from
any other source leaves it
unauthenticated and
unidentified. According to
counsel, unless its authenticity
as well as the contents is
proved, its reception in
evidence would offend the rule
against hearsay.
This may be a correct
representation of the hearsay
rule at common law, but it has
now suffered a disinclination to
relax its rigours by the courts
of the United Kingdom and this
country. See Myers v Director
of Public Prosecutions
[1965] AC.1001, HL where at p
1021 Lord Reid stated as
follows:
“I have never taken a narrow
view of the functions of this
House as an appellate tribunal.
The common law must be developed
to meet changing economic
conditions and habits of
thought, and I would not be
deterred by expressions of
opinion in this House in old
cases, but there are limits to
what we can or should do. If we
are to extend the law it must be
by the development and
application of fundamental
principles. We cannot introduce
arbitrary conditions or
limitations, that must be left
to legislation…”
By the Criminal Evidence Act
1965, the United kingdom
Parliament altered substantially
the common law rule in the
United Kingdom, and in Ghana the
Evidence Decree 1975 (NRCD 323)
now regulates the authentication
and admissibility of such
documents and not section 71(3)
of the Courts Act 1993 (Act 459)
which, according to the Deputy
Attorney-General, makes the
admission of such documents like
judgments of the court in the
custody of the Registrar
admissible without further
proof. Section 71 of the Courts
Act deals with the preservation
of minutes of the proceedings
and notes of evidence taken at
the hearing or trial in court,
which are required to be signed
and certified as true copies by
the officer of the court
authorised by the judge. It is
these that have to be admitted,
without proof, as evidence of
the proceedings and of
statements made by witnesses.
Even though section 149(1) of
the Evidence Decree states that
authentication or identification
of writings made or kept in the
regular course of business
may be by the testimony of a
representative of the business
who is responsible for keeping
the records or familiar with
them though he did not make the
writing or see it made, section
136(1) of the Decree provides
that -
“136(1) Where the relevancy of
evidence depends upon its
authenticity or identity, so
that authentication or
identification is required as a
condition precedent to
admission, that requirement
is satisfied by evidence or
other showing sufficient to
support a finding that the
matter in question is what its
proponent claims.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
To satisfy this requirement the
1st respondent procured John
Albert Owusu, a
Government-gazetted document
examiner and a retired Chief
Superintendent of Police, to
submit a report which stated,
among other things, that
exhibits MB1 and CTC are the
same document and typed on the
same typewriter except
page 28 of CTC which was typed
on a different typewriter. In
other words that exhibit MB1 has
characteristics common to
exhibit CTC except page 28 of
CTC.
It is significant that section
136(1) of the Decree does not
require that a particular
representative (like Mustapha
Logoh) must be called to
authenticate or identify a
record prior to its reception in
evidence. All that the section
demands is a sufficient showing
to support a finding that the
document in question is what its
proponent claims. For the
avoidance of doubt, section
136(2) provides that:
“Permissible means of
authentication or identification
include, but are not limited to,
those provided in sections 137
to 161,” and section 149 which
provides that a representative
of the business may be called to
identify a record issuing from
the business house, only refers
to one of the means by which
authentication or identification
may be effected. It does not
limit the mode of
identification.
As a matter of fact section 144
which provides that
authentication or identification
may be by evidence of
distinctive characteristics,
appearance, contents, substance
or internal patterns, makes it
clear that, even with business
records, the mode of
authentication or identification
is not limited to the testimony
of a representative of the
business. The sole requirement
of the law is evidence or other
showing, sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent
claims.
I have examined carefully the
disputed exhibits together with
the original of exhibit CTC
lodged with the Supreme Court
registry, and I agree with the
results of John Albert Owusu’s
examination and comparison of
the disputed exhibits referred
to him together with his
observations and conclusions
contained in his report, exhibit
“JOA” attached to his affidavit.
My examination revealed further
that with the exception of pages
1 and 6 (apart from the disputed
page 28) of exhibits CTC, MB1
and the original of exhibit CTC
where there are no significant
typing alterations or
amendments/ corrections all the
remaining pages of the three
documents have the same typing
alterations, hand written
amendments and/or corrections.
Even a close study of page 1 of
the three exhibits shows the
word “celebration” in line 9 has
the letter “a” typed on another
letter that cannot be
deciphered.
I also observe that the
corrections and marks made in
CTC and the original of CTC were
the same and exact replica in
exhibit MB1 at pages 13, 15, 16,
25, 26, 30, 31, 35 and 36.
Secondly, I observe that though
there is no handwritten
amendment or correction in the
first line of page 28 of exhibit
CTC, there is a handwritten
correction in the first line of
page 28 of exhibit MB1; it is
the word “era” which is written
above the typewritten word
“erra”. I have carefully
examined the letters “e”, “r”,
“a” in the word “era” on this
page with the letter “e” in the
word “be” at page 16 and the
word “between” at page 33 of
exhibit CTC, and the letter “a”
in the word “what” at page 31
and the word “holidays” at page
36 of exhibit CTC and the
original of CTC, and I am
convinced that the word “era” in
the first line of page 28 of
exhibit MB1 was in the same
handwriting of the person who
wrote “be”, “between,” “others”,
“holidays” and “what” at pages
16, 33, 31 and 36 of exhibit CTC
and the original of CTC.
As the learned Deputy
Attorney-General admits that
exhibit CTC is the exact
photocopy of the alleged
original copy of the judgment of
Justice Abban lodged with the
registry of the Supreme Court,
and that the corrections on the
two documents were made in the
handwriting of Justice Abban, I
find as a fact and conclude that
the correction in the first line
of page 28 (“era”) or exhibit
MB1 was made by Justice Abban
and not by the 1st respondent or
any other person.
I have also carefully considered
the reasons given by the learned
Chief State Attorney which made
her come to the conclusion that
exhibits MB1 and CTC cannot be
the same document and therefore
typed on the same typewriter
“except” page 28 of CTC which
was typed on a different
typewriter as deposed to in
paragraph 5 of John Albert
Owusu’s affidavit. The first
reason is that her comparison of
exhibits MB1 and CTC showed
clearly that while the
handscripts in the nature of
insertions or corrections to
exhibit MB1 can be found on
pages 13, 15, 30, 31, 32, 33 and
35 that on exhibit CTC can be
found on pages 2, 8, 13, 14, 16,
17, 18, 25, 26, 31, 32, 34, 35
and 36. My examination of the
two documents or exhibits shows
that all the insertions or
corrections to exhibit MB1
stated by her appear clearly in
exhibit CTC, and all those that
according to her are found in
exhibit CTC can also be clearly
found in exhibit MB1. Added to
these, the same insertions and
or typewritten corrections
appear at pages 4, 5, 7, 9, 10,
11, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
27, 29, 37, 38, 39 and 40 of
both exhibits MB1 and CTC.
The second reason of the learned
Chief State Attorney talks about
handmade scripts in pen and
pencil on the original of the
document while the insertions
appearing in exhibits CTC and
MB1 do not disclose the
instrument with which they were
made, and for that matter the
documents are different. The
simple answer is that when one
takes a photocopy of a document
having handmade scripts in pen
and pencil, the photocopy cannot
portray identical characters.
The next reason is that there
are short vertical lines/marks
on MB1, and these do not appear
on CTC. The lines/marks are just
peculiar to a particular
photocopying machine used in
taking the copies.
Then she said that page 33 of
CTC was found to be shorter in
length than the rest of the
pages of the same exhibit CTC. I
least expected this sort of
comparison. She also said that
the typeface of exhibit CTC
appears to be bigger than that
on exhibit MB1. She said this
difference suggests that the
first document is not the
same as the second. Surely,
this should not have created any
problem for her because the
difference is only due to an
adjustment of the photocopying
machine used in taking the copy.
Finally she said that the
signature on exhibit CTC and the
original document appears longer
in length than that in exhibit
MB1. My comparison shows that
the signatures are the same as
stated by John Albert Owusu in
his observation in his report -
one is a photocopy of the other.
I now proceed to give my views
on page 28 of exhibit MB1 and
that of exhibit CTC and the
alleged original of the Reasons
for judgment of Justice Abban
lodged with the Registry of the
Supreme Court. The second
paragraph of page 28 of exhibit
MB1 contains, inter alia, the
following:
“The Daily Graphic of
Tuesday 24 February 1970 No
6033, carried the speech of Dr
Busia on that day; and I will
quote a few extracts from it,
“Salute the gallant men.
Today is the fourth anniversary
of the 24th February 1966
revolution. Exactly four
years ago today…”
However, the second paragraph of
page 28 of exhibit CTC and the
alleged original judgment lodged
with the registry of the Supreme
Court contains the following:
“The Daily Graphic of
Tuesday 24 February 1970 No
6033, carried the speech of Dr
Busia on that celebration. I
will however quote a few
extracts from the “Daily Graphic
View” that day.
“Salute to the gallant men.
Today is the fourth anniversary
of the 24 February 1966
revolution.
Exactly four years ago today…”
A close reading of the two
passages shows clearly that
whereas the former, ie the
attribution of the quotation to
Dr Busia is syntactic and flows
textually with the sense and
logic of the reasons for
judgment, the latter quotation
does not flow logically with the
textual reasoning of the
judgment. The second sentence “I
will however quote a few
extracts from the “Daily Graphic
View” that day “has a disjointed
relationship with the first
sentence, both together forming
an incoherent thought.
In the result it is my judgment
that Justice Abban’s judgment
that was read in open court on 8
March 1994 was tampered with,
and this was done by Justice
Abban himself after he had read
it in open court, and not by the
1st respondent as alleged, and
that page 28 of exhibit MB1 was
the one Justice Abban read in
open court on 8 March 1994.
The affidavit evidence shows
that when the 1st respondent
read exhibit MB1 he wrote
exhibit MB3 to Justice Abban
pointing out to him that his
signed reasons for judgment in
the 31st December case,
the passage in the judgment
which purported to be a verbatim
speech made by Dr Busia on 24
February 1970, was in fact the
full text of an editorial of the
Daily Graphic of the same
date, and that what he had done
in his judgment was to
misrepresent the editorial
opinion of the Daily Graphic
as a speech made by Dr Busia.
The 1st respondent pointed out
to him that that was an
inexcusable error, and forwarded
to him photocopies of the front
and back pages of the Daily
Graphic edition of 24
February 1970, No 6033 which
contained the report of Dr
Busia’s speech and the “Daily
Graphic View”. This letter was
copied to the Chief Justice, and
The Free Press which,
according to 1st respondent,
published it with its comments.
He said that since the matter
evoked much public interest he
wrote an article “about the
erroneous attribution of the
Daily Graphic editorial to
Dr Busia who was dead and was
not in a position to answer back
from the grave. The article was
titled: “Judicial Chicanery.” It
contains the following:
“(2) He [ie Justice Abban]
sought to justify the
celebration of 31st December not
by reference to arguments
advanced before him or upon the
recognition that the suit
involved interpretation of
Article 3(3) of the
Constitution. He sought refuge
in the past to justify the
present. His reference to what
happened in the past and the
behaviour of past Governments on
the celebration of holidays may
be passable political argument.
It certainly is not legal
argument.
(2) JUDICIAL CHICANERY
In his zeal to justify 31st
December, Mr Justice Abban
indulged in judicial chicanery
by attributing to Dr Busia a
statement he did not make. After
exhuming the Daily Graphic
edition of 24 February 1970
from the archives, the learned
judge pontificated as follows:
‘Busia Government continued to
exclude 1 July - Republic Day -
from the list of holidays but
continued to celebrate 24
February as a public holiday
under the heading “Liberation
Day.” But as I stated earlier
on, Busia Government actually
celebrated it as a “Revolution
Day.” The Daily Graphic
of Tuesday 24 February 1970 No
6033, carried the speech of Dr
Busia on that day; and I will
quote a few extracts from it:
‘We salute the gallant men
Today is the fourth …’
(3) In the first place, Dr Busia
never made this so-called
speech which Mr Justice Abban
attributed to him. It is a pity
that the learned Supreme Court
judge either by gross negligence
or outright chicanery should
have attributed it to him. Dr
Busia’s broadcast was not
reproduced in the Daily
Graphic of 24 February 1970
No 6033 as alleged. It was
rather paraphrased in the front
and back pages of that edition.
What Mr Justice Abban attributed
to Dr Busia was that paper’s
editorial view which was boldly
headed: “Graphic View.” It is
difficult to see how this bold
heading could have escaped the
judge’s attention.
(4) In the second place, the
overriding consideration is
that: Is it legitimate for a
judge, in any court, to go
fishing for facts which neither
of the parties has deemed fit to
bring to his attention or of
which he has not been invited to
take judicial notice?
(5) In going out of his way to
find fanciful material to
support the case of the
government Mr Justice Abban has
abandoned the noble role of the
judge as an umpire who holds an
even balance between the parties
who appear before a court. In
the words of Lord Greene, master
of the Rolls, Mr Justice Abban
“descended, so to speak, into
the arena of conflict and had
his vision clouded by the dust
of the conflict.
(6) Another aspect
of Mr Justice Abban’s chicanery
is that he set his standard of
proof too high, even though the
proof he required was not
germane to the issue. He
admonished the plaintiff as
follows:
‘The court was not even
furnished with evidence as to
opinion polls, scientifically
conducted as is done in other
countries to show the percentage
of those who did not like the
celebration.’
(7) There is no doubt that Mr
Justice Abban’s judgment is
tainted with politics. The
impression created in his
judgment is that of a judge
bending over backwards to please
the government. What is even
more serious is that he has
indulged in what is plain
falsehood. This is bad in a
judge whether it happened by
accident, negligence or design
especially, when the target of
his falsehood, Dr Busia, is no
longer alive to defend himself.
The Fourth Republican
Constitution is in serious
danger if judges, called upon to
interpret the constitution, are
going to use the Bench for what
is manifestly politics of
undisguised partisan nature,
and in the process do violence
to the truth.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
The article by the 1st
respondent containing the above
quotation is what was published
in The Free Press issue
of Friday May 20 to Thursday May
26, 1994. What is stated in
The Free Press issue of May
27 to June 2, 1994, is The
Free Press view and not that
of the 1st respondent. I have
carefully examined the two
publications and I fail to see
anything scurrilous and abusive
against Justice Abban and the
administration of justice as the
plaintiff seems to say in his
ground (iv) upon which he seeks
his reliefs. The heading of
Mensa-Bonsu’s article is “Judicial
Chicanery.” The word
“chicanery” simply means “legal
trickery or false argument.” If
Justice Abban read page 28 of
exhibit MB1, as I have found as
a fact, can his action not aptly
be described as legal (or
judicial) trickery or false
argument? What offence has
Mensa-Bonsu then committed by
describing this opinion as
“judicial chicanery”? I think he
has not committed any crime.
Furthermore The Free Press
publication in its issue of
May 13 to 19, 1994 quotes, as
far as 1st respondent is
concerned, just his letter
addressed to Justice Abban.
There is nothing in this letter
that scandalises the learned
judge, by calling him a liar, a
criminal and a political chicane
as is portrayed in the
applicant’s ground (iii). What
1st respondent did was to
criticise the judgment of
Justice Abban after this had
been delivered in open court. In
my view the criticism by the 1st
respondent is accurate and fair.
As Lord Hardwicke recognised in
the course of his speech in the
case of In re Read and
Huggonson 2 Atk 471 , “when
a trial has taken place and the
case is over, the judge or the
jury are given over to
criticism.” See also McLeod v
St Aubyn [1899] AC 549, PC
at 561, 1st respondent’s
criticism cannot, in my view,
amount to contempt of court. In
R v Commissioner of Police of
the Metropolis, ex parte
Blackburn (No 2) [1968] 2
All ER 319, CA it was held that
criticism of the court and of
judicial decisions, however
rumbustious, whether or not in
good taste, and despite its
inaccurate statement of fact,
was not contempt of court but
was within the limits of the
inalienable right of every
individual to freedom of speech
which the courts had always
unfailingly upheld. I think this
is a good exposition of the law
and I adopt it.
After all the 1st respondent is
just pointing out an error in
the judgment of Justice Abban.
If there is an error, and it is
exposed, this cannot in my view
amount to contempt of court. The
error in this context related to
quoting in full the editorial of
a newspaper and attributing it
to Dr Busia. If this error is
established the passage becomes
misleading and dishonest as long
as it is not suggested that the
mistake was inadvertent. The use
of the word “chicanery” to
describe the situation cannot,
in my view, be said to be an
intemperate or abusive language.
The publications in The Free
Press newspaper by the 2nd
and 3rd respondents have been
referred to earlier in this
judgment and there is no need to
repeat them. Learned counsel for
the applicant has urged that the
publications were actuated by
malice, were intemperate and
scurrilous, and constitute a
deliberate contempt of court by
scandalising Justice Abban, the
Supreme Court and the judicial
process, especially as they
charged Justice Abban with being
a liar, a criminal and a
political chicane. To buttress
his argument learned counsel
cited a number of decided cases
including Rex v Freeman
The Times, November 18, 1925,
Rex v Vidal October 14,
1922, Rex v Editor of the New
Statesman, ex parte Director of
Public Prosecutions The
Times Law Reports, Friday, March
2, 1928 at 301 and The Queen
v Gray [1900] 2 QB 37.
I think these cases ought to be
examined carefully with a view
to assessing their relevance to
the present case and their
effect on it. In Rex v
Freeman (supra) the court
comprising the Lord Chief
Justice, Mr Justice Avory, and
Mr Justice Sankey, ordered
Freeman to be imprisoned for
eight months for contempt of
court, and expressed the hope
that his mental state would be
kept under observation. The
order was made on the motion of
the Attorney-General, calling on
Freeman to answer for his
contempt in publishing abusive
letters to and concerning Mr
Justice Roche, who in January
1924, dismissed an action
brought by Freeman against the
Royal Liver Friendly Society.
Freeman had been plaintiff in an
action before Mr Justice Roche
on January 16 and 17, 1924, and
in those proceedings he was not
so successful as he had hoped to
be. He did not appeal, but began
to assail the learned judge with
letters and postcards containing
the grossest calumny and
vituperation. In one letter he
had said to the learned judge:
“You are a liar, a coward, a
perjurer …You aided Lord
Sheffield in a felony.” He said
that he was entitled to say
these things with a view to
forcing the learned judge to
take proceedings against him.
The facts of this case contained
nothing that entitled Freeman to
charge the learned judge with
being a liar, a coward and a
perjurer.
In Rex v Vidal (supra)
the contempt arose from the
publication of certain posters
in Carey-Street near the law
courts. The matter arose out of
a case Vidal v Vidal and
Wilson in the divorce court,
before the learned President.
The defendant who was related to
one of the parties to that case
was dissatisfied with the result
and so he caused posters to be
exhibited in which, among other
things, he charged the learned
President with being a traitor
to his duty, and with defrauding
the course of justice for the
benefit of one of the parties to
a case tried before him. In
delivering judgment the Lord
Chief Justice said that if there
had been reasonable argument and
expostulation, that would pass
without serious notice, but to
say of a learned judge that he
has given active and complete
support to a conspiracy to
suppress evidence, that he “has
defrauded the course of justice”
is scurrilous abuse of the worse
description, and amounts to
contempt of court. In this case
also no reasonable argument or
expostulation was offered
against any judicial act as
contrary to law or the public
good.
In Rex v Editor of the
Statesman, ex parte Director of
Public Prosecutions (supra)
Clifford Dyce Sharp, the editor
of the New Statesman, was
called upon to show cause why he
should not be attached for
contempt of court in respect of
the following paragraph
publicised in the New
Statesman on January 28,
1928, which, it was alleged, was
calculated to lower the
authority of Mr Justice Avory
and bring him into contempt:
“We cannot help regarding the
verdict given this week in the
libel action brought by the
Editor of the Morning Post
against Mr Marie Stopes as a
substantial miscarriage of
justice. We are not at all in
sympathy with Dr Stope’s work or
aims, but prejudice against
those aims ought not to be
allowed to influence a court of
justice in the manner in which
they appeared to influence Mr
Justice Avory in his summing
up…”
In delivering the judgment of
the court, Lord Hewart, the Lord
Chief Justice said that in the
opinion of the court the meaning
of the words complained of was
quite free from ambiguity. He
said they meant what they said,
namely, that a person who held
certain views could not hope for
a fair hearing in a court
presided over by the learned
judge who was named. Here too no
reasonable argument or
expostulation was offered
against any judicial act as
contrary to law or the public
good.
In both this case and Rex v
Vidal the Lord Chief Justice
who delivered the judgment of
the court cited with approval
Reg v Gray [1900-3] All ER
59 where at page 62 Lord
Russell, delivering the
unanimous judgment of the court,
said:
“It cannot be doubted…that it
does constitute a contempt of
court, but as these applications
are happily of an unusual
character, we have thought it
right to explain a little more
fully than is perhaps necessary
what does constitute a contempt
of court, and what are the means
which the law has placed at the
disposal of the judicature for
checking and punishing contempt
of court.
Any act done or writing
published calculated to bring a
Court or a judge of the court
into contempt or to lessen his
authority, is a contempt of
court.”
Later he stated that the
contempt in issue was of the
class described by Lord
Hardwicke in re Read and
Huggonson (1742) 2 Atk
291 at 469 as “scandalising
a court or a judge, and
continued:
“¼but
that description of that class
is to be taken subject to one -
and an important qualification.
Judges and courts are alike
open to criticism, and if
reasonable argument or
expostulation is offered against
any judicial act as contrary to
law or the public good no court
could or would treat that as
contempt of court.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
Here a reasonable argument or
expostulation has been offered
by the 2nd and 3rd respondents
against a judicial act of
Justice Abban contrary to law or
the public good, in that in his
judgment he had attributed to Dr
Busia a statement Busia never
made ie, the editorial view of
the Daily Graphic which
was boldly headed: “Graphic
View.”
Any person who tells a lie can
be charged with perjury, and
perjury is a crime. Therefore to
call such a person, if he is a
judge, a liar or a criminal
cannot, in my view, amount to
contempt of court. After all a
liar is a person who tells an
untruth.
Queen v Gray
itself is an interesting case.
In that case one Wells was
indicted at the Birmingham
Assizes for uttering and
publishing certain indecent
words, and for publishing an
indecent book. The case came to
be tried before Darling J and
before the trial Darling J made
some observations in court,
warning all persons concerned,
including the press of
Birmingham, against the
publication of any of those
indecent details, “taking care,
at the same time, that his
observations should not in any
sense prejudice the matter to be
tried, because he was careful to
point out that, although
necessarily indecent matter
would be put in evidence, it did
not follow the publication of it
in the actual case necessarily
constituted a criminal offence.”
Wells was convicted, and whilst
the Birmingham Assizes were
still continuing and Darling J
was sitting as one of Her
Majesty’s judges of Assize, Gray
wrote and published in the
Birmingham Daily Argus, of
which he was editor, an article
headed “A Defender of
Decency.” It was written
with reference to the
observations made by Darling J
before the trial of Wells, and
may be described in the words of
Lord Russel of Killowen CJ as
being “personal scurrilous abuse
of the judge as a judge.”
In an affidavit made by Gray
himself he described the article
thus: “In writing the article…I
used language referring to Mr
Justice Darling in terms which
were intemperate, improper,
ungentlemanly, and void of the
respect due to his Lordship’s
person and office…I deeply
regret the publishing of the
article and the inexcusable and
insulting language in which it
referred to one of Her Majesty’s
judges, and I humbly apologise
to his Lordship and to the court
for my conduct, which I now,
upon consideration, see
reflected not only upon the
individual judge but upon the
Bench of judges, and the
administration of justice.”
Lord Russell of Killowen, CJ in
giving judgment for the court,
composed of himself, Grantham
and Phillimore JJ said: “It is
not too much to say that it is
an article of scurrilous abuse
of a judge in his character of a
judge - scurrilous abuse in
reference to the conduct of the
judge while sitting under the
Queen’s Commission, and
scurrilous abuse published in a
newspaper in the town in which
he was still sitting under the
Queen’s Commission. It cannot be
doubted … that the article does
constitute a contempt of court…”
He then continued to make the
pertinent statement or
observation referred to above.
He said in [1900-3] All ER Rep
59 at 62:
“Any act done in writing
calculated to bring a court or a
judge of the court into contempt
or to lower his authority, is a
contempt of court. That is one
class of contempt. Another class
is, any act done, or writing
published, calculated to
obstruct or interfere with the
due course of justice or the
lawful process of the court.
That is another class of
contempt. The former class
belongs to the category which
Lord Hardwicke characterised as
“scandalising a court itself.”
¼that
description of that class is to
be taken subject to one
qualification - and an important
qualification. Judges and courts
are alike open to criticism if
reasonable argument or
expostulation is offered against
any judicial act as contrary to
law or the public good. No court
could or would treat that as
contempt of court.”
(Emphasis mine.)
It will be observed that in this
case the publication was
manifestly uncalled for under
the circumstances, unlike the
instant case, and the court was
right in finding the publication
a contempt of court punishable
by the court on summary process.
Gray’s case can be
distinguished from the instant
case, and cannot therefore be
used as an authority to buttress
up the argument of the learned
Deputy Attorney-General urging
this court to attach the 2nd and
3rd respondents for contempt of
court.
As was pointed out by Lord
Morris when delivering the
judgment of their Lordships in
McLeod v St Aubyn [1899]
AC 549, PC at 561:
“Committals for contempt of
Court are ordinarily in cases
where some contempt ex facie of
the Court has been committed, or
for comments on cases pending in
the Courts. However, there can
be no doubt that there is a
third head of contempt of Court
by the publication of scandalous
matter of the court itself. Lord
Hardwicke so lays down without
doubt in the case of In re
Read and Huggonson 2 Atk
471. He says: one kind of
contempt is scandalising the
court itself. The power
summarily to commit for contempt
of court is considered necessary
for the proper administration of
justice. It is not to be used
for the vindication of the judge
as a person. He must resort to
action for libel or criminal
information. Committal for
contempt of Court is a weapon to
be used sparingly, and always
with reference to the interests
of the administration of
justice. Hence, when a trial
has taken place and the case is
over, the judge or the jury
are given over to criticism.”
(Emphasis mine.)
His Lordship concluded by saying
that: “Committals for
contempt of Court by
scandalising the court itself
have become obsolete in this
country.” (Emphasis mine.)
Lord Russell in Gray’s case
was very much concerned with the
proper use of the court’s
jurisdiction in a case of
contempt. He said at p 41 of the
report that it is a
jurisdiction to be exercised
with scrupulous care, to be
exercised only when the case
is clear and beyond reasonable
doubt; because, if it is not
a case beyond reasonable doubt,
the courts will and ought to
leave the Attorney-General to
proceed by criminal information.
The case under consideration is
a doubtful one; if it is not a
case beyond reasonable doubt,
and in my view this court ought
not to entertain it.
The learned Deputy
Attorney-General also laid a lot
of emphasis on the English House
of Lords decision in
Attorney-General v Times
Newspaper Ltd [1973]
3 All ER 54. In that case the
House of Lords overturned the
decision of the Court of Appeal
discharging an injunction
granted by the Divisional Court
restraining the proprietors of
The Sunday Times from
publishing an article showing
that a drug company called
Distillers had not exercised due
care to see that their drug
thalidomide was safe for
pregnant mothers before they put
it on the market. The Court of
Appeal had discharged the
injunction on the grounds, inter
alia, that the article contained
comments which the authors
honestly believed to be true on
matters of outstanding public
interest and did not prejudice
pending litigation since the
litigation had been dormant for
several years and no active
steps had been taken or were
likely to be taken to bring it
before the courts. The House of
Lords in upholding the
injunction granted by the
Divisional Court held (i) that
it was contempt of court to
publish an article expressing an
opinion on the merits of a
specific issue which was before
the court for determination in
circumstances such that the fair
trial of the action would be
prejudiced, and (ii) that it was
a contempt of court to use
improper pressure to induce a
litigant to settle a case on
terms to which he did not wish
to agree.
The case itself did not concern
a matter that had been disposed
of by the court, as in the
instant case, but the Deputy
Attorney-General used it to
hammer home the
Attorney-General’s right to
bring before the court any
matter which he thinks may
amount to contempt of court and
which he considers should in the
public interest be brought
before the court. With respect
to cases dealt with by the
courts Lord Reid, Lord Simon of
Glaisdale and Lord Cross of
Chelsea observed that proper
criticism of a judgment already
given but under appeal would not
amount to contempt. And Lord
Simon also observed at p 82 that
once the proceedings are
concluded, the paramount
interest of the public now is
that it should be fully
appraised of what has happened,
and hear unhampered debate on
whether the law, procedure and
institutions which it had
ordained have operated
satisfactorily or call for
modification. That is exactly
what the respondents have done
in the instant case.
I have drawn a lot of
inspiration from the
Blackburn case, and this has
helped me in arriving at my
conclusions in the instant case.
In that case the article
complained of made references to
the Court of Appeal and the
House of Lords which were found
to be erroneous, vis-a-vis the
instant case where the main
article referred to an error
committed by one of the judges
who sat on the case. The salient
passages in the English article
were quoted in the judgment of
Lord Denning MR in the manner
following:
“The recent judgment of the
Court of Appeal is a strange
example of the blindness which
sometimes descends on the best
of judges. The legislation of
1960 and thereafter has been
rendered virtually unworkable by
the unrealistic, contradictory
and, in the leading case,
erroneous, decisions of the
courts, including the Court of
Appeal. So what do they do?
Apologise for the expense and
trouble they have put the police
to? Not a bit of it. Lambaste
the police for not enforcing the
law which they themselves had
rendered unworkable and which is
now the subject of a Bill, the
manifest purpose of which is to
alter it. Pronounce an impending
dies irae on a series of parties
not before them, whose crime it
has been to take advantage of
the weaknesses in the decisions
of their own court. Criticise
the lawyers, who have advised
their clients. Blame Parliament
for passing Acts which they have
interpreted so strangely.
Everyone, it seems, is out of
step, except the courts… The
House of Lords overruled the
Court of Appeal …it is to be
hoped that the courts will
remember the golden rule for
judges in the matter of obiter
dicta. Silence is always an
option.”
The speeches of Lord Denning MR
and Lord Salmon in the Court of
Appeal are illuminating and
instructive. They touch on
freedom of speech and freedom of
the Press and every man to make
a fair comment, even outspoken
comments, on matters of public
interest which is also enshrined
in article 21(1)(a) of our
Constitution 1992. Lord Denning
stated:
“That article is certainly
critical of this court. In so
far as it referred to the Court
of Appeal, it is admittedly
erroneous. This court did not in
the gaming cases give any
decision which was erroneous,
nor one which was overruled by
the House of Lords. But is the
article a contempt of court?
This is the first case, so far
as I know, where this court has
been called on to consider an
allegation of contempt against
itself. It is a jurisdiction
which undoubtedly belongs to us
but which we will most sparingly
exercise: more particularly as
we ourselves have an interest in
the matter.
Let me say at once that we will
never use this jurisdiction as a
means to uphold our own dignity.
That must rest on sure
foundations. Nor will we use it
to suppress those who speak
against us. We do not fear
criticism nor do we resent it.
For there is something far more
important at stake. It is no
less than freedom of speech
itself. It is the right of
every man, in Parliament or out
of it, in the Press or over the
broadcast, to make fair comment,
even outspoken comment on
matters of public interest.
Those who comment can deal
faithfully with all that is done
in a court of justice. They can
say that we are mistaken, and
our decisions erroneous, whether
they are subject to appeal or
not. All we would ask is that
those who criticise us will
remember that, from the nature
or our office, we cannot reply
to their criticisms. We cannot
enter into public controversy.
Still less into political
controversy. We must rely on
our conduct itself to be its own
vindication. Exposed as we
are to the winds of criticism,
nothing which is said by this
person or that, nothing which is
written by this pen or that,
will deter us from doing what we
believe is right, nor, I would
add, from saying what the
occasion requires, provided that
it is pertinent to the matter in
hand. Silence is not an option
when things are ill done.
So it comes to this: Mr Quintin
Hogg has criticised the court,
but in so doing he is exercising
his undoubted right. The article
contains an error, no doubt
but errors do not make it a
contempt of court. We must
uphold his right to the
uttermost.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
To support this opinion Lord
Salmon also said at page 155:
“The authority and reputation of
our courts are not so frail that
their judgments need to be
shielded from criticism, even
from the criticism of Mr Quintin
Hogg. Their judgments, which
can, I think, safely be left to
take care of themselves, are
often of considerable public
importance. It is the
inalienable right of everyone to
comment fairly upon any matter
of public importance. This right
is one of the pillars of
individual liberty - freedom of
speech, which our courts have
always unfailingly upheld. It
follows that no criticism of a
judgment, however vigorous, can
amount to contempt of court,
providing it keeps within the
limits of reasonable courtesy
and good faith. The criticism
here complained of, however
rumbustious, however wide off
the mark, whether expressed in
good taste, or in bad taste,
seems to me to be well within
those limits.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
Then later he said:
“No one could doubt Mr Hogg’s
good faith. I, of course,
entirely accept that he had no
intention of holding this court
up to contempt; nor did he do
so. Mr Blackburn complains that
Mr Hogg has not apologised.
There was no reason why he
should apologise, for he owes no
apology, save, perhaps, to the
readers of Punch for some
inaccuracies and inconsistencies
which his article contains.”
These are words of wisdom, and I
adopt every bit of them. At the
same time, like Lord Salmon, I
entirely accept that the
respondents had no intention of
holding this court up to
contempt; nor did they do so.
There was no reason why they
should apologise, for they owe
no apology. If the Blackburn
case had come before any
of our courts I am sure the
initial reaction of a number of
our judges would have been that
a contempt of court had been
committed and so Quintin Hogg
must be imprisoned.
Alternatively, are we so
uncultured in the Fourth
Republic, after so many years of
gaining our independence, to fit
ourselves in the same social and
political background as obtained
in St Vincent in the late 1890’s
to measure up to the following
opinion of Lord Morris in
McLeod v St Aubyn, where
after approving of the opinion
of Lord Hardwicke in the case of
In re Read and Huggonson
(supra) that committals for
contempt of court by
scandalising the court itself
had become obsolete in Britain,
and that the courts in Britain
were satisfied to leave to
public opinion attacks or
comments derogatory or
scandalous of them, said:
“But it must be considered that
in small colonies, consisting
principally of coloured
populations, the enforcement in
proper cases of committal for
contempt of court for attacks on
the court may be absolutely
necessary to preserve in such a
community the dignity of and
respect for the court.”
I think we are in this century
civilised enough to be outside
that environment. The
publication concerning Justice
Abban may be said to be
libellous, but that cannot
necessarily be a contempt of
court unless it is calculated to
obstruct or interfere with the
course of justice or the due
administration of the law: See
In the matter of a Special
Reference from the Bahama
Islands (1893) AC 138, and
The King v Nicholls
(1911) 12 CLR 280, High Court of
Australia which I approve.
The Deputy Attorney-General says
that any publication calculated
to bring Justice Abban into
contempt or to lower his
authority is a contempt of
court, and that since Justice
Abban is a member of the panel
of this court that sat on the
31st December case, that
publication is a contempt of the
Supreme Court. This in my
opinion is unfounded and cannot
be supported in the sense it is
contended for. He relies on the
language of Lord Russell of
Killowen in Reg v Gray
(supra). As to what Lord
Hardwicke characterised as
“scandalising a court or a
judge,” Lord Morris pointed out
in McLeod v St Aubyn
(supra) that prosecutions for
that class of contempt are
practically obsolete in England,
and speaking for myself I do not
see the wisdom in maintaining it
in Ghana. It may be argued that
every defamatory publication
concerning a judge may be said
to bring him into contempt as
that term is used in the law of
libel, but I do not think that
it necessarily follows that
everything thus said of a judge
amounts to a contempt of court.
That distinction was pointed out
by a Committee of the Privy
Council to which the question
was referred by the Secretary of
State in 1892 in the case of
In the matter of a Special
Reference from the Bahama
Islands (supra) where the
Chief Justice of the Colony was
held up by a publication to
public ridicule in the grossest
manner, representing him as an
utterly incompetent judge, and a
shirker of his work, suggesting
that it would be a providential
thing if he were to die. Though
the Judicial Committee did not,
as was in vogue at the time,
give a formal judgment, it
reported that the letter
complained of, though it might
have been made the subject of
proceedings for libel, was not,
in the circumstances, calculated
to obstruct the law, and
therefore did not constitute a
contempt of court: see the
King v Nicholls (supra). I
do not think in the instant case
it is possible to say that what
was said about Justice Abban is
calculated to obstruct or
interfere with the course of
justice in the Supreme Court,
more so when in the first place
Justice Abban appeared to
consider the issue as a personal
matter and referred it to the
National Media Commission
through the Chief Justice, and
later to the police through the
Attorney-General for
investigation.
It is my view also that though
the relevant publications may be
said to have been strong and
rumbustious in parts, they were
published in good faith and in
honest belief of their truth,
and in the exercise of the
respondents’ right to freedom of
expression. The intention behind
the publications was, in my
judgment to uphold the
independence and integrity of
the Supreme Court as the highest
court of justice in our judicial
system. Justice, as Lord Atkin
put it in Ambard v
Attorney-General for Trinidad
and Tobago [1936] AC 322,
PC, “is not a cloistered virtue:
she must be allowed to suffer
the scrutiny and respectful even
though outspoken, comments of
ordinary men.”
I would dismiss the application.
BAMFORD-ADDO JSC.
On 10 November 1994 the
Attorney-General initiated
contempt proceedings against the
respondents at the Supreme
Court. The 1st respondent is a
private legal practitioner and a
columnist of The Free Press
newspaper, the second is the
editor of the said newspaper and
the third respondent company,
Tommy Thompson Books Ltd the
printers, publishers and
proprietors of The Free Press
The charge of contempt of court
is in respect of the publication
in The Free Press of
contumacious and scandalous
matter concerning Mr Justice
Abban, a Supreme Court judge,
calculated to erode public
confidence in the administration
of justice and the law and to
impair the authority of the
judiciary. The said judge was
one of the members of a panel of
nine judges which heard the case
of New Patriotic Party v
Attorney-General [1994-95]
GBR 1, popularly called
the 31st December case.
Judgment in the case was given
on 29 December 1993 and reasons
for the judgment delivered on
the 8 March 1994. The judgment
was a majority judgment of 5 to
4 in favour of the New Patriotic
Party. On 8 March 1994 each of
the nine judges read their
individual judgments and
according to 1st respondent he
was in court that day and heard
Mr Justice Abban read his
reasons.
On 9 May 1994 the 1st respondent
wrote a letter to the said judge
in which he accused him of
wrongly attributing at page 28
of his judgement the editorial
opinion of the Daily Graphic
newspaper, to Dr Busia: A
summary of Dr Busia’s speech was
contained in the same Daily
Graphic of Tuesday February
24 1970. According to 1st
respondent, when he heard this
in court he decided to obtain a
copy of Mr Abban’s signed
reasons, to find out whether
what he had heard was correct.
He therefore asked Mr
Owusu-Ansah Deputy Judicial
Secretary for a copy of the
written reasons. Mr Owusu-Ansah
directed him to obtain a copy of
the reasons from lawyer
Okerchiri Adusa Kwabena to whom
he had earlier given a copy.
First respondent said he found
that what he had heard the judge
say in court was what was
contained in the written, signed
judgment (herein after referred
to as exhibit MB1). He made a
photocopy and returned the
document to Mr Owusu-Ansah who
said he replaced it in the
registrar’s office. It is to be
noted that exhibit MB1 was not a
certified copy of the judge’s
reasons - at that time, the
registrar of the Supreme Court
had not certified the document.
The letter of 9 May 1994 was
copied to the Chief Justice who
investigated the accusation
contained therein, and caused Mr
Logoh, the registrar of the
Supreme Court to send a
certified copy of the page 28
complained of, to 1st respondent
pointing out to him that in the
certified copy of Mr Abban’s
judgment (exhibit CTC) at page
28 showed that what the judge
quoted at page 28 of his
reasons, is the “Daily Graphic
View” and not Dr Busia’s speech
as alleged by 1st respondent.
Before receipt of this letter
1st respondent sent a copy of
his letter of 9 May 1994 to
The Free Press which
published it together with
comments in the issue of 13 to
19 May 1994, under the caption:
“Justice Abban is a liar.”
It is expedient to quote certain
portions of the said article as
I would be referring to them
later in this judgment. The
article in parts stated:
“… the learned Supreme Court
judge committed one of the most
grievous and unpardonable legal
crimes against the media,
the judiciary and the people of
Ghana. In his display of
political chicanery and
bamboozelment of Ghanaians
the learned Supreme Court judge
lifted the whole editorial
comment of Daily Graphic
newspaper of Tuesday February
24, 1970 No 6033 and portrayed
it as a speech made by Dr K A
Busia, Ghana’s Prime Minister in
the Second Republic which to all
intents and purposes, is most
outrageous in the field of legal
issues… the bamboozle
displayed by Mr Justice I K
Abban in lifting of Graphic
editorial and making it a speech
delivered by the late Prime
Minister to support his NDC
government…” (Emphasis
mine.)
After this, 1st respondent did
not allow the matter to lie, he
replied to the registrar on 23
May 1994 to the effect that he
had compared page 28 of MB1 with
page 28 of the “certified copy”
sent to him, but was still of
the view that what he heard Mr
Justice Abban say in court was
not what the “certified copy” of
page 28 stated. The letter dated
23 May was also published in the
June 3 to June 9, 1994 issue of
The Free Press under the
title: “Abban scandal … Abban
scandal …Abban scandal’,
“Mensah-Bonsu tells Supreme
Court: ‘I heard it all’.”
In the issue of The Free
Press of 20 May to 26 May
1994 another article appeared at
page 8 of the newspaper under
column: “Sentiments of K
Mensah-Bonsu” titled:
“Judicial Chicancery.”
That article contained some of
the accusations which the
Attorney-General has described
as “gross abuse” of the judge.
These parts are the following:
“In his zeal to justify 31st
December, Mr Justice Abban
indulged in judicial
chicanery by attributing to
Dr Busia a statement he did not
make… In the first place, Dr
Busia never made this so-called
speech which Mr Justice Abban
attributed to him. It is a pity
that the learned Supreme Court
judge, either by gross
negligence or outright
chicanery, should have
attributed it to him…Another
aspect of Mr Justice Abban’s
chicanery is that he set his
standard of proof too high, even
though the proof he required was
not germane to the issue.
There is not doubt that Mr
Justice Abban’s judgment is
tainted with politics. The
impression created in his
judgment is that of a judge
bending over backwards to please
the Government.” (Emphasis
mine.)
Yet again the respondents
published in the May 27 to June
2, 1994 issue of The Free
Press two items namely: (a)
“Justice Abban scandal takes
dramatic turn. He is accused of
doctoring” and (b) a front-page
comment under the title “A
challenge to Media Commission.”
“It is stated that Mr Justice
Abban is accused of doctoring
his version of his judgment as a
subterfuge to free himself from
scandal.”
Again in the issue of The Free
Press of 4 to 6 November 1994
under an editorial titled “Abban
puts integrity of the Bench on
the line” appeared among other
things, these remarks. “It is
therefore the height of mischief
for Mr Justice Abban to withdraw
his case at a time a report on
it was allegedly being prepared.
This is most unfortunate coming
from no mean a person. Running
away from the NMC is enough
proof of his guilty conscience
yet he expects to establish his
innocence on the Bench. The
question that must disturb all
right thinking Ghanaians is how
can Mr Justice Abban then expect
from the Bench what he felt he
could not gain from the MNC,
without insulting the integrity
of the courts? Is Mr Justice
Abban not implying that the
judges at the courts are
lunatics - indeed zombies - and
therefore, he expects them to
twist in his favour a case which
cannot stand on its mosquito
feet even at the Media
Commission? …The fetish which Mr
Justice Abban is making of the
so-called “certified true copy”
is therefore nothing but
mischievous, frivolous and
vexatious we beg to submit … And
whether the men and women on the
Bench would allow themselves to
be reduced to such depth and
also abused (sic) to save the
face of a fellow prodigal
benchman, remains to be seen.
Ghanaians are watching
developments with eagle’s eyes”
(Emphasis mine.)
These are the publications which
the Attorney-General has said
are scandalous abuse of a judge,
contumacious of the court, and
calculated to bring the
administration of the law into
disrepute. He submitted that the
act of the respondents has
scandalised the court, and it is
likely to lower the authority of
the courts and impair public
confidence in them. What the
court has to decide is whether
calling a judge, in his capacity
as a judge a liar, a criminal
and a partial judge, a judge who
practices political and judicial
chicanery scandalises the court,
and amounts therefore to
contempt of court.
The Superior Courts of record in
England have always exercised at
common law the power to commit
for contempt. This power, it had
been said is inherent in their
constitution and coeval with
their institution. In Ghana the
Superior Courts of record
inherited this common law power
and even though our Criminal
Code 1960 (Act 29) in section 8
specified that no person shall
be liable to punishment by the
common law yet section 10
thereto preserved the common law
power of a court to punish a
person for contempt of court.
The 1969 Constitution article
102(5), the Constitution 1979,
article 114(6) and the present
Constitution 1992 in article
126(2) have empowered the
Superior Courts of record in
this country to commit for
contempt of court. The
Constitution 1992 in article 127
also guaranteed the independence
of the judiciary and stated in
clause 2 thereof.
“(2) Neither the
President nor Parliament nor any
person acting under the
authority of the President or
Parliament nor any other person
whatsoever shall interfere with
judges or judicial officers or
other persons exercising
judicial power, in the exercise
of their judicial functions, and
all organs or agencies of the
state shall accord to the courts
such assistance as the courts
may reasonably require to
protect the independence,
dignity and effectiveness of the
courts, subject to this
Constitution.” (Emphasis
mine.)
The high premium placed on the
integrity, dignity and
independence of the judiciary by
our Constitution is due to its
importance in society. The
judiciary is an indispensable
institution in any democratic
society such as ours, and is
expected to administer impartial
justice in disputes between
individual citizens or
institutions and disputes
between citizens and the state;
and provide reliefs and
remedies. It is also to declare
the rights of citizens and to
provide reliefs and remedies for
the protection of human rights.
Therefore for the fair and
proper administration of justice
it is of the utmost importance
that the sanctity and integrity
of the courts and its judges are
preserved to enable them to
perform their constitutional and
judicial functions peacefully,
fairly, impartially and
independently free from any
undue interference from any
quarter. This is the reason why
the courts are given power to
commit for contempt, that is to
punish any act which tends to
interfere with the proper
administration of justice, or
which “scandalises” the courts,
by eroding public confidence in
them or by weakening and
impairing their authority. The
power to commit summarily for
contempt is indeed an effective
but very powerful tool, which
must be wielded only in very
clear cases. It must be noted
however that it is not to be
used from a tenderness of
feeling or to vindicate any
particular judge, it is used to
protect the whole administration
of justice and to keep the
“blaze of glory” round the
courts for obvious reasons. The
public must have confidence in
the law and the courts, and any
attempt by any one calculated to
erode such confidence must be
viewed very seriously and must
be punished swiftly to restore
the integrity of the courts
which administer the law.
Contempt has been generally
defined in Oswald on Contempt,
3rd edition page 6 as follows:
“To speak generally contempt of
court may be said to be
constituted by conduct that
tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into
disrepute or disregard and or to
interfere with or prejudice
parties, litigants or their
witnesses.”
This is only a general
definition. There are two kinds
of contempt; criminal contempt
which consists in acts tending
to obstruct or interfere with
the due administration of
justice; and civil contempt,
which consists in disobedience
to the judgments, orders or
other processes of the Superior
Courts of record. Criminal
contempt takes various forms,
and it may be committed before
the actual hearing of a case, or
while it is pending in court or
when the hearing is concluded.
One type of contempt is that
which Lord Hardwick described as
“scandalising the court.” This
type of contempt is committed
usually when proceedings have
been terminated and a judge is
subjected to scurrilous abuse in
his capacity as a judge; this is
the type of contempt under
consideration in this case.
Although criminal contempt takes
various forms they all share a
common characteristic, in that
they all involve an interference
with the due administration of
justice. But the policy of the
law is that the courts must not
be interfered with, and those
who strike at it, strike at the
very foundation of our
democratic society hence the
power given to judges to commit
summarily for contempt.
“Scandalising the court”
consists of any act done or
writing published calculated to
bring a court or judge into
contempt, it has the tendency of
impairing public confidence in
them. The celebrated case of
R v Gray [1900] 2 QB 36
deals with the contempt of
“scandalising the court.” One
Wells was put before Darling J
to be tried for publishing and
selling an obscene libel
contained in a book. Before the
trial started the judge made
some observations in court,
cautioning the press from giving
full or detailed account of the
trial, since the matters were
objectionable, obscene and
indecent and said that any
newspaper which did so might
easily be prosecuted as anybody
else. After Well’s conviction
and sentence, while Darling J
was still a judge at the Assize,
Gray wrote and published in the
Birmingham Daily Argus, a
newspaper of which he was
editor, an article headed “A
Defender of Decency.” The
article contained scurrilous
abuse of Darling J in his
character as a judge. Gray was
found to be in contempt. In that
case Lord Russel of Killowen CJ
stated at p 40:
“Any act done or writing
calculated to bring a court or
judge of the court into contempt
or to lower his authority is
contempt. Furthermore any act
done or writing published
calculated to obstruct or
interfere with the due course of
justice or the lawful process of
the court is a contempt of
court. The former class belong
to the category which Lord
Harwick LC characterised as
“scandalising a court or a
judge.” That description of that
class of contempt is to be taken
subject to one and an important
qualification. Judges and courts
are alike open to criticism, and
if reasonable argument or
expostulation is offered against
any judicial act as contrary to
law or the public good, no court
could or would treat that as
contempt of court. The law ought
not to be astute in such cases
as to criticise adversely what
under such circumstances and
with such object is published,
but it is to be remembered that
in this matter the liberty of
the press is no greater and no
less than the liberty of every
subject of the Queen.”
So criticism of a judgment is
permitted but as Lord Russell
said “scurrilous abuse” is “not
reasonable argument or
expostulation” or criticism, and
would amount to contempt.
Wilmot J in his undelivered
judgment published posthumously
by his son, in respect of the
case of King v Almon
(1765) Wilm 243 aptly describes
the nature of the contempt of
“scandalising the court.” Lord
Mansfield had made an amendment
to an information against one
John Wilkes. One Mr Almon
published a pamphlet in which he
said Lord Mansfield had made the
amendment “officiously,
arbitrarily and illegally.” The
Attorney-General moved against
him for a contempt of court. In
Mr Justice Wilmot’s judgment
which was never delivered
because Almon apologised and the
proceedings were dropped, he
stated:
“But when the nature of the
offence of libelling Judges for
what they do in their judicial
capacities, either in Court or
out of Court, comes to be
considered, it does, in my
opinion, become more proper for
an attachment than any other
case whatsoever.
By our constitution, the King is
the fountain of species of
justice which is administered in
this Kingdom 12 Co 25. The King
is “de jure” to distribute
justice to all his subjects;
and, because he cannot do it
himself to all persons, he
delegates his power to his
Judges who have the custody and
guard of the King’s oath and sit
in the Seat of the King
‘concerning his justice.’
The arraignment of the justice
of the Judges, is arraigning the
King’s justice; it is an
impeachment of his wisdom and
goodness in the choice of his
Judges and excites in the people
a general dissatisfaction with
all judicial determinations, and
indisposes their minds to obey
them; and whenever men’s
allegiance to the laws is so
fundamentally shaken, it is the
most fatal and most dangerous
obstruction of justice, and in
my opinion, calls out for a more
rapid and immediate redress than
any other obstruction
whatsoever; not for the sake of
the Judges, as private
individuals, but because they
are channels by which the King’s
justice is conveyed to the
people. To be impartial and to
be universally thought so, are
both absolutely necessary for
giving justice that free, open,
and uninterrupted current, which
it has, for many ages, found all
over this kingdom, and which so
eminently distinguishes and
exalts it above all nations upon
the earth.”
The principle of law is that any
person including the press is
within this right of free speech
to criticise however trenchant
the criticism however
rumbustious, or vigorous,
provided that, members of the
public abstain from imputing
improper motives to those taking
part in the administration of
justice; and are genuinely
exercising their right of
criticism, and not acting in
malice or attempting to impair
the administration of justice.
This principle has been applied
in a number of cases. It was set
out concisely in Ambard v
Attorney-General for Trinidad
and Tobago [1936] AC 322 in
which Lord Atkin in delivering
the judgment of the court stated
at page 335 as follows:
“The path of criticism is a
public way, the wrong headed are
permitted to err therein:
provided that members of the
public abstain from imputing
improper motives to those taking
part in the administration of
justice …Justice is not a
cloistered virtue: she must be
allowed to suffer the scrutiny
and respectful, even though
outspoken comments of ordinary
men.”
The same view was expressed by
Lord Denning in R v
Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn
(No 2) [1968] 2 QB 150.
He also said:
“It is the right of every man in
Parliament or out of it, in the
Press or over the broadcast to
make fair comment, even
outspoken comment on matters of
public interest. Those who
comment can deal faithfully with
all that is done in a court of
Justice, they can say that we
are mistaken, and our decisions
erroneous, whether they are
subject to appeal or not. All we
would ask is that those who
criticise us will remember that,
from the nature of our office,
we cannot reply to their
criticisms. We cannot enter into
public controversy. Still less
into political controversy. We
must rely on our conduct itself
to be its own vindication.
Exposed as we are to the winds
of criticism nothing which is
said by this person or that,
nothing which is written by this
pen or that, will deter us from
doing what we believe is right;
nor, I would add, from saying
what the occasion requires
provided that it is pertinent to
the matter in hand. Silence is
not an option when things are
ill done.”
It appears that a vigorous and,
in some respects inaccurate
criticism of itself does not
amount to a contempt. See the
same case of Ex parte
Blackburn (supra) p 155
where Salmon LJ said:
“…no criticism of a judgment,
however vigorous, can amount to
contempt, providing it keeps
within the limits of reasonable
courtesy and good faith. The
criticism here complained of,
however rumbustious, however
wide off the mark, whether
pressed in good taste or in bad
taste, seems to be well within
those limits.”
However the courts have in many
cases unfailingly upheld and
protected the inalienable right
of everyone including the press
to comment fairly on any matter
of public importance since this
right of freedom of speech is
one of the pillars of individual
liberty. In the Blackburn
case, Quintin Hogg QC was
not committed because he was
said to have paid proper respect
to the standards of fairness
accuracy, and good taste when he
was composing his article which
was published in the Punch
newspaper entitled: “Political
Parley” in which he
criticised the Court of Appeal
and its dicta, even though he
wrongly attributed to that court
decisions of the Divisional
Court.
What then is scurrilous abuse of
a judge in his capacity as a
judge, which according to the
law would amount to the contempt
of “scandalising the court,” as
defined in R v Gray
[1900] 2 QB 36, already
discussed above? A number of
English cases have specified the
kind of attacks on a judge which
was said to be “scurrilous
abuse” and which amounts to the
contempt of “scandalising the
court” as in the case before us.
The articles called Justices
Abban a liar a criminal, a
biased and partial judge and one
who uses political and judicial
chicanery to judge cases. I will
refer to some cases which show
that attributing such words to a
judge in his capacity as such,
does amount to contempt of
court, and that those words are
“scurrilous” abuse which
scandalises the court. In one
case it was held that calling a
judge a liar or a criminal is
contempt.
In the case of R v Freeman,
The Times November 18, 1925 one
Freeman had been the plaintiff
in an action tried before Mr
Justice Roche. In those
proceedings he was unsuccessful
as he hoped to be. He did not
appeal. The course which he took
was different. He began to
assail the learned judge with
letters and postcards containing
the grossest calumny and
vituperation. In one letter he
had said of the judge “You
are a liar a coward, a perjurer
¼You
aided Lord Sheffield in felony.”
Freeman was found to be in
contempt and sentenced to 8
months imprisonment. (Italics
mine.)
It is also contempt to attribute
criminality to a judge. In R
v Vidal The Times of October
14, 1922. It was reported:
“Vidal was brought before court
for contempt which arose from a
publication of certain posters
in Carey Street near the law
courts and in Parliament Square
near the Houses of Parliament.
The matter apparently arose out
of a case Vidal v Vidal
and Wilson, in the
Divorce Court before the learned
President. The defendant was
related to one of the parties to
that case. The defendant was
dissatisfied with the result, so
he caused posters to be
exhibited in which among other
things he charged the learned
President with being a
traitor to his duty, and with
defrauding the course of justice
for the benefit of one of the
parties to the case tried before
him. Respondent alleges
conspiracy to suppress evidence
and says that those who agreed
to this conspiracy, perjury and
fraud found active assistance in
the person of the learned
President who presided at the
trial. It was held that it
is needless to say that those
who administer justice are not
immune from criticism even if it
be quite wrong. It is one thing
to criticise: it is quite
another to do what Lord
Hardwicke called “scandalising
the court or judge“ as stated in
R v Gray. Lord Avory CJ
went on in that case to state:
“Reasonable argument and
expostulation that is
permissible probably even more
than that would pass without
serious notice, but to say of a
learned judge that he has given
active and complete support to a
conspiracy to suppress evidence
that he has defrauded the course
of justice; is scurrilous abuse
of the worst description. That
is contempt.”
Vidal was committed to prison
for 4 months. It is also
necessarily contemptuous to
suggest judicial bias against a
judge; see the Privy Council
case of Badry v DPP of
Mauritius [1982] 3 All ER
973, as it is to impute lack of
impartiality to a judge. In the
case of The Statesman
(1928) 44 TLR 301, the editor of
the New Statesman was
found guilty of contempt in
publishing a statement that “an
individual owning to such views
as those of Dr Stopes (favouring
birth-control) cannot apparently
hope for a fair hearing in a
court presided over by Mr
Justice Avory - and there are
many Avorys.” The Divisional
Court held that the article did
scandalise the court. The court
rejected the argument that this
was permissible criticism, being
intended only to convey that the
subject of birth-control was so
controversial that no one who
held strong views on one side or
the other could prevent his
judgment from being
unconsciously influenced by his
personal views. Lord Heward CJ
said:
“[The article] imputed
unfairness and lack of
impartiality to a judge in the
discharge of his judicial
duties. The gravamen of the
offence was that by lowering his
authority it interfered with the
performance of his judicial
duties.”
The law is that after a case is
concluded it is given over to
criticism and no wrong is
committed by any member of the
public including the press, who
exercises freely the ordinary
liberty of criticising
temperately and fairly, in good
faith, in private or in public
any episode in the
administration of justice.
Provided that members of the
public refrain from imputing
improper motives to those taking
part in the administration of
justice, and are genuinely
exercising their right of
criticism without malice, they
are immune from attachment for
contempt.
Upon the facts of this case the
Attorney-General has asked this
court to commit the respondents
for contempt of court. When the
respondents were called upon to
show cause learned senior and
respected counsel Mr da Rocha,
counsel for 1st respondent
relied on a number of defences,
including justification, among
others. He invited the court to
examine exhibit MB1 and exhibit
CTC and determine in his favour,
that exhibit MB1 is the
“genuine” judgment of Mr Justice
Abban. He claimed that according
to 1st respondent, what he heard
the judge say in court is not
the same as was contained in
page 28 of the “certified copy”
of the judgment exhibit CTC
which the registrar of the
Supreme Court sent to him even
though that was a “certified
copy and exhibit MB1 was not. It
was submitted that as between
1st respondent and Mr Justice
Abban 1st respondent was telling
the truth, he was entitled to
call the judge a liar. But is
he? Truth, what has truth got to
do with the offence of contempt?
Truth or otherwise of the matter
published is no defence in law
in the case of contempt of
court, and this is why I would
refrain from making any finding
on the issue about the
genuineness or otherwise of
exhibit MB1. Such a finding is
completely irrelevant to the
determination of this case. In
fact as far as this case is
concerned it is my view that it
is an exercise in futility.
Once the matter published
scandalises the court, truth is
no defence nor is justification.
The reason is that the contempt
of scandalising the court is
committed against the
administration of justice itself
not against an individual judge,
qua judge. The mischief in
publishing “scurrilous abuse”
about a judge is its tendency to
bring the administration of the
law into disrepute, to lower the
authority of the court and
impair public confidence in the
judiciary. On the issue of truth
not being a defence, see Re
Martindale [1891-94] All ER
Rep 1248 where it was held that
it is no defence to a motion for
contempt of court in publishing
an account of proceedings held
in camera which amounts to
contempt, that the matter
published was true. North J
stated therein:
“It is said that as the
statement that the marriage had
taken place was quite true, it
could not be contempt to state
that; but, if the question of
contempt depended upon the truth
or untruth of the matter
published, it would result in
this - that there would be no
contempt in an accurate
disclosure of what passed in
camera, although there would be,
if the account was a fictitious
one, which is absurd.”
It seems to me that if the truth
were a defence it would give a
platform for the repetition of
the offending original scandal
and could also be used
maliciously to rake up some
damaging episode in a judge’s
past life which conduct would
tend to interfere with the
administration of justice, the
very mischief which contempt
seeks to prevent. The
jurisdiction does not exist for
the protection of an individual
judge but for the protection of
the court, and therefore if the
words complained of amount to
“scurrilous abuse” of a judge in
his capacity as a judge, and the
requisite mens rea is present,
then the offence of contempt of
court would have been committed
regardless of the truth or the
accuracy of the matter
published.
Another defence raised is that
the matter published was a fair
criticism on a matter of public
interest. It is true that once a
case has been concluded it is
given over to criticism, and
provided that members of the
public abstain from imputing
improper motives to those taking
part in the administration of
justice they are genuinely and
perfectly entitled to criticise
any judgment. The cases of
The New Statesman ex parte DPP
The Times Law Reports Friday
March 2, 1928, Ambard v
Attorney-General for Trinidad
and Tobago [1936] AC 323 and
ex parte Blackburn supra
amply illustrate this principle
of law.
All these cases applied the
above stated principle that
criticism of the court and of
judicial decisions however
rumbustious, whether or not in
good taste, and despite
inaccurate statements of fact,
would not amount to contempt of
court and is within the limits
of the inalienable right of
every individual’s freedom of
speech, subject of course, to
the proviso I have already
referred to earlier. The courts
have always upheld this right,
in a number of cases which I
have not found it necessary to
cite. However it should not be
forgotten that there are limits
to this freedom, and therefore
even though one is in fact
criticising, if imputation of
improper motives are attributed
to those taking part in the
administration of justice
calculated to interfere with the
administration of justice, a
publisher of such matter would
not be immune from contempt.
Some have argued that this
limitation on freedom of speech
would tend to stifle the press -
well this is the law. I agree
that the freedom to criticise
and the freedom of speech are
inherent in any democratic
society and even though
criticism should not be stifled,
I also believe that the
integrity and independence of
the judiciary should be upheld
by all, especially the press
which no doubt expects the
courts to uphold and protect the
right of freedom of speech. Free
speech carries with it duties
and responsibilities and is
subject to conditions and
restrictions prescribed by law
including committal for contempt
of court when this offence is
committed. Committal for
contempt is a necessary power
given to the courts themselves,
and which they are in duty bound
to exercise to preserve and
maintain the dignity and
authority of the courts.
This court has been referred to
a number of cases on the issue
of permissible criticism, from
other jurisdictions namely
America, England, Canada,
Australia etc and I think both
counsel in this case deserve to
be commended for their diligence
in the handling of this case.
But in those jurisdictions the
law on the point has been
modified by statute and is
different from the common law of
England (see eg, the Contempt of
Court Act 1981. These statutes
are not applicable to Ghana
where the common law is still
applied.
Applying the principles of the
common law to the facts of this
case I do not think the defence
of fair criticism would enure to
the benefit of respondents. The
importance of a free press in
any democratic society cannot be
over-emphasised and this is
because no society can thrive
and progress if there is no
freedom of expression, which is
essential to the achievement and
maintenance of a democratic
society. That is why the press
may criticise in matters of
public interest but it must be
remembered that this right is
not absolute, but subject to the
limitation that it does not
violate the integrity of the
court or present a threat to
judicial authority. Criticism
however trenchant is permitted
but criticism ends where
“scurrilous abuse” begins, and
there is a great difference
between criticism of a judgment
and imputation of unfairness and
of impartiality to a judge as a
judge. This is contempt, not the
permissible criticism recognised
by the law. Nor would a mixture
of “scurrilous abuse” and
criticism make it fair and
permissible criticism. The chaff
would contaminate the wheat
thereby converting fair
criticism into scurrilous abuse
amounting to contempt of court.
Another submission made is that
there was no malice on the part
of the publishers of the
“scurrilous abuse” against
Justice Abban. It is to be noted
that mens rea is not capable of
direct proof but can be deduced
from the nature and meaning of
the actual words used. Is it
malicious to impute derogatory
conduct to a judge in his
capacity as such by the use of
such words as liar, criminal,
one practising judicial and
political chicanery and a
partial judge? The imputation of
such conduct against any
ordinary person, is bad enough,
but against a judge in his
capacity as a judge, it is the
grossest abuse and amounts to
“scurrilous abuse.” It is my
view that the submission of
counsel that the words were not
used intentionally or
maliciously is untenable. The
words are pregnant with malice
and this amounts to
“scandalising the court” which
is a contempt. In such a case
judges are in duty bound to
punish the contemnors so as to
maintain the “blaze of glory
round the courts’, and prevent
any interference with the
administration of justice. I am
of the view that the
publications are scandalous and
that they were intentionally
published.
Learned counsel for the 2nd and
3rd respondents associated
himself with most of the
defences relied on by Mr Da
Rocha namely justification, fair
criticism, lack of mens rea and
the submission that the
publication was not scandalous
of the Supreme Court. I have
already dealt with these issues.
He submitted also with
characteristic force that the
attack on Mr Justice Abban is an
attack on one judge of the panel
of nine and cannot therefore
amount to contempt of the
Supreme Court. The answer to
these submissions is simple.
Court is defined as “judge or
judges who sit in a court;” See
Osborn’s Concise Law
Dictionary 7th edition p 98.
The Supreme Court sits in panels
of either 5 or 7 or 9 judges in
the hearing of any case, and in
rule 70 of the Supreme Court
Rules 1970 (CI 13) “Supreme
Court” is defined thus “Supreme
Court” includes a single justice
or three (or more) justices
thereof.” A final judgment of
the Supreme Court, whether
unanimous or by majority is a
judgment of that Court made up
of the composite number of
judges on the panel. It is
therefore contempt of the
Supreme Court itself when
scurrilous abuse is heaped on
even one member of the panel or
on the whole panel or court. The
view that since only one member
of the panel was attacked, no
contempt had been committed, is
therefore erroneous.
Another issue raised is that a
judgment of the court is
actually the oral pronouncement
made by the judge in open court.
This is a curious submission - a
judgment is the decision or
sentence of a court in a legal
proceeding and includes the
final order and reasoning of the
judge or judges, which led to
the decision. These are then
reduced into writing or the
court records. Even oral
judgment must of necessity be
reduced into writing in the
court record book, but generally
judgments are reduced into
writing before they are read in
open court. The procedure is
that after a judgment is read in
court it is sent to the
registrar of the court who
compiles them into one document
and certifies it as true copy of
the judgment read in court. The
“certified copy” of the judgment
thereafter becomes a record of
the court and is kept in the
custody of the Registrar until
requested for by members of the
public, when copies of same are
given out from the court upon
payment of a specified fee.
The Courts Act 1993 (Act 459)
deals with access to records of
the court. It states at section
70(1):
“(1) No person is entitled to
inspect or to have a copy of the
record of evidence given in a
case before a court or to a copy
of the court’s notes, except as
may be expressly provided by the
Constitution, a rule of court or
any other enactment.
(2) If a person affected by a
judgment or a court order
desires to have a copy of the
judgment, order, disposition or
other part of the record, he
shall on application for a copy
be furnished with it if he pays
its costs except where the court
for some special reason thinks
fit to furnish it free of
charge.”
Under this section no person is
entitled to obtain a copy of a
judgment without complying with
section 70, a provision which
was knowingly contravened by the
1st respondent in this case.
Even when one properly applies
for a judgment it is the
“certified copy” of the judgment
which is sent out. Under section
162 of the Evidence Decree 1975
(NRCD 323) a certified copy of
any document is presumed to be
genuine hence the necessity and
desirability of properly
obtaining a certified copy. On
this state of the law, anybody
who procures through the back
door and publishes an
uncertified copy of a judgment
does so at his own risk, and can
be proceeded against for
contempt since this conduct,
would amount to an interference
with the rules and processes of
the court. See Dobson v
Hastings [1992] 2 All ER 94.
The submission that only the
oral judgment read in court is
the proper judgment ought to be
rejected outright.
Another submission by counsel
for 2nd and 3rd respondents is
that a judge cannot correct any
errors in his judgment after it
had been read. There are two
kinds of errors - one kind is,
errors which are merely
typographical or typists errors
or citation errors, which can be
corrected by the judge or later
by the Council for Law Reporting
when processing the “certified
copy” of the judgment for the
law reports. See the April 1974
issue of Review of Ghana Law
Vol VI No 1 p 19 at 31 by the
late Janet Daniels then Editor
of Law Reports under the title:
“Editorial Fashions.” The
other kind comprises errors
which are substantial errors.
In the article entitled:
“Revision by Judge of Oral
Judgment” (1970) 86 LQR pp
229-300, the note therein
suggested that if the Judgment
of a court delivered is wrong by
reason of any substantial error
or omission, its correction
should be by way of appeal or by
way of judicial review of the
judgment before it is reported.
This point was taken in the
Practice Direction in R v
Kuczynski [1973] 1 WLR 1230
at 1232. See also the note in
Ghani v Jones [1969] 3 All
ER 1700. In that case Lord
Denning made a substantial
correction, which changed the
meaning of his judgment as a
whole. The note suggested that
if a judgment of a court as
delivered is wrong by reason of
any substantial error or
omission, its correction should
be by way of judicial review of
the judgment before it is
reported. The principle then is,
that if the error is a
typographical error or citation
error the judge can correct it
or the editor of the law reports
can do so when processing it for
publication in the law reports.
It is my view that even if there
was some error in page 28 of
exhibit CTC it was merely a
citation error which could be
corrected as stated above.
Mistakes or errors do occur
sometimes in judgments hence the
existence of the right of
appeal. There is no doctrine of
judicial infallibility. Judges
are human beings capable of
erring and making mistakes, and
when they do they can be
criticised, but then it is risky
for anyone when criticising
errors made by judges, to
intentionally impute improper
motives to them since such act
could amount to contempt.
1st respondent is a lawyer of
many years standing and it is
surprising that he did not adopt
the legal procedure for
correcting any alleged errors in
Mr Justice Abban’s judgment, but
rather initiated and prosecuted
a smear campaign of “scurrilous
abuse” against the said judge in
respect of the judgment he had
delivered in the 31st
December case.
In any case if his interest was
only, as he claimed, to seek a
correction of any alleged error
in the said judgment, it is
rather surprising that he did
not allow this case to rest,
after he was informed by the
registrar of the Supreme Court
that the certified copy
contained his desired
correction. Of course, 1st
respondent was entitled to
criticise the judge for whatever
he thought, he had done wrong,
if as he said he felt it was a
matter of public interest. But
that did not entitle him to heap
on the judge the scurrilous
abuse referred to above, which
is scandalous of the Supreme
Court. He is not only an
experienced lawyer but also a
journalist, and a columnist of
The Frees Press. He
caused his letter to Justice
Abban to be published in The
Free Press in the 13 to 19
May 1994 issue of the said
newspaper, under the heading:
“Justice Abban is a liar.”
That article and the
comments flowing from the letter
were clearly instigated by him
and he cannot now extricate
himself from the consequence of
the publication of such
scurrilous abuse, by claiming as
he did that it was not his act
but the editor who put in the
title to that article. In fact
in 2nd respondent’s affidavit he
said he was relying on 1st
respondent and he had no reason
to doubt what 1st respondent had
claimed he heard in court. 1st
respondent encouraged the
publication and is a participant
in contempt. Indeed it is under
the column: “Sentiments of
Mensa-Bonsu” in the 20 to
26 May 1994 issue of The Free
Press newspaper that the
most scandalous attacks were
heaped on the judge, and he was
accused of using political and
judicial chicanery to come to
his decision to please the NDC
Government. These were the
actual word used: “There is no
doubt that Mr Justice Abban’s
judgment is tainted with
politics. The impression created
in his judgment is that of a
judge bending over backwards to
please the government.” These
words are not only scandalous, -
malice actually permeates them.
I find that the publications
were made maliciously and I have
no reasonable doubt in this
matter.
It has been held that imputation
of lack of impartiality on a
judge is necessarily contempt.
Just as calling a judge a liar
and a criminal, is contempt. See
R v Freeman The Times
November 18, 1925, Rex v
Vidal The Times October 14,
1922 and Re New Statesman
The Times Law Reports Friday
March 2, 1928.
The 2nd respondent is the editor
of The Free Press. He
knowingly published the 1st
respondent’s letter and the
other comments and articles
containing “scurrilous abuse” of
a judge in his capacity as a
judge. He is responsible also
for the contumacious editorials
referred to earlier in this
judgment. The 3rd respondent of
course happened to be the
printer and publisher of The
Free Press newspaper, which
published the offending
articles.
The learned counsel for the 2nd
and 3rd respondents lastly made
a novel and surprising
proposition of law. He submitted
that since the offence of
contempt of court is in the
nature of a crime the
respondents cannot be found to
be in contempt unless the
decision of this court is
unanimous. This submission is
wrong, as it ignores the law on
the point, namely that it is
only in murder cases where the
sentence is death and the
offences of treason and high
treason, that the decision or
verdict of the court or jury
requires unanimity. In all other
cases including contempt, a
majority decision is proper and
would support a conviction for
contempt of court. See
Gallagher v Durack (1985) LR
Cm (Crim) 706 in which case the
decision to attach for contempt
of court was by majority. I have
carefully considered the case
against respondents in the light
of the various publications
referred to above in The Free
Press newspaper and the law.
In my view the meaning of the
words used in the attack on the
integrity and lack of
impartiality on the part of
Justice Abban is a question of
fact for this court, and it is
my view that they admit of no
ambiguity. Their meaning is
clear; I find them to be
“scurrilous abuse.” Applying all
the canons stated above I am
left with no doubt that the
three respondents published
“scurrilous abuse” against Mr
Justice Abban in his capacity as
a judge knowingly; that the
publications scandalise the
court and were calculated to
interfere with the proper
administration of justice namely
lowering the authority of the
courts and impairing public
confidence in them.
I can do no more than end with a
quotation from one of our most
respected able and revered
judges in the person of the late
Chief Justice Mr Justice
Akufo-Addo in Republic v
Liberty Press Ltd [1968] GLR
123 at 137 wherein he ably set
out the main principles of the
law of contempt. He stated at p
137 as follows:
“It must be appreciated by the
press and all other
freedom-lovers that without a
judiciary strong, courageous and
respected that can effectively
protect the freedom which we all
love so much, all talk about
freedom, whether it be in the
lecture room or at Bukom Square,
remains no more than a mere
metaphysical speculation, and
the courts are entitled to look
upon men such as are before me
today to help them in the
acquisition of the requisite
strength, courage and respect.
One of the surest ways of doing
so is to refrain from commenting
on proceedings which are pending
in the courts. For these
constitute some of the most
fruitful fields of contempt.
There is however no law which
prohibits absolutely any such
comments, but there is law which
punishes if the limits set by
law are transgressed, as indeed
they have been transgressed in
this case.”
For the reasons I have
endeavoured to explain above I
am left with no alternative but
to find all the respondents
guilty of contempt of court.
HAYFRON-BENJAMIN JSC.
This is a committal application
with an unusual background. The
novelty of the application has
itself generated so much
research on the part of counsel
into case law that this court is
perhaps in danger of being
driven away from the
fundamentals which in the
present constitutional order
ought to guide our thinking the
better to enable us as Ghanaians
arrive at conclusions which will
serve our national interest. In
so doing I do not think that too
much reliance should be placed
on some of the cases which have
been cited to us. In my
respectful opinion a large body
of the cases cited to us have no
relevance to the matters in
hand, dealing as they do with
cases of contempt of court in
respect of
pending proceedings. Those
cases which deal with the topic
in hand will of course be
considered. Apaloo CJ in the
case of Kwakye v
Attorney-General [1981] GLR
944 at 958 clearly stated the
guidelines when he said:
“[In the exercise of the
interpretative jurisdiction of
this court] it is obvious that
we should go beyond statutory
interpretation since we are
concerned with the most
fundamental issues of our
jurisdiction. We must have
regard to the terms of our
particular Constitution whose
specific reference points are
largely unique to our national
history. In this area, more than
others, judicial pronouncements
in other jurisdictions on the
particular facts of their
experience are not likely to be
of much assistance; the range of
judicial wisdom embodied in them
will, of course, influence our
judicial reflections. I think
originality is required of us in
the exercise of our original
jurisdiction if we are to attend
to the letter and spirit of the
Constitution as the basic law of
our land. That originality must,
of course, be judicial and must
not do damage to the plain and
obvious meaning of the words
used nor is it the province of
this court to be astute to find
some reason or other for
depriving the constitutional
provision of an effect clearly
intended.”
Yet again in Director of
Public Prosecutions v Belize
Times Press (1989) LRC
(Const) 579 at page 594 Cotran,
CJ of Belize wrote:
“I think that the three
judgments from Belize, just
quoted, emphasise, if emphasis
is needed, that what amounts to
scandalising the court in one
country, may not necessarily
amount to scandalising the court
in another country: the size of
population, the manpower of the
Supreme Court Bench, the
standard of economic and social
development the country has
achieved, the intention of the
framers of the Constitution, if
there is one, the attitude of
the ordinary man to politics, to
what he reads in the press, and
what he sees on television, and
the advent of a new generation
on to the scene with different
mores, are factors that may
affect whether the court’s
decision goes one way or the
other. Contempt by scandalising
the court has been the subject
of extensive debate and legal
literature but the diversity of
views of the judges sitting in
judgment on whether an uttering
or a publication is or is not a
scandalous contempt are
extremely wide.”
Our jurisdiction in matters of
contempt of court is clearly
stated in article 126(2) of our
Constitution 1992 and it reads:
“The Superior Courts shall be
Superior Courts of record and
shall have power to commit for
contempt to themselves and all
such powers as were vested in a
court of record immediately
before the coming into force of
this Constitution.”
Then also it must be
acknowledged that chapter 12 of
the Constitution 1992 guarantees
the freedom and independence of
the media. Conjoined with the
right of all persons to the
“freedom of speech and
expression, which shall include
freedom of the press and other
media” contained in article
21(1)(a) of the constitution, it
can be said that the freedoms of
speech and expression which can
be enjoyed under this
constitution are only subject to
the provisions of article 164 of
the constitution which states:
“The provisions of articles 162
and 163 of this Constitution are
subject to laws that are
reasonably required in the
interest of national security,
public order, public morality
and for the purpose of
protecting the reputations,
rights and freedoms of other
persons.”
Thus the freedoms of expression
and speech and of the media
cannot be said to be absolute or
wherein the freedoms may
degenerate into licence. It
cannot be said that the framers
of the constitution were not
mindful of the need for the
creation of an orderly, decent
and civilized society in this
country, conformable with our
traditional morality and respect
for authority, seniority good
behaviour and decent speech and
actions. It is with all these at
the back of my mind that I
approach my opinion in this
application. The pith of this
application is the scandalising
of this court.
In this application the
Attorney-General complains that
the respondents have scandalised
this court by publishing matters
of scurrilous abuse upon this
court and in particular upon a
member of this court in the
person of Mr Justice I K Abban.
However, before I proceed
further I must mention that Mr
Justice I K Abban is not a party
to this committal application.
Nevertheless it is essential
that his name is mentioned in
these proceedings for otherwise
it will be difficult to
understand and appreciate the
history of this application. It
must also be said in his favour
that Mr Justice Abban has sworn
to no affidavits in respect of
the matters, which constitute
the offence of criminal contempt
by scandalising this court.
Therefore in my respectful
opinion what the
Attorney-General has presented
to this court is a criminal
information in the nature of a
proceeding nisi and the
respondents as contemnors are
called upon to show cause why
the rule nisi should not be made
absolute by their committal to
prison.
Accompanying the motion on
notice of the Attorney-General
as applicant was a statement of
the grounds upon which the
reliefs were sought. They were
stated thus:
“GROUNDS UPON
WHICH APPLICANT SEEKS RELIEFS
(i) That on 9 May 1994 the 1st
respondent wrote a letter to Mr
Justice Abban entitled Writ No
18/93: New Patriotic Party v
the Attorney-General in
which he accused Mr Justice
Abban a Supreme Court judge of
misrepresenting the editorial
opinion of the Daily Graphic
as a speech made by Dr Busia in
his reasons for judgment
delivered by the Supreme Court
on 8th March 1994.
(ii) That the Chief Justice to
whom the letter of 9th May 1994
was copied caused the registrar
of the Supreme Court by letter
reference No W18/93/56 of 12 May
1994 to send to the 1st
respondent a certified true copy
of the relevant page of the
reasons given by Justice Abban
and pointed out that Justice
Abban quoted the “Graphic View”.
(iii) That without waiting for a
response to his letter of 9th
May 1994 the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
respondents caused to be
published in the 13 May to 19th
May issue of The Free Press
a report that the judge is a
liar, a criminal and a political
chicane.
(iv) That in The Free
Press newspaper publications of
20 May to 26 May 1994; and 27
May to 2 June 1994 the 1st, 2nd
and 3rd respondents caused to be
printed and published further
scurrilous abusive materials
against Justice Abban and the
administration of justice.
(v) That by calling Justice
Abban a liar a criminal and a
political and judicial chicane
the conduct of the 1st, 2nd and
3rd respondents in the said
publications constitutes a gross
contempt of court in so far as
they were calculated to erode
public confidence in the
administration of the law and
impair the authority of the
judiciary as an independent
organ of state.
(vi) That in the November 4 to
November 10, 1994 issue of
The Free Press the 2nd and
3rd respondents caused to be
published an editorial in which
the paper alleged among other
things that “and it is this
clearly bad case which Mr
Justice Abban expects the court
to twist in his favour. What Mr
Justice Abban may not realise in
his desperation in expecting his
colleagues on the Bench to
behave like lunatics, however,
is that he is, in fact, putting
the integrity, credibility and
respectability of the Bench on
the line. And whether the men
and women on the Bench would
allow themselves to be reduced
to such depth and also abused to
save the face of a fellow
prodigal benchman, remains to be
seen. Ghanaians are watching
developments with eagle’s eyes.
(vii) That the 2nd and 3rd
respondents by making
insinuations at the independence
and impartiality of members of
the Bench and or the judiciary
in the said editorial were in
contempt of court in so far as
they were calculated to shake
public confidence in the
authority of the law, the courts
and are a baseless attack on the
integrity or impartiality of the
courts and judges.
(viii) That the publications and
conduct of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
respondents have scandalised
both Justice Abban and the
courts of Ghana as they are
particularly outrageous and
constituted contempt of court.”
Also in support of the motion by
the applicant was an affidavit
sworn to by Mrs Adusa-Amankwa, a
Chief State Attorney. In order
to demonstrate the veracity or
otherwise of the 1st
respondent’s affidavit in
opposition sworn to on 18
November 1994 and filed on 21
November 1994 I have picked out
the sections of the learned
Chief State Attorney’s affidavit
as the averments have been
admitted, not admitted or denied
and compare them with the
publications in the relevant
editions of The Free Press
edited by the 2nd respondent
and published by the 3rd
respondent.
The following paragraphs in the
applicant’s affidavit were not
admitted by the 1st respondent:
“2 I have the authority of the
applicant to depose to these
facts which are within my
personal knowledge.
7 The court took over eight
hours to read its reasons for
judgment.
8 On 10 May 1994 the
Attorney-General’s Office
applied for a certified copy of
the reasons for judgment but was
informed by the Registrar of the
Supreme Court that the judgment
had not yet been certified and
could not therefore be released
to the Attorney-General’s
Office.
9 On 13 May 1994 I read in
the 13 to 19 May 1994 issue of
The Free Press under the
caption: “Justice Abban Is A
Liar” a letter from one K
Mensa-Bonsu to Mr Justice Abban
in which Justice Abban was
accused of misrepresenting the
editorial opinion of the
Daily Graphic as a speech by
Dr Busia and which in the view
of the writer was an inexcusable
error. He attached to his letter
extracts from the Daily
Graphic to buttress his
point.
10 That in a commentary which
preceded the letter of the 1st
respondent, the 2nd and 3rd
respondents caused to be
published the following:
‘By the sane and sound
conviction of one of Ghana’s
Supreme Court Justices, in the
person of Mr Justice I K Abban
in disagreeing with the majority
decision of the nine members of
the Supreme Court in upholding
the writ filed by the New
Patriotic Party (NPP) that the
government of the National
Democratic Congress (NDC) has no
legal basis and is highly
unconstitutional to celebrate
the last year’s anniversary of
the 31st December revolution,
the learned Supreme Court judge
committed one of the most
grievous and unpardonable legal
crimes against the media, the
judiciary and the people of
Ghana.’
11 The commentary preceding the
said letter also added that:
‘In his display of political
chicanery and bamboozlement of
Ghanaians, the learned Supreme
Court judge lifted the whole
editorial comment of the
Daily Graphic newspaper of
Tuesday, 24 February 1970, No
6033 and portrayed it as a
speech made by Dr K A Busia,
Ghana’s Prime Minister in the
Second Republic which to all
intents and purpose is most
outrageous in the field of legal
issues.’
13 On 9 May 1994 when the 1st
respondent wrote his letter to
Justice Abban and copied it to
the Chief Justice, the reasons
for the judgment delivered by
the Supreme Court were not
certified and available to the
parties to the suit or the
public.
14 The 1st respondent
nonetheless purported to rely on
what he called Justice Abban’s
signed reasons for judgment
which is not an authentic copy
of the reasons for judgment read
in the Supreme Court on 8 March
1994.
18 The 2nd and 3rd respondents,
undaunted by the fact that the
alleged signed reasons for
judgment was not an authentic
signed judgment of Justice
Abban, caused to be printed and
published in the May 27 to June
2, 1994 issue of The Free
Press newspaper two front page
news items entitled “A Challenge
To Media Commission” and “Media
Commission Called In As Justice
Abban Scandal Takes Dramatic
Turn - He Is Accused Of
Doctoring;” and another article
at page 4 of the said
publication entitled: “The Abban
Scandal - Our Proof” which
contained scurrilous abuses of
the judge intended to bring him
and the judicial system into
disrepute in the eyes of the
public. A photocopy of the said
publications is annexed herewith
and marked exhibit C.
22 While the police were
investigating a case of criminal
libel or contempt of court
against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
respondents, the 2nd and 3rd
respondents caused to be
published in the November 4 to
November 10, 1994 issue of
The Free Press and editorial
entitled: “Abban Puts Integrity
Of The Bench On The Line,” which
constitutes contempt of court by
stating among other things that:
‘And it is this clearly bad case
which Mr Justice Abban expects
the court to twist in his
favour. What Mr Justice Abban
may not realise in his
desperation in expecting his
colleagues on the Bench to
behave like lunatics, however,
is that he is, in fact, putting
the integrity, credibility and
respectability of the Bench on
the line. And whether the men
and women on the Bench would
allow themselves to be reduced
to such depth and also abused to
save the face of a fellow
prodigal bench man, remains to
be seen. Ghanaians are watching
developments with eagle eyes.’
A photocopy of the
Free Press of 4 to 10
November 1994 is attached and
marked exhibit D.
23 In The Free Press
newspaper referred to in
paragraph 16 above the 2nd and
3rd respondents caused to be
printed and published
repetitions of accusations that
Justice Abban is a liar and
mischievous.
24 The 2nd and 3rd respondents
by making insinuations at the
independence and impartiality of
the members of the Bench, and of
the judiciary in the said
editorial were in contempt of
court in so far as they were
calculated to shake public
confidence in the authority of
the law, the courts and are a
baseless attack on the integrity
and impartiality of the court
and judges.”
The 1st respondent denied the
following paragraphs in the
affidavit of the applicant:
“16 By the publication referred
to in paragraph 13 above the
1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents
intended to portray and did
portray to the public that the
judge is dishonest, blasphemous,
partial and not worthy of the
high office of a justice of the
Supreme Court.
17 In the publication referred
to in paragraph 13 above the
1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents
manifested a malicious intention
to bring the administration of
the law and the judicial system
into disrepute by subjecting the
alleged reasons for judgment of
a justice of the Supreme Court
to scurrilous insults, abuse and
mockery.
19 In spite of the fact that the
Registrar of the Supreme Court
had written to the 1st
respondent to call his attention
to the fact that the alleged
signed reasons for the judgment
of Justice Abban on which he
based his letter of 9 May 1994
was not an authentic copy of the
reasons for the judgment read by
Justice Abban on 8 March 1994
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents
caused to be printed and
published in the 3 to 9 June
1994 issue of The Free
Press newspaper a reply from the
1st respondent to the registrar
of the Supreme Court in which
the 1st respondent cast
insinuations and aspersions on
Justice Abban and the judicial
system by alleging that the
certified copy of the judgment
was not the judgment read by
Justice Abban in court thus
imputing to Justice Abban and
the Supreme Court the dishonest
conduct of interfering with the
reasons for judgment after it
was read.
20 By calling Justice Abban a
liar, criminal and a political
and judicial chicane the 1st,
2nd and 3rd respondents’ conduct
is contumacious of the judge and
the judicial system as it was
calculated to bring the court
and the judge into contempt and
lower the authority of the law,
the judge and the court as an
impartial and independent organ
of state.
21 The said publications also
constitute a scurrilous abuse of
a judge of the Supreme Court and
an attack on the personal
character of the judge and are
contumacious of the judge,
courts and judicial system.
25 The said publications and
conduct of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
respondents have scandalised
both Justice Abban and the
courts of Ghana as they are
particularly outrageous. This is
particularly so when the 1st
respondent in his letter of 9
May 1994 admits that the issue
raised in his letter was not
germane to the reasons for
judgment of the judge and the
court’.”
The 1st respondent however
admitted the following averments
in the applicant’s affidavit:
“1 That I am a Chief State
Attorney in the office of the
Attorney-General and the
deponent herein.
2 That on 21 December 1993 the
New Patriotic Party issued a
writ against the
Attorney-General as representing
the Government of Ghana in the
Supreme Court claiming among
other things a declaration that
the celebration of 31 December
as a public holiday and from
public funds is inconsistent
with the letter and spirit of
the Constitution and therefore
null and void.
4 On 29 December 1993 the
Supreme Court heard arguments
from counsel and delivered
judgment granting the New
Patriotic Party’s reliefs. The
judgment was a split judgment of
five against four. The court
reserved its reasons for
judgment.
5 Justice Abban was one of the
dissenting judges on 29 December
1993.
6 On 8 March 1994 the Supreme
Court delivered its reasons for
judgment by each justice reading
his reasons for judgment in open
court.
12 The said
publication which contains the
Daily Graphic editorial
and a speech by Dr Busia is
attached and marked exhibit A
and is intended to form part of
the evidence in this case.
15 The 1st, 2nd and
3rd respondents nonetheless
caused to be printed and
published in the May 20 to 26
1994 issue of The Free
Press newspaper an article
written by the 1st respondent
and entitled: “Judicial
Chicanery” accusing Justice
Abban among other things of
being tainted with politics and
the “the impression created in
his judgment is that of a judge
bending over backwards to please
the government.” The said
article in The Free Press
is attached herewith and marked
exhibit B.”
The respondents also made
affidavits in answer to the
affidavit in support of the
application as stated above the
relevant paragraphs of which are
here also set down:
“6 Paragraphs 1-8 and of the
affidavit of Mustapha Habib
Logoh are admitted.
8 In answer to paragraph 20 I
say that I sent a copy of my
letter to Mr Justice Abban to
The Free Press but deny
calling the judge a liar and a
criminal as alleged. The
captions in the said newspaper
are not my handiwork.
10 On 8 March 1994 I was in the
Supreme Court when Mr Justice
Abban delivered his reasons for
judgment in the New Patriotic
Party v Attorney-General.
11 I heard the judge attribute
to Dr K A Busia, former Prime
Minster of Ghana, a statement
praising the celebration of 24
February 1966 coup d’etat which
the judge purported to quote
from the Daily Graphic of
Tuesday 24 February 1970.
12 I have made special study of
the speeches and writings of Dr
Busia over the years and it
struck me that the passage I
heard Mr Justice Abban quote did
not sound like Busia and was
very much unlike his style.
13 I decided to obtain a copy of
Mr Justice Abban’s signed
reasons to find out whether what
I heard was correct.
14 I therefore approached the
Deputy Judicial Secretary to
find out whether I could get a
copy of Mr Justice Abban’s
written reasons for his
judgment.
15 He informed me that he had a
copy which he had given to Mr
Kerchiri Adusa Kwabena, a
lawyer, and authorised me to
collect it from him.
16 I collected the reasons for
judgment and saw that it bore
the signature of Mr Justice
Abban.
17 The written reasons for
judgment confirmed what I had
heard Mr Justice Abban say in
court, namely, that Dr Busia had
made a speech praising the
celebration of 24 February 1966
coup d’etat and that he was
quoting from that speech. A
photo copy of the said reasons
for judgment is exhibited hereto
marked “MB1.’
18 After taking a photocopy of
the signed reasons, I returned
it to the Deputy Judicial
secretary who took it from me
without any comment.
19 To give Mr Justice Abban the
benefit of the doubt I decided
to procure a copy of the
Daily Graphic of that date
to ascertain whether indeed Dr
Busia had made such a
speech.
20 Through my research in the
Padmore Library I procured a
photo copy of the Daily
Graphic of the relevant date
and discovered that what Mr
Justice Abban had quoted as part
of Dr Busia’s speech was, in
fact word for word, the Daily
Graphic editorial of that
date boldly captioned ‘Graphic
View’.”
22 I honestly believed and still
believe that the copy of the
reasons for judgment from the
Deputy Judicial Secretary was
genuine. It bore the signature
of the learned judge and the
relevant page of the judgment,
ie page 28, had a correction in
his handwriting. I have no
reason therefore to doubt its
authenticity.
23 On 9 May 1994 I wrote a
letter to Mr Justice Abban, with
a copy to the Chief Justice,
drawing his attention to the
fact that he had erroneously
attributed the Daily Graphic
editorial to Dr Busia and
also informed him that I was
bringing the error to the
attention of the public. A copy
of my said letter is exhibited
hereto and marked MB3.
24 I sent a copy of the said
letter to The Free Press
which published it with its own
comments not written by me.
25 Since the matter had evoked
much public interest I also
wrote an article about the
erroneous attribution of the
Daily Graphic editorial to
Dr Busia who was dead and was
not in a position to answer back
from the grave. A copy of the
said article is exhibited hereto
marked MB4.
26 On Friday 20 May 1994 I
received by post a letter from
the registrar of the Supreme
Court informing me that I had
“probably not got a certified
copy of the reasons given by His
Lordship Justice Abban” and
enclosing “a copy of the
relevant page of the judgment
(page 28)” for my benefit. This
copy of page 28 sent to me by
the Registrar did not bear any
stamp of certification. A copy
of the Registrar’s letter is
exhibited hereto marked MB5.
27 The discrepancy between page
28 of exhibit MB1 and exhibit
MB5 was so glaring that I drew
the attention of the Registrar
of the Supreme Court to it in a
letter dated 23 May 1994. A copy
of my said letter is exhibited
hereto marked MB6.
28 A careful comparison between
the page 28 of exhibit MB1 and
exhibit MB5 starkly reveals that
whilst page 28 of exhibit MB1 is
consistent in its structure and
coherent in its argument this is
not the case with exhibit MB5.
29 For example, the second
paragraph of page 28 of exhibit
MB1 begins with the following
words:
‘The Daily Graphic of
Tuesday 24 February 1970 No 6033
carried the speech of Dr Busia
on that day and I will quote a
few extracts from it” and is
followed by the quotation
attributed to Dr Busia.’
30 The second paragraph of page
28 of the alleged certified copy
attached to exhibit MB5 begins
with the following words:
‘The Daily Graphic of
Tuesday 24 February 1970 No 6033
carried the speech of Dr Busia
on that celebration. I will
however quote a few extracts
from the ‘“Graphic View”” that
day’, and proceeds to quote the
graphic editorial, in effect
saying that it is not quoting
Busia’s speech but “Graphic
View”.’
31 I sat in the Supreme Court
throughout the hearing of the
suit and was present in court
when Mr Justice Abban read his
reasons.
32 The front page of the same
edition of the Daily Graphic
carried a report of a speech
which Dr Busia had given the
previous day. It was boldly
captioned: “Use Freedom
Responsibly” and had a picture
of Dr Busia.
33 It did not carry the full
speech as alleged or even make
any extensive extract from this
speech. It is therefore
incorrect to say that the
Daily Graphic of 24 February
1970 carried a speech of Dr
Busia. A photocopy of the
Daily Graphic report is
exhibited hereto marked MB7.
34 I am positive that in the
judgment that he read in open
Court the learned judge said
that he was quoting from a
speech made by Dr Busia which
was carried in the Daily
Graphic of Tuesday, 24
February 1970 and that he
proceeded to read out what I
later discovered was a Daily
Graphic editorial without
giving any kind of indication
that what he was reading was
Daily Graphic editorial or
“Daily Graphic View”.
35 I did not hear him utter the
words “Graphic View.” Having
stated that Dr Busia made a
speech a quotation from such a
speech makes more sense and
logic than a quotation from
“Graphic View.”
36 I sent a copy of my letter
and the article to The Free
Press because I considered
it in the public interest to do
so.
37 It was at no time my
intention to libel Mr Justice
Abban or scandalise the Supreme
Court as an institution or the
Judiciary as an arm of the
state.
38 I believe I was exercising my
constitutional right as a
citizen of Ghana to draw
attention to errors in the
judgment of Mr Justice Abban.
39. I am not
responsible for the various
comments made by The Free
Press .
40 I honestly believed and still
believe that honest criticism of
a judge’s judgment does not
amount to contempt.
43 As a mature adult I am
capable of forming my own
opinion and taking my own
decisions for which I am also
ready to assume full
responsibility.”
It must be said in favour of the
2nd respondent that he conceded
that if this court felt that he
was guilty of scandalising it he
was ready to apologise. The 3rd
respondent merely stood by the
2nd respondent.
A comparison of the replications
of the 1st respondent’s
affidavit to the affidavit sworn
to on behalf of the applicant
demonstrates quite clearly that
in the publications complained
of, the respondents were
reckless and careless, not
minding whether the contents of
their affidavits were true. At
page 6 of the issue of The
Free Press (Friday May 13
to Thursday May 19, 1994)
appears the caption: “Justice
Abban Is A Liar.” The
whole of that page it seems was
given over to K Mensa-Bonsu for
his column: “Sentiments of K
Mensa-Bonsu.” On the same
page also appears the following
statement:
“In his display of political
chicanery and bamboozlement of
Ghanaians the learned Supreme
Court judge lifted the whole
editorial comment of Daily
Graphic newspaper of Tuesday
February 24, 1970 No 6033 and
portrayed it as a speech made by
Dr K A Busia, Ghana’s Prime
Minister in the Second Republic,
which to all intents and
purposes, is most outrageous in
the field of legal issues.’
As if by design the word
“chicanery” found itself in the
column contributed by K.
Mensa-Bonsu for The Free
Press at page 8 thereof
(Friday May 20 to Thursday May
26, 1994). The caption for that
week’s contribution read:
“Judicial Chicanery.” The
following are some quotations
from that page:
“(a) In his zeal to justify 31
December, Mr Justice Abban
indulged in judicial chicanery
by attributing to Dr Busia a
statement he did not make. After
exhuming the Daily Graphic
edition of 24 February 1970
from the archives, the learned
judge pontificated as follows:
‘It is a pity that the learned
Supreme Court judge, either by
gross negligence or outright
chicanery, should have
attributed it to him. Dr Busia’s
broadcast was not reproduced in
the Daily Graphic of
February 24, 1970.’
(b) Another aspect of Mr Justice
Abban’s chicanery is that he set
his standard of proof too high,
even though the proof he
required was not germane to the
issue.”
That page concluded:
“There is no doubt that Mr
Justice Abban’s judgment is
tainted with politics. The
impression created in his
judgment is that of a judge
bending over backwards to please
the government.
What is even more serious is the
fact that he indulged in what is
plain falsehood. This is bad in
a judge whether it happened by
accident, negligence or design.
The Fourth Republican
Constitution is in serious
danger if judges, called upon to
interpret the constitution, are
going to use the Bench for what
is manifestly politics of
undisguised partisan nature and
in the process do violence to
the truth.”
After a series of publications
in the various editions of
The Free Press that paper in
its edition of Friday June 3 to
Thursday June 9 1994 by its
front page banner headline in
respect of the “Abban scandal”
told the world that: “Mensah
Bonsu tells Supreme Court ‘I
heard it all’.” By this
statement the 1st respondent
says he was in court and heard
the learned judge pronounce the
alleged mistaken statement which
constituted part of his reasons
for his decision. I am satisfied
that the 1st respondent is the
author of the articles in The
Free Press. I am satisfied
that the 1st respondent is the
author of the articles in The
Free Press which bore the
captions which included the
words, “liar,” bamboozlement”
“criminal” and “chicanery.” Also
the editorial of The Free
Press referred to the judges
of this court as “lunatics -
indeed zombies” who will be
expected to “twist in his [Mr
Justice Abban’s] favour a case
which cannot stand on its
mosquito feet even at the Media
Commission.”
It may at this stage be well to
understand the ordinary meanings
of the serious words used in
describing the judge and the
court. For the sake of brevity I
will use the definitions
contained in Funk & Wagnalls
Standard Dictionary
(Comprehensive International
edition) Vol 1. In that
dictionary:
“liar is: “one who
intentionally tells falsehood or
is giving to lying.”
“bamboozlement (noun from
the verb bamboozle) meaning (1)
To impose upon; mislead; cheat
(2) To perplex (3) To practice
trickery or deception.”
“criminal (1)…Law,
relating to crime or pertaining
to the administration of penal
as opposed to civil law. (2)
Implying crime or heinous
wickedness. (3) Guilty of crime
the criminal classes one who has
committed an offence punishable
by law.”
“chicanery - The use of
mean or paltry artifices,
subterfuges or shifts,
especially legal trickery or
underhandedness. (2) Trick or
dodge.”
“lunatic - (1) Affected
with lunacy. (2) Characteristic
of or resembling lunacy: crazy,
insane.”
I have taken the liberty of
setting down these definitions
because English is a second
language within our municipality
and those who can speak that
language (particularly in the
press) often think that the use
of sonorous words and
expressions connote the meanings
they desire to make in their
vernaculars. Unfortunately this
is not always so and may lead to
difficulties and embarrassments.
The Attorney-General says that
the publications taken together
and given their proper
connotations amount to the
offence of scandalising the
court and publishing scurrilous
abuse of a judge thereof. It
will be useful to consider what
is meant by scandalising the
court before proceeding to
consider the submissions of
counsel. I must state that in
the course of hearing this
application I kept reminding
counsel that this was a case of
criminal contempt but counsel
directed their courses to the
laws of libel and other matters
which I thought did not address
the issue in hand. Nevertheless
I feel myself duty bound to
consider their submissions. R
v Gray [1900] 2 KB 36
contains the locus classicus on
contempt of court by
scandalising the court. This
case received explanation and
approval in R v Vidal,
1922 Times, 14 October, where
this passage appears:
“In his affidavit made a few
days ago, he reiterates in
emphatic language the matters
complained of. He alleges
conspiracy to suppress evidence
and says that those who agreed
to this conspiracy, perjury, and
fraud found active assistance in
the person of the learned
President who presided at the
trial. It is needless to say
that those who administer
justice are not immune from
criticism even if it be quite
wrong. It is one thing to
criticize: it is quite another
to do what Lord Hardwicke called
‘scandalizing the court or a
judge,’ Lord Russel of Killowen
said in R v Gray [1900] 2
QB 36 at 40:
…as these applications are,
happily, of an unusual
character, we have thought it
right to explain a little more
fully than is perhaps necessary
what does constitute a contempt
of court…Any act done or writing
published calculated to bring a
court or a judge of the court
into contempt, or to lower his
authority, is a contempt of
court. That is one class of
contempt …(and) belongs to the
category which Lord Hardwicke,
L.C. characterised as
“scandalising a court or a
judge.” That description of that
class of contempt is to be taken
as subject to one and an
important qualification. Judges
and courts are alike open to
criticism, and if reasonable
argument or expostulation is
offered against any judicial act
as contrary to law or the public
good, no court could or would
treat that as contempt of
Court.”
Having thus defined what would
constitute scandalising the
court, I now proceed to consider
the submissions of counsel. I am
satisfied that the
Attorney-General discharged his
duty as was required. As the
keeper of the public interest it
was his duty to come to court
anytime he formed the view that
that interest was threatened. In
the case of contempt of
scandalising the court his duty
was to lay the information
before the Superior Courts and
to leave the courts to determine
after hearing the contemnors
whether the conduct or statement
complained of is proved. The
Attorney-General does not
thereby become a party to the
proceedings. In the present
application the Attorney-General
by his affidavits discharged the
burden which lay on him to
inform the court of the
existence of the offence. The
burden was then cast upon the
respondents to dissolve the
order nisi in their favour.
Mr da Rocha, leading counsel for
the 1st respondent submitted in
reply to the submissions of Mr
Amidu, the Deputy
Attorney-General, that the issue
was how the principles
enunciated by the Deputy
Attorney-General were going to
be applied to the present
application. In his submission,
the 1st respondent was not
guilty of contempt of court. Mr
da Rocha relied for this
proposition on the case of
Mcleod v St Aubyn [1899] AC
549 at page 561. I have examined
page 561 of the report very
carefully and I cannot see that
the case is of any assistance to
the 1st respondent’s cause. I
suppose counsel was desirous of
relying on the dictum in the
McLeod case, supra, that
“when a trial has taken place
and the case is over, the judge
or jury are given over to
criticism.” Yet again while
conceding that the power to
commit for contempt may be
considered necessary for the due
administration of justice,
counsel submitted that: “It is
not to be used for the
vindication of the judge as a
person. He must resort to action
for libel or criminal
information.” That may well be
so. But there is a third course
open to a judge so scandalised -
contempt of court. The
justification for such a course
is given on the same page of the
McLeod case, supra, where
Lord Morris speaking for the
Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council said:
“But it must be considered that
in small colonies, consisting
principally of coloured
populations, the enforcement in
proper cases of committal for
contempt of court for attacks on
the court may be absolutely
necessary to preserve in such a
community the dignity of and
respect for the court.”
This dictum was made in 1899 and
may now be considered racist.
But the underlying principle is
still valid with respect to
countries emerging from
colonialism - such as Ghana.
Years of colonial rule have
instilled in our populations a
resistance to the institutions
of colonial rule, one of such
being the courts. In the post
colonial era the resistance
subsists and courts are wont to
be described as instruments of
government. Casual readers of
our Constitution 1992 will
observe that this court - and
indeed all our courts - have
become the watchdogs of the
constitution. In the
circumstances and in aid of the
awesome responsibility entrusted
to this court “the enforcement
in proper cases of committal for
contempt of court may be
absolutely necessary to preserve¼the
dignity and respect for the
court.”
Nor is this all. Learned counsel
cannot be serious when he
submits that the 1st respondent
can use such words as “liar,”
“bamboozlement,” “chicanery” and
describe this court as composed
of lunatics etc and yet not be
guilty of contempt. The matter
is not without authority. In
R v Freeman, Times
(1925) November 18, Freeman it
seems had been engaged in
consistent attacks on the judge
in an attempt to force judge to
sue him for libel. The report
continues:
“He began to assail the learned
judge with letters and postcards
containing the grossest calumny
and vituperation. What had been
Freeman’s attitude to that
language, which he had
reiterated after frequent
warnings and expostulations, and
which he had now repeated in
that court? In one letter he had
said to the learned judge: ‘You
are a liar, a coward, a perjurer¼You
aided Lord Sheffield in a
felony.’
All those expressions Freeman
adhered to without a word of
apology or regret. He said that
he was entitled to say these
things with a view to force the
learned judge to take
proceedings against him. Well,
proceedings had been taken.
Freeman’s language, by itself
and by its reiteration,
constituted as gross a contempt
as had lately been brought to
the knowledge of the court.”
Incidentally the record shows
that Mr Vidal who had recently
been convicted for contempt of
court was in court. I think
these publications demonstrated
a case of contempt by
scandalising the court.
As I have stated earlier, in the
course of the hearing of the
arguments I kept directing the
attention of counsel to the
proper nature of the
application. Nevertheless Mr da
Rocha, leading counsel for the
1st respondent thought he had
made a profound statement when
he submitted that once a judge
had made a pronouncement in
court such pronouncement was in
the public domain and was
therefore incapable of being
retracted. Profound as such a
proposition may be, it is not
altogether correct and in any
case was irrelevant as a defence
to the application under
consideration. As I have said I
will consider that proposition.
But before I do so I think I
ought to set the parameters for
dealing with such type of
contempt.
In the Belize Times Press
case, supra, at page 587
appears the following:
“The question, in my judgment,
in a case of this nature, is not
that there are four additional
counts so to speak in charge
sheet, but one count only, the
count being scandalising the
court, and in the determination
of guilt or otherwise, the court
must look at all the passages in
the article in order to be
satisfied whether or not the
written publication was
calculated to bring the court
into contempt or lower its
authority or bring it into
disrepute and disregard.”
So that whatever came out of the
judges mouths is irrelevant when
a court comes to consider a case
of scandalising the court. The
court must look at the
publications and in the light of
whatever explanations are
offered by the respondent or
contemnor to decide whether the
case had been made out.
I have a feeling that my
opinions on this matter may be
obiter since strictly speaking
they may not be necessary for my
decision. Besides I do not think
that the conclusions will enure
to the benefit of the 1st
respondent. Nevertheless the
matter has attracted great
publicity and the untutored and
popular world may think that the
proposition is wholly correct.
Lawyers and learned men are
aware that there are rules
relating to the obtaining and
publishing of documents and
judgments from the courts. It
will be wrong if anybody could
go out and publish what he
assumes he heard in court
without checking in the proper
manner from the court. In the
instant application what would
the respondents say if someone
else who was in court published
that he heard differently? This
is the moral to be learnt form
the story of the three blind men
who went to the zoo to “see” the
elephant. Of course each of them
“saw” a different thing and
pronounced it so and they were
all wrong. They were correct on
only one thing - they were all
present at the zoo. The policy
reason for the establishment and
maintenance of a registry of a
court is not only for the
storage and safekeeping of
records - including judgments -
but also to enable authenticated
copies of any such documents so
stored to be extracted for
private or public use. In my
view the fact that a person has
heard a judge say something in
court is not the justification
for repeating the same outside
the courthouse without having
the same authenticated. Mr da
Rocha may therefore be right
that once a judge has spoken in
court his words are clearly
within the public domain but
they are bereft of any value
when pitted against the
authenticated written version.
Much fuss was made by the
respondents in their editorial
under attack in which they
referred to the judgment of a
British Acting High Court judge
in a celebrated libel case
involving a prominent Ghanaian.
The transcript of the judgment
had been authenticated and
certified. The question may be
asked could anybody obtain an
unauthenticated and an
uncertified copy of the judgment
and publish it? I say that
person would have been guilty of
contempt of court.
But the 1st respondent did not
end there with what he allegedly
heard in court. He visited his
friend the Deputy Judicial
Secretary and sought for a copy
of Mr Justice Abban’s judgment.
He was told yet another lawyer
friend had collected a copy from
him and the 1st respondent could
obtain a copy if he so desired
from that mutual friend. This he
did and from that signed copy
his suspicions were confirmed.
What he had heard in open court
was apparently correct. After
some correspondence on this copy
he went to the press. The
offending page in the judgment
was page 28. Subsequently the
registrar of this court
furnished the 1st respondent
with a certified true copy of
page 28 of the same judgment. A
comparison revealed a small but
significant difference between
the two documents. Hence the
campaign of abuse and
vilification directed at the
judge and the court.
It is at this point proper to
interpose my opinion with my
reasons in respect of the
application of Mr da Rocha to
call two witnesses to give oral
evidence on his client’s behalf.
Subpoenas had been issued to two
officers of the court. They were
Mr Owusu-Ansah, the Deputy
Judicial Secretary and Mr
Tawiah, a registrar of the High
Court who was for some time the
acting registrar of this court.
I joined the majority in
rejecting this application.
First, the practice of contempt
in this court even though
conferred on us by the
constitution yet there are no
specific rules for invoking this
practice. Second, in the
circumstances the general
practice of the Superior Courts
as to this type of practice will
apply. If I am correct, - and I
have no reason not to be correct
- then the practice is that
where the application is made
under statute - or the
constitution - and the rules do
not specify any method for
approaching the court, the
proper method is by an
originating notice of motion.
Third, evidence shall strictly
be by affidavits. Fourth, in the
case of contempt of court it is
only the respondents or
contemnors who may choose to
give oral evidence in answer to
the motion. Fifth, generally
speaking it is the privilege of
the court, rather than the right
of the parties, in the interest
of justice to call oral evidence
but the court will usually
invite such persons to furnish
it with affidavits on the issue
on which such information is
required. In the present
application the 1st respondent
had already mentioned the names
of the witnesses he wished to
call in his affidavit and as the
Deputy Attorney-General had not
made any submission which had
taken the 1st respondent by
surprise the application was
dismissed.
The Deputy Attorney-General
submitted that the signed
judgment obtained by the 1st
respondent was a forgery. I do
not wish to comment on his
submission on this matter. The
truth of the matter is the court
is presented with two documents
and it is called upon to
determine which of the two is
genuine. Now a genuine document
in law is one that will be
admitted in evidence when
tendered. In other words such a
document must satisfy the
evidential requirements for its
admission.
In the instant application it is
evident that the signed but
uncertified document emanated
from Mr Tawiah through the
Deputy Judicial Secretary to
another lawyer and then to 1st
respondent who made a photocopy
and the same published in The
Free Press. It must be
admitted that in this case the
person who was in official
possession of the judgments of
this court is the registrar, Mr
Logoh. True, under the rules of
this court, registrar includes
the Judicial Secretary. But in
this case the affidavit of the
Deputy Judicial Secretary did
not say that he had ever been in
possession of the judgments.
Therefore on the basis of the
maxim “omnia praesumuntur rite
et solemniter esse acta” the
registrar of the Supreme Court
was the person entitled to
proper custody of the court’s
documents including its
judgments. Applications for
copies of the courts documents
must be made to the registrar.
By section 70(2) of the Courts
Act 1993 (Act 459) it is
provided as follows:
“(2) If a person affected by a
judgment or a court order
desires to have a copy of the
judgment, order, deposition or
other part of the record, he
shall on application for the
copy be furnished with it if he
pays its cost except where the
court for some special reason
thinks fit to furnish it free of
charge.”
Quite apart from the 1st
respondent not being affected by
the judgment - even if he was -
the 1st respondent had made no
written or oral application to
the court for a copy of the
judgment nor paid the cost for
that judgment nor was he exempt
from paying any cost therefor.
To use the local English, he
obtained the judgment “by the
back door” and that is a
contempt of court. In the case
of Dobson v Hastings
[1992] 2 All ER 94 where a
newspaper reporter in the course
of her investigation unlawfully
obtained information from the
records of the court and
published it, the matter of her
having so unlawfully obtained
and therefore committed contempt
of court was considered. There
are two dicta in that judgment
which appeal to me and I think
satisfy me that contempt of
court was committed by the 1st
respondent and it seems by all
those who unlawfully obtained
that signed judgement.
On the failure to comply with
the rules the judgment says at
page 101(g):
“Of course, in the ordinary way
a failure by a party to comply
with an obligation imposed on
him by the rules is not a
contempt of court. The court has
at its disposal other sanctions
for ensuring that justice is
done between the parties to an
action when one of them fails to
take some procedural step which
the rules require of him. For
example, the court may strike
out the plaintiff’s proceedings
or the defendant’s defence. But
that course is not available in
a case where a non-party
inspects documents on a court
file. Take the case of a person
who knows that, pursuant to the
court procedures, documents have
been lodged in an office of the
court. He also knows that he has
no right to inspect them.
Despite that he nonetheless
proceeds to inspect the
documents. He gains access to
them by deception of court
officials or by some subterfuge.
He then publishes what he
discovers. In my view such a
person is interfering with the
administration of justice. He
commits a contempt of court.”
And on the effect of such
conduct at page 102(f):
“In my view considerations such
as these go to the seriousness
of the contempt, rather than to
its existence. The essential
vice lies in knowingly
interfering with the court’s
documents. This is as much as
interference with the
administration of justice as
knowingly interfering with the
court’s officers. The boundary
line is to be drawn at the point
where there has been a taking of
information from documents in
the custody of the court knowing
that leave was needed and that
it had not been obtained. In
such cases there is an act of
interference with the judicial
process; there is also an
intention to interfere, because
the act was done with knowledge
that it was a contravention of
the prescribed judicial process.
‘With knowledge’ includes cases
where access was obtained by
practising deceit or trickery on
court officers. It may also
include a case where, to the
knowledge of the person seeking
access, the court officer is
acting under a mistake. For
instance, the clerk hands over
the file in the mistaken belief
that the person seeking access
is entitled to inspect it. I
have considered whether the
latter type of case is properly
to be regarded as an
interference with justice. In my
view it is. Again, the absence
of deceit or trickery goes to
the seriousness of the contempt,
not to its existence. The key
feature is the need for
knowledge that the inspection in
question is a contravention of
the rules. There is such
knowledge when a person is fully
aware that a court officer is
acting under a mistake, just as
much as in a case where the
mistaken belief was induced by
deception.”
Clearly the conduct of the 1st
respondent with respect to
obtaining the said judgment and
publishing it was a contempt of
court. Thus the certified copy
of that judgment was the only
correct admissible and
acceptable judgment. A certified
copy, as defined in
Osborn’s Concise Law
Dictionary’ means:
“A copy of a public document,
signed and certified as a true
copy by the officer to whose
custody the original is
entrusted, and admissible as
evidence when the original would
be admissible. Also, it is
provided by various statutes
that certified copies of certain
documents and entries shall be
receivable in evidence if
properly authenticated.”
In spite of these several
defects in the attitude of the
1st respondent to this
application, he contends that
the judgment has been
“doctored.” I understand him to
mean that the learned judge had
so tampered with the judgment in
such a significant manner as to
seemingly remove the offending
part of the judgment. Mr da
Rocha, leading counsel for the
1st respondent observed the
obvious break in the writing and
invited us to go on a journey of
English appreciation. Useful as
the tour was I must confess that
in my life at the Bar and or the
Bench I have seen many non
sequiturs. The essential
question is whether such non
sequitur involves or implies
such a break in the thinking
process as to make the second
part of the statement
incomprehensible having regard
to the meaning of the former
part. I think the respondents
would be the first to have
appreciated the correction since
they were anxious that the late
Dr Busia was not misquoted if
they did not have any
mischievous intentions.
The whole question of review of
judgments by judges has been
excellently treated in a major
contribution by the late Mrs
Janet Daniels, Barrister-at-Law,
the illustrious and
indefatigable Editor of the
Ghana Law Reports in (1974)
6 RGL 19. In her contribution
entitled: “Patterns and fashions
in reported judgments” at page
31 under subtitle: “Editorial
Fashions” she writes:
“There can be few lawyers who
have noticed that there are
differences between certified
true copies of judgments, and
those same judgments as they
appear in law reports.”
She gives cogent reasons why
this may be so. Says she:
“All references given by the
judges are checked. Mistakes of
grammar are also corrected. The
edited script is then returned
to the judge for his approval.’
She concludes that this is a
delicate exercise in which the
judges usually co-operate. I
cannot imagine that if the late
Mrs Janet Daniels saw such a
glaring misquotation as is
contended by the respondents she
would not have corrected and
sent it to the learned judge for
his approval. Mrs Janet Daniels
says at page 33 of her article
that:
“Ex tempore judgments as
delivered in the United Kingdom
give judges and editors more
latitude as the following shows:
‘In an interesting note entitled
“Law Reporting and the Amending
Hand” the New Law Journal
(May 7, 1970, p 423) discussed
an amendment apparently made by
Lord Denning MR in his judgment
as delivered orally in Court in
Ghani v Jones [1969] 3
All ER 1700; (1969) 3 WLR 1158.
In the original judgment Lord
Denning MR had said that: ‘The
police officers must have
reasonable ground to believe
that the person in possession of
the property has himself
committed the crime or is
implicated in it or accessory to
it’, while in the revised
version the following words were
added, ‘or at any rate his
refusal must be quite
unreasonable.’ The note points
out that this reached an
entirely opposite conclusion
from the original one as it now
entitled the police to take away
property from a person who was
innocent of the crime. The note
suggested that if the judgment
of a court as delivered is wrong
by reason of any substantial
error or omission, its
correction should be by way of
appeal and not by way of
judicial revision of the
judgment before it is
reported’.”
Those who think that English
judges delivering ex tempore
judgments may not necessarily
revise their opinion can observe
Lord Denning in the case cited
above. In my respectful opinion
it is more dangerous for a judge
after judgment to introduce
passages which change the
meaning and effect of a judgment
than for a judge to make slight
amendments to his opinion which
have no effect whatsoever on the
effect and result of a case.
I cannot better conclude my
opinion on this part of the
submissions than to express my
gratitude, albeit posthumous, to
Mrs Janet Daniels, for leaving
with us real insights into the
business of law reporting. The
majority of lawyers come face to
face with the law in the Law
Reports. It is interesting,
therefore to know that even the
certified true copy of a
judgment may not accord with the
same case as reported.
Mr Akufo-Addo, leading counsel
for the 2nd and 3rd respondents
argued with characteristic force
on behalf of his clients. It
must be said that part of his
address was committed to
supporting the case of the 1st
respondent. That, in my view was
quite natural and proper. For
the 1st respondent had
originated their involvement in
the situation in which they
found themselves. But the 2nd
and 3rd respondents had defences
to make on their own behalf.
Mr Akufo-Addo submitted that the
2nd and 3rd respondents’
defences were predicated on four
issues which were:
1 Is the allegedly improper
conduct of a member of this
court, the proper subject of
criticism by the press?
2 Are there any limits to the
criticism of a public official
such as a judge who is precluded
from defending himself in public
and who is operating in a
pluralistic society?
3 Whether by focusing upon
the conduct of one member of the
court there was contempt when
there was no aspersion or
criticism of the outcome of the
case; and
4 What is a judgment of a
court.
In a further submission Mr
Akufo-Addo said the judgment of
a court is what the judge reads
in court. Learned counsel posed
the question whether there were
limits to the criticism of a
judgment of a court and whether
the press was entitled to
comment on the improprieties of
a judge with respect to his
judicial functions. Counsel
submitted the press was entitled
so to do. He further submitted
that the judge under attack
recognised that the matters
complained of were personal to
him that was why he took his
complaint to other forums before
concluding with this application
for contempt of court by
scandalising the court. Counsel
noted that the 2nd respondent
was prepared to apologise if
this court found that the
publications were scandalous.
Counsel submitted that the
attack was on the judge in his
individual capacity and not as a
member of the Supreme Court.
Finally Mr Akufo-Addo submitted
that in the peculiar
circumstances of this case the
truth of the allegation would
constitute a defence to a charge
of scandalising the court.
Counsel’s submissions were
attractive but they were not
convincing. As I have already
stated counsel having addressed
us in support of the 1st
respondent some of the issues
raised have been answered. With
respect to the other submissions
I am of the opinion that the
views of learned counsel’s late
illustrious and distinguished
father Akufo-Addo CJ and later
President of the Republic of
Ghana expressed in Republic v
Liberty Press Ltd [1968] GLR
123 more than amply answer his
submissions.
I will hereafter cite his
classic statement on the topic
in hand. But there are two
matters in counsel’s
submissions, which need special
treatment. Counsel submitted, as
I have stated that the attack
was on the judge as an
individual and therefore this
court could not be said to have
been scandalised by those
publications. I disagree with
that submission. First as a
Supreme Court judge he does not
sit alone. He sits in banc.
Second, whatever powers or
jurisdiction that the judge
possesses must be exercised in
conjunction with at least four
of his brethren. In the
circumstances abuse of one
member is an abuse of the rest
of the members of the court. I
have the benefit of Cotran CJ of
Belize’s reference to the dictum
of Martin CJ of New South Wales
at page 597 of the Belize
Times Press case, supra,
when he cited Re The Evening
Newspaper (1880) NSWLR 211
at 237 where it was reported:
“What are such courts but the
embodied force of the community,
whose rights they are appointed
to protect? They are not
associations of few individuals,
claiming on their own personal
account special privileges and
peculiar dignity by reason of
their position. A Supreme Court
like this, whatever may be
thought of the separate members
composing it, is the appointed
and recognised tribunal for the
maintenance of the collective
authority of the entire
community…it derives its force
from the knowledge that it has
the whole power of the community
at its back. This is a power
unseen, but efficacious and
irresistible and on its
maintenance depends the security
of the public.”
Learned counsel submitted that
in the peculiar circumstances of
this case the truth of the
allegation was a defence. I
disagree. The matter is covered
by authority. In the Belize
Times Press case there
occurs a passage which in my
respectful opinion settles the
issue. At page 601-602 of the
report the learned Chief Justice
of Belize writes:
“Justification or truth is a
defence to civil libel but it
has not been known to be a
defence in cases of contempt of
court even where contempt
involved a finding of facts. In
R v Castro, Skipworth’s case
(1873) LR 9 QB 230 (a case where
the contempt was alleged to
prejudice a fair trial)
Blackburn J said:
‘The defendant urged that we
ought to allow the case to go to
trial before a jury, because he
might prove the truth of what he
alleged. The truth of it has
nothing to do with the question.
The question at present is, is
he trying to interfere with the
course of justice.”
Borrie and Lowe in their Law
of Contempt, 1973 at p 165
wrote that:
“The rational of any type of
contempt is that the
administration of justice has to
be protected. Thus if
allegations of partiality, or
corruption, even if true, have
the potential effect of lowering
the court’s repute and thereby
undermining public confidence in
the administration of justice
contempt will have been
committed.”
One matter remains for comment.
I have found no need to comment
on the affidavit of the expert
Mr Owusu. The subject of his
investigations, though
interesting, was irrelevant to
the issues at hand. The issue
was: Had the publications in
The Free Press scandalised
the court? To resolve this issue
it is to the publications that
we must look and not to the
respective merits of the
judgments giving rise to those
publications.
As with Apaloo CJ so earlier
with Akufo-Addo CJ we ought to
demonstrate some originality in
our pronouncements and look
homeward for restatements of our
national philosophy with respect
to our civil institutions and
our attitude to the freedoms
that we enjoy. In this area I
can do no better than quote
Akufo-Addo CJ in the Liberty
Press case, supra, where he
wrote at page 135-136 the
following:
“I need hardly say that the
judiciary has never claimed to
be above criticism. Indeed I
have no more than one occasion
stated in public that the
judiciary, like any other
democratic institution, must
justify its continued existence.
This implies that its actions
and conduct must be subject to
the same measure of public
scrutiny as any other
governmental institution.
Justice, it has been said, is
not a cloistered virtue, and
those who have the
responsibility to dispense
justice will certainly not want
to live in cloisters. But the
important position of the
judiciary in any democratic
set-up must be fully
appreciated. Performing, as they
are called upon to do, the
sacred duty of holding the
scales between the executive
power of the state and the
subject and protecting the
fundamental liberties of the
individual, the courts must not
only enjoy the respect and
confidence of the people among
whom they operate, but also must
have the means to protect that
respect and confidence in order
to maintain their authority. For
this reason any conduct that
tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into
disrespect or disregard or to
interfere in any way with the
course of justice becomes an
offence not only against the
courts but against the entire
community which the courts
serve. Such conduct constitutes
the offence of contempt of
court, and the courts are vested
with the power of dealing with
it in a manner that is almost
arbitrary. For this reason the
power is rarely invoked and only
when the dignity, respect and
authority of the courts are
seriously threatened. It has
been said that these powers are
given to the courts (and the
judges) to keep the course of
justice free; power of great
importance to society, for by
the exercise of them law and
order prevail; those who are
interested in wrong are shown
that the law is irresistible.
It is contempt of court by deed
or word to scandalise the
courts. It is contempt of court
to make statements amounting to
abuse of the courts. It is
contempt of court to make
statements, which tend to expose
the courts or parties who resort
thereto to the prejudice or
hatred or ridicule of mankind.
Within these limits and within
the further limits set by the
legitimate exercise of the
freedom of thought and
expression criticism of judicial
acts is free. The press both
high and low must fully realise
and appreciate that there is no
such species of the freedom of
thought and expression as press
freedom. The freedom which the
press enjoys is no less and no
more than the freedom of thought
and expression which the
humblest illiterate citizen
enjoys.”
Mr da Rocha contends that
contempt applications should not
be used to frighten citizens
from criticising the courts. I
agree with him. I also think
that the dictum of Akufo-Addo CJ
in the Liberty Press case,
supra, is sufficient guarantee
of this court’s attitude to this
type of application. The
Constitution 1992 speaks of a
right to freedom of speech, of
expression and of the media of
which the press is an integral
part. But a right is correlative
to responsibility. Clearly there
cannot be such a thing as an
unlimited right to print
whatever one desires. The
textbook writers have culled
from a learned discourse a
passage, which fully expresses
my view on the issue of the
freedom of the press. It states:
“There is no such thing as an
unlimited right to print
whatever one may choose to
print, regardless of its
character and effect. Without
law there can be no liberty, and
freedom of the press does not
mean irresponsibility for what
is printed. All right-thinking
men will join with Alexander
Hamilton in his reprobation of
“the pestilential doctrine of an
unchecked press’, and agree with
him that ill-fated would be our
country were this doctrine to
prevail.
It is for the State to say what
publications are harmful, what
use of the press is permissible.
It would be an act of tyranny
under normal conditions to
deprive a citizen of the right
to own a gun, but it is
essential to public safety to
prevent him from using it to the
injury of others. So it is with
the printing press, an
instrument no less dangerous
than a shotgun. It is not
tyrannous or inconsistent with
the freedom of the press that
its owner should be held
accountable for any improper use
he may make of it.”
See Constitutional Law Cases
and Materials by Cohen &
Varat 9th ed page 1201. The
respondents seized upon a little
slip by the judge in his
judgment and set out on an
inglorious campaign of abuse and
vilification of the basest order
against him and the court. All
the respondents were guilty of
contempt of court.
I note that the 2nd respondent
has a desire to apologise if we
should find him guilty. I think
his readiness to apologise must
be taken into consideration in
the award of punishment. I note
also that the 2nd and 3rd
respondents say they relied on
the expert knowledge and
experience of the 1st
respondent. I think the 1st
respondent took over the
editorial chair of The Free
Press and from there
orchestrated his vicious
campaign of abuse and
vilification against Mr Justice
Abban and this court. He says he
is man enough to take the
consequences of his actions. So
be it.
AMPIAH JSC.
This is an application made to
the court by the
Attorney-General, for an order
of committal or attachment
against:
(1) Kwabena
Mensah-Bonsu, a legal
practitioner, and a Columnist of
The Free Press, a local
newspaper;
(2) Eben Quarcoo,
the editor of The Free Press
newspaper, and,
(3) Tommy Thompson
Books Ltd, the printers,
publishers and proprietors of
The Free Press newspaper,
for their alleged contemptuous
publications and conduct
concerning a court or a judge
thereof.
The respondents have refuted the
allegations and claimed that the
publications were true of the
conduct of the judge and that
what was published was a fair
comment made in good faith.
The facts culminating in the
present proceedings are that, on
29/12/93, this court gave
judgment in New Patriotic
Party v Attorney-General
[1994-95] GBR 1 and reserved its
reasons for the judgment; the
judgment was by a majority of 5
to 4. On 8/3/94 each of the 9
judges gave his or her reasons
for the judgment; the reasons
took over 8 hours to deliver.
On 9 May 1994, almost about two
months after the delivery of the
reasons for the judgment, the
1st respondent wrote to one of
the judges, namely Justice I K
Abban, with a copy to the Chief
Justice, saying:
“There is in your signed reasons
for judgment in the above quoted
suit a passage which purports to
be a verbatim speech made by Dr
Busia on 24 February 1970. In
fact, what has been reproduced
in your judgment is the full
text of an editorial of the
Daily Graphic of the same
date
¼It
is obvious that what you have
done in you judgment is to
misrepresent the editorial
opinion of the GRAPHIC as a
speech made by Dr Busia
¼Putting
aside the question whether that
part of your reasons is germane
to the issues, that misquotation
is unfair and undermines
confidence in the judiciary
¼”
A copy of this letter was
released to The Free Press
newspaper, which published
it. The Chief Justice, upon
reading a copy of the said
letter, called for the written
reasons of Mr Justice Abban as
read in court on 8/3/94 and
after satisfying himself that
what was said of the reasons for
Justice Abban’s judgment by the
1st respondent could not be
correct, directed the registrar
of the court to write back to
the 1st respondent in response
to his letter and attach a
certified true copy of the
reasons as read to the 1st
respondent. Despite this reply,
the respondents caused to be
published in the 13 May to 19
May 1994 issue of The Free
Press newspaper, a statement
that the judge (Justice Abban)
was a liar, a criminal and a
political chicane.
The 20 May to 26 May 1994 and
the 27 May to 2 June 1994 issues
of The Free Press newspaper
printed and published, alleged
further scurrilous and abusive
materials about Justice Abban
and the administration of
justice.
The matter was referred to the
Media Commission but was later
withdrawn. After the withdrawal
of the matter, The Free Press
newspaper in its editorial
captioned: “Abban Puts Integrity
Of The Bench On The Line”, of 4
November to 10 November 1994
issue, published among other
things, the following:
“And, it is this clearly bad
case which Mr Justice Abban
expects the court to twist in
his favour. What Mr Justice
Abban may not realise in his
desperation in expecting his
colleagues on the Bench to
behave like lunatics however, is
that he is in fact putting the
integrity credibility and
respectability of the Bench on
the line. And whether the men
and women on the Bench would
allow themselves to be reduced
to such depth and also abused to
save the face of a fellow
prodigal benchman, remains to be
seen. Ghanaians are watching
developments with eagles’ eyes.”
These publications, the
applicant contends, constitute,
“a gross contempt of court in so
far as they were calculated to
erode public confidence in the
administration of the law and
impair the authority of the
judiciary as an independent
organ of state.” The applicant
therefore prays that:
“(i) the 1st and 2nd
respondents be attached and
committed to prison for contempt
of court;
(ii) the 3rd respondent be
ordered to pay heavy fines for
contempt of court and the costs
of these proceedings;
(iii) all the respondents be
ordered to publish a full and
unconditional recantation of and
apology for their contumacious
and scandalous publications and
conduct through the same media
and with the same prominence by
which they published their
contumacious and scandalous
statements.”
Many cases and authorities have
been cited to us by counsel
appearing in this case. I must
express my gratitude and
appreciation for counsel’s
industry and assistance; they
deserve our congratulations. It
must have appeared, however, to
all of us that many of these
cases and authorities cited
apart from the general
principles expressed in them,
are foreign to us and are
generally based on statutes and
notions of the law as are
applicable to those countries.
It has been urged in these
proceedings that the facts and
law applicable in this case must
be looked at from our own
notions and perceptions of the
situation and circumstances
existing in our own society. I
agree.
Generally, the publication in a
newspaper of an article
containing scurrilous personal
abuse of a judge, with reference
to his conduct as a judge, in
judicial proceedings which have
terminated, is a contempt of
court punishable by the court on
summary process. See Queen v
Gray [1900] 2 QB 36. At page
40 of that case Lord Russell,
delivering the unanimous
judgment of the court said:
“It cannot be doubted¼that
the article does constitute a
contempt of court; but, as these
applications are, happily, of an
unusual character, we have
thought it right to explain a
little more fully than is
perhaps necessary what does
constitute a contempt of Court,
and what are the means which the
law has placed at the disposal
of the judicature for checking
and punishing contempt of court.
Any act done or writing
published calculated to bring a
Court or a judge of the Court
into contempt or to lower his
authority, is a contempt of
Court.” (Emphasis mine.)
In Wilmot’s “Opinions” at
page 255, there was a clear, if
rather archaic and stilted,
statement of the principle:
“The arraignment of the justice
of the Judges is arraigning the
King’s justice; it is an
impeachment of his wisdom and
goodness in the choice of his
Judges, and excites in the minds
of the people a general
dissatisfaction with all
judicial determinations and
indisposes their minds to obey
them; and whenever men’s
allegiance to the laws is so
fundamentally shaken, it is the
most fatal and most dangerous
obstruction of justice, and in
my opinion calls out for a more
rapid and immediate redress than
any other obstruction
whatsoever; not for the sake of
the judges as private
individuals, but because they
are the channels by which the
King’s justice is conveyed to
the people. To be impartial, and
to be universally thought so,
are both absolutely necessary
for the giving justice that
free, open, and uninterrupted
current, which it has, for many
ages, found all over this
kingdom, and which so eminently
distinguishes and exalts it
above all nations upon the
earth.”
See R v Editor of the New
Statesman (1928) 44 TLR 301.
In Ghana, the power to commit
for contempt by this court is
contained in article 126(2) of
the constitution which provides:
“The Superior Courts shall be
superior courts of record and
shall have the power to commit
for contempt to themselves and
all such powers as were vested
in a court of record immediately
before the coming into force of
this Constitution.”
Counsel for the 1st respondent
has submitted that the
statements published of and
concerning the judge were: (1)
published of him in his personal
capacity; (2) true in substance
having regard to the conduct of
the judge in question; (3)
published in good faith without
malice, and (4) that the
captions or headlines given to
the statements were not the 1st
respondent’s.
It cannot be disputed that the
statements published by the 1st
respondent concerned or were in
respect of reasons given by the
judge for his judgment in the
proceedings in NPP v
Attorney-General [1994-95]
GBR 1 of which the judge had
given a dissenting opinion.
Paragraphs 8-39 of the 1st
respondent’s affidavit of
21/11/94 in opposition to this
application testify to this
fact. See also exhibit MB3.
Apart from insinuating that the
judge’s reasons for his judgment
had been motivated by his
political inclinations, there is
no doubt that the statements had
referred to the judge as a judge
in the aforesaid proceedings.
The statements did not and could
not have referred to him in his
personal capacity. The
statements by the 1st respondent
positively asserted that the
judge had committed judicial as
well as political chicanery and
that the judge, apart from
doctoring his reasons for the
judgment, had told lies or
engaged in falsehood. Some of
the headings or captions to the
published statements were
headings or captions supplied by
the 1st respondent himself. -
See exhibit MB4. At no time
during the publication of these
statements did the 1st
respondent denounce or complain
about the headings or captions.
Indeed, the 1st respondent
adopted them, even if they were
not his own, and continued to
supply the 2nd and 3rd
respondents with more
information. I hold therefore
that it is too late in the day
for the 1st respondent to
disassociate himself from the
headlines or captions given to
his published statements. If the
statements as a whole are found
to be contemptuous of this
court, the 1st respondent must
necessarily and equally be
blamed for the publications,
save those which form the
editorial of the 2nd and 3rd
respondent’s newspaper of 4
November to 10 November 1994
issue.
The 1st respondent has pleaded
justification. He stated,
“I believed I was exercising my
constitutional right as a
citizen of Ghana to draw
attention to errors in the
judgment of Mr Justice Abban.”
What is true? The fact
that the judge is alleged to
have referred to the statement
by the Daily Graphic as a
speech of Dr Busia, or that by
so doing he had become a liar, a
criminal or had committed
judicial or political chicanery?
In his letter of 9 May 1994 to
the judge, the 1st respondent
had said, inter alia:
“Even if the speech contained
material which might justify the
editorial comment of the
Daily Graphic, it is, in my
respectful opinion, an
inexcusable error to quote in
full the editorial of a
newspaper and attribute it to a
person since a very casual
reading of the newspaper would
reveal this error.” - See
exhibit MB3b.
Thus, if materially, the
“Graphic View” could be
justified as being a correct
commentary on what Dr Busia had
said that day, on the
presumption that the judge had
done what the 1st respondent
says he did, would that have
made the judge a liar, a
criminal or guilty of either
judicial or political chicanery,
when what was stated carries the
correct views of Dr Busia on
that occasion? If indeed, the
judge misquoted Dr Busia, what
did the judge say that Dr Busia
did not say? In other words what
was contained in the Daily
“Graphic View” that Dr Busia
had not said? The 1st
respondent’s complaint was:
“¼I
heard the judge attribute to Dr
K A Busia, Former Prime Minister
of Ghana, a statement
praising the celebration of 24
February, 1966 coup d’etat
which the judge purported to
quote from the Daily Graphic
of Tuesday 24th February 1970.”
(Emphasis mine.)
Refer to affidavit filed by the
1st respondent on 21/11/94 in
opposition to this application.
If what has been said is all
that the complaint is about,
then the criticism of the
judge’s reason in the way it was
done was unfair and baseless.
What did Dr Busia actually say
on 24 February 1970 as reported
by the Daily Graphic of
that date?
“¼’Today’,
he said, is being observed as
‘public holiday’ but it would
not be marked by military
parades… The Premier then said
he had occasion to say to both
the Ghanaian public and to the
international world community of
the United Nations that the
patriotism and magnanimity of
the dissolved National
Liberation Council demonstrated
in the seizure of power, and in
preparation for, and the
voluntary, relinquishing of
power mark achievements of human
spirit that demonstrated the
spiritual heights to which men
could rise.”
He continued:
“I would like to offer again,
and in this, I am sure I speak
for the Government and for the
whole country, our measureless
gratitude and admiration for all
that the National Liberation
Council and our Armed Forces and
Police have done for us, their
fellow citizens.”
The “Daily Graphic View” was
this:
“Salute to the gallant men.
Today is the fourth anniversary
of the 24th February 1966
revolution. Exactly four years
ago today a grateful and
surprised Ghana woke up to see
the end of tyranny and injustice¼
As Ghanaians celebrate the
historic event today, there is
no better monument we can erect
in the memory of the fallen
gallant men than to uphold, at
all times the aims of the
revolution. We must also pay
tribute to the living, the
gallant NLC men, who ably did
the spade work for the
democratic rule we have now...
Indeed Ghana’s record in the
last four years has vindicated
the revolutionary action the
army and police took¼“
This quotation, which is
contained in the reasons for the
judge’s judgment, is the “Daily
Graphic View” and not a speech
by Dr Busia. If these statements
by Dr Busia that day were not in
praise of the military and
police and, a support for the
celebration of the 24 February
1966 coup, then I do not know
what they were! The respondents
have described Justice Abban as
an eminent judge of high
integrity who would not mistake
one person’s speech for another.
This is exactly what the
applicant had sought to
establish; that Justice Abban
could not have mistaken the
“Daily Graphic View” for Dr
Busia’s speech. Even if the
judge had misquoted Dr Busia,
what harm does the misquotation,
if any, cause to warrant calling
the judge a liar, a criminal
etc? But was that what the judge
said?
The 1st respondent, I would say,
in good faith, informed the
court of what he had heard. This
was about two months after the
reading of the judgment. The
registrar of the court, on the
instructions of the Chief
Justice explained the situation
to the 1st respondent and
furnished him with a certified
true copy of the relevant page
of the reasons as read by the
judge. The 1st respondent
without waiting for the reply
responded: “I heard it all!” In
my opinion, whatever good faith
the 1st respondent had initially
was eroded by his subsequent
outburst and conduct. Here he
showed contempt not only for the
Chief Justice who had offered to
give him a certified copy of
what was read, but also of the
whole proceedings of the court.
The 1st respondent relied on an
alleged signed copy of the
reasons for the judge’s judgment
that day. The 1st respondent had
also criticised the judge for
including in his said reasons,
matters that were not germane to
the issue at stake. He had gone
further to recommend the
adoption of civilised conditions
whereby only certified true
copies of judgments were read in
court. It is conceded that our
system may not be all that
perfect. He must however realise
by his own showing that only
certified true copies of
judgments, orders and
proceedings of the court may be
relied on. The issue of the 24
February 1966 revolution was
germane to the arguments before
the court in the NPP v
Attorney-General [1994-95]
GBR 1. Also, the issue of
the discriminatory celebration
of these revolutions was germane
to the arguments put forward. I
do not know whether the 1st
respondent has ever written a
judgment for a court, but I am
prepared to pardon him for his
criticism of the procedures and
practices of our courts, and the
manner of writing judgments, on
grounds of ignorance. It was not
only Justice Abban who referred
to the 24 February 1966
revolution, some of the other
judges also did; some even made
references to the French
Revolution, even ancient history
and even the Bible!
In one of his statements
published by The Free Press
newspaper, the 1st
respondent had asked, “And so
what?” And so what if the copy
he held was not a certified true
copy? There is everything wrong
with that paper. It is rather
surprising for a person who
claims to know how judgments
should be written and the
reading of certified true copies
of these judgements, to display
such gross ignorance of the need
for the certification of court
records. It is to avoid such
mischief that is apparent in the
conduct of the 1st respondent
that certified true copies of
court records are required by
law. It is to avoid this “I
heard, I heard” syndrome that a
certified true copy of what
actually happened in court must
be obtained. A judge in reading
his judgment or ruling may refer
to cases or authorities whose
full references have not been
given. He may even make side
comments which are not contained
in his judgment. Of course such
side comments may not
necessarily be part of the
judgment or may not affect the
substance of his judgment; these
may not be included in the
certified true copy of the
judgment. Section 70 of the
Courts Act 1993 (Act 459)
provides:
“(1) No person is entitled to
inspect or have a copy of the
record of evidence given in a
case before a court or to a copy
of the court’s notes except as
may be expressly provided by the
Constitution, a rule of court or
any other enactment.
(2) If a person affected by a
judgment or a court order
desires to have a copy of the
judgment, order, deposition or
other part of the record, he
shall on application for the
copy be furnished with it if he
pays its cost except where the
court for some special reason
thinks fit to furnish it free of
charge.”
The fees so collected are paid
into the Consolidated Fund and
it is the responsibility of the
registrar to see to it that such
records are certified as true
copies of the court’s records.
The evidence on record does not
show that the alleged signed
copy of the reasons for the
judge’s judgment relied upon by
the 1st respondent was properly
or lawfully obtained. Firstly,
it did not come from proper
custody. Neither Mr Owusu-Ansah,
the Deputy Judicial Secretary
nor the alleged Tawiah had any
legal responsibility for keeping
copies of judgments or orders or
proceedings of the court.
According to Mr Owusu-Ansah, he
obtained only a copy of this
document from Mr Tawiah. It is
true that the said Tawiah was
once the Acting Registrar of the
Supreme Court but the evidence
shows that at the time of giving
the reasons for the judgment, it
was one Mr Logoh and not Tawiah
who was the Acting Registrar of
the Supreme Court. Mr Logoh has
sworn to an affidavit stating
positively that he was the
Acting Registrar that day and
that he received the reasons for
the judgment and kept them in
his office; Mr Tawiah has not
sworn to any affidavit in
rebuttal of this statement. What
was said of him cannot be relied
on. It was for Mr Tawiah
personally to say by affidavit
whether on the face of the
evidence he was the Registrar or
acting Registrar of the Supreme
Court, and that he came by the
signed copy of the reasons for
the judgment in his official
capacity. Mr Tawiah has not told
this court why he is unable to
swear to an affidavit, apart
from what counsel for the 1st
respondent told the court. The
Deputy Judicial Secretary, Mr
Owusu-Ansah, had no business
keeping signed or certified true
copies of the records of the
court. Okechire to whom Mr
Owusu-Ansah gave the document,
was neither a party nor counsel
in the case. Why did Mr
Owusu-Ansah give a copy of this
document to an outsider without
a formal application and
authorization? It cannot also be
correct that Mr Owusu-Ansah
released copies of these reasons
for judgment of some of the
judges to Okechire or any other
person with a view to releasing
the others later. There is no
evidence that any other copies
of the judges’ reasons were
released to Okechire.
And, why did Mr Owusu-Ansah,
Okechire and the 1st respondent
go in for the reasons for
judgment of Justice Abban only?
These and many questions would
continue to be asked because of
the clandestine manner by which
the document was released. I am
not prepared to conjecture any
motives or intention but it must
be obvious to all of us why a
certified true copy of the
reasons for the judge’s judgment
is the only document that could
be relied upon. From what has
been said of page 28 of the
judge’s reasons and in fact of
the whole reasons, it is quite
clear that even at that stage
when the written reasons were
released to the Acting
Registrar, Mr Logoh, there were
still more corrections to be
done on the document even though
signed. Secondly, no fees were
paid for this copy.
Significantly no one has been
able to produce the original
copy from which Mr Owusu-Ansah,
Okechire Adusa Kwabena, the 1st
respondent and the others were
alleged to have obtained their
copies. Mr Logoh in one of his
affidavits stated that he kept
the originals in his locked
drawer from which he produced
the certified true copies of
what was read. Is Mr Tawiah
still in possession of the
original of his alleged signed
reasons? It is for this reason
that I would describe as
valueless the evidence of Mr
Owusu, the document examiner.
His report, relied on by the 2nd
and 3rd respondents, has been
procured by contract between
themselves and the said Mr
Owusu. What documents had been
given him by the respondents or
for that matter their counsel,
to examine and comment on, we
cannot be sure of.
Normally it is the court, which
calls for such examination. Why
the respondents should decide to
do so unilaterally is not
explained to the court; it is
self-serving evidence made at a
time when proceedings were
pending in court; he has not
shown us the original copy of
the document upon which he made
his comments. The document
relied on by the 1st respondent
can only be described as a
“stolen” document. Documents,
however obtained, may be
accepted and used in court
proceedings where they are
relevant and, authentic. The
document in dispute cannot be
said to be authentic and this
court cannot accept it as a
proper or lawful document of the
court. The 1st respondent should
not be allowed to rely on an
unlawfully obtained and
unauthenticated document whose
contents could not be vouched to
criticise the certified reasons
of the judge’s judgment.
The 1st respondent has accused
the judge of “doctoring” his
reasons. In fact the reasons
could not have in anyway changed
the judgment which had been
delivered as far back as 29
December 1993. Within the two
months that the 1st respondent
took time to comment on the
reasons he could have effected
whatever change he wanted on
this unlawfully procured
document!
In proceedings such as this, it
is not the quantity of evidence
that is required but the
quality. It is true that persons
who had never before stated they
heard the judge say what he is
alleged to have said, have now
sworn to affidavits saying so.
The affidavits of Mr Logoh the
Acting Registrar of the Supreme
Court and the letter he wrote to
the 1st respondent on the
instructions of the Chief
Justice go to show that what the
1st respondent was alleging was
not or could not be true. It is
for this reason that a certified
true copy of the 28th page of
the written reasons as read was
sent to the 1st respondent.
Others could have sworn to
affidavits either saying they
“heard it” or “did not hear it.”
It is the duty of this court,
looking at the circumstances of
the case, the nature and
interest of the deponents, to
decide whom to believe.
The law permits some amount of
criticism of a judgment, order
or pronouncement of the court,
but such criticisms must be made
in good faith devoid of malice,
and in temperate words. See
Perera v R [1951] AC 482,
HL. In Ambard v
Attorney-General for Trinidad
and Tobago [1936] AC 322 on
appeal from the Supreme Court of
Trinidad and Tobago it was
observed,
“…whether the authority and
position of an individual judge,
or the due administration of
justice is concerned, no wrong
is committed by any member of
the public who exercise freely
the ordinary right of
criticising in good faith in
private or in public any act
done in the seat of justice. The
path of criticism is a public
way: the wrong headed are
permitted to err therein:
provided that members of the
public abstain from imputing
improper motives to those taking
part in the administration of
justice, and are genuinely
exercising a right of criticism
and not acting in malice, or
attempting to impair the
administration of justice, they
are immune.”
As stated before in this
judgment, the good faith of the
1st respondent was eroded when
he refused to accept the
certified true copy of the
reasons as given by the judge.
His refusal even touched on the
integrity of the Chief Justice
and the court. It is not clear
why he had gone for this
particular judge’s reasons for
his judgment - the judge was
neither the most senior nor the
first person to dissent in the
judgment - but the manner by
which he secured the copy he
relentlessly relied on, which
document was not obtained from
proper custody, smacked of
malice, or a calculated design
to attack the judge’s reasons.
His subsequent statements, which
I find to be scandalous were
actuated by malice and could not
be justified in any way. I find
the words used by the 1st
respondent to be contumacious of
the judge and the court and an
interference with the
administration of justice.
The 2nd and 3rd respondents have
relied on the statements given
them by the 1st respondent. In
fact they have said they were
prepared to apologise to the
court, if statements given them
were found to be untrue. They
have however contended that, if
the judge did what the 1st
respondent said he did, then
their publication could not be
said to be in contempt of court.
I have found no truth in the
statements of the 1st
respondent. I have also found
the statements made by the 1st
respondent to be contumacious.
The 2nd and 3rd respondents’
defence therefore cannot be
supported.
Counsel for the 2nd and 3rd
respondents has further
contended that if there was any
contempt at all it could not be
contempt of the court, since
only one judge was criticised.
Statements made concerning a
judge of the court do not
constitute contempt of that
court unless they are calculated
to obstruct or interfere with
the course of justice, or the
due administration of the law,
in the court. Wilmot J in
King v Almon 97 ER 94 at
100:
“By the word ‘Court’, I mean the
Judges who constitute it, and
who are intrusted by the
constitution with a portion of
jurisdiction defined and marked
out by the common law, or Acts
of Parliament. ‘Contempt of the
court’ involves two ideas;
contempt of their power, and
contempt of their authority. The
word ‘authority’ is frequently
used to express both the right
of declaring the law, which is
properly called jurisdiction,
and of enforcing obedience to
it, in which sense it is
equivalent to the word power:
but by the word ‘authority’, I
do not mean that coercive power
of the judge, but the deference
and respect which is paid to
them and their acts, from an
opinion of their justice and
integrity.”
I am satisfied that the contempt
was of the court and not of the
judge personally. The 2nd and
3rd respondents cannot run away
from their insinuation that the
judges who would back Justice
Abban could only be lunatics is
contempt of the court.
The Supreme Court by law may be
constituted by a single judge; a
group of 5, 7, 9, or 11 judges;
vide article 128(2), 133 and 134
of the Constitution 1992. The
decision of the court is by a
majority. A criticism of a judge
sitting as a Supreme Court, or
in a group as a Supreme Court,
is a criticism of the court and
if contumacious, is punishable
by the court. I find the conduct
of the 2nd and 3rd respondents
also to be contempt of this
court.
It is said that “when a trial
has taken place and the case is
over, the judge or the jury are
given over to criticism” (McLeod
v St Aubyn [1899] AC 549).
Consequently, counsel for the
2nd and 3rd respondents has
contended that there could not
be contempt of court when
proceedings have terminated.
This proposition ignores the
existence of two types of
contempt of court. There is
contempt in the face of the
court and scandalising the court
which amounts to contempt. The
publication in a newspaper of an
article containing scurrilous
personal abuse of a judge with
reference to his conduct as a
judge in a judicial proceeding
which has terminated, is a
contempt of court punishable by
the court on summary process.
See The Queen v Gray
[1900] 2 QB 36. I do not
therefore accept the proposition
of law by counsel for the 2nd
and 3rd respondents.
It was also argued that since
the proceedings in contempt
actions are criminal any doubt
created by any of the judges
dissenting should result in the
acquittal of the respondents.
The decision of this court is by
a majority. If it is not
possible to reach a unanimous
decision, then the majority
decision is the decision of the
court. If the majority decision
favours committal for contempt,
then the true legal position is
that there is no doubt in the
case as to the respondents’
guilt; the minority decision
cannot operate to create a doubt
in the circumstances otherwise
there could never be a
conviction. Compare the case of
trial by a jury of a case other
than murder. Here the law allows
a conviction or otherwise on a
majority verdict of the jury. I
would also reject the
proposition of law by counsel
for the 2nd and 3rd respondents.
On the totality of the evidence
I find that the publications
made by the 2nd and 3rd
respondents in The Free Press
newspaper, were scandalous
of the judge and the court and
constituted contempt of court. I
would commit both the 2nd and
3rd respondents for contempt.
It has been urged on this court
to exercise its coercive powers
of committing for contempt
sparingly. It has been submitted
that with the emergence of our
newly won democratic order, it
would only be fair if our
constitutional rights of freedom
of speech and expression were
not stultified by orders of the
court. It has been observed in
the case of R v Kopyto 47
DLR that:
“The concept of free and
uninhibited speech permeates all
truly democratic societies.
Caustic and biting debate is,
for example, often the hallmark
of election campaigns,
parliamentary debates and
campaigns for the establishment
of new public institutions or
the reform of existing practices
and institutions.
So long as comments made on
matters of public interest are
neither obscene nor contrary to
the laws of criminal libel,
citizens of a democratic state
should not have to worry unduly
about the framing of their
expression of ideas. The very
lifeblood of democracy is the
free exchange of ideas and
opinions. If these exchanges are
stifled, democratic government
itself is threatened¼
The courts play an important
role in any democratic society¼They
are well-regarded in the
community because they merit
respect. They need not fear
criticism nor need they seek to
sustain unnecessary barriers to
complaints about their
operations or decisions¼”
And, in Bridges v State of
California, 62 SC 190, 314
US 252 (1941), the court
observed,
“The possibility of a disorderly
and unfair administration of
justice as a result of the
published criticism of the acts
of a judge
¼justifying
impairment of the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and
press, must be determined
according to the publication and
circumstances involved in the
particular case.”
Thus, while the court would not
ordinarily punish for contempt
of itself, there must also be
respect for the court. The
protection which the law would
give or gives to freedom of
speech and expression would
erode where there is an abuse of
these rights. These freedoms
must be used responsibly. In a
speech delivered by Dr K A Busia
on 24 February, 1970
(anniversary celebration of the
24 February 1966 coup) he called
on Ghanaians to guard and use
freedom of speech responsibly
(see Daily Graphic No
6033 of 24 February 1970). This
he said should also be done in
the use of all the other
freedoms. He said:
“We, therefore intend
henceforth to discharge that
duty unflinchingly and we trust
that all citizens who wish us to
make responsible use of freedom
will co-operate with us.”
Dr Busia said some people were
behaving as if the freedom of
speech carried no
responsibility, adding that they
paraded the streets in party
vans hurling insults and abuse
at others in vulgar language,
mounted platforms to spread
inciting and false rumours, all
of which were capable of
provoking fights and even riots.
“That is not how to take counsel
for the state. It is the wrong
use of freedom and it is against
the spirit of the revolution”,
he said.
I agree with Dr Busia on his
observations. The manner in
which the respondents exercised
their freedom of speech and
expression was an abuse of their
constitutional rights. They went
outside the protection given
them by law, and used the
occasion to vindicate whatever
malicious intentions they had. I
would punish them for their
contempt.
Application granted.
S Kwami Tetteh, Legal
Practitioner |