Action for account-Claim for
refund of money alleged to have
been paid by mistake-Compound
interest charged on overdraft at
the rate of
10 per cent with monthly
rests-Custom of
BankersNotoriety of custom-Acquiscence.
In an action brought by a
customer against his Bankers for
an account to bJ taken of the
moneys alleged to have been
overpaid by him in respect of
interest charged on his
overdrawn current account it was
held as follows. affirming the
judgment of the Court below :-
1.That
there had been no over payments
by the plaintiff to the
defendants. 2. That the money
paid by the plaintiff to the
defendants to settle his
over-drawn current account was
not paid by mistake.
3. That the charge of 10 per
cent compound interest with
monthly rests on an over-drawn
current account was fair and
reasonable, and in accordance
with the well recognised custom
of Bankers in England and the
Gold Coast.
4. That such custom had been
proved to be well known to the
plaintiff
who acquiesced in the rate of
interest charged against him.
R. E. Phipps
for the Plaintiff-Appellant.
C. C.
Carter
for the Defendants-Respondents.
The following judgments were
delivered:-
MICHELIN, ACTING C.J. THE GOLD
COAST COLONY. 8 per ce
This is an appeal by the
plaintiff from the judgment of
the Chief Justice (Sir George
Campbell Deane) dated the 30th
of December, 1932, in which he
gave judgment for the defendants
with costs.
By his writ of summons dated the
8th of July, 1932, as amended in
Court on the 21st of September,
1932, the plaintiff claimed that
an account should be taken of
what sums had been overpaid by
the plaintiff to the defendants
as interest on his overdrawn
account with them or otherwise
from the 1st of January, 1918,
to the lIth of February, 1932,
the date of the settlement of
the said overdrawn account, and
for payment to the plaintiff of
the amount so found due with
interest thereon from the date
of such payment to the date of
filing of the writ of summons
herein.
Pleadings were ordered by the
Court and filed by Counsel on
each side, and after an
exhaustive hearing the Chief
Justice delivered a written
judgment on the 30th December,
1932, in which after setting out
the facts and the law, he
concluded as follows:-
•• I am of opinion that the
money paid by plaintiff on the
11th of February, 1932, to
settle his account with the Bank
was not paid under any mistake,
but that on the contrary right
through he knew of what was
being done and agreed to it. I
am further of opinion that the
charges against plaintiff right
through were the customary and
usual charges of Banks in the
Gold Coast and fully justified,
and I see no reason for
reopening the account which has
been settled."
" There must be judgment for the
defendants with costs."
Three grounds of appeal were
originally filed, but in arguing
the appeal Mr. Phipps, on behalf
of the appellant, confined his
submissions to the following two
grounds, abandoning the second
ground:-
(1) Some material findings of
fact were against the weight of
evidence.
(3) The judgment was wrong in
law.
He dealt with these two grounds
together, and his submissions
for the purpose of convenience
may be grouped under the
following five headings :-
(1) Question of verbal agreement
with Bank for overdraft in
January, 1918.
(2) Was the Bank justified in
charging 10 per cent compound
interest with monthly rests?
(3) Was there acquiescence on
the part of the plaintiff in
regard to such charges ?
(4) Was the account closed on
the 17th August, 1921 ?
(5) Was the account closed on
the 18th November, 1922 ?
In arguing as to (1), Mr. Phipps
submitted that at the beginning,
when the plaintiff started to
negotiate with the Bank for an
overdraft, it was verbally
agreed between the parties that
for allowances covered by any
fixed deposit, the plaintiff
should pay to the Bank interest
at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum on any overdraft up to the
limit of any fixed deposit they
might hold for the plaintiff,
and interest at the rate of 8
per cent per annum on sums in
excess of such limit. Instead of
complying with that agreement,
however, the Bank charged him
interest at the rate of 8 per
cent when the overdraft was
below the amount of the
plaintiff's fixed deposit, and
they also charged him
fluctuating rates of interest
according to the instructions
received from time to time from
the head office, and capitalised
this interest with monthly
rests, which was a breach of the
verbal agreement entered into
between the parties. In proof of
his contention as to this
agreement, learned Counsel
referred the Court to the
evidence of the plaintiff at
page 19 of the record in which
he stated as follows :-
" The deposit was a fixed
amount.
" For any overdraft up to £2,500
I agreed to pay 6 per cent per
annum and it was agreed that for
any sum overdrawm beyond
£2,500,8 per cent whether it was
secured or unsecured." He also
referred to page 138 of the
Bank's ledger which was
admitted in evidence as exhibit"
AA " where the following entry
in red ink appears at the top of
the page :- " Covering any
overdraft in current account
fixed deposit 25/168 £2,000,
interest 6 per cent.
The following note in pencil
being made under this entry" 8
per cent excess.In dealing with
this matter, the learned Chief
Justice in the course of his
judgment stated as follows :-
"It is
at once apparent therefore that
the course of
business between the parties as
shewn by the Bank's ledger is
quite inconsistent with the
agreement which plaintiff
alleges was made with the
defendants.
" Yet we can hardly believe that
had such an agreement been made
preliminary to the granting of
the overdraft, as the plaintiff
alleges, it would not at once
have been reflected in the
defendants' books unless they
consciously and deliberately
from the first intended to
defraud him. Instead of being so
reflected what do we find?
Interest for the first 11 months
at 8 per cent then at rates
varying between 9 and 10 per
cent for a year and only after
that for the first time at 6 per
cent on the sum secured by
deposit, 9 per cent on the
excess. These figures are to my
mind significant.
* * *
* "
On the very question of the
amount of interest therefore
I find, if we except the
plaintiff's statement made 13
years after the event, there is
nothing to support "the
plaintiff's claim that he made a
special agreement with the Bank
as a preliminary to obtaining an
overdraft at the rate he says he
did, and that the probabilities
of the case are decidedly
against him."
Although the learned Chief
Justice did not deal
specifically with the entry in
red ink and the pencil note at
the top of page 138 of the
ledger, it is clear that this
entry cannot be regarded as
forming evidence of any verbal
agreement entered into between
the parties.
It does not form one of the
entries in the ledger made in
the ordinary course of the
business of the Bank. Although
it is alleged by the plaintiff
that this agreement was made in
January, 1918, the entry in red
ink appears for the first time
in the ledger in the month of
April, 1918.
The fact that it represented an
agreement made between the
parties is completely refuted"
by the entries in the
defendants' books showing that
different rates of interest were
consistently being debited by
the defendants to the
plaintiff's account.
It is significant also that in a
letter dated the 7th September,
1927, from the plaintiff to the
defendants' Manager in Accra
(exhibit" R "), he stated
inter alia
as follow~ :-
" In reference to my account you
will observe that from the
business I have done with you
from 1918 to 192~, sometimes my
overdraft has stood up to a
debit balance of between £25,000
to £50,000, bearing as you are
aware a considerable money
having interest running per
month, apart from the interest
running when the account was
brought down to the
agreed limit of £8,000 and from
which it has been reduced to
where it is to-day," no mention
whatever was made as to the
verbal agreement for a charge of
6 per cent interest.
Again when the plaintiff wrote
the General Manager of the Bank
in London on the 14th November,
1931, in which he went at some
length into his accounts and
dealt with the question of the
interest charged, no mention
whatever was made by him in this
letter of the fact that there
had been a verbal agreement as
to a charge of 6 per cent
interest.
In my opinion therefore the
finding of fact of the learned
Chief Justice as to the
non-existence of this verbal
agreement, was amply supported
by the evidence before the
Court, and I see no reason to
dissent from such finding of
fact.
In dealing with heading (2), Mr.
Phipps submitted that the
defendants had no authority for
charging fluctuating interest
and capitalising such interest
with monthly rests as had been
done in the present case. He
contended therefore that the
learned Chief Justice was wrong
in holding that the rates of
interest charged and the
practice adopted of charging
compound interest with monthly
rests were in accordance with
the universal custom of Banks in
this Colony. He contended that
in order to establish a custom,
it was necessary to prove that
the custom was notorious and
also that it was reasonable and
legal, and referred us to
numerous authorities in support
of his contention.
The law is very clearly set out
in Roscoe's Evidence in Civil
Actions, 19th Edition at page
21, as follows :-
II The usage must be shewn to be
certain and reasonable and so
universally acquiesced in that
everybody in the particular
trade knows it, or ought to know
it, if he took the
pains to enquire."
'
In proof of custom the learned
Chief Justice had before him the
evidence of Mr. Kirk, the
Manager of the Accra Branch of
the defendants' Bank and also
the evidence of Mr. Passells,
Accountant to the Accra Branch
of Barclay's Bank Limited.
In the course of his evidence,
Mr. Kirk states as follows :-
II The usual rate of interest
against overdraft accounts
secured by mortgage would be 10
per cent compound interest.
Simple interest is never charged
on such accounts. Compound
interest is charged with monthly
rests invariably-that is in
accordance with the Bank's
custom."
Mr. Passells in the course of
his evidence stated as follows
:-
II I have had 13 years
experience of overdrafts in
current accounts allowed by the
Bank secured by legal mortgages
on local properties. 10 per cent
is the usual rate of interest
charged on such overdrafts with
monthly rests, illiterate at the
end of each month is carried to
the debtor's overdraft account
and increases the capital on
which interest is charged for
the following month. The same
rule applies in Nigeria and s.
D. Sierra Leone. Banking
business is carried on, on same
lines in Papoe all three West
African Colonies.
. Mr. Phipps referred us to the
case of Moore v. Voughton,
1
Stark.
487, in which in an action by
Bankers for money lent, the
Court held it was not sufficient
to show that it was the general
custom of the house to charge
interest calculated upon half
yearly rests without also
showing that defendant knew that
such was the position, and to
the Canadian case of
Standard Bank v. Brodrecht
referred to at page 265 of
Volume 3 of the British and
Empire Digest. where in an
action to recover an overdrawn
account compound interest at 6t
per cent per annum, with monthly
rests, was disallowed. In the
first case it will be seen that
the action was not in respect of
an overdraft, but was in respect
of money lent. In the second
case, not having the report, it
is impossible to say upon what
grounds the judgment was based.
In the recent case, however, of
Inland Revenue Commissioners v.
Holder
(1931) 2
K.B.
81, where the previous cases on
the subject were considered,
Lord Hanworth, Master of the
Rolls, in the course of his
judgment stated as follows :-
" The decision of the
Commissioners was based upon the
judgment in
Parrs Bank v. Yates
(1898) 2
Q.B.
460. The case is important for
it recognises the system of
bankers in turning interest into
capital as usual and binding on
the parties who have acquiesced
in it. It seems to be a question
ill each case whether the
customer did acquiesce in it.
(See Fergusson v. Fyffe
8
Cl. and F.
121, and
Spencer v. Wakefield
(1887) 4
T.L.R.
194). The plan of capitalising
interest at the end of each half
year was adopted by bankers in
order to enable them in effect
to secure what is usually termed
compound interest, which could
not have otherwise been claimed
by reason of the usury laws."
It is clear from this judgment
that the custom of charging
compound interest with rests is
a well recognised custom of
Bankers in England.
In my opinion the notoriety of
the custom in this Colony was
sufficiently proved by the
evidence of the representatives
of the only two banks carrying
on business in the Gold Coast,
and it is quite clear from
Exhibit" R," to which I have
previously referred, that the
plaintiff must have been fully
aware that he was being charged
interest in accordance with this
custom.
As to the question of the
reasonableness of the custom,
according to the evidence of Mr.
Kirk the Bank would gain only
£23 a year by charging compound
interest with rests instead of
simple interest, on £5,000.
By consent of Counsel on each
side a document prepared by the
Manager of the defendants' bank
was admitted in evidence before
us showing that the difference
between the interest on £100 per
one year at 10 per cent per
annum, and the compound interest
with monthly rests at the rate
of 10 per cent on such sum for a
similar period was only 9s. 8d.
In view of the high rate of
interest in accordance with
native custom charged to natives
of this Colony, as stated by the
leaned Chief Justice in the
course of his judgment, I agree
with him that the rate of
interest at 10 per cent with
monthly rests was not an
unusually high rate of interest.
This ground therefore fails.
Dealing next with heading (3).
In dealing with this question,
Mr. Phipps referred to pages 54
and 57 of the record where the
leaned Chief Justice dealt in
some detail with the question of
the periodical rendering of the
plaintiff's pass book as
constituting acquiescence on his
part, and where after
considering the various
authorities he came to the
following conclusion :-
" I shall not, however, in view
of the legal divergence of
opinion in the matter take it to
be an estoppel, but it affords
evidence and very strong
evidence of the plaintiff's
knowledge of what was going on
and acquiescence therein. In the
case of
Bruce v. Hunter,
3
Camp.
467, where an agent who has
advanced money for his principal
in effecting insurances and
other business had charged
interest and at the end of the
year had made a rest and added
the interest due to the
principal, Lord Ellenborough
said it was fair and reasonable
that the defendant should pay
interest in the manner charged,
and that the interest to which
he had not objected for a number
of years afforded sufficient
evidence of a promise on his
part to pay interest. These
words apply' mutatis mutandis'
in their entirely in this case."
Learned Counsel then referred us
to page 35 of the record, where
Mr. Kirk in the course of his
evidence mentioned two instances
in which it appeared from the
Bank's ledger that the
plaintiff's pass book had been
forwarded to him by the Bank. He
also submitted that there was
nothing in the pass book to show
that compound interest had been
charged. He also referred to the
case of
Chatterton v. London and County
Bank,
referred to in volume 3 of the
British and Empire Digest at
page 244, in which Lord Esher in
the course of his judgment held
that there was no duty on the
part of a customer to refer to
his pass book, which is sent to
him by the Bank.
He submitted that the only
evidence in the Court below as
to acquiescence being the
periodical rendering of the
plaintiff's pass book, unless
knowledge on the part of the
plaintiff could be presumed the
finding of the leamed Chief
Justice as to acquiescence was
not justified. In considering
the question of the pass book,
the evidence of the plaintiff
which appears at page 23 of the
record is as follows :-
" I don't deny I may have had my
pass book out in March,
1918-May, 1919- June 1919,
December, 1919-May. 1920,
September, 1920, September,
W21-November, 1921, January,
April, July, August, December,
1922, April, 1927-September,
1929. I used to have my pass
book out every now and then but
kept no date. I looked generally
to my pass book when I had it
out and saw the interest debited
but did not check it " ;
and this must be considered
together with the evidence of
Mr. Kirk to which I have
referred. I t is clear from this
evidence that the plaintiff
received his pass book and had
the opportunity of examining it
on many other occasions than
those mentioned by Mr. Kirk.
On page 24 of the record, in the
course of his evidence, the
plaintiff admitted that he was
an acute business man, and from
the passage in Exhibit " R " to
which I have previously
referred, it is clear that the
plaintiff was fully aware
of
the fact that heavy interest was
running from 1918, and not only
was it running, but it was also
running by the month. He must
therefore have known of the
monthly rests of interest. It is
also clear from Exhibit" F" a
letter dated the 24th August,
1923, written by him to Mr.
Akiwumi Barrister-at-Law, that
he knew as far back as 1923 that
he had to
pay 10 per cent interest. It is
also clear from his letter to
the London Office, exhibit " X "
to which I have previously
referred, that he knew he had to
pay high interest with monthly
rests.
Then again, on referring to a
letter dated the 17th August,
1921, from the Bank to the
plaintiff which was admitted in
evidence as Exhibit" I," which
reads as follows :-
"DEAR SIR,
•• Sometime ago, our Head Office
advised us that they were not
willing to continue giving
overdrafts against mortgage at
rates of interest less than 10
per cent.
" As your mortgages only permit
us to charge 8 per cent, we
shall be obliged if you will
confirm to us that you agree to
the increased charge .
•• We hope to be able to advise
you at an early date that the
rates of interest have been
reduced again.
Yours faithfully,
J. C. PATRICK, Manager .••
and to the reply from the
plaintiff dated the 18th August,
1921 (exhibit" J ") in which the
plaintiff stated as follows :-
•• I accept and confirm the
terms of your letter under
reply, and will confine myself
to the rate of 10 per cent until
your Head Office directs the
necessary reduction as they may
think fit in the near future.
Yours faithfully,
S. DAVID PAPPOE."
it will be seen that the
plaintiff admitted the
defendants' right to charge
interest at the rate of 10 per
cent and this act on his part
constitutes knowledge and
acquiescence.
In my opinion there was
overwhelming evidence in the
Court below, apart from the
question of the pass book, to
justify the Chief Justice in
coming to the conclusion that
there was knowledge and
acquiescence on the part of the
plaintiff in regard to the
interest which was being charged
him by the defendants.
I see no reason therefore to
dissent from this finding of
fact.
Dealing next with heading (4),
Mr. Phipps referred to the three
mortgages, dated 11th July,
1919, 15th September, 1919 and
17th August, 1921, respectively
which were admitted in evidence
as exhibits" D " " E
I'
and "H." He submitted that the
wording of these deeds did not
give the Bank the right to
charge capitalised interest with
monthly rests, but they were
only justified in charging
simple interest at the rate of 8
per cent per annum. Exhibit" H "
was a mortgage to secure an
overdraft of £2,000. He further
submitted that before the
execution of exhibit "H," the
plaintiff's account so far as
£6,000 was concerned, was
closed.
At the date of that deed the
plaintiff had paid in the whole
of his fixed deposit. As far as
that amount of £6,000 was
concerned, therefore, the
position between the parties was
that of mortgagor and mortgagee,
and the Bank could not therefore
charge more than 8 per cent
interest.
As regards exhibits" I " and" J
" he contended that a mere
verbal agreement could not vary
the terms of the mortgages which
were deeds under seal.
In dealing with the question of
these mortgages, the learned
Chief Justice at page 58 of the
record stated as follows :-
" Now of course it is obvious
that when a solemn deed has been
entered into between banker and
customer under which the
customer conveys securities to
the Bank by way of mortgage for
securing a certain sum with
interest at a certain definite
rate, the relation between the
customer and the banker is •
prima facie' one of mortgagor
and mortgagee, and the banker is
precluded from charging more
than the interest prescribed in
the deed so long as it regulates
the relations between the
parties. The mortgages in this
case, however, were all of them
given not for the purpose of
securing an ascertained balance
of an overdrawn account but to
secure a further fluctuating
overdraft up to a certain
amount. The recitals of the deed
did not correspond with the
actualities since in both" D "
and" E " it was expressly
stipulated that the mortgagor
should repay any sums advanced
together with the usual
interest, commission and lawful
bank charges, and it was only if
after the account was closed any
balance remained due to the Bank
that it was stipulated that
interest at 8 per cent should be
paid on that balance. The
account had in fact never been
closed and the condition had not
therefore arisen under which
interest at 8 per cent became
payable. The deed of 17th
August, 1921, moreover was
expressed to be supplemental to
the two previous deeds and
provided for payment of interest
in exactly the same manner as
had been done in them .
•• Construing the three deeds
together, therefore, I am of
opinion that notwithstanding the
recitals in the deed of 17th
August, 1921, I am bound to hold
that the Bank were entitled to
charge interest on the whole of
the current account."
On referring to exhibit" A "
which appears at page 97 of the
~. D. record it will be seen
that in April, 1921, the sum of
£6,000 was still shewn in
the plaintiff's current account
as not being withdrawn.
In my opinion therefore the
learned Chief Justice was right
in holding that at the date of
the execution of exhibit "H" the
Ag: c.]. plaintiff's account had
not in fact been closed, and
therefore the position of
mortgagor and mortgagee did not
arise.
As regards exhibts " I " and "
J," the learned Chief Justice in
the course of his judgment
stated as follows :-
" In their view of what the
mortgages permitted, both the
plaintiff and the defendants
were, I consider, mistaken, but
the important thing is that the
plaintiff by letter ".J"
confirmed the previous charge of
10 per cent and agreed to the
same rate being charged in
future until the Head Office
directed the necessary
reduction. Such an agreement was
of course a perfectly valid
variation of the contract by
mutual agreement, the
consideration of which to the
plaintiff was that the Bank
would not call in the money if
he agreed to pay the interest,
and it would avail to alter the
deed whether the deed had the
effect which plaintiff contends
or that which I say it had-ie.
to allow the Bank to charge the
usual interest commission and
lawful Bank charges so long as
the account was open; 8 per cent
when it was closed."
As the validity of the contract
created by exhibits" I " and "
.J " has been questioned by Mr.
Phipps, it will be as well for
me to refer to the case of
Nash v. Armstrong
10
C.B. (N.S.)
259, in which it was held that
parties to a deed can only
discharge their obligations by
deed, yet they may make a parol
contract which creates
obligations separate from the
deed, and even substantially at
variance with the deed. In the
present case, the parol
agreement created by exhibits "
I " and " J " did not vary the
contract as between mortgagor
and mortgagee but only as
between banker and customer, the
rate of interest as between
mortgagor and mortgagee still
remaining the same as in the
deeds.
Dealing now with the last
heading. It was contended by Mr.
Phipps that the plaintiff's
current account had been
definitely closed on the 18th of
November, 1922, in view of the
fact that the plaintiff stopped
operating his account on that
date. He contended therefore
that the Chief Justice was wrong
in holding that it had only been
closed on the 11th of February,
1932, when the plaintiff settled
it by paying in the balance then
standing in the Bank's ledger.
Apart from the fact that five
cheques were proved to have been
drawn by the plaintiff as set
out at pages 144 and 145 of the
record after the 18th of
November, 1922, it is clear from
Mr. Kirk's evidence which
appears at page 35 of the
record, where he states that the
plaintiff took out his pass book
in December, 1922, and to the
plaintiff's own admission at
page 23, where he stated that he
did not deny that he may have
had his pass book out in
December, 1922, among other
dates, that he must have known
that his account was not closed
on the 18th of November, 1922.
In conclusion, I may say that
after carefully considering all
the evidence in the Court below,
notwithstanding the very able and
lucid manner in which the case has
been put in before us by Counsel
for the appellant, I see no reason
for setting aside the judgment of
the Court below.
The appeal must therefore be
dismissed with costs assessed at
the sum of £48 Os. 6d.
The Court below to carry out.
KINGDON, C.J. NIGERIA.
I
have had the advantage of reading
the judgment of the learned
President of the Court and I
concur therewith.
BARTON, ACTING J.
I
concur. |