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SETH ASANTE v. NANA YAW BOAKYEM, (SUB. BY ERIC O. BAIDOO) OPANIN KWAME ATIA [18TH JUNE 2002] CA/NO. 173/2001.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

ACCRA – GHANA

---------------------------

CORAM:     OMARI-SASU, JA (PRESIDING)

 OWUSU-ANSAH, JA.

          AMONOO-MONNEY, JA

CA/NO. 173/2001

18TH  JUNE 2002

SETH ASANTE                                       :             PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

VRS.

1.   NANA YAW BOAKYEM

     (SUB. BY ERIC O. BAIDOO)

2.   OPANIN KWAME ATIA                 :               DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

____________________________________________________________________________

 

 

_

JUDGMENT

OMARI-SASU, J.A:

The Plaintiff-Respondent who will henceforth be referred to simply as the Respondent sued the Defendants-Appellants who will henceforth be referred to as the Appellants in the High Court, Koforidua which was presided over by Mrs. Sophia Adinyira J. (as she then was) for

(a) Declaration of title to land at Senchi in the Eastern Region of the Republic of Ghana measuring about 70.91 acres

(b)  ¢3million general damages for trespass and

(c)  perpetual injunction to restrain the Appellants from further entry onto the land in dispute.

At the end of the trial the learned trial Judge on 25th June 1998 entered Judgment for the Respondent and gave him title to the said land.

The Respondent was awarded damages for trespass by the Appellants and the Appellants were restrained from further entry onto the land.

They appealed against the said judgment and grounds of Appeal and written submissions have been filed on behalf of the litigants herein by their respective Counsel. For the purpose of  this judgment I shall deal with the original ground alleging  that the Judgment is against the weight of evidence and the second ground which alleges that the case of the Defendants was not adequately considered but before then I shall state the brief facts of the case which are not mainly in dispute.

The Respondent is son of one Kwame Amoaforo (deceased) who hailed from Jakiti in Akwamu Traditional Area of the Eastern Region and he says his late father in the year 1950 bought the land in dispute for £200 from one Isaac Mensavi Dugbatey, an Ada-man who had lived at Senchi but had decided to go to his home town for good.

The sale was evidenced in writing in 1960 and was consented to by late Nana Kwafo Akoto, the Omanhene of Akwamu Traditional Area and witnessed by two of his elders.

The late Kwame Amoaforo was succeeded by his nephew Kwaku Osei who is said to have gifted the land in dispute to Respondent and his brothers and sisters.

The Respondent had said in the court below that the Appellant had been engaging in acts of harassment against the Respondent and had sold out portions of the disputed land to others.

The 1st Appellant on his part claimed in the court below that the property in dispute formed part of his stool property and admitted entering upon it and granting portions to others including the 2nd Defendant but he says he performed these acts in his capacity as Mankrado of Senchi.                      

From the processes filed the main contention of the Appellants is that the Respondent had no capacity to sue and also he was not entitled to a declaration of title and the other reliefs he claimed.

On capacity: Respondent’s case is that the property was gifted to him, his brothers and sisters by the customary successor of his late father called Osei Kwaku and they gave this Osei Kwaku customary “aseda” in the shape of a live ram and drinks.

The Appellants contend that even if late Amoaforo had bought the land (which is denied) on his death intestate the land would become the property of Amoaforo’s family at Jakiti and thus the customary successor had no right of his own to gift the land to Respondent and his brothers and sisters, without the consent of the head of Amoaforo’s family and his elders. In our case there was no such consent thus the Respondent had no capacity to sue for declaration of title and the other reliefs.

I accept the contention by the Appellants on this issues as a correct statement of the customary law concerning gifts inter vivos of land. The Donor must own the property he intends to gift.

Since on the death intestate of late Mr. Amoaforo his family had appointed his nephew Osei as customary successor, the land in dispute if it belonged to late Amoaforo had become his family property. The Head and principal members must have approved of the gift and the Acceptance must have been followed by “Aseda” which should have been given to the family publicly and not to Osei privately.

See:

1.   Sarbah  Customary Laws 3rd Edn page 80-82

2.   Danquah – Akan Laws and Customs page 219

3.   Bentsi-Enchil—Ghana Land Law pages 360-370

4.   Ollenu—Customary Land Law 2nd Edn pages 120-121

5.   Da. Rocha & Lodoh—Ghana Land Law pages 238-240

6.   Woodman Ghana Land Law  pages 358-361

7.  ASARE v. Kumorji (S.C) Supreme Court of Ghana Law Report [2000] 298 at 302.

From the Record of proceedings, it is clear that no evidence was led to show that the Amoaforo family who allegedly owned the property in dispute ever consented to the making of the alleged gift. That alleged gift therefore fails and I find that the Respondent herein had no capacity to sue the Appellants. This would have disposed of the case but I will comment briefly on the ground that the judgment is against the weight of evidence adduced.

In the court below the Respondent was granted title to the disputed land for the learned trial judge, thought with the Omanhene of Akwamu Traditional Area consenting to the “sale” between Dugbatey and Amoaforo everything was right and proper.

A close look at Exh A (the title deed which the Respondent tendered in the Court below) shows that nowhere in the document is any mention made of Dugbatey’s root of title.

The property was said to be senchi stool property before it came to the possession of Dugbatey yet no stool occupant of Senchi signed Exh. A. The question then is who gave or “sold” the land to Dugbatey before he came to “sell” it to late Amoaforo? The record does not provide an answer. The 1st Appellant is said to have witnessed the alleged sale of the disputed property to Amoaforo but he denies this and an examination of Exh. A shows that 1st Appellant had nothing to do with the transaction.

The record rather shows that from the answers PW1 gave in cross-examination the 1st Appellant had sold portion of the land to others. Thus the Respondent should have called some of the boundary or adjourning owners e.g Otinkorang and Amartey who are mentioned in Exh A to testify.

Strangely the Respondent on whose shoulders lay the burden of proving that he was entitled to a declaration of title failed to call the occupant of stool that owned the land in dispute or any of the principal member of the said stool who were Dugbatey’s vendor(s) to testify.

It is my candid view that the Respondent failed to discharge his evidential burden to prove title. He also had no capacity to sue and was therefore not entitled to a declaration of title and the other reliefs granted. 

See:

1.  Ogbame – Tetteh v. Ogbame- Tetteh [1993-94] 1 GLR 353 (Holding 4) and

2.  Odametey  v. Clocuh [1989-90] 1 GLR 14 (HOLDING 1)

The appeal should accordingly be allowed and the judgment of the court below set aside.

K. OMARI-SASU

JUSTICE OF APPEAL

AMONOO-MONNEY, JA:

I agree that the appeal be allowed for the reasons given by my brother Omari-Sasu, JA. I will, however, add some words of my own in respect of a related aspect of the case.

2. By a writ of summons filed on 7th July 1988 at the Koforidua High Court, the Plaintiff/Respondent commenced an action “for himself and on behalf of the other children of late Opanin Kwame Amoaforo” against the Defendants/Appellants claiming:

“(a)  A declaration of title to the land more particularly described in the Schedule hereunder.

(b)    ¢5,000,000.00 General Damages for Trespass.

(c)  An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents/servants and privies from further entry unto the land”

3.  In the accompanying Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff averred that

“(3) In his lifetime Plaintiff’s father in 1950 acquired the land at Senchi …… from one Isaac Mensavi Dugbatey.

 “(4) The said purchase was later evidenced in writing and registered with the Lands Registry as No. 2115/1960.

  “(5) Plaintiff’s father was in occupation of this land until his death in 1962.

 “(6) Upon his death, the property was succeeded to by Plaintiff’s father’s nephew who in turn gifted same to the Plaintiff and his other brothers and sisters”. In their Statement of Defence filed on 14th November 1988 the Defendants/Appellants also averred that:                                                                                                    

  “(4) The Defendants vehemently deny paragraph 3 of the claim and say that the 1st Defendant took possession of a larger tract of land including the land which is the subject matter of dispute in 1942 when he became Mankrado of Senchi

“(5) Further to paragraph 4 above the 1st Defendant says that in 1943 one Ocansey sued him in respect of the said land and judgment was given in favour of the 1st Defendant who has since been in possession. The one by name Isaac Mensah Dugbatey has never owned any portion of the 1st Defendant’s land.

 “(8) Paragraph 6 is vehemently denied and the Defendants say that the land in dispute has never been transferred to the Plaintiff’s father nor the father’s nephew. Any purported gift therefore is of no legal consequence, is null and void and cannot pass any interest or title to the land.” The Defendants also denied that the Plaintiff’s father and the Plaintiff and his brothers and sisters, had never been in occupation or possession of the land .

4.  At the end of the trial the Court below gave judgment for the Plaintiff. It is from this decision that the appellants have appealed to this Court on the original grounds that :—

 “(a)  The judgment is against the weight of evidence

 (b)  The  judge failed to consider the case of the  Defendant.” On 14th September 2001 Counsel for the appellants filed an application for leave to amend the grounds of appeal by adding further grounds of appeal. On 9th May, 2002 this Court granted the application and directed Counsel for the respondent to file a supplementary Statement of Case in response to the additional grounds of appeal. I will refer to only one additional ground namely, that “ The learned Judge erred in law by her finding for the plaintiff that a customary gift inter vivos of the over 70 (seventy) acres disputed land was proved to have passed title to plaintiff and his siblings when the only evidence adduced before the court was that the said gift inter vivos of the self-acquired property of an intestate deceased member of a matrilineal family was made to plaintiff and his siblings (the deceased’s children) solely by the customary successor, all by himself without any publicity whatsoever and more importantly, without the knowledge, consent, involvement and concurrence of the Abusuapanyin (Head of Family) AND/OR the other members of that matrilineal lineage supposed to have been directly and adversely affected by the purported transfer and alienation of the 70-acre land to the children (i.e. the plaintiff and his siblings) who were not members of the matrilineal family”. It appears almost all the additional grounds of appeal and certainly the one I have just referred to sin against rule 8(5) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19) which states that “The grounds of appeal shall set out concisely and under distinct heads the grounds upon which the appellant intends to rely at the hearing of the appeal without any argument or narrative and shall be numbered consecutively” (emphasis supplied).

5.  Counsel for the respondent’s answer to this ground of appeal is in these terms  “There is also a submission made at page 27 of the appellants’ Statement of Case that the land which Amoaforo purchased from Dugbatey became family land upon the death of Amoaforo so Kwaku Osei had no authority to give same to Amoaforo’s children without the knowledge and consent of Amoaforo’s family and without customary publicity given to the gift. The submission borders on absurdity to say the least. There is no shred of evidence in the Record that Amoaforo purchased the land with assistance from any member of his family, neither did he purchase it with proceeds from his family’s property. Throughout the proceeding the fact that Amoaforo bought the land for himself and it thus became a self-acquired property is not lost even on a cursory reader. Being a self-acquired property, Amoaforo was entitled to deal with it in  anyway he chose……. There was no need on the part of plaintiff to call a witness to  corroborate the evidence of plaintiff and PW2 on the gift because the appellants did not challenge the statements by the plaintiff and PW2 on the gift”. It must be noted that the interests of PW2, Elizabeth Amoaforo and Adwoa Adwaase, elder sister of the  Plaintiff/Respondent and the Plaintiff/Respondent himself in the subject matter of  this case, are the same. In fact by the writ the Plaintiff sued “for himself and on behalf of the other children of late Opanin Kwame Amoaforo”. She is indeed also a plaintiff and cannot, stricto sensu, be regarded as a disinterested witness for the cause of her brother. She cannot therefore be properly said to “corroborate” the evidence given by her designated  Plaintiff/Respondent  brother.

6. The Plaintiff/Respondent was at pains to establish the title of his late father to the property in dispute. The question may be asked, why didn’t  he rather concentrate on establishing the title to the property of his alleged GRANTOR, Kwaku Osei, his late father’s nephew who was his father’s customary successor, even assuming that his father’s title was not  defective? There is no evidence that Plaintiff/Respondent’s father in his lifetime made any testamentary disposition or devise of the property in dispute or that he made any inter vivos disposition of it. By customary law a person’s self-acquired property prior to the enactment of the Intestate Succession Law, 1985 (PNDCL 111) on 14th June, 1985 became family property upon his death intestate. See AMARFIO V. AYORKOR 14 WACA 554, MILLS V. ADDY [1958] 3 WALR 357, and KWAKYE V TUBA AND OTHERS [1961] GLR (Part II) 535. The Plaintiff/Respondent’s father, Opanin Kwame Amoaforo, is said to have died in 1962 and there is no evidence that his  customary successor, Kwaku Osei, was also Head of Opanin Kwame Amoaforo’s family. Whether as customary successor or even as Head of Family, Opanin Amoaforo’s self-acquired property on his death intestate did not devolve on Kwaku Osei. Therefore even assuming, once again, that Opanin Amoaforo’s title was valid, Kwaku Osei did not acquire any title to the property which personally, or by himself, he could effectively, validly, and lawfully transfer to anybody, be he even a son of the deceased. The late Amoaforo, by the evidence, hailed from Jakiti and if his nephew was his customary successor then he belonged to the matrilineal family.

7.  For these reasons as well, I agree that the appeal be allowed.

J. C. AMONOO-MONNEY

JUSTICE OF APPEAL 

OWUSU-ANSAH, JA:

I agree.

P. K. OWUSU-ANSAH

JUSTICE OF APPEAL

COUNSEL

*vdm*

 
 

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