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SHATCO (GH) LIMITED v. KWAPACO LIMITED, RICHARD K. APPIAH [13TH JUNE, 2002] CA/NO. 59/2001

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

THE COURT OF APPEAL

ACCRA – GHANA

_________________

CORAM:  BROBBEY, JA (PRESIDING)

GBADEGBE, JA.

AMONOO-MONNEY, JA.

                                                                                                          CA/NO. 59/2001

13TH JUNE, 2002.

SHATCO (GH) LIMITED                 :             PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

VRS.

1.  KWAPACO LIMITED

2.  RICHARD K. APPIAH                :             DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS

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JUDGMENT

BROBBEY, JA:

This is an appeal from the decision of Benin, JA. Sitting as an additional Justice of the High Court in which he gave judgment in favour of the Plaintiff/Respondent.

The case arose out of business transaction between the Defendant/Appellant and the Respondent. Simply stated, the business took the form of orders for some goods being made by the Respondent from overseas; when they arrived in Ghana, the Appellant was to inform the Respondent of the arrival.  The Respondent would then issue an invoice to cover the goods that have arrived and indeed if there were to be short falls the Respondent would make good the difference.

According to the Respondent, goods were ordered on invoice Number 101 and 152 on Appellant’s LPO Numbers 11139 dated 29th June 1994 and 20826 dated 12th January 1995 at the total value of $281,828.25.  The goods were delivered.  The Appellants paid $65,675.41 leaving a balance of $216,153.14.  It was that amount that the Respondent sued for.

The case of the Appellants is that the second Appellant developed friendship, love and trust with the managing director of the Respondent Company. That relationship resulted in the managing director visiting the offices of the Appellants and collecting not only rubber stamp but also documents some of which related to previous transactions and replacing them with fake ones.  It was through the use of those fake documents that the Respondents laid claim to goods allegedly supplied to the appellants but which in fact had not been supplied.

The Appellants accused the Managing Director of breach of trust by the unauthorized use of the rubber stamp and documents.  They further accused him of fraud, the particulars of which they gave as follows:—

i.    Obtaining blank copies of the Appellant’s letter-heads,

ii.   Using the letter-heads to clear goods from Togo,

iii. Using the letter-heads to write letters purporting them to have been written by the second Appellant.

iv.  Using the documents to claim from the Appellants goods which the appellants had never applied for.

It was part of the case of the appellants that they never received the goods that formed the subject matter of the Respondent’s claims but that all the goods supplied to them were paid for.

The trial Judge dismissed the Appellant’s contention and entered judgment in favour of the Respondent.  It was against the judgment that the Appellants appealed to this Court.

The Appellants filed only these two grounds of appeal, namely:

1.  That the judgment was against the weight of evidence and

2.  The Judge erred in deciding that no payment had been made in respect of the first batch of goods and also in deciding that the second of batch of goods arrived in Ghana.

No additional grounds of appeal were filed.

The well-established rule is that where the Appellant contends that the judgment is against the weight of evidence, he assumes the burden of showing from the evidence that that was so.  There are several authorities on this principle, one of which is BOATENG V. BOATENG [1987-88] 2 GLR 81.

At the trial Court, the entire case was decided on facts.  It was therefore not surprising that in this appeal too, the Appellants have confined their appeal to only factual matters.

All the issues of fact raised at the trial were exhaustively considered and disposed of by the trial judge.  It must also be stated emphatically that every single finding of fact that he made was convincingly supported by the evidence on the record.

Before, us none of the said findings has been shown to be unreasonable and or perverse.

This is an appellate court and we are not placed in the same position as the trial court which heard the evidence and observed the demeanors of the witnesses and parties out of which it decided on  their credibility. We as the appellant court have no basis to interfere with the findings of facts or substitute our own views on the facts for those of the trial court.  The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.

The Respondents claimed interest up to the date of payment.  That is not supported out by law. The correct legal position under LN. 140A is that interest is payable on the amount claimed up to today, the date of judgment. After today, interest on the judgment debt will be regulated by order LN. 140A.

 S. A. BROBBEY

JUSTICE OF APPEAL

GBADEGBE, JA.:

I agree.

 N. S. GBADEGBE

JUSTICE OF APPEAL.

AMONOO-MONNEY, JA:

I also agree.

J. C. AMONOO-MONNEY

 JUSTICE OF APPEAL.

COUNSEL

*vdm*

 
 

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