HOME  UNREPORTED CASES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF GHANA 2007

 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA.

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                             CORAM:       ATUGUBA, J.S.C.(PRESIDING)

MRS. WOOD, J.S.C.

                                                BROBBEY, J.S.C.

ANSAH, J.S.C.

MRS. ADINYIRA,J.S.C.

 

 

CIVIL APPEAL

NO. J4/18/2006

 

14TH JANUARY 2007.

 

   T H E     R E P U B L I C

 

                 VRS.

 

1. NANA OSEI BONSU ll, MAMPONGHENE                                                        

2.  BUSUAPANIN ALEX OSEI BONSU                          RESPONDENTS/APPELLANTS/

3. NANA YAA ADWUBI;                                               APPELLANTS.                                                                             

 EX PARTE: OBAAPANIN AFUA AMADIE                    APPLICANTS/RESPONDENT          OBAAPANIN AFUA BUOR    

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                                                         J   U   D   G   M   E  N   T

  

 BROBBEY, J S C. This case started when two contestants were vying to be installed as the queenmother of Asante Mampong. One will be described as the nominee of the first appellant. The other contestant was Nana Yaa Adwubi, the third respondent. The case of the appellants was that first appellant’s nominee intimated to the Mamponghene, the first respondent, that she was interested in being considered for installation as the queenmother of Asante Mampong. When the nominee’s supporters realized that the first respondent was bent on nominating the third respondent in preference to her, they filed a petition in the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs asking for the following reliefs:

 

(a) A declaration that members of the Botase Royal family are eligible to occupy both male and female stools of Mampong.

(b) A declaration that, without having taken a decision on the application of the first appellant’s nominee, the first respondent’s nomination of the third respondent as the queenmother of Mampong was contrary to custom and void.

© A further declaration that adequate consideration be given to the candidature of the first appellant’s nominee and since the first and second respondents had failed to do that they were in breach of their customary duty.

(d) An order compelling the first and second respondents to follow the customary procedure in installing a queenmother for Mampong.

(e) An  order restraining the first and second respondents from going ahead to install the third respondent as the queenmother of Mampong.

 

 The petition was filed on 22 February, 2000. On the next day of 23 February, a motion for injunction was filed to restrain the first and second respondents from installing the third respondent as the queenmother of Mampong. The appellants contended further that notwithstanding the motion, the first and second respondents went ahead and installed the third respondent as the queenmother of Asante Mampong on 29 February 2000. On 5 April 2000, they filed a motion in the High Court to attach the three respondents for contempt of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs. According to the appellants, the basis of the allegation of contempt was that on 7th February 2000 there was a meeting of the Mamponghene and the Mampong Traditional Council at which the issue of nomination of the queenmother was discussed: The actual enstoolment was conducted on 29 February 2000 while the petition and motion for injunction were already pending. The enstoolment therefore constituted contempt of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs that made the injunction order. The respondents on the other hand contended that on 7th February 2000 the nomination and installation took place before the appellants filed their petition and obtained the order of injunction.

 

 

The High Court granted the motion, convicted and sentenced them to various fines in lieu of which certain terms of imprisonment were imposed on them. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal which allowed the appeals. It is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal that the appellants appealed to this court.

 

Before this court, the grounds of appeal filed were that:

“I. The Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that the enstoolment and installation of the third respondent as Mamponghemaa took place on the same day she was nominated as Mampong-hemaa-elect on 7th November 2000 when there was no iota of evidence to support that finding.

ii. The honorable court erred in allowing the appeal of the appellants on the ground that their conviction for contempt was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt in the teeth of overwhelming affidavit evidence.

iii. The honorable court erred in holding that viva voce evidence ought to have been led at the High Court, Kumasi, where the contempt proceedings were conducted.

iv. The judgment is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence on record.

v. Additional grounds to be filed upon receipt of the certified copies of the records of proceedings and judgment/ruling.”

 

The appellants filed two additional grounds which were that:

“a. That the Court of Appeal shirked its duty of calling oral evidence as a court of re-hearing thus occasioning a miscarriage of justice.

b. that since the court was of the opinion that a reference should have been made to the appropriate customary body for the determination of the custom, it failed in its duty to make such reference, thus falling into the same error as it had accused the trial court of making; such failure occasioning a grave miscarriage of justice.”

 

It will be observed that ground three of the original grounds and the two additional grounds more or less covered the same ground and will be considered together.

 

 

The most essential issue to be resolved in the case were the nature and effect of what took place on 7 February 2000. A resolution of the issue calls for a determination as to what constitutes enstoolment of a queen mother in Ashanti Mampong. Both parties gave what they considered to be enstoolment in Ashanti Mampong. It was the case of the appellant that on that day, the third respondent was merely nominated by the first respondent as the queenmother of her choice but actual enstoolment was postponed to 29 February. The respondents on the other hand maintained that what took place on that 7 February amounted to enstoolment.

 

To resolve the conflict in the two versions, it has been argued that the trial court should have ordered investigation into the exact nature of the custom that prevails in Ashanti Mampong for the enstoolment of a queenmother. For two main reasons, there was no need for the order: First, because the affidavit evidence on the record was sufficient to resolve the issue; and secondly if  investigations were to be ordered, it appears that no higher authorities could have given testimony of the alleged custom than the very people who at the trial court provided information on the custom in question: They were the Mamponghene himself, the Abusuapanin of the  Botase family, the family to which the appellants belonged, the Krontihene and Akwamuhene of Mampong, and Nana Afua Saka, a principal member of the Botase Royal family. All these swore to various affidavits which were used to support one side or the other of the disputed custom. Ground iii of the original grounds of appeal and the two additional grounds of appeal therefore fail and are dismissed.  

 

A consideration of ground one of the grounds of appeal will entail examination of the evidence on the record. Similarly, ground four which attacks the judgment of the Court of Appeal as being against the weight of the evidence will involve an examination of the evidence. Grounds one and four will therefore be considered together.

 

As the evidence stood, the appellants insisted that after the nomination that  took place on 7 February 2000 there were other customs to be performed before installation would be complete: They included confinement, placing of the queenmother-elect on the stool, the handing over of stool regalia to the queenmother-elect and introduction to the Asantehemaa.

 

On the other hand, the respondents contended that the installation comprised the Mamponghene consulting families authorized to put forward names of contestants for prospective queenmothers, making his choice out of the names of contestants, disclosing his choice to the kingmakers at a meeting with them and if his choice was accepted, to inform the winning contestant,  who then accepts the offer by giving thanks to the Omanghene and the kingmakers. According to the respondents, whatever would be done thereafter in connection with the enstoolment would be formalities and would not form part of the installation process.

 

The court had to decide the case on affidavit evidence. It was however not impossible to come to conclusion on the issues. To determine which of the two conflicting versions to accept, one has to consider the source from where the information came. The information of the appellant was from Nana Afua Saka, a principal member of the Botase Royal family of Mampong. The trial judge accepted her version that what took place on 7 February was only nomination and not installation or enstoolment. In support of that he relied on provision of the 1992 Constitution and the Chieftaincy Act, 1971(Act 370) and dictionary meanings of some of the expression used to define the requisites for installing a chief or queenmother.

 

There is no doubt about the requirements for enstooling a chief as stated in the 1992 Constitution and Act 370. These were that the candidate should hail from the appropriate family; he should belong to the appropriate lineage within the family; and he must be nominated, selected and installed in accordance with customary law.  The first point that militated against the analysis of the trial judge was that there was not a single affidavit from any other principal members of the Botase Royal family who filed an affidavit in support of the allegations of Nana Afua Saka on the requirements for enstooling a queenmother in Mampong. Additionally, she alleged that she knew the customs in question because she had been acting queenmother of Mampong from 1993 to February 2000. That turned out to be untrue. The affidavit in which she deposed to that fact was filed on 11 January 2004. In an affidavit filed by the Senior Registrar of Mampong Traditional Council and supported by minutes of the council meting, there was clear evidence that she ceased to be acting Mamponghemaa from 1994 and this was brought to her notice. The capacity in which she claimed to know the Asante Mampong custom on enstoolment having been proved false and seriously undermined, the trial judge erred in relying on her affidavit to conclude that her version was the truth.

 

As against that, the version of the respondents on the custom was supported by the Krontihene, Akwamuhene and Abusuapanin of the Bretuo Botase Royal family. These are people who can certainly be considered as knowledgeable in the customs of Asante Mampong. They all swore affidavits to deny the allegations of the principal member of the family. Between the two versions, the allegations of the respondents were more credible.

 

What the respondents established was that the events of 7 February constituted the custom for the installation of the queenmother of Asante Mampong. It is important to bear in mind when dealing with customs of various people in this country that customs differ from one traditional area to the other. What may be the essential practice in one area may not necessarily be the practice in another area. This principle is emphasized by the 1992 Constitution, art. 11(3) which defines customary law as “the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana.”

 

There are several features of customary law pertaining to installation of queenmothers. They include confinement, outdooring to the populace, presentation of the queenmother- elect to the overlord chief and others. It is the stool elders and kingmakers who decide which aspect of the custom will be applicable to a particular area. There are basic rules which are applicable to specific areas. But rules on aspects of custom do not apply with equal force in all areas. While compliance with one rule will be imperative in one area, it may either not apply at all or be applicable but not subject to the same force and compulsion as its application in another area. This is the essence of the constitutional provision that customary law is the rule of law which by custom is applicable to particular communities in Ghana. It is important to note that the provision does not refer to general application to all communities in Ghana.

 In the instant case, the respondents, led by the first respondent, Omanghene of Asante Mampong himself, and supported by other customary authorities of the area, deposed in affidavits that the enstoolment of queenmothers in Asante Mampong comprises the following:

  1. Request by the Omanghene to the appropriate families to put forward names of candidates to be considered as queenmothers.
  2. Submission of names of the eligible candidates through established queenmothers already at post.
  3. Decision by the Omanghene on his choice from the names submitted
  4. Disclosing his choice of queenmother to stool elders and kingmakers at a meeting with them.
  5. Approval of that choice by the kingmakers and stool elders.
  6. Acceptance by the queenmother-elect who then gives thanks to the Omanghene and the kingmakers.
  7. Introduction of the queenmother-elect to the public.

 

 

After these, the stool regalia will be handed over to her, including the stool on which queenmother-elect may sit. The argument of the appellants that the installation is incomplete without the queenmother-elect being seated on a stool or being in possession of the stool regalia is untenable. Republic v Sito l; Ex parte Fordjour [2001-2002] SCGLR 322 at page 338, explains circumstances when enstoolment can be valid even where the person installed is not seated on a stool. In that case, the stool regalia were in the possession of the opponent who would not make it available for use by the person nominated and yet the installation was ruled as valid by the Brong Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs and the National House of Chiefs. In the instant case, Nana Afua Saka who opposed the nomination of the third respondent deposed to an affidavit that the stool regalia were in her custody: In fact, she added that the stool room had to be broken into and the stool regalia forcibly removed by the Okyeame and others. She reported the incident to the police. Like the situation in Ex parte Fordjour, if the installation took place without the stool regalia, it was because those opposed to the installation would not make the stool regalia available. How can the same people turn round to complain that the installation was not complete because of the unavailability of stool regalia and the stool to sit on? It is to avert situations like these where opponents may attempt to frustrate installations that the law in its wisdom validates installations in which the incumbent cannot immediately be made to sit on a stool. It follows therefore that even if the third respondent did not comply with the requirement to possess stool regalia or sit on the stool on February 7, 2000, the non performance of those customs did not invalidate the installation.

 

The respondents contended that the requirements that the queenmother should be introduced to the Asantehemaa was also a formality and not essential part of the installation process. To determine whether that is an essential part of the installation, one has to consider the effect on the installation if it is not performed. The Asantehemaa is not part of the decision-making panel members who have the responsibility to determine the right candidate. It cannot therefore be the case that the introduction  will take place while the decision is in the process of being taken.

The successful candidate is to be queenmother for the people of Asante Mampong. It is only fair that they should be the ones who decide on the person to be queenmother. That is performed on behalf of the people by the stool elders and kingmakers. No one outside Asante Mampong can take it upon himself or her self the right to decide upon a queenmother for them. After the people of Asante Mampong have selected their own queenmother, presenting her to the Asantehene or Asantehemaa can therefore only be a formality based on recognition that within the unitary chieftaincy system prevailing in Ashanti, the over-all female chief of the entire Ashanti Region has to know who are the chiefs in the Region. That is ex post facto function. The installation will first have to take place for the person to be a queen mother for Mampong. She will then have to be introduced, in her capacity as queenmother-elect, to the Asantehemaa who will receive her as the queenmother already installed for Mampong. She will not receive her as a contestant vying to be a queenmother. Obviously, such ex post facto function can only be a formality.

 

According to the respondents, the enumerated seven points form the crux of the installation process in Asante Mampong. Of all the seven points, the most essential one is the decision by the Omanghene on his choice of queenmother out of the candidates submitted. The well established rule is that it is the prerogative of the chief or Omanghene to nominate the person to be queenmother under his rule. According to Chambers 21st Dictionary, second edition, at page 1096, the word “prerogative” means “an exclusive right or position arising from one’s rank or position.” Even more explicit is the definition of that word in Collins English Dictionary, 21st edition, at page 1222 which reads:

 

“An exclusive privilege or right exercised by a person or group of people holding a particular office or hereditary rank.”

 

The connotation of the exclusiveness of the right vested in the chief presupposes that he alone has the right to choose who should be his queen mother. That should be the case because the chief is a traditional ruler and the queenmother is to assist him to rule traditionally. Common sense dictates that the ruler should have the prerogative to select the one he believes can assist him to rule the traditional area, just like the selection of a cabinet minister to assist a head of state to rule a nation.

It is apparent that the problems arising from this case have partly been fanned by comparison between the installation of male chiefs and those of queenmothers. There is no doubt that there are similarities in the installation of male chiefs and queenmothers: These will be found in the personal characteristics that both contestants to a male or female stools should possess, reputation, family qualifications and others; there are at the same time significant differences in the two processes of installation.

For the installation of a male chief, the queenmother has three chances to nominate candidates or her choice: See Boampong v Aboagye [1981] GLR 927, SC. There is no such rule in the installation of a queenmother.  The appellants contended that the queenmother has to be confined. That may be a  requirement in the installation of male and female chiefs. The Omanghene and the stool authorities deposed that confinement was not part of the Asante Mampong custom during the enstoolment of queenmothers.

 

The authorities  require that before deciding on his choice of a queenmother, the chief should consult his kingmakers and stool elders as well as the relevant family members: The decision will be annulled if the relevant family is not consulted, as it happened in In re Kwabeng Stool; Karikari v Ababio ll [2001-2002] SCGLR 515, SC. Consultations with families, stool elders and kingmakers are to ensure that the right decision is taken at the right time. They do not give those consulted the right to make the decision for the chief.

 

In the instant case, the first respondent deposed in an affidavit that he consulted the relevant families before making his choice. That was supported by the minutes of the meeting of February 7 2000 and the fact that at that meeting when the third respondent was announced as the one chosen by the Omanghene, there were over fifteen chiefs and kingmakers present including the Botasehene, Nana Owusu Ansah Ababio who is the head of family of the first appellant. He raised no objection to the nomination, neither did he complain of not having been consulted.  Rather, they unanimously gave approval to the choice of the Omanghene.

 

The evidence on the record showed that there were two contestants in the persons of the third respondent and the first appellant’s nominee. Each contestant passed her request through the appropriate customary sources to reach the Omanghene. He received each request. According the first respondent, he considered each request and finally decided that he preferred the third respondent to the first appellant’s nominee. His choice having been unanimously endorsed by the stool elders and kingmakers at the meeting of February 7, 2000 should have ended the issue as to who should be the queenmother of Asante Mampong.

 

The affidavit evidence of the Omanghene of Asante Mampong, supported by affidavits of stool elders and kingmakers, showed that all the seven points enumerated above were complied with. According to those stool authorities, what took place on February 7 2000 amounted to installation of the queenmother of Asante Mampong. Other traditional areas may lay different emphasis on different aspects of the process of installation but that does not amount to diminution of the process in Asante Mampong. The effect of the evidence is that the constitutional requirements of nomination, selection and installation had been satisfied. The nomination was undoubtedly done by the Omanghene, the first respondent; the selection was done by the stool elders and kingmakers present at the meeting of February 7, 2000. The installation was done on the same day by the Omanghene, stool elders and the kingmakers at that meeting.

 

Much capital was made of the time that it took to install the queenmother. The length of time taken for the installation depends on the customs to be performed. Where for instance confinement is compulsory, the period of confinement alone takes any time from three weeks, two weeks, one week, three days or one day. The period differs from one traditional area to the other. Confinement obviously will make the installation period longer. In the instant case, the evidence from the respondents is that there is no confinement when the queenmother is being installed. If that was the case, the period of installation will certainly be short. That possibly accounted for the installation taking no more than one day. The fact that this particular installation took one day will be no ground for invalidating it.

 

 On the basis that what took place on that day constituted installation of the third respondent, the first ground of appeal failed and is dismissed.

 

Ground two of the grounds of appeal attacked the decision of the Court of Appeal for the reason that the court erred in its ruling that the allegation of contempt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The law is now well settled that contempt of court is a quasi criminal process: The onus of proof required in contempt proceedings is proof beyond reasonable doubt. This is so even in civil cases. As was rightly stated in Comet Products UK Ltd v. Hawkex Plastics Ltd [1971] 1 All E R 1141 at page 1143-1144, CA:

 

“Although this is a civil contempt, it partakes of the nature of a criminal charge. The defendant is liable to be punished for it. He may be sent to prison. The rules as to criminal charges have always been applied to such proceedings. It must be proved with the same degree of satisfaction as in a criminal charge.”

 

The local locus classicus on this seems to be In re Effiduase Stool Affairs (No 2) [1998-99] SCGLR 639. The same principles were applied in Akele v Cofie; Akele (Consolidated) [1979] GLR 84 and Kangah v. Kyere [1979] GLR 458. The trial court and the Court of Appeal articulated the issues clearly and therefore there is no need to elaborate on the principles further. Relating the principles to the facts of the instant case, the affidavit evidence on the record shows that all the above seven points took place on February 7, 2000. That clearly demonstrates that by time the motion for contempt was filed on 23 February 2000, the installation had already been completed. z

 

To be guilty of contempt of court or contempt of the Regional House of Chiefs, there must be conduct, action or omission on the part of the person charged with contempt which tends to undermine the authority of the court or tribunal by interfering with process pending in that court or tribunal. Since the proceedings to be undermined in the instant case did not exist at all at the time when the installation took place, that instillation could not ground a charge of contempt of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs.

 

For all the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

 

The decision of the Court of Appeal is affirmed but on different grounds.

 

 

 

                                                                            W. A. ATUGUBA

                                                                 JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

                                                                                               

 

                                                                                                                                                                                                G. T. WOOD(MRS.)

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREMCOURT

 

 

S. A. B ROBBEY

                                                                 JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

                                                                               J. ANSAH

                                                                 JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

                                                                              S. O.A. ADINYIRA(MRS.)

                                                                 JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

 

COUNSEL

 

Mr. Thomas Hughes for Appellant.

Mr. Kwasi Afrifa for Respondent.

 

 

 

 

 
 

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