Constitutional law –
Interpretation – Supreme Court -
Exercise of its original
jurisdiction - Enforcement or
interpretation – Whether or not
of
Section 30 of Act 32 with the
provisions of section (sic)
17(1) of the 1992 Constitution,
I am referring the matter to the
Supreme Court for interpretation
as to whether or not the
provisions of section 30 of Act
32 is inconsistent with
the provisions of Article 17(1)
of the 1992 Constitution.” -
Rule 67 of the Supreme Court
Rules 1996 C I 16 - Section 30
of Act 32 with the provisions of
section (sic) 17(1) of
the 1992 Constitution
HEADNOTES
The
plaintiff, a lawyer, testified
before the Magistrate that he
had agreed with the defendant
that in exchange for his legal
services to secure damages in
respect of a motor accident that
had killed the defendant’s
sister, the plaintiff would be
paid 15% of any damages that he
would succeed in obtaining in
court. The plaintiff’s conduct
of the case resulted in an award
of 8,000 ghana cedis together
with costs of 1,000 ghana cedis
at the Krobo Odumase Circuit
Court. In the plaintiff’s view,
if interest calculated in
accordance with the provisions
of CI 52, the Court (Award of
Interest and Post Judgement
Interest) Rules, 2005, was added
to the judgment debt against the
tortfeasor the total debt
amounted to 15,000 ghana cedis.
The plaintiff became aggrieved
when the defendant agreed to
allow the judgment debtor to pay
the debt by monthly instalments
of 500 ghana cedis. Accordingly
he brought action against the
defendant for 2,800 ghana cedis,
representing 15% of the judgment
debt. On 22nd
September 2009, the Magistrate
gave the plaintiff judgment by
default on this action. On 30th
October 2009, however, an
application was made on behalf
of the defendant to set that
judgment aside on the ground
that the plaintiff’s writ
against the defendant was for
his legal fees and that by
virtue of section 30(1) of the
Legal Profession Act 1960 (Act
32) the action was a nullity.
The plaintiff’s response to this
application was to argue that
section 30 of Act 32 was
inconsistent with Article 17(1)
of the 1992 Constitution and
therefore not binding. It was
as a result of this argument
that the Magistrate has found it
necessary to refer this case to
this court for interpretation
HELD
In our view,
therefore, the response to the
issue referred to this Court by
the Magistrate is that, in the
context of the facts of this
case, section 30 of the Legal
Profession Act, 1960 is not
inconsistent with the provisions
of Article 17(1) of the 1992
Constitution.
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Supreme Court
Rules 1996 C I 16
Legal
Profession Act 1960 Act 32
CASES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Republic v
Special Tribunal; Ex parte
Akosah [1980] GLR 592
Bimpong-Buta
v General Legal Council
[2003-2004] SCGLR 1200
K. Thimmappa
v Chairman, Central Board of
Directors AIR 2001 SC 467
Kedar Narh
Bajoria v State of W.B. AIR1953
SC 404,
Ayarna &
Anor. V Agyemang & Ors [1976]
1GLR 306
BOOKS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Indian
Constitutional Law,(LexisNexis
Butterworths Wadhwa, 2009, 5th
Ed.) p. 858.) Jain,
V.N. Shukla’s
Constitution of India 11th
Ed. By M.P. Singh (Eastern Book
Company, 2008 at p.47
DELIVERING
THE LEADING JUDGMENT
DR. DATE-BAH,
JSC:-
COUNSEL
T.T. NARTEY
REPRESENTING HIMSELF.
W. L.
ANTHONIO FOR THE DEFENDANT
_________________________________________________________________
R
U L I N G
_________________________________________________________________
DR. DATE-BAH,
JSC:-
This is the
unanimous ruling of the Court on
this reference.
Introduction
His Worship
Ali Baba Abature, the Magistrate
who has in this case made a
reference to this Court, has
exhibited commendable legal
awareness. This is the first
reference that we are aware of
that has come from a
Magistrate’s Court. He is, of
course, well within his rights,
under article 130(2) of the 1992
Constitution, to refer to this
court:
“(a) all
matters relating to the
enforcement or
interpretation of this
Constitution; and
(b) all
matters arising as to whether an
enactment was made in excess of
the powers conferred on
Parliament or any authority or
person by law or under this
Constitution.”
The context
within which this Court will
exercise
its original jurisdiction,
whether by way of a reference or
otherwise, was set out lucidly
by Anin JA in the locus
classicus in
Republic v Special Tribunal; Ex
parte Akosah [1980] GLR 592
at p. 604 as follows (in
relation to the 1979
Constitution):
“From the foregoing dicta, we
would conclude that an issue of
enforcement or interpretation of
a provision of the Constitution
under article 118(1)(a) arises
in any of the following
eventualities:
(a)
where
the words of the provision are
imprecise or unclear or
ambiguous. Put in another way,
it arises if one party invites
the court to declare that the
words of the article have a
double-meaning or are obscure or
else mean something different
from or more than what they say;
(b)
where
the rival meanings have been
placed by the litigants on the
words of any provision of the
Constitution;
(c)
where
there is a conflict in the
meaning and effect of two or
more articles of the
Constitution, and the question
is raised as to which provision
should prevail;
(d)
where
on the face of the provisions,
there is a conflict between the
operation of particular
institutions set up under the
Constitution, and thereby
raising problems of enforcement
and of interpretation.
On the other
hand, there is no case of “enforcement
or interpretation” where the
language of the article of the
Constitution is clear, precise
and unambiguous. In such an
eventuality, the aggrieved party
may appeal in the usual way to a
higher court against what he may
consider to be an erroneous
construction of those words; and
he should certainly not invoke
the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction under article 118.
Again, where the submission made
relates to no more that a proper
application of the provisions of
the Constitution to the facts in
issue, this is a matter for the
trial court to deal with; and no
case for interpretation arises.”
Summing up
the received learning from the
many cases on this issue, I said
in
Bimpong-Buta v General Legal
Council [2003-2004] SCGLR
1200 at p. 1253 that:
“Lower courts may apply
the Constitution, but only the
Supreme Court may, under its
original jurisdiction,
interpret or enforce
the Constitution, within the
meaning discussed above”.
Accordingly,
lower courts are to apply,
themselves, unambiguous
provisions of the Constitution
which come before them, but they
are obliged to refer to this
Court provisions which are
unclear for interpretation or
enforcement. The learned
Magistrate correctly appreciated
this point and, although he did
not fully comply with the
details required to be submitted
to this Court under
Rule 67
of the Supreme Court Rules,
the matter he has submitted to
this Court for interpretation is
interesting and appears to
present a genuine issue for
interpretation. His reference
was in the following terms:
“In view of
the fact that both parties are
linking up the provisions
of
Section 30 of Act 32 with the
provisions of section (sic)
17(1) of the 1992 Constitution,
I am referring the matter to the
Supreme Court for interpretation
as to whether or not the
provisions of section 30 of Act
32 is (sic) inconsistent
with the provisions of Article
17(1) of the 1992 Constitution.”
This
reference thus calls for an
interpretation of article 17 of
the 1992 Constitution on
Equality and Freedom from
Discrimination, which provides
as follows:
“17
(1) All persons shall be
equal before the law.
(2) A
person shall not be
discriminated against on grounds
of gender, race, colour, ethnic
origin, religion, creed or
social or economic status.
(3) For
the purpose of this article,
“discriminate” means to give
different treatment to
different attributable only or
mainly to their respective
descriptions by race, place of
origin, political opinions,
colour, gender occupation,
religion or creed, whereby
persons, of one description are
subjected to disabilities or
restrictions to which persons of
another description are not made
subject or are granted
privileges or advantages which
are not granted to persons or
another description.
(4)
Nothing in this article shall
prevent Parliament from enacting
laws that are reasonably
necessary to provide:-
(a) for
the implementation of polices
and programme aimed at
redressing social, economic, or
educational imbalance in the
Ghanaian society;
(b) for
matters relating to adoption,
marriage, divorce, burial,
devolution of property on death
or other matters of personal
law;
(c)
for the imposition of
restrictions on the acquisition
of land by persons who are not
citizens of Ghana or on the
political and economic
activities of such persons and
for that matters relating to
such persons ; or
(d) for
making different provision for
different communities having
regard to their special
circumstances not being
provision which is inconsistent
with the spirit of this
Constitution.
(5)
Nothing shall be taken to be
inconsistent with this article
which is allowed to be done
under any provision of this
Chapter.”
Interpretation of Article 17
This
reference presents a genuine
issue for interpretation because
the concept of equality embodied
in article 17 is by no means
self-evident. To our mind, it
is clear what article 17 does
not mean. It certainly does not
mean that every person within
the Ghanaian jurisdiction has,
or must have, exactly the same
rights as all other persons in
the jurisdiction. Such a
position is simply not
practicable. Soldiers,
policemen, students and judges,
for instance, have certain
rights that other persons do not
have. The fact that they have
such rights does not mean that
they are in breach of article
17. The crucial issue is
whether the differentiation in
their rights is justifiable, by
reference to an object that is
sought to be served by a
particular statute,
constitutional provision or some
other rule of law. In other
words, article 17(1) is not to
be construed in isolation, but
as part of article 17. This
implies that the equality
referred to in article 17(1) is
in effect freedom from unlawful
discrimination. Article 17(2)
makes it clear that not all
discrimination in unlawful. It
proscribes discrimination based
on certain grounds. The
implication is that
discrimination based on other
grounds may not be unlawful,
depending on whether this Court
distils from article 17(1) other
grounds of illegitimate
discrimination which are not
expressly specified in article
17(2).
Thus, for
instance, in India, the Supreme
Court has there held that mere
differentiation or inequality of
treatment is not per se
equivalent to discrimination
within the proscription
contained in that country’s
equal protection clause. That
clause, which is article 14 of
the Indian Constitution, reads
as follows:
“The State
shall not deny to any person
equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws
within the territory of India.”
The Supreme
Court of India has said in
relation to this clause that:
“When a law
is challenged to be
discriminatory essentially on
the ground that it denies equal
treatment or protection, the
question for determination by
the Court is not whether it has
resulted in inequality but
whether there is some difference
which bears a just and
reasonable relation to the
object of legislation. Mere
differentiation does not per
se amount to
discrimination within the
inhibition of the equal
protection clause. To attract
the operation of the clause it
is necessary to show that the
selection or differentiation is
unreasonable or arbitrary, that
it does not rest on any rational
basis having regard to the
object which the legislature has
in view.” (See
K.
Thimmappa v Chairman, Central
Board of Directors AIR 2001
SC 467. Quoted in
Jain,
Indian Constitutional Law,(LexisNexis
Butterworths Wadhwa, 2009, 5th
Ed.) p. 858.)
This approach
is a reasonable one and flows
from the obvious fact that no
two human beings are equal in
all respects. Accordingly, if
the law were to treat all human
beings rigidly equally, it would
in fact result in unequal
outcomes. Rigid equal treatment
would often result in unfair and
unequal results. Accordingly,
it is widely recognized that
equality before the law requires
equal treatment of those
similarly placed, implying
different treatment in respect
of those with different
characteristics. In simple
terms, equals must be treated
equally, while the treatment of
unequals must be different. The
law must be able to
differentiate between unequals
and accord them the
differentiated treatment which
will result in enabling them, as
far as practicable, to attain
the objective of equality of
outcomes or of fairness. In
effect, equality of opportunity
will often entail the law
treating people differently in
order to give them a fighting
chance of attaining equality of
outcomes or of fairness. If the
differentiated legal rights
arising from such an approach to
the law were to be struck down
as not conforming with the
constitutional prescription that
all persons are equal before the
law, it would be thoroughly
counterproductive.
Indian
constitutional cases have
grappled with this need for
differentiation in order to
attain legitimate legislative
objectives. Thus in
Kedar
Narh Bajoria v State of W.B.
AIR1953 SC 404, at 406
(quoted in
V.N.
Shukla’s Constitution of
India 11th Ed. By
M.P. Singh (Eastern Book
Company, 2008 at p.47) the
Supreme Court of India said:
“The equal
protection of the laws
guaranteed by Article 14 of the
Constitution does not mean that
all the laws must be general in
character and universal in
application and that the State
is no longer to have the power
of distinguishing and
classifying persons or things
for the purposes of
legislation.”
In India, the
test of validity of a statute
which discriminates between
classes of people is whether the
“legislative classification” is
reasonable. The Indian case law
establishes that to pass the
test of permissible
classification two conditions
must be met. These are: first,
the classification must be
founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes
between persons or things that
are grouped together from others
left out the group; and
secondly, the differentia must
have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by
the statute in question. (See
Shukla’s Constitutional of
India pp. 47-48.)
This Indian
approach is a useful one that
can beneficially inform this
Court’s own approach to the
interpretation of article 17.
The constitutional prescription
in Article 17(1) that all
persons shall be equal before
the law should not, and does
not, disable Parliament from
enacting legislation that gives
different rights to different
classes of people, so long as
the differentiation in rights
bears a reasonable relationship
to the legislative purpose that
Parliament is seeking to achieve
and Parliament does not fall
foul of any of the grounds set
out in article 17(2). Of
course, one should also add the
caveat that the legislative
purpose sought to be achieved by
Parliament must be
constitutional. And, one of the
constitutional prescriptions
that must be complied with,
pursuant to article 17(1), is
that a law must operate equally
on all persons similarly
situated. The constitutional
slogan has to be: equals must
be treated equally by the law.
The facts
underlying the reference.
At this
point, it is useful to set out
the facts of the case before the
Magistrate from which this
reference has arisen.
The
plaintiff, a lawyer, testified
before the Magistrate that he
had agreed with the defendant
that in exchange for his legal
services to secure damages in
respect of a motor accident that
had killed the defendant’s
sister, the plaintiff would be
paid 15% of any damages that he
would succeed in obtaining in
court. The plaintiff’s conduct
of the case resulted in an award
of 8,000 ghana cedis together
with costs of 1,000 ghana cedis
at the Krobo Odumase Circuit
Court. In the plaintiff’s view,
if interest calculated in
accordance with the provisions
of CI 52, the Court (Award of
Interest and Post Judgement
Interest) Rules, 2005, was added
to the judgment debt against the
tortfeasor the total debt
amounted to 15,000 ghana cedis.
The plaintiff became aggrieved
when the defendant agreed to
allow the judgment debtor to pay
the debt by monthly instalments
of 500 ghana cedis. Accordingly
he brought action against the
defendant for 2,800 ghana cedis,
representing 15% of the judgment
debt. On 22nd
September 2009, the Magistrate
gave the plaintiff judgment by
default on this action. On 30th
October 2009, however, an
application was made on behalf
of the defendant to set that
judgment aside on the ground
that the plaintiff’s writ
against the defendant was for
his legal fees and that by
virtue of section 30(1) of the
Legal Profession Act 1960 (Act
32) the action was a nullity.
That section provides as
follows:
"A lawyer is
not entitled to commence a suit
for the recovery of fees for a
business done as a barrister or
solicitor until the expiration
of one month after the lawyer
has served on the party to be
charged a bill of those fees ."
The
plaintiff’s response to this
application was to argue that
section 30 of Act 32 was
inconsistent with Article 17(1)
of the 1992 Constitution and
therefore not binding. It was
as a result of this argument
that the Magistrate has found it
necessary to refer this case to
this court for interpretation.
Before we
proceed to consider the
applicability of article 17(1)
to the facts of this case, we
think it appropriate to draw the
attention of courts which make
references to this court to the
need to comply fully with the
relevant rule in the Supreme
Court Rules which provides as
follows:
“PART
VII-REFERENCES TO THE COURT
67. (I) A
reference to the Court for the
determination of any question,
cause or matter pursuant to any
provision of the Constitution or
of any other law shall be by way
of a case stated by the court
below, or by the person or
authority making the reference.
(2) A
case stated under sub-rule (I)
of this rule shall contain-
(a)
a summary of the action or
matter before the court below
or the person or the authority
from which the reference is
made;.
(b)
the issue
involved in the matter before
the court or that person or
authority;
(c)
the matter or
question referred for
determination by the Court;
(d) any
findings of fact relevant to the
matter or question referred
to the Court;
(e)
the arguments of counsel, if
any;
(f)
the ruling or decision of
the court below or of that
person
or authority;
and
(g)
a
statement by the court below
that the determination of the
constitutional matter or
question is necessary to a
decision of the action, where
the reference is made under
clause(2) of article 130 of the
Constitution.”
It would be
helpful if courts referring
cases stated to this court for
interpretation would
methodically attend to each of
the items in the list set out in
sub-rule 2 supra.
Although the trial Magistrate in
this case did not
comprehensively deal with the
list referred to above, the
materials attached to his
reference, including the
judgments delivered in the case
and the arguments by counsel,
gave this Court a sufficient
basis to give an opinion in this
case, without remitting it to
the Magistrate for a better and
more detailed reference
complying with Rule 67 of the
Supreme Court Rules.
Applicability of Article
17(1) to the facts of this case.
In
Ayarna
& Anor. V Agyemang & Ors
[1976] 1GLR 306, the Court
of Appeal held that the true
object of section 30 of the
Legal Profession Act, 1960 (Act
32), was to enable the court to
oversee and supervise the
charging of professional fees if
a dispute arose between a lawyer
and his client as to the quantum
or propriety of the fees charged
and that compliance with section
30 of Act 32 was a mandatory
pre-condition for the
commencement of an action by a
lawyer to recover his fees.
This decision provides a
rational and legitimate basis
for differential treatment
between lawyers and their
clients. Parliament, with a
view to protecting the interests
of clients of lawyers, has
thought it fit to enact section
30 of Act 32. This is a
legitimate use of the
legislative authority which is
not inconsistent with Article
17(1) whose meaning has been
explained above. In other
words, the inequality or
discrimination necessitated by
section 30 of the Legal
Profession Act, 1960 bears a
just and reasonable relation to
the purpose of that provision,
which is to protect the clients
of lawyers. The provision does
not, thus, provide for unlawful
discrimination or unlawful
inequality. It represents
justifiable discrimination; it
is not arbitrary nor
unreasonable. Indeed, article
109 (1) expressly gives
Parliament the authority to
regulate professional, trade and
business organizations. That
article therefore confirms the
interpretation of article 17(1)
which has been laid out above.
Conclusion
In our view,
therefore, the response to the
issue referred to this Court by
the Magistrate is that, in the
context of the facts of this
case, section 30 of the Legal
Profession Act, 1960 is not
inconsistent with the provisions
of Article 17(1) of the 1992
Constitution.
DR. S.K. DATE-BAH
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
DOTSE, JSC:-
I have had
the advantage of reading the
Ruling delivered by my respected
brother, Dr. Date-Bah JSC and I
agree with the summary of the
facts, the statement and
analysis of the law as well as
the conclusions reached
therein. This concurring
opinion is just to re-emphasise
my understanding of the issues
referred to this Court by His
worship Ali Baba Abature,
presiding over the District
Court, Community Centre, Accra.
In my
opinion, the reliance by the
plaintiff, (a Legal Practitioner
of some years standing) on
article 17(1)(2) and (3) of the
Constitution 1992 to mount a
defence for his non-compliance
with section 30 of the Legal
Profession Act, 1960 Act 32
before the issuance of a writ,
demanding the payment of his
professional fees is not only
unwarranted but is clearly
untenable and also inapplicable
under the circumstances of this
case.
In order to
put the matters in proper
context, it is appropriate to
refer to the provisions of
section 30(1) of the Legal
Profession Act, 1960, Act 32.
It provides as follows –
“A Lawyer is
not entitled to commence a suit
for the recovery of fees for a
business done as a barrister or
solicitor until the expiration
of one month after the lawyer
has served on the party to be
charged a bill of those fees.”
Since the
Constitutional reference is in
respect of article 17(1) of the
Constitution 1992, it is
worthwhile to consider the
provisions of the said article
as well as the context in which
those provisions have been
provided in order for their full
force and effect to be
understood.
Articles
17(1)(2) and (3) of the
Constitution 1992 provide as
follows:-
17 (1)
“All persons shall be
equal before the law.
(2) A person shall not be
discriminated against on
grounds
of gender, race, colour, ethnic
origin,
religion,
creed or social or economic
status.
(3) For the purpose of
this article, “discriminate”
means to
give
different treatment attributable
only or mainly to
their
respective descriptions by race,
place of origin,
political opinions, colour,
gender, occupation, religion
or
creed, whereby persons, of one
description are
subjected to disabilities or
restrictions to which
persons
of another description are not
made subject
or are
granted privileges or advantages
which are not
granted
to persons of another
description.”
In the first
place, what must be noted is
that, article 17(2) is under
chapter five of the Constitution
1992 which deals generally with
Fundamental Human Rights and
Freedoms. As a matter of fact,
article 17 of the Constitution
1992 comes under the sub-heading
“EQUALITY AND FREEDOM FROM
DISCRIMINATION.”
Under the
circumstances, it is my
considered opinion that in order
to understand the philosophical
underpinnings of article
17(1)(2) & (3) of the
Constitution 1992, the entire
provisions of chapter five of
the Constitution 1992 must be
read together and put in that
context. If this is done, it is
clear that the type of
discrimination envisaged in
article 17(1)(2) & (3) of the
constitution when read alongside
articles 12(2) and 17(1) of the
Constitution 1992, gives the
clearest indications that the
fundamental rights and freedoms
contained in chapter five of the
constitution shall be enjoyed by
all Ghanaian citizens subject
only to the respect for the
rights and freedoms of others
and for the public interest. The
provision that all persons shall
be equal before the law is
therefore to be understood in
such a context, taking a cue
from the fact that there are no
absolute rights contained in the
Constitution 1992.
Secondly, the
Legal Profession Act, 1960, Act
32 must be understood and taken
as a statutory law passed by
Parliament of Ghana to regulate
professional practice of law in
Ghana. Act 32 is in my opinion
consistent with the constitution
1992 in view of the clear
provisions of article 109(1) of
the Constitution which provides
thus:-
1)
“Parliament may by law regulate
professional, trade and business
organisations.
2)
The
affairs of an organisation
referred to in clause (1) of
this article shall be conducted
on democratic lines.”
Since legal
practice is a profession, it is
safe to conclude that an Act of
Parliament such as the Legal
Profession Act, 1960, Act 32, is
not only consistent with article
109 of the Constitution but also
consistent with article 11 of
the Constitution on the Laws of
Ghana.
Under article
11 of the Constitution, the Laws
of Ghana consist among others,
the constitution and enactments
made or passed under the
authority of parliament. Since
Act 32 was passed by parliament
and assented to by the
President, it forms part of the
Laws of Ghana, and there being
no inconsistency or conflict
with it and any provision of the
Constitution 1992, the
contention that section 30 of
Act 32 is inconsistent with and
violates article 17(1)(2) & (3)
is not only absurd, but is
untenable and clearly without
any basis.
In my
opinion, the request for Lawyers
(under Act 32) to give a written
demand for their fees one month
before the commencement of a
suit is mounted in the law
courts to demand their legal
fees pursuant to section 30 of
Act 32, is only regulatory of
the affairs of Lawyers and not
discriminatory. The rationale
for this to me is not only sound
but in line with the ethics of
the legal profession. This is
further to ensure that the
client of a lawyer is notified
before the commencement of the
suit at the instance of the
lawyer that so much is either in
arrears or due in the nature of
legal fees. Apart from being
regulatory of the Legal
Profession, Section 30 of Act 32
must be seen also as preventing
situations where the client is
taken by surprise. In any case
the right of the Lawyer to go to
court has never been taken away.
Clearly
therefore, the plaintiffs
contention that section 30 of
Act 32 is inconsistent with
article 17(1)(2) & (3) of the
Constitution 1992 and therefore
discriminatory of him as a
Lawyer must fail.
The trial
District magistrate is therefore
directed to dismiss as
inapplicable the invocation of
the Constitutional provisions in
article 17(1)(2) & (3) and apply
the provisions of the Legal
Profession Act, 1960 Act 32 the
way he understands it, there
being no constitutional
interpretation involved in the
case.
J .V. M.
DOTSE
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
S. A.
B. AKUFFO (MS)
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
S.
A. BROBBEY
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
J. ANSAH
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
R. C. OWUSU (MS)
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
ANIN YEBOAH
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
P.
BAFFOE-BONNIE
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
N.S. GBADEGBE
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL:
T.T. NARTEY
REPRESENTING HIMSELF.
W. L.
ANTHONIO FOR THE DEFENDANT
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