Appeal Court.
18th September, 1937.
Pleadings-Demurrer-Case can only
be struck out on admitted facts-
Appeal from Effect of
joinder of issue-Rules of
Supreme Court of England only
applicable when local
law is silent.
Pleadings
had been ordered, and after
plaintiffs had filed a reply to
the statement of defence, and
joined issue with same,
defendant applied to have suit
dismissed on the ground that
plaintiffs' pleadings disclosed
no legal cause of action. Suit
was dismissed accordingly
without evidence being called.
Held:
on appeal, that joinder of
issue had effect of putting
material facts in issue, and
that case must proceed.
It was also
held that procedure by way of
demurrer under Order 19 of
Schedule 3 of the Courts
Ordinance was available to a
defendant, even in cases where
pleadings had been ordered,
provided the step was taken
before statement of defence was
filed. Order 32, Rule 2 of
Schedule 3 of the Courts
Ordinance provided an
alternative where defendant was
too late to demur under Order 19
of Schedule 3 of the Courts
Ordinance. Unnecessary therefore
to resort to the rules of the
Supreme Court of England, and
that trial Judge was wrong in
doing so.
P. A.
Renner (with him J. H.
Coussey and W. E. G.
Sekyi) for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.
A. J.
Ainley for
Defendant-Respondent.
The following
joint judgment was delivered :STROTHER-STEWART,
DOORL Y AND BRUCE, JJ.
This is an
appeal from a judgment of Yates,
J., dated 16th November, 1936,
whereby on a motion by the
defendant he dismissed the suit
of the plaintiffs with costs and
before trial on the grounds that
the plaintiffs' pleadings did
not disclose any legal right or
interest in the subject-matter
of the suit which had been
infringed.
There has
been considerable argument
before us as to whether the
procedure adopted came within
the scope of Order 19 of the 3rd
Schedule to the rules made under
the Courts Ordinance or under
Order 25 of the R.S.C. of
England and as to whether the
R.S.C. of England can be applied
in any circumstances in the
Courts of the Colony.
We do not,
however, find it necessary to
decide on these matters save in
so far as we hold that, seeing
that the plaintiffs, having
obtained permission, have filed
a reply to the statement of
defence and have therein used
the expression" join issue"
(neither pleading nor expression
coming within the ambit of Order
25 of our rules) it does not lie
in their mouths to contend that
the RS.C. of England, of which
they have made use, may not
apply in the Courts of the
Colony.
In our
opinion this appeal can be
decided by considering the facts
which the learned trial Judge
held in his judgment to be
admitted on the pleadings and on
which he based his conclusion
that the plaintiffs' pleadings
disclosed no legal right of the
plaintiffs which had been
infringed.
These facts
are two, viz. :-
(1) That no
objection to the proposed
undertaking of the licensees was
made within two months as is
required by law,
and (2) That
at that time the plaintiff
company was not incorporated.
As to the
first, in the plaintiffs'
amended statement of claim in
paragraphs 5 and 7, it is
averred that the plaintiffs
lodged objection on or about
16th February, 1934 (within two
months of the publication of the
Gazette Notice of the licensees'
application, viz. 23rd
December, 1933).
In paragraph
2 of the plaintiffs' reply to
the statement of defence, it
was averred that objection to
the grant of the licence was
made by persons not being the
plaintiffs, but by order of the
Court dated 23rd December, 1935,
on application by the defendant,
this paragraph was struck out.
In plaintiffs' reply he had
joined issue with the defendant
on his statement of defence.
This expression does not occur
in the Rules under the Courts
Ordinance, but it is a
well-known expression in the
RS.C. of England. We consider
therefore that its
interpretation and effect are to
be ascertained by a
consideration of these rules.
Now by Order 19, Rule (18) of
the RS.C. of England, it is
provided that" the plaintiff, by
his reply, may join issue upon
the defence and such joinder of
issue shall operate as a denial
of every material allegation of
fact in the pleading upon which
issue is joined, but it may
except any fact which the party
may be willing to admit and
shall then operate as a denial
of the facts not so admitted. "
Following the
provisions of this rule, we find
that the plaintiff~ had averred
that they gave notice of
objection, this was denied by
the defendant in his defence and
was not excepted by the
plaintiffs ill their reply
whereby they joined issue upon
the defence.
From these
considerations it appears that
the question whether the
plaintiffs had or had not made
objection to the grant of the
licence to the licensees was not
admitted in the pleadings.
(2) For the
same reasons we find that the
date of the incorporation of
the plaintiff company was not
admitted in the pleadings.
Now under
whatever law the proceedings
before the learned trial Judge
had, there can be no doubt that
such a judgment can only be
given on admitted facts.
For these
reasons we hold that the
judgment of the learned Judge
was wrong, and we allow this
appeal with costs here (assessed
at £50 8s. 6d.) and in the Court
below on the issue here decided.
The case must be remitted to the
Divisional Court with an
instruction that the case
proceed.
Judgment
having been read, Mr. Ainley
objects that he understood that
the Court would only decide
whether the Judge had
jurisdiction by way of demurrer
in the circumstances of the
case, and that the Court had not
decided that point. It had gone
on to decide an entirely
different point.
The Court
agreed to decide the question of
jurisdiction, and then delivered
the following judgment :-
We agree that
there has been some
misunderstanding as to the
reason why the Court adjourned
and, in deference to Mr.
Ainley's submission, we propose
to deliver judgment on the
question whether the learned
trial Judge adopted the proper
procedure in deciding this
matter by way of demurrer at the
stage of the proceedings at
which he did.
In the
preliminary ruling given by the
Judge on 6th October, 1936, he
states: "This is a motion
brought by the defendant under
Order 19, Rule 1, Schedule 3."
In his final judgment the
learned Judge said: "This is a
motion brought by the defendants
under Order 25, Rules 2 and 5 of
the Annual Practice." This
amendment by the learned Judge
follows the shifting of ground
by learned Counsel for the
defendant in the course of the
argument.
We are unable
to agree with the learned Judge
that Order 19 of the Rules under
the Courts Ordinance is
inapplicable to cases in which
pleadings are ordered. We see no
reason why a defendant, who has
been ordered to file a defence
within a certain time of receipt
of the statement of claim,
should not immediately move the
Court under Order 19 to have the
suit dismissed. If he failed in
his application, the Court
would then order the defendant
to. answer plaintiffs'
allegations of fact, i.e. it
would repeat its original order
on the defendant.
But Order 19
only applies before a statement
of defence has been filed,
otherwise it is meaningless. Now
we do not say that the Rules of
the Supreme Court of England
never apply or may never be
applied in the courts in this
country ; but they should apply
only when our law is silent. By
our Order 19 provision is made
and further by Order 32, Rule 2,
the Court is empowered at the
trial to direct a single issue
of fact or law to be tried
before any other issues. That
being so, it seems to us that a
defendant, having failed to
demur under Order 19 or being
out of time to make such
application, may at the trial
raise the question whether the
plaintiff's statement of claim
discloses any cause of action or
interest in the plaintiffs to
sustain the action.