Practice and
procedure – Certiorari – Statute
– interpretation - Section 8 (c)
- Security Industry Act, 1993 (PNDCL
333) – Whether or not a non
joinder or misjoinder of a party
to proceedings ordinarily points
to a breach of the nemo judex in
causa sua principle of natural
justice
HEADNOTES
Indeed the
Statement of case of the 1st
Interested Party dated thereof,
though complaining that the 2nd
Interested Party had conducted
private investigations into the
transaction in issue, also
admits that the said Interested
Party “wrote to it… on 1 (after
it instituted the suit) to
request all records relating to
the transaction the subject
matter of the suit.” This should
indicate that the 2nd
Interested Party was still
keeping an open mind on the
issue. The preliminary
investigations are even required
by S. 8 (c) (3) of PNDCL 333 and
do not therefore necessarily
point to bias.For all the
forgoing reasons the application
is granted.
HELD
Indeed the
Statement of case of the 1st
Interested Party dated 23/7/2014
at page 7 thereof, though
complaining that the 2nd
Interested Party had conducted
private investigations into the
transaction in issue, also
admits that the said Interested
Party “wrote to it… on 11th
June 2014 (after it instituted
the suit) to request all records
relating to the transaction the
subject matter of the suit.”
This should indicate that the 2nd
Interested Party was still
keeping an open mind on the
issue. The preliminary
investigations are even required
by S. 8 (c) (3) of PNDCL 333 and
do not therefore necessarily
point to bias. For all the
forgoing reasons the application
is granted.
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Securities
Industry Law 1993 (PNDCL 333
CASES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Republic v
Accra Circuit Court; Ex Parte
Appiah [1982-83] 1 GLR 129 C.A
at 169-170 Roger
Boyefio v
NTHC Properties Ltd [1997-98] 1
GLR 768
Osei Yaw v
Nsiah [1968] GLR 951
Watson v
Petts (No.2) (1899) I QB 430
Australian
case of Laws v Australian
Broadcasting Tribunal, [1990]
HCA 31; (1990) 170 CLR 70 28
June 1990
BOOKS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING
THE LEADING JUDGMENT
ATUGUBA JSC:-
COUNSEL
FUI TSIKATA
(WITH HIM MS TAKYIWA EWOOL AND
EDINAM COFIE) FOR THE APPLICANT.
NANIA OWUSU
ANKOMA FOR THE 1ST
INTERESTED PARTY.
NII OMAN
BADOO (WITH HIM ALIDU MOHAMMED)
FOR THE 2ND
INTERESTED PARTY.
___________________________________________________________________
RULING
___________________________________________________________________
ATUGUBA JSC:-
The
applicant moves this Court for:
1.
“An order of
certiorari directed to the
High Court, Commercial Division,
presided over by His
Lordship Justice Koomson to move
into this Court for the
purpose of being quashed the
ruling dated 23rd
June 2014 in which it assumed
jurisdiction to entertain Suit
No: BFS/144/14;
2. An
order of certiorari to quash the
order made by the High Court
(Commercial Division) in Suit
No: BFS/144/14, on 23 June 2014
in which the High Court
upheld a preliminary objection
by the Plaintiff/1st
Interested Party herein, to the
application by 1st
Defendant/Applicant herein to
strike out the pleading of
Plaintiff as disclosing no cause
of action basing itself on
the ground that the 1st
Defendant/Applicant herein had
not entered appearance;
3.
Consequent upon (1) and (2)
above, an order of prohibition
restraining the said
High Court from proceeding with
the hearing of the interlocutory
application and the suit;
4.
Consequent upon (1) and (9)
above, orders setting aside the
writ of summons,
striking out the suit and the
application for interlocutory
injunction in the
said suit;
….Grounds for seeking this
order:
a)
The High Court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the
suit when Section 8 (c) of the
Securities Industry Law 1993
(PNDCL 333) required that
any complaint, dispute or
violation arising under the law
be submitted to the Securities
and Exchange Commission before
redress is sought in the courts
and the High Court acknowledged
that this prior step had not
been taken by the Plaintiff.”
Several
grounds were argued for and
against the application by both
sides. However, we propose to
deal with what can be described
as the principal ground in this
application, for the success or
failure of that ground gravely
affects the other grounds
argued.
The principal
ground for the application is
ground (a) supra.
Section 8 (c)
of the Security Industry Act,
1993 (PNDCL 333) provides thus:
“Section 8C—Submission of
Complaint and Examination of
Issues.
(1) A complaint, dispute or any
violation arising under this Act
shall, before any redress is
sought in the courts, be
submitted to the Commission for
hearing and determination in
accordance with this Part.
(2) A matter to which subsection
(1) applies shall be submitted
in writing to the
Director-General of the
Commission and where it is not
in writing the Director-General
shall cause the matter to be
reduced into writing.
(3) The Director-General shall
cause the matter to be
investigated and
shall unless
he
(a) considers the matter to be
frivolous or vexatious; or
(b) can settle the disputed
matter or complaint to the
satisfaction of parties
concerned,
refer the matter together with
the findings of the
investigations to the
Hearings Committee within thirty
days from the date of receipt of
the written complaint, dispute
or violation and shall at the
same time inform the complainant
or persons concerned of the
submission to the Hearings
Committee.
(4) Subject to section 8F, the
Hearings Committee shall upon
receipt of a complaint or any
matter under this Part examine
and determine the
complaint or matter.
(5) The Hearings Committee shall
not determine any complaint or
matter which is the subject
matter of an action before a
court unless the parties to
the action so agree”
Mr. Ace
Ankomah will always try to be
resourceful and ingenious in
cases he handles no matter the
odds involved. Accordingly, he
resists the application in
relation to ground (a) on three
principal grounds.
The first is
that S. 8 (c) does not apply in
this case in view of S. 8 (c)
(5) which provides as follows:
(5)” The Hearings Committee
shall not determine any
complaint or matter which is the
subject matter of an action
before a court unless the
parties to the action so
agree”.
There can be
no doubt that if S. 8 (c) (1) is
to be operative the hearings
committee must have jurisdiction
to deal with the matter in issue
as laid down in S. 8 (c) (3) (4)
which provide as follows:-
“(3) The Director-General shall
cause the matter to be
investigated and shall unless he
(a) considers the matter to be
frivolous or vexatious; or
(b) can settle the disputed
matter or complaint to the
satisfaction of parties
concerned,
refer the matter together with
the findings of the
investigations to the
Hearings Committee within thirty
days from the date of receipt of
the written complaint, dispute
or violation and shall at the
same time inform the complainant
or persons concerned of the
submission to the Hearings
Committee.
(4)
Subject to section 8F, the
Hearings Committee shall upon
receipt of a complaint or any
matter under this Part examine
and determine the
complaint or matter.”
It is not in
dispute that the subject matter
of the 1st Interested
Party’s action in the High Court
is a complaint, dispute or a
violation arising under the
Security Industry Act, 1993.
It is trite
law that all the provisions of a
statute are intended to have
effect and such construction
should be made that, if
possible, all such provisions
have effect. It is also trite
law that the courts must always
interpret a statute ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. It
is obvious that Mr. Ace
Ankomah’s submission as to S. 8
(c) (3) will utterly defeat the
object of S. 8 (c) (1) if a full
literal interpretation is given
to it. It is trite law that
except for very clear words the
supervisory jurisdiction of the
court cannot be taken away.
Therefore
during the pendency of such
supervisory proceedings relating
to a matter before the 2nd
Interested Party’s Board under
S. 8 (c) (1) the Board cannot as
provided under S. 8 (c) (5)
determine a subject matter of
such proceedings.
In
Republic v Accra Circuit Court;
Ex Parte Appiah [1982-83] 1 GLR
129 C.A at 169-170 Roger
Korsah J said:
“I would …call attention to
the rule of
interpretation which enjoins
the courts to have regard to all
sections of a statute and their
interaction or interdependence
on each other…”
In former
times there was a rule of
construction which gave
precedence of a last provision
in the same statute which
conflicts with a preceding one.
Even in those days that would
only be so if the two provisions
could not be construed in any
manner that would induce
consistency with each other. We
think that S. 8 (c) (1) can
survive nullification if S.8 (c)
(3) is confined to matters that
are ab initio properly brought
before the courts without
disregard of S. 8 (c) (1). It
must be noted that S. 8 (c) (3)
is part of a series of
subsections which in statutory
construction parlance is termed
as, machinery, for the
implementation not defeasance of
S. 8 (c) (1).
The second
contention of Mr. Ace Ankomah is
that S. 8 (c ) (1) is procedural
and therefore since the
applicant took steps in the
action in the High Court it
thereby submitted to the
jurisdiction of that court and
is concluded by the same. We do
not see how the jurisdiction of
the Board per the hearings
committee in respect of “A
complaint, dispute or a
violation under this Act ..
submitted… for hearing and
determination” can be
regarded as procedural. It is
clear that S.8 (c) (1) vests
substantive adjudicatory
jurisdiction on the Board of the
Securities and Exchange
Commission. The kindred
jurisdiction that was involved
in
Boyefio v NTHC Properties Ltd
[1997-98] 1 GLR 768 was
held by this Court to be
substantive.
The matter,
even long before that decision
was not res integra; see
Osei
Yaw v Nsiah [1968] GLR 951
in which Annan J held that
the resort to court for
maintenance relief without a
prior application to the Social
Welfare Department was an
invalidating precondition.
It has been
trite law from early times that
the consent of the parties
cannot (except in a few cases
such as common law jurisdiction
under the rules of Private
International Law), confer
jurisdiction where there is
none, see
Watson v Petts (No.2)
(1899) I QB 430.
Clearly therefore whether the
applicant took steps in the
matter in the High Court or not
is of no avail. As is well
known, a point of jurisdiction
can be raised at any stage of
proceedings
The third and
final submission of Mr. Ace
Ankomah is that the non resort
to the Board of the 2nd
Interested Party is justified on
the grounds of the emission of
bias from its handling of
investigations in a matter in
which the 1st
Interested Party claims to be
interested without notice to it.
We are
unimpressed by this contention.
Ordinarily the trite principle
of law that a statutory duty
must be performed in case of
necessity, despite the element
of bias would have concluded
this issue.
However, the
incidence of the 1992
Constitution with regard to
ordinary statutory provisions
would require some cautious
treading. Nonetheless we do not
see how the question of
non
joinder or misjoinder of a party
to proceedings ordinarily points
to a breach of the nemo judex
in causa sua principle of
natural justice rather than
the audi alteram partem
principle.
But counsel
for the applicant Mr. Fui
Tsikata in his reply to the 1st
Interested party’s statement of
case dated 29th July
2014 for and on behalf of the
applicant, which exudes
nostalgic competence, aptly
quotes the words of the joint
judgment of Gaudron and Mchugh
JJ in the
Australian case of Laws v
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal,
[1990] HCA 31; (1990) 170 CLR
70 28 June 1990,
to the effect that;
(a) “reasonable bystander
does not entertain a reasonable
fear that a
decision-maker will bring an
unfair or prejudiced mind to an
inquiry merely because he
has formed conclusion about an
issue involved in the inquiry…
when suspected prejudgment of an
issue is relied upon to ground
the disqualification of a
decision-maker, what must be
firmly established is a
reasonable fear that the
decision-maker’s mind is so
prejudiced in favour
of a conclusion already formed
that he or she will not alter
that conclusion irrespective of
the evidence or arguments
presented to him or her”
(paragraph 5 of their judgment
as reported in [1990] HCA 31]”
Indeed the
Statement of case of the 1st
Interested Party dated 23/7/2014
at page 7 thereof, though
complaining that the 2nd
Interested Party had conducted
private investigations into the
transaction in issue, also
admits that the said Interested
Party “wrote to it… on 11th
June 2014 (after it instituted
the suit) to request all records
relating to the transaction the
subject matter of the suit.”
This should
indicate that the 2nd
Interested Party was still
keeping an open mind on the
issue. The preliminary
investigations are even required
by S. 8 (c) (3) of PNDCL 333 and
do not therefore necessarily
point to bias.
For all the
forgoing reasons the application
is granted.
(SGD)
W. A. ATUGUBA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD)
S. A. B. AKUFFO (MS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD)
P. BAFFOE BONNIE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD)
N. S. GBADEGBE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
(SGD)
V. AKOTO BAMFO (MRS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
COUNSEL
FUI TSIKATA
(WITH HIM MS TAKYIWA EWOOL AND
EDINAM COFIE) FOR THE APPLICANT.
NANIA OWUSU
ANKOMA FOR THE 1ST
INTERESTED PARTY.
NII OMAN
BADOO (WITH HIM ALIDU MOHAMMED)
FOR THE 2ND
INTERESTED PARTY. |