Constitutional law - Review -
Supreme Court -
Supervisory jurisdiction
-
Fundamental human rights and
Freedoms -
Validity of any parliamentary
election - Order of mandamus -
Order of Prohibition -
Certiorari to quash the orders
of High Court - Whether or not
'the right to vote' forms part
of the human rights provided for
under Article 33 or part of the
representation rights provided
for under Chapter 7 of the
Constitution - Whether or not
the conduct of the elections by
the 1st and 2nd
respondents as set out above,
the 3rd respondent
was not duly elected as the
person to represent the people
of Hohoe Constituency -
Whether
or not the 3rd
respondent as duly elected to be
member of parliament for Hohoe
Constituency and could be
gazetted - 1992 Constitution -
Article 33(1) - Article 133 of
the 1992 Constitution and Rule
54 of the Supreme Court Rules
1996, CI 16
HEADNOTES
On 23rd of December
2020, the Applicants herein
commenced an action in the High
Court, Ho. They sought to invoke
the jurisdiction of the High
Court by the issue of an
Originating Motion against The
Electoral Commission (1st
Respondent), the Regional
Electoral officer, (2nd
Respondent), (3rd
Respondent) and (4) The Attorney
General (4th
Respondent) and a declaration
that as a result of the numerous
deficiencies in
the
conduct of the elections by the
1st and 2nd
respondents as set out , the 3rd
respondent was not duly elected
as the person to represent the
people of Hohoe Constituency
in Parliament from 7th
January 2021 to 6th
January 2025, On the same 23rd
December 2020 that the
originating motion was filed,
the Ho High Court granted the
Applicants the following
interlocutory orders. It is
these orders that precipitated
the application by the Attorney
General for
Certiorari to quash the orders
of the Ho High Court, The
Attorney General also sought an
order of
Prohibition to stop the
presiding Judge from the further
hearing or conduct of the suit,
Consequently, this Court granted
the application for certiorari
to quash the orders of the High
Court Ho, including the reliefs
that related to the completed
Parliamentary election. On 12th
January 2021, the Applicants
applied for a review of the
ruling of 5th January
2021
HELD
On account of the analysis set
out above, we do not find that
the application for review of
this court’s decision of 5th
January 2021 is sustainable. The
decision was not erroneous so as
to invite the description of
such grounds as exceptional
circumstances, neither did it in
any way lead to miscarriage of
justice. Indeed, the Applicant's
right to ventilate the human
right questions before the High
Court were left untouched, and
this allows the dispute that
properly invoked the
jurisdiction of the High Court
in an originating motion to be
ventilated. The parties were
also not precluded from settling
any questions as to the validity
of the parliamentary election by
the proper procedure directed by
statute and the structure of the
Constitutional provisions in
Article 99. The application is
refused and consequently,
dismissed.
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Supreme Court Rules 1996, CI 16
1992 Constitution
High Court (Civil Procedure)
Rules 2004 (CI 47)
Representation of the People’s
Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284)
Representation of the People
(Parliamentary Constituencies)
Instrument, 2020, CI 128
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Afranie 11 v Quarcoo 1992 2 GLR
561,
Koglex Ltd No 2 v Field 2000
SCGLR 175,
Republic v Tetteh 2003 – 2004
SCGLR 140
Quartey v Central Services
1996-97 SCGLR 398
Edusei v Attorney - General
1996-97 SCGLR 1,
Edusei v Attorney - General
1997-1998 2 GLR 1,
Edusei v Attorney - General
1998-99 SCGLR 753
Yeboah v JH Mensah 1998-99 SC
GLR 492,
In Re Parliamentary Election for
Wulensi Constituency Zakaria v
Nyimakan 2003-2004 1 SCGLR 1
Awuni v WAEC
2003 – 2004 SCGLR 471
Attorney General v Faroe
Atlantic Ltd 2005-2006 SCGLR
271,
Attorney General v Balkan Energy
Ghana Ltd 2012 2 SCGLR 998
Awuni v West African
Examinations Council 2003 – 2004
SCGLR 471
Republic v High Court, Accra, Ex
Parte Industrialization Fund for
Developing Countries and Another
2003-2004 348;
Republic v High Court, Ex parte
CHRAJ (Addo Interested Party)
2003-2004 1 SCGLR 312,
Republic v Court of Appeal
Ex-Parte Tsatsu Tsikata 2005 –
2006 SCGLR 612
Republic v High Court, Accra
Ex-Parte CHRAJ, 2003 – 2004
SCGLR 312
Attorney General v. Faroe
Atlantic 2005-2006 SCGLR 271
New Patriotic Party v Inspector
General of Police 1993-94 2 GLR
459,
New Patriotic Party v Attorney
General 31st December
Case 1993-94 2 GLR 35,
Attorney General v Balkan Energy
Ghana Ltd 2012 2 SCGLR 99
Ebusuapayin Yaw Stephens v Kwesi
Apoh, C.A HI/252/04 (5th
February 2009),
Graves v. Oyewoo [1967] GLR 803
SC,
Akrong v Bulley [1965] GLR 469
SC
Sarkodie I v Boateng II
[1982-83] 715 GLR SC
Republic v The High Court
(General Jurisdiction), Accra,
Exparte Nii Agyemankese 111,
Civil Motion No J5/11/2019 of
6th February 2019,
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
TORKORNOO (MRS.) JSC:-
COUNSEL
GODFRED YEBOAH DAME (
ATTORNEY-GENERAL) FOR THE
APPLICANT/
RESPONDENT WITH HIM GRACE EWOOL
(CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY) AND
YVONNE BANNERMAN (SENIOR STATE
ATTORNEY).
TSATSU TSIKATA FOR THE
INTERESTED PARTIES/APPLICANTS
WITH EMILE ATSU AGBAKPE.
TORKORNOO (MRS.) JSC:-
Background to the current
application
On 23rd of December
2020, the Applicants herein
commenced an action in the High
Court, Ho. They sought to invoke
the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 33 of the
1992 Constitution and
Order 67 of the High
Court (Civil Procedure) Rules
2004 (CI 47) by the issue of
an Originating Motion against
The Electoral Commission (1st
Respondent), Wisdom Kofi
Akpakli, the Regional Electoral
officer, (2nd
Respondent) (3) John Peter
Amewu (3rd
Respondent) and (4)
The Attorney General (4th
Respondent)
Chapter 5 of the 1992
Constitution
provides in Article 33(1)
and (3) that
33(1)
Where a person alleges that a
provision of this
Constitution on the
fundamental human rights and
freedoms has been, or is
being or is likely to be
contravened in relation to him,
then, without prejudice to any
other action that is lawfully
available, that person may apply
to the high court for redress
33(3)
A person aggrieved by a
determination of the High Court
may appeal to the Court of
Appeal with the right of a
further appeal to the Supreme
Court
Order 67 of CI 47
provides:
Application for redress under
Article
33 of the Constitution
1.
A person who seeks redress in
respect of the enforcement of
any fundamental human right in
relation to the person under
article 33(1) of the
Constitution shall submit an
application to the High Court
Included in the reliefs sought
by Applicants from the High
Court were the following
prayers:
Relief 1(f)
A
declaration that as a result of
the numerous deficiencies in the
conduct of the elections by the
1st and 2nd
respondents as set out above,
the 3rd respondent
was not duly elected as the
person to represent the people
of Hohoe Constituency (including
the applicants and all
registered voters in the
subject-areas) in Parliament
from 7th January 2021
to 6th January 2025
(2)
An
order of mandamus to compel
the 1st and 2nd
respondents, to organize and
conduct the parliamentary
election in respect of the Hohoe
Constituency including the
Santrokofi and the other three
traditional areas to enable all
registered voters there to have
the opportunity to vote for the
determination of the member of
parliament
(3) An order to restrain:
a.
the 1st and 2nd
respondents from seeking to
gazette the 3rd
respondent as the duly elected
MP for the Hohoe Constituency
from January 7th 2021
to January 6, 2025
b.
the 1st and 2nd
respondents from in any way,
presenting the 3rd
respondent as duly elected to
represent the people of Hohoe
Constituency in Parliament; and
c.
the 3rd respondent
from presenting himself to be
sworn in as the Member of
Parliament for the Hohoe
Constituency or otherwise
holding himself out as such
On the same 23rd
December 2020 that the
originating motion was filed,
the Ho High Court granted the
Applicants the following
interlocutory orders
restraining:
1.
The 1st Respondent
from seeking to
gazette
3rd
respondent as duly elected to be
member of parliament for Hohoe
Constituency from January 7
2021 to January 6, 2025
2.
The 1st and 2nd
respondents from in any way,
presenting the 3rd
respondent as duly elected to
represent the people of the
Hohoe Constituency in parliament
from January 7 2021 to January
6, 2025 or holding the 3rd
respondent out as such
3.
The 3rd respondent
from presenting himself to be
sworn in as the member of
parliament for the Hohoe
constituency or otherwise
holding himself out as such
It is these orders that
precipitated the application by
the Attorney General for
Certiorari to quash the orders
of the Ho High Court pursuant to
Article 132.
It reads:
132. The Supreme Court shall
have
supervisory jurisdiction
over all courts and over any
adjudicating authority and may,
in the exercise of that
jurisdiction, issue orders and
directions for the purpose of
enforcing or securing the
enforcement of its supervisory
power.
The Attorney General had been
made the 4th
Respondent to the action and
served with the Originating
Motion as required by Order
67 (2).
The
Attorney General also sought an
order of Prohibition to stop the
presiding Judge from the further
hearing or conduct of the suit
that led to the proceedings and
orders described above.
Application for Certiorari
The grounds for the application
for Certiorari were that
a.
the High Court has no
jurisdiction under Article 33 of
the Constitution to entertain a
matter in the nature of a
parliamentary election petition
and to grant any relief(s),
interim, interlocutory or final,
available in a parliamentary
election commenced under
Article 99 and Section 16
of the
Representation of the
People’s Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284)
b.
the proceedings of the court
below and the orders emanating
therefrom dated 23rd
December 2020 were void as same
were in violation of Article
99 of the 1992
Constitution
c.
the orders of the court below
dated 23rd December
2020 constituted a patent error
on the face of the record to the
extent that they purported to
confer on the applicants
(interested parties herein),
non-existent voting rights in
respect of the Hohoe
Constituency in the Volta Region
The Applicants herein and
Interested parties in the
Certiorari application resisted
the application by the Attorney
General. On 5th
January 2021, this Court agreed
with the Attorney General on
grounds (a) and (b) above, and
also that the orders granted by
the High Court Ho, constituted a
patent error on the face of the
record to the extent that it
sought to injunct the gazetting
and swearing in of the person
declared as a Member of
Parliament.
Consequently, this Court granted
the application for certiorari
to quash the orders of the High
Court Ho, including the reliefs
that related to the completed
Parliamentary election.
The ratio of this Court’s
decision on 5th January 2021 can
be found on pages 10 and 11 of
the ruling in these terms:
‘The law as constitutionally
and statutorily provided and
judicially considered by this
apex court in a plethora of
decisions, does not permit the
interested parties to include
reliefs 1 (f), 2 and 3 in the
reliefs sought in their apparent
human rights action when these
reliefs were purporting to
challenge the due election of
John Peter Amewu as the Member
of Parliament elect for the
Hohoe Constituency’. (Page
10)
‘Substantively therefore, the
jurisdiction of the High Court
conferred by article 99 of the
Constitution, 1992 and Section
16 of PNDCL 284 of 1992, for the
determination of a parliamentary
dispute, is fundamentally
different from a human right
action pursued under article 33
(1) of the Constitution, 1992’
(page 11)
On 12th January 2021,
the Applicants applied for a
review of the ruling of 5th
January 2021
pursuant to
Article 133 of the 1992
Constitution and Rule 54
of the Supreme Court
Rules 1996, CI 16, as
amended.
Rule 54 of the Supreme Court
Rules 1996 CI 16
provides two grounds that must
exist for invocation of the
Review jurisdiction of the
court. The application before us
is brought pursuant to Rule
54 (a). It reads:
54.
The court may review any
decision made or given by it on
any of the following grounds –
a. the exceptional circumstances
which have resulted in
miscarriage of justice
Citing various decisions of the
Supreme Court in
Afranie 11 v Quarcoo 1992 2 GLR
561, Koglex Ltd No 2 v
Field 2000 SCGLR 175,
Republic v Tetteh 2003 – 2004
SCGLR 140 and other
unreported cases where the
Supreme Court reviewed its
decisions on account of
fundamental errors that would
lead to miscarriage of justice,
the applicant is urging that in
the decision of 5th
January 2021, the Court fell
into a range of fundamental
errors that have resulted in
miscarriage of justice to the
applicants.
Grounds for Application for
Review
The eighteen grounds on which
the review is sought are:
a.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice when it said, per
incuriam, that there is a
determination for the High Court
to make as to “whether or not
the right to vote, which is not
a provision under Chapter 5 of
the Constitution on fundamental
human rights but under Chapter 7
on the Directive Principles of
State Policy, is a human right
or not.”
b.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law in
invoking its supervisory powers
and granting the discretionary
order of certiorari against the
High Court, Ho, which had
jurisdiction to embark on the
application to enforce
fundamental human rights of the
Interested Parties. This
fundamental error occasioned a
miscarriage of justice.
c.
In this Honourable Court
claiming “[o]ur jurisdiction in
the instant case does not extend
to the determination of the
constitutionality or otherwise
of CI 128. The Interested
parties have not invoked the
jurisdiction of this Court to
challenge the constitutionality
or otherwise of CI 128”, it
committed a fundamental error of
law that has occasioned a
miscarriage of justice by not
recognizing that it was the
Applicant that put forward CI
128 to contest the insistence of
the Interested Parties that CI
95 had not been repealed.
d.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice in its complete
misapprehension of the case the
Interested Parties presented to
the High Court, Ho.
e.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice in stating what is to be
determined by the High Court,
Ho, as if it was already
determined or could be
determined by the Supreme Court:
“The fact is that, Mr. John
Peter Amewu has nothing to do
with the denial by the Electoral
Commission of the right of the
people in the SALL Area to
vote”.
f.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice in determining that
because the Interested Parties
stated in an affidavit that “the
announcement of the Electoral
Commission on 6th
December 2020 that the voters in
the SALL area could not vote in
Parliamentary elections on 7th
December 2020 and the resultant
denial of the right to
representation in the 8th
Parliament of Ghana are at
the heart of the action for
the enforcement of the
fundamental human rights that we
have initiated at the High
Court, Ho”, “John Peter Amewu
has nothing to do with the
denial by the Electoral
Commission of the people in the
SALL Area to vote.
g.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice in prejudging in the
very opening paragraph of the
ruling the alleged status of
John Peter Amewu as “the NPP M.P
Elect for Hohoe Constituency”.
h.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice in its claim that “the
Interested Parties did not say
anything in justification of the
interim orders made by the High
Court” and that “the interested
parties’ affidavit in opposition
did not provide any answer to
applicant’s submissions against
the propriety of the interim
orders made by the trial High
Court on 23rd
December 2020.”
i.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice when it deprived the
Interested Party of
constitutionally protected
fundamental human rights by
recourse to a provision in a
statute.
j.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice when it claimed that the
“Constitution per article 99,
clothes only the High Court with
jurisdiction to hear and
determine any question as to
whether or not a person has been
validly elected as a Member of
Parliament.”
k.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice when it claimed that “In
the wake of these two
provisions; that is article 99
of the Constitution, 1992 and
section 16 of PNDCL 284 of 1992,
a person cannot sidestep this
procedure and commence an action
in the High Court invoking any
of the High Court’s other
jurisdiction to ventilate a
grievance that border (sic) on
the validity of an election to
Parliament.”
l.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice in its claim that the
interim orders “are in the
nature of orders made in an
election petition”.
m.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice when it claimed “The
only time that the High Court
has power to make orders
affecting the
validity
of any parliamentary election
is when an election dispute is
initiated under article 99 of
the Constitution.”
n.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice when it purported to
“order that the entire
proceedings of the High Court,
Ho dated 23rd
December, 2020, which led to the
making of the void orders of
mandamus and injunction, be
brought to this court for the
purpose of same being quashed
and they are hereby quashed”.
o.
This Honourable Court acted
without jurisdiction when it
purported to strike out certain
reliefs sought in the
originating motion on notice
p.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice in failing to take into
consideration in its ruling
earlier binding decisions of the
court which Counsel for the
Interested Parties had cited
before the court in both written
and oral submissions.
q.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice in its ruling in respect
of the objection raised against
the participation of Justice
Honyenugah in a determination of
his own eligibility after an
objection on the real likelihood
of bias and actual bias arising
from the Justice’s long-standing
close relationship with Amewu
and the “unbreakable bond”
between them was raised with the
indication of witnesses being
available to testify.
r.
This Honourable Court committed
a fundamental error of law that
has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice in its ruling in respect
of the objection raised against
the participation of Justice
Honyenugah when it claimed that
the action in the High Court,
Ho, was not about Amewu.
We would first state that the
settled position of the law that
allows the Supreme Court to
review its decisions under
Article 133 is as stated in
Quartey v Central Services
1996-97 SCGLR 398 at
399, 'A review of a
judgment is a special
jurisdiction and not an
appellate jurisdiction conferred
on the court; and the court
would exercise that special
jurisdiction in favor of an
applicant only in exceptional
circumstances. This implies that
such an applicant should satisfy
the court that there has been
some fundamental or basic error
which the court inadvertently
committed in the course of
considering its judgment; and
which fundamental error has
thereby resulted in gross
miscarriage of justice.
....Consequently, a losing party
is not entitled to use the
review process ....to prevail
upon the court to have another
or a second look at his case.'
The eighteen grounds in this
application point to a range of
aspects of the ruling that the
Applicant submits are
fundamental errors that the
decision turns on, and
constitute exceptional
circumstances that have
occasioned grave injustice to
the applicants, such that this
Court ought to reverse its
decision.
Consideration of submissions
Ground a - Error in Description
of Chapter 7 of the Constitution
It is conceded that a
description of Chapter 7 of the
1992 Constitution as the chapter
on Directive Principles of State
Policy is erroneous. This is not
an error of law, and definitely
not a fundamental legal error
that can constitute an
exceptional circumstance for
reviewing a judgment. The
statement that Chapter 7 of the
1992 Constitution, which is the
chapter on 'Representation of
The People,' deals with the
right to vote is absolutely
correct.
Also, the observation in the
ruling that the core of the case
before the High Court is for the
High Court to determine
whether
'the right to vote' forms part
of the human rights provided for
under Article 33 or part of the
representation rights provided
for under Chapter 7 cannot
be per incuriam any
Constitutional provision,
statute or decided position in
law.
This is because even if the
ruling made an observation that
the right to vote was not a
human right (which is a position
it did not even consider or
express a view on), the decision
under review took no account of
that observation regarding
whether the right to vote was a
human right or constitutional
right under Chapter 7 of the
1992 Constitution. The case
considered solely dealt with the
jurisdiction of the High Court
when it came to parliamentary
elections. And the decision in
the ruling under review was that
the challenging of a
parliamentary election or its
outcome was a special right
provided for under Article 99 of
the Constitution and for which a
special procedure requiring
commencement by Petition had
been set by PNDC Law 284. For
that reason, the High Court
could not consider a challenge
to parliamentary elections as a
consequential relief or order
when adjudicating a claim to
human rights under Article 33 of
the 1992 Constitution.
And the fact that PNDC Law 284
predated the 1992 Constitution
did not create an incongruity or
absurdity because the existing
law of Ghana was continued in
force through Article 11(1)
(d) of the 1992
Constitution.
The premise of ground (a) for
this review therefore, was only
an observation, and did not
constitute a decision, nor did
it even feed into the decision
of the court on 5th January
2021.
Grounds b, d, e, f, i, j, k,
l, m, o - Due Process
Grounds b, d, e, f, i, j, k,
l, m, o will be addressed
together because they all compel
the same consideration.
This is the position urged by
the Applicant that to the extent
that the High Court is seised
with jurisdiction under Article
33 of the Constitution to
enforce fundamental human rights
that include the right to vote,
the High Court has jurisdiction
to consider whether the conduct
of an election is part of the
denial and violation of the
human rights complained of. And
when the High Court makes
consequential orders that
pronounce on elections during
such a case, it would be doing
so within the totality of its
jurisdiction under Article 33.
The Applicant counsel has
submitted that this Court was
therefore in error in its
decision that the right to vote
was a separate cause of action
from the validity of
parliamentary elections and its
outcome, and they could only be
ventilated under separate
procedures and within separate
jurisdictions of the High Court.
To use the language of the
ruling found on page 11 thereof,
'the jurisdiction of the High
Court conferred by Article 99 of
the Constitution, 1992 and
Section 16 of PNDCL 284 of 1992,
for the determination of a
parliamentary dispute, is
fundamentally different from a
human right action pursued under
article 33 (1) of the
Constitution, 1992'
The submission of learned
counsel cannot be upheld because
jurisdiction is always conferred
by statute, and exercised within
the rules of procedure set for
the exercise of that
jurisdiction. In that regard, it
is to be appreciated that all
judicial processes ought to be
conducted within the ambit of
procedures regulated by statute.
And these statutes must be
harmoniously interpreted to
achieve the purposes intended by
the legislature and to avoid
absurdity.
Article 140 (1) of the 1992
Constitution
provides:
140 (1)
The High Court shall, subject to
the provisions of this
Constitution, have jurisdiction
in all matters and in
particular, in civil and
criminal matters and such
original, appellate and other
jurisdictions as may be
conferred on it by this
Constitution or any other law.
Section 15 (1) (a) of the Courts
Act, 1993 Act 459
also gives original jurisdiction
to the High Court in all
matters, and immediately follows
it with distinct contexts of
specific jurisdictions.
15(1) The High Court shall,
subject to the provisions of the
Constitution have –
a.
original jurisdiction in all
matters and in particular, in
civil and criminal matters;
b.
jurisdiction to enforce the
Fundamental Human Rights and
Freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution;
c.
appellate jurisdiction from a
decision of a Community Tribunal
in civil matters;
d.
any other jurisdiction conferred
by the Constitution or by any
other enactment
Notwithstanding this seemingly
blanket grant of jurisdiction to
the High Court, it is the trite
and well understood position of
the law that this provision does
not confer unfettered
jurisdiction on the High Court,
and the jurisdictional reach of
the High Court is always
interpreted to ensure harmony
with other statutes that confer
various jurisdiction on other
bodies or adjudicating forums.
Further, for each matter that
any court has jurisdiction to
consider, that jurisdiction must
be exercised within the
framework of the law regulating
the relevant procedure.
The holdings of this court in
the
Edusei v Attorney - General
cases 1996-97 SCGLR 1,
1997-1998 2 GLR 1, (also
reported in 1998-99 SCGLR 753)
on the severance of the
constitutionally created
jurisdictions of the Supreme
Court in its interpretation and
enforcement jurisdiction, and
the High Court over the
enforcement of human rights are
apposite to this instant suit.
They help to settle the firm
position in our constitutional
jurisprudence that in construing
the 1992 Constitution and
statutes on jurisdiction, the
courts have to ensure harmonious
co-existence of the various
jurisdictions conferred on every
court by the Constitution, no
matter its place in the
hierarchy of courts, and where a
claim is couched to sound as
invoking a particular court's
jurisdiction, it is the duty of
the court to look at the claim
and identify its true call,
before assuming jurisdiction
over it.
In the first proceeding reported
in Edusei v Attorney -
General 1996-97 SCGLR 1, the
plaintiff sought the
interpretative and enforcement
jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in Article 130 (1) on his
fundamental human rights under
Article 17 of the Constitution.
This Court in its majority
decision was firm that the
effect of reading articles
33(1), 130(1) and 140(2)
together was to vest the High
court with exclusive
jurisdiction in the enforcement
of fundamental human rights and
freedoms, and this jurisdiction
is completely excluded from the
jurisdiction granted to the
Supreme Court in all matters
relating to the enforcement or
interpretation of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court
could therefore not assume
jurisdiction to sit on the
claims brought to it dressed in
the garb of a claim for
interpretation and enforcement
of the constitution.
On an application for review of
the decision, the court
dismissed the application in
Edusei v Attorney General and
Another 1997-1998 2 GLR 1,
on the ground inter alia, and
per Bamford Addo JSC, that the
provisions that the applicant
purported to seek interpretation
for were absolutely clear and
did 'not need to be
interpreted by the court at all'.
(Page 8) The claim was a claim
for enforcement of a fundamental
human right and freedom in
Chapter 5 of the Constitution
and the jurisdiction to consider
that lay in the High Court.
On page 6, Bamford Addo JSC
said: ‘Since jurisdiction is
a fundamental issue, the absence
of which would render any
decision of a court null and
void, it is of utmost importance
for a court to ensure that in
any case brought before it, it
has the requisite jurisdiction
to hear and determine that case.
Where there is lack of
jurisdiction, a court ought to
decline jurisdiction’.
Kpegah JSC, in support of the
decision to dismiss the
application reiterated the view
that 'After examining the
reliefs sought in the writ and
the statement of case as
amended, the plaintiff's claim
was in essence and substance a
claim for the enforcement of his
fundamental human rights but
dressed up as a constitutional
issue; and that such a claim is
cognisable by the High Court as
a court of first instance'
(page 22)
Acquah JSC (as he then was),
said of the matter on hand at
page 31: 'An objection on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction
is not one of technicality. It
is a fundamental objection which
questions the very foundation
and authority of a court to sit
and adjudicate on the matter
before it. Jurisdiction is the
power of the court to decide a
matter in controversy and
presupposes the existence of a
duly constituted court with
control over the subject-matter
and the parties. Jurisdiction
defines the powers of court to
inquire into facts, apply the
law, make decisions and declare
judgment.'
So it is that the High Court,
although seised with
jurisdiction over both
fundamental human rights and
parliamentary elections, cannot
assume jurisdiction to make
declarations regarding
parliamentary elections, so long
as there is no Petition
specifically invoking its
jurisdiction under Article 99
before the court.
And this is so, even if the
claims for reliefs on a
parliamentary election are
dressed up as consequential to
the right to vote. Despite the
fact that the High Court has
jurisdiction over fundamental
human rights and freedoms under
Article 33, and parliamentary
elections under Article 99, the
1992 Constitution that created
the two jurisdictions designed
for them to be exercised under
fundamentally different
procedures, and this is why the
High Court's jurisdiction over
parliamentary elections under
Article 99, is a special
jurisdiction that cannot be
invoked and exercised within its
other jurisdictions.
In the instant case, this court
did not fail to recognize the
general overarching jurisdiction
of the High Court in all
matters, and in particular it's
specific jurisdiction in the
enforcement of human rights, as
well as the specific
jurisdiction of the High Court
over parliamentary elections.
What this court did was look at
the orders made on 23rd December
2020 and the reliefs 1(f), 2,
and 3(a), (b), and (c ) endorsed
on the case presented to the
High Court, and as in the Edusei
case, recognize them for what
they were - claims relating to
the validity and outcome of a
parliamentary election. Having
recognized them in their plain
words, this court identified
that the High Court had no
jurisdiction to deal with a
parliamentary election in a suit
commenced by originating motion
pursuant to Article 33 of the
Constitution.
And this is simply because the
Constitution created a special
jurisdiction for their
consideration in Article 99,
enforceable by procedures
catered for under Section 16 of
PNDC Law 284.
As referred to by Appau JSC on
page 7 of the decision under
review, this Court has settled
through cases such as
Yeboah
v JH Mensah 1998-99 SC GLR 492,
and In Re
Parliamentary Election for
Wulensi Constituency Zakaria v
Nyimakan 2003-2004 1 SCGLR 1,
that the effect of
Section 16 (1) of PNDC
Law 284, (continued in force
through Article 11(1) (d) of
the Constitution) and
Article 99, is that any
cause of action that is in
substance and reality one that
questions the validity of a
parliamentary election and its
outcomes, must necessarily be
prosecuted through a
parliamentary election petition
in the High Court. And neither
the Supreme Court in its several
jurisdictions, and the High
Court in its various
jurisdictions, have jurisdiction
to grant reliefs relating to a
parliamentary election without a
hearing conducted via Petition
to question that election in the
High Court.
In Zakaria v Nyimakan
cited supra, the maxim
generalia specialibus non
derogant (general words
do not derogate from special)
was applied to determine that
the special jurisdiction created
by Article 99 should supersede
the general jurisdiction of the
High Court, including the
distinct jurisdiction over human
rights created under Article 33
of the Constitution and Section
15 (1) (b) of the Act 459.
In our view, the maxim
expressio unius est exclusion
alterius (the express
mention of one or more things of
a particular class may be
regarded as silently or
inferentially excluding all
other members of the class)
is also applicable in the manner
that the two provisions have
been interpreted and applied to
ensure the integrity of the
legislative intent behind these
two distinct jurisdictions of
the High Court.
Articles 99 (1), 99 (1) (a) and
99(2) of the 1992 Constitution
read
99(1) The High Court shall have
jurisdiction to hear and
determine any question whether –
a. a person has been validly
elected as a member of
Parliament or the seat of a
member has become vacant;
99(2) A person aggrieved by the
determination of the High Court
under this article may appeal to
the Court of Appeal
(emphasis mine)
Article 33 (3) also provides:
33(3)
A person aggrieved by a
determination of the High Court
may appeal to the Court of
Appeal with the right of a
further appeal to the Supreme
Court
(emphasis mine)
It is the Constitution’s
truncation of appeals in cases
commenced pursuant to Article 99
that formed the basis for this
Court holding in Zakaria v
Nyimakan cited supra
that in order for the clear
intention of the framers of the
Constitution not to be aborted,
the prosecution of parliamentary
elections must be treated as
belonging to a special
jurisdiction distinct from other
jurisdictions of the High Court
where appeals can climb up to
the Supreme Court. By the
direction of the 1992
Constitution, appeals in
decisions that pronounce on the
validity or outcomes of
parliamentary elections must end
in the Court of Appeal.
And yet, when the High Court
considers human rights actions
commenced pursuant to Article
33, the decisions emanating
therefrom must be inherently
capable of travelling up to the
Supreme Court. Under what
condition then can a High Court
mix its jurisdiction to
pronounce on the validity of
parliamentary elections
conferred under Article 99, with
the exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 33, when the
processes set by the
Constitution and statute for
their commencement and appeals
are different?
To allow this would lead to the
untenable situation where final
orders relating to the validity
of the parliamentary election
(as was quashed in the decision
of 5th January 2021),
may not be questioned beyond the
Court of Appeal, while those
relating to the human rights
questions (as were left
untouched in the decision of 5th
January 2021) may be questioned
up to the Supreme Court.
It must also not be forgotten
that when an action is commenced
by originating motion, as
happened in the suit that
provoked the application and
ruling on review now, the motion
can only be responded to with
affidavits. On the other hand, a
Petition is responded to with an
Answer. The Petition and Answer
form pleadings pursuant to which
a trial can be conducted, while
an originating motion is a
process that is determined on
the strength of arguments backed
by affidavit evidence. By
providing that the validity of
elections is questioned only
through a process that allows
for a trial, the situation of
deciding the validity of an
election on the strength of a
motion and affidavit evidence,
has been disallowed by statute
and judicial interpretation on
Articles 33 and 99 cited above.
Again, Article 33 allows a
person who complains that their
fundamental human rights have
been violated to activate the
action ‘without prejudice to
any other action that is
lawfully available’.
This way, if the nature of the
controversy over an alleged
human right violation cannot be
settled through affidavit
evidence, the party is entitled
to invoke the jurisdiction of
the High Court through other
forms such as a Writ.
To quote Akuffo JSC (as she then
was), on page 510 of
Awuni
v WAEC
2003 – 2004 SCGLR 471,
’When fundamental human
rights have been, are being or
likely to be contravened, access
to judicial redress must be as
swift and timely as feasible to
ensure that such rights or
freedoms are not lost or
irremediably damaged forever.
Hence, in the light of the
objective of article 33(1) (as
hereinbefore mentioned), it is
clear to me that what article
33(1) seeks to assure, by making
provision for access by an
application rather than a writ
of summons (a relatively
sluggish process), is that such
a complaint be disposed of by
the High Court with optimum
dispatch…we have to view the
High Court’s jurisdiction under
article 33 (1) as a special one;
and by clear constitutional
stipulation, it may be invoked
by an application.’
Thus when it comes to
controversies over the validity
of an election, Article 99 of
the 1992 Constitution read
together with PNDC Law 284
allows only one door to the High
Court – by Petition. This is not
the case with human rights
actions under Article 33. When
it comes to human rights
violations, the 1992
Constitution provides multiple
doors to the court’s
jurisdiction. This is another
important distinction that
dictates that the High Court’s
jurisdictions over Article 33
court actions and Article 99
court actions cannot be mixed up
and exercised together in one
action.
The severance of the High
Court’s jurisdiction in Article
33 from its jurisdiction in
Article 99 and Section 16 (1) of
PNDC Law 284 does not contradict
the holdings of Awuni v WAEC
cited supra and Edusei (No 2)
v The Attorney-General 1998- 99
SCGLR 753 as submitted by
Applicant. This court also
upheld the invocation of the
jurisdiction of the High Court
over human rights under Article
33 by the Applicants, by leaving
the claims relating to human
rights violations untouched. And
indeed, the Applicants were also
not estopped from commencing an
action under Article 99
challenging the validity of the
elections if they so desired.
In summary, this court did not
err when it ruled that 'the
jurisdiction of the High Court
conferred by Article 99 of the
Constitution, 1992 and Section
16 of PNDCL 284 of 1992, for the
determination of a parliamentary
dispute, is fundamentally
different from a human right
action pursued under article 33
(1) of the Constitution, 1992'
This decision reiterates the
position that the High Court
does not have jurisdiction to
make orders or consider any
issue regarding the validity of
parliamentary elections as
provided for under Article 99 of
the Constitution, unless its
jurisdiction has been invoked by
the issue of a Petition under
section 16 of PNDC Law 284. And
especially, the High Court
cannot, under the guise of
adjudicating human rights and
freedoms, consider reliefs and
issue orders that essentially
contest the validity of
parliamentary elections, because
its jurisdiction under Article
33 is exercised under a
different regime from its
jurisdiction under Article 99 of
the 1992 Constitution. Grounds
b, d, e, f, i, j, k, l, m, o
of this application
therefore cannot be upheld.
Non-Consideration of
constitutionality of CI 128
Applicant counsel urges
underground ( c) that in the
decision under review herein,
the Supreme court was bound to
address the constitutionality of
the
Representation of the People
(Parliamentary Constituencies)
Instrument, 2020, CI 128
after the Attorney General
presented that it was the
statutory basis for the
elections in Hohoe. This is
because in rebuttal, Counsel for
Applicant herein had disputed
its constitutionality.
It is his submission that by
reason of settled decisions of
the Supreme Court from cases
such as
Attorney General v Faroe
Atlantic Ltd 2005-2006 SCGLR 271,
Attorney General v
Balkan Energy Ghana Ltd 2012 2
SCGLR 998 and Awuni v
West African Examinations
Council 2003 – 2004 SCGLR 471,
all courts, including the
Supreme Court are bound to
address the issue of
constitutionality of actions and
statutes when it is raised in
any suit.
This submission fails to
appreciate the position of the
law that when a court is
considering a preliminary issue
such as jurisdiction, which is
fundamental to the very capacity
of a court to even hear a suit
before it, the court is bound in
law not to consider any other
issue that goes to the merits of
the controversy in the suit
until it has resolved the
preliminary question.
This Court in the exercise of
its supervisory jurisdiction
over the High Court would grant
an order of certiorari only
against errors of law that are
so fundamental and clear on the
face of the ruling, or an error
which amounts to lack of
jurisdiction in the court so as
to make the decision a nullity.
This is because errors made in
the course of exercising the
court’s legitimate jurisdiction
may only be corrected within the
appellate jurisdictions of the
court hierarchy.
This landscape has become well
settled and the decisions of
this Court in
Republic v High Court, Accra, Ex
Parte Industrialization Fund for
Developing Countries and Another
2003-2004 348; Republic v
High Court, Ex parte CHRAJ (Addo
Interested Party) 2003-2004 1
SCGLR 312, and Republic v
Court of Appeal Ex-Parte Tsatsu
Tsikata 2005 – 2006 SCGLR 612
are referred to.
In
Republic v High Court, Accra Ex-Parte
CHRAJ, 2003 – 2004 SCGLR 312
at page 345 this
Court, speaking through Date-Bah
JSC in what the Court describes
as a re-statement of the law
governing the exercise of the
Supreme Court’s supervisory
powers had this to say: ‘The
re-statement of the law may be
summarized as follows: where the
High Court (or for that matter
the Court of Appeal) makes a
non-jurisdictional error of law
which is not patent on the face
of the record (within the
meaning already discussed), the
avenue for redress open to an
aggrieved party is an appeal,
not judicial review. In this
regard, an error of law made by
the High Court or the Court of
Appeal is not to be regarded as
taking the judge outside the
court’s jurisdiction, unless the
court had acted ultra vires the
Constitution or an express
statutory restriction validly
imposed on it’
Of significant note also is the
decision in Republic v Court
of Appeal Ex Parte Tsatsu
Tsikata cited supra, where
Wood JSC (as she then was),
stated thus at page 619 ‘the
clear thinking of this court is
that, our supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 132
of the 1992, should be exercised
only in those manifestly plain
and obvious cases, where there
are patent errors of law on the
face of the record, which errors
either go to jurisdiction or are
so plain as to make the impugned
decision a complete nullity’
Consequent to the above
position, this court, while
exercising its jurisdiction
under Article 132 where the
matter under consideration is
whether a lower court has
jurisdiction to act or not,
would be acting per incuriam if
it digressed into consideration
of the constitutionality of CI
128, a question of law that is
only relevant for determining
the merits of the challenge to
the parliamentary election.
As already
explained in the first analysis
in this decision, the different
jurisdictions of a court must be
exercised within the right
procedures directed by statute
supporting the law creating the
jurisdiction. And this is why on
page 9 of the Ruling, the Court
stated per Appau JSC that
‘Our jurisdiction in the instant
application before us does not
extend to the determination of
the constitutionality or
otherwise of CI 128. The
interested parties have not
invoked the jurisdiction of this
court to challenge the
constitutionality or otherwise
of CI 128’.
May I also add that no court's
considerations are done in a
vacuum. Considerations of any
issue by a court must occur only
with a view to feeding into the
decision the court is called
upon to make. What would be the
reason for this court to admit
an off the cuff consideration of
the constitutionality of CI 128,
if the matter that the Court's
jurisdiction had been invoked to
consider, did not go beyond the
preliminary and fundamental
point of the High Court's
jurisdiction to even consider
the parliamentary elections that
were allegedly premised on CI
128?
The case before the Court in the
ruling under review was solely
against the High Court and its
capacity to assume jurisdiction
over the parliamentary election
it had purported to pronounce
on, and not the 'right to vote'
action that was still pending in
the High Court after the orders
made by this court.
The position of the law is that
it is only after fundamental
issues such as jurisdiction have
been settled and therefore not
in controversy, that a court and
parties before it can be free to
adjudicate any matters that go
to the merit of the actual
subject matter in dispute and
related issues.
All the cases cited by Applicant
in support of this ground of
review are distinguishable. In
Attorney General v. Faroe
Atlantic 2005-2006 SCGLR 271,
this Court was sitting in
its appellate jurisdiction over
the subject matter in
controversy, and it was in the
exercise of that appellate
jurisdiction, that the Supreme
Court held per Akuffo JSC (as
she then was) that, the
Constitution is applicable at
all times and all acts and
things, particularly those done
for and on behalf of the
Republic, must always be tested
against its provisions. In the
case on review, the
applicability of the
Constitution was required only
in relation to the issue of
jurisdiction, and that matter
was adequately considered.
Similarly, in the decisions of
the Supreme Court in
New
Patriotic Party v Inspector
General of Police
1993-94 2 GLR 459,
New Patriotic Party
v Attorney General 31st
December Case 1993-94 2
GLR 35, and Attorney General
v Balkan Energy Ghana Ltd
2012 2 SCGLR 998
cited by Applicant, the Supreme
Court was sitting in its
original enforcement
jurisdiction when it dilated on
the constitutionality of various
actions.
Those jurisdictions are
clinically different from that
exercised in the decision under
review. The supervisory
jurisdiction that was invoked to
quash orders relating to the
validity of a parliamentary
election and the outcomes of the
election when the High Court’s
jurisdiction had not been
invoked under Article 99,
required that this court focus
only on the jurisdictional error
submitted to us to remove from
the records of the courts.
In
Ebusuapayin Yaw Stephens v Kwesi
Apoh, the Court of Appeal
per Anin Yeboah JA (as he then
was), HI/252/04 (5th
February 2009), held that ‘A
defence of estoppel, statute of
limitation, lack of locus standi,
etc are all pleaded to show that
the cause of action is wanting
in a legal manner. This is the
rational for determining such
preliminary matters first in the
course of proceedings. It is
therefore the law that if an
action succeeds on a plea of
statute of limitation,
lack of jurisdiction or
lack of locus standi, the trial
court and for that matter an
appellate court should not
proceed to determine the merits
of the case, irrespective of the
evidence. See
Graves v.
Oyewoo [1967] GLR 803 SC, Akrong
v Bulley [1965] GLR 469 SC and
Sarkodie I v Boateng II
[1982-83] 715 GLR SC.
(emphasis mine)
Because of the above legal
positions, ground (c) is
misconceived.
Quashing of Void Orders
To the extent that the 23rd
December 2020 proceedings to
grant an injunction to restrain
the gazetting of parliamentary
election outcome and a winner of
a parliamentary election from
taking their place in
parliament,
were undertaken without
the jurisdiction to pronounce on
a parliamentary election
conferred by the commencement of
an election petition, the
proceedings in issue and the
reliefs they flowed from
constituted a jurisdictional
error and had to be quashed. To
quote the language of Date-Bah
JSC in Ex Parte CHRAJ
cited supra, 'the court had
acted ultra vires the
Constitution or an express
statutory restriction validly
imposed on it'.
The High Court had acted ultra
vires Article 99 and PNDCL 284.
An order that is fundamentally
defective by reason of being
made without proper jurisdiction
ought to be removed from the
body of proceedings to which it
does not belong. This is the
duty that the Supreme Court
implemented by removing the
entire proceedings and orders
made by the Ho High Court on 23rd
December 2020 including the
reliefs endorsed within the
human rights action that were in
substance and reality, an action
protesting the validity of a
parliamentary election.
In
Republic v The High Court
(General Jurisdiction), Accra,
Exparte Nii Agyemankese 111,
Civil Motion No J5/11/2019 of
6th February 2019, this
court similarly quashed orders
that emanated from a
jurisdiction that the High Court
was not allowed to assume -
settling matters that related to
a cause of action in
chieftaincy. In several other
decisions prior to the order by
Abodakpi J directed at one Nii
Dodoo Nsaki to purge himself of
contempt, the High Court had
issued orders that essentially
affected chieftaincy matters.
The order of contempt was built
on these decisions.
Even though the High Court has
jurisdiction to make orders
regarding contempt, the quashing
of its orders on contempt along
with the premise of the order,
was derived from the want of the
High Court's foundational
jurisdiction over chieftaincy
matters. Similarly, where no
jurisdiction to act exists, this
court is bound to exercise its
supervisory jurisdiction to
prevent the occurrence of
further nullities. The quashing
of the lapsed orders of 23rd
December 2020 and Reliefs 1(d),
2 and 3 constituted the removal
of matters over which the High
Court had no jurisdiction from
the proceedings before it.
Dismissal of Objection to Panel
Member
We must note that this matter is
moot to the extent that the
court that gave the decision
under review comprised all five
members of the panel that heard
the application. The court had
dismissed the preliminary
objection to the panel member,
exercised the supervisory
jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, and completed its work
with a ruling. With the
completion of its work, grounds
(q) and (r) are moot. They have
no foundation within the
application that was heard, and
the decision that is under
review.
On account of the analysis set
out above, we do not find that
the application for review of
this court’s decision of 5th
January 2021 is sustainable. The
decision was not erroneous so as
to invite the description of
such grounds as exceptional
circumstances, neither did it in
any way lead to miscarriage of
justice. Indeed, the Applicant's
right to ventilate the human
right questions before the High
Court were left untouched, and
this allows the dispute that
properly invoked the
jurisdiction of the High Court
in an originating motion to be
ventilated. The parties were
also not precluded from settling
any questions as to the validity
of the parliamentary election by
the proper procedure directed by
statute and the structure of the
Constitutional provisions in
Article 99. The application is
refused and consequently,
dismissed.
G. TORKORNOO (MRS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
Y. APPAU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
S. K. MARFUL-SAU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
A.
LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
I. O. TANKO AMADU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
PROF. H. J. A. N.
MENSA-BONSU (MRS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
E. YONNY KULENDI
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
GODFRED YEBOAH DAME (
ATTORNEY-GENERAL) FOR THE
APPLICANT/
RESPONDENT WITH HIM GRACE EWOOL
(CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY) AND
YVONNE BANNERMAN (SENIOR STATE
ATTORNEY).
TSATSU TSIKATA FOR THE
INTERESTED PARTIES/APPLICANTS
WITH EMILE ATSU AGBAKPE. |