Company law –
Liquidation – Certiorari -
Official
Liquidator – Financial
Institution – Microfinance -
Revocation of licence – Whether
or not the learned justice of
the High Court, Wa committed
error of law apparent on the
face of the record
HEADNOTES
The brief
facts of the case are that on
the 1st of March 2016
the Bank of Ghana,
revoked
the licence of DKM Diamond
Microfinance Ltd under
section 68 (1) of
Banking
Act 2004, Act 673, and the
applicant was appointed the
Liquidator of the company and
subsequently ordered the
liquidation of the company,
The applicant published in the
national dailies a Press Release
informing the interested parties
to submit their proof of debts.
The interested parties who were
paid portions of their claim,
later filed an application in
the Registry of the High Court,
Wa, for leave to issue a writ of
summons against the Official
Liquidator. The High Court, Wa,
granted the interested parties
leave to issue the writ of
summons on 7th July
2020.This is the order applicant
sought to quash by certiorari.
HELD
The record in
this case is clear that the
trial High Court had
jurisdiction to hear the
application that was brought
before it, which resulted in the
ruling of the 7th July 2020.
From the re-statement of the
law, we can only exercise our
supervisory jurisdiction as
invoked by the applicant herein,
if we find that the High Court,
Wa, committed error of law
patent on the record. The other
condition is that the said error
should be fundamental or
substantial going to root of the
matter. In this case no error
was committed by the High Court,
Wa and for that reason our
supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 132 of the 1992
Constitution was not properly
invoked, hence our decision to
dismiss the application by the
Official Liquidator on the 25th
of November 2020.
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
1992
Constitution
Banking Act
2004, Act 673
Bodies
Corporate (Official Liquidation)
Act, 1963 (Act 180),
Corporate
Restructuring and Insolvency
Act, 2020 (Act 1015).
CASES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Republic v.
the High Court (Commercial
Division) Ex-parte Alfredina
Ofori and Nikabs Grande,
unreported Civil Motion No.
J5/36/2016 of 3/11/2016
Republic v.
High Court (Commercial Division)
Accra; Ex parte the Trust Bank
Ltd (Ampomah Photo Lab Ltd &
Three Others (Interested
Parties) {2009} SCGLR 164
Republic v.
High Court Accra; Ex parte
Commission on Human Rights and
Administrative Justice (Addo
Interested Party) {2003-2004} 1
SCGLR 312
Republic v.
Court of Appeal; Exparte Tsatsu
Tsikata {2005-2006} SCGLR 612
BOOKS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING
THE LEADING JUDGMENT
MARFUL-SAU,
JSC: -
COUNSEL
GEORGE KOFI
BEKAI FOR THE APPLICANT.
ISAAC BORRIDO
FOR THE INTERESTED
PARTIES/RESPONDENTS
MARFUL-SAU,
JSC:-
The applicant
herein who is the
Official
Liquidator of DKM Diamond
Microfinance Ltd prayed this
Court for an order of
certiorari directed at the
High Court, Wa presided over by
His Lordship Justice Kwasi
Boakye, to quash the ruling of
that court dated the 7th
of July 2020 in suit number
UW/WA/HC/E2/23/2020. In that
suit the interested parties
herein had applied for leave to
issue a writ of summons against
the applicant herein. The High
Court granted the application
for the interested parties to
issue a writ of summons against
the applicant. It is the order
granting leave to the interested
parties to issue the writ of
summons that has become the
subject of this application. On
the 25th November,
2020, this Court by a unanimous
decision dismissed the
application for certiorari by
the Official Liquidator and
reserved its reasons which we
hereby deliver.
The brief
facts of the case are that on
the 1st of March 2016
the Bank of Ghana, revoked the
licence of DKM Diamond
Microfinance Ltd under section
68 (1) of Banking Act 2004, Act
673, and the applicant was
appointed the Liquidator of the
company.
The applicant subsequently
ordered the liquidation of the
company under section 1(1) (b)
of then
Bodies Corporate (Official
Liquidation) Act, 1963 (Act
180), which is now section
81(1) (b) of the
Corporate
Restructuring and Insolvency
Act, 2020 (Act 1015).
The
applicant published in the
national dailies a Press Release
informing the interested parties
to submit their proof of debts.
The interested parties who were
paid portions of their claim,
later filed an application in
the Registry of the High Court,
Wa, for leave to issue a writ of
summons against the Official
Liquidator. The High Court, Wa,
granted the interested parties
leave to issue the writ of
summons on 7th July
2020.This is the order applicant
sought to quash by certiorari.
The applicant
formulated one ground for the
application, which was that
the
learned justice of the High
Court, Wa committed error of law
apparent on the face of the
record which goes to
jurisdiction when he granted the
interested parties leave to
issue a writ against the
Official Liquidator of DKM
Diamond Microfinance Ltd. The
issue we need to resolve in this
case is whether the High Court,
Wa, erred when it granted leave
to the interested parties to
issue a writ of summons against
the applicant herein?
Now, reading
the ruling of the High Court,
Wa, it is clear that the
interested parties herein
brought their application for
leave under section 93 of the
new Corporate Restructuring and
Insolvency Act 2020, Act 1015,
which provides as follows:-
‘’ A person
shall not on the commencement of
a winding up proceed with or
commence an action or civil
proceedings against the company
other than proceedings by a
secured creditor for the
realization of the security of
that secured creditor except:
a)
By leave of the Court and
b)
Subject to the terms that the
Court may impose.’’
The
resolution of this case depended
on the interpretation of section
93 of Act 1015 to determine
whether or not the High Court,
Wa did commit an error in
granting leave to the interested
parties to issue the writ of
summons. The issue with the
interpretation of section 93
relates to whether unsecured
creditors have the right to sue
and if so under what
circumstances. In this
proceedings the applicant, who
classified the interested
parties as unsecured creditors,
posited that under section 93 of
Act 1015, upon the commencement
of winding up it is only secured
creditors who have the right to
commence action against the
company. According to the
applicant unsecured creditors
such as the interested parties
have no right to sue under
section 93 of Act 1015.
This Court in
the case of
Republic
v. the High Court (Commercial
Division) Ex-parte Alfredina
Ofori and Nikabs Grande,
unreported decision in Civil
Motion No. J5/36/2016 of
3/11/2016 had the
opportunity to pronounce on the
scope of section 17 of the
Bodies Corporate (Official
Liquidation) Act, 1963, Act 180
a provision retained as section
93 of Act 1015. Pwamang JSC, who
delivered the decision of the
Court had this to say:
‘’The
provision of section 17 of Act
180 is clear and unambiguous. It
provides that;
On the
commencement of a winding up, no
action or civil proceedings
against the company, other than
proceedings by a secured
creditor for the realization of
this security, shall be
proceeded with or commenced save
by leave of the Court and
subject to such terms as the
Court may impose.’’
His Lordship
continued as follows:- ‘’ What
it means in simple language is
that upon commencement of a
winding up only secured
creditors are allowed as of
right to sue or continue with
pending civil proceedings for
the realization of their
security. Any other person who
has a cause of action against a
company being wound up cannot
sue as of right but may do so
only with the prior leave of the
High Court. Similarly an
unsecured creditor who has
pending civil proceedings cannot
continue with them without leave
of the High Court. So the
applicants in this case who are
not secured creditors were
within their rights to apply for
leave to continue with their
case and the Judge acted in
accordance with the law in
granting same.’’
Taking
inspiration from the above
decision of this Court, we find
it difficult to see any error
committed by the High Court, Wa
in granting leave to the
interested parties to commence
an action against the applicant.
We hold that the High Court was
right in granting the interested
parties leave to issue the writ
of summons. The High Court, Wa,
was within jurisdiction and it
rightly granted the leave on the
7th July 2020, thus
no error was committed to
warrant the order of certiorari
sought by the applicant.
It is now
settled that when a High Court
acts within jurisdiction and
commits an error, that decision
will only be quashed under the
supervisory jurisdiction of this
Court if only the error is so
fundamental to render the
impugned decision a nullity. So
in a case where the High Court
acts within jurisdiction and no
error is committed as held in
this case certiorari will not
lie.
WHAT IS THE
LAW ON CERTIORARI?
The law is
now well settled by this court.
In the case of
Republic v. High Court
(Commercial Division) Accra; Ex
parte the Trust Bank Ltd
(Ampomah Photo Lab Ltd & Three
Others (Interested Parties)
{2009} SCGLR 164,
this court speaking through Dr.
Date-Bah, JSC stated the law at
page 169 to 171 as follows:
‘’ The
current law on when prerogative
writs will be available from the
Supreme Court to supervise the
superior courts in respect of
their errors of law was
re-stated and then fine- tuned
in the cases of
Republic
v. High Court Accra; Ex parte
Commission on Human Rights and
Administrative Justice (Addo
Interested Party) {2003-2004} 1
SCGLR 312 and Republic v. Court
of Appeal; Exparte Tsatsu
Tsikata {2005-2006} SCGLR 612
respectively. In my view,
the combined effect of these two
authorities results in a
statement of the law which is
desirable and should be
re-affirmed. This court should
endeavour not to backslide into
excessive supervisory
intervention over the High Court
in relation to its error of law.
Appeals are better suited for
resolving errors of law. In
Exparte CHRAJ (supra), this
court, speaking through me,
sought to reset the clock on
this aspect of the law (as
stated at pages 345-346 of the
Report) as follows:
‘’The ruling
of this court in this case, it
is hoped, provides a response to
the above invitation to restate
the law on this matter. The
restatement of the law may be
summarised as follows: where the
High Court (or for that matter
the Court of Appeal) makes a
non-jurisdictional error of law
which is not patent on the face
of the record (within the
meaning already discussed), the
avenue for redress open to an
aggrieved party is an appeal,
not judicial review. In this
regard, an error of law made by
the High Court or the Court of
Appeal is not to be regarded as
taking the Judge outside the
court’s jurisdiction, unless the
court has acted ultra vires the
Constitution or an express
statutory restriction validly
imposed on it. To the extent
that this restatement of the law
is inconsistent with any
previous decision of this
Supreme Court, this court should
be regarded as departing from
its previous decision or
decisions concerned, pursuant to
article 129(3) of the
1992
Constitution. Any previous
decisions of other courts
inconsistent with this
restatement are overruled’’.
At page 170
of the report the learned jurist
continued the re-statement of
the law as follows;
‘’In Exparte
Tsatsu Tsikata (supra), Georgina
Wood JSC (as she then was) said
(as stated at page 619 of the
Report) thus:
The clear
thinking of this court is that,
our supervisory jurisdiction
under article 132 of the 1992
Constitution, should be
exercised only in those
manifestly plain and obvious
cases, where there are patent
errors of law on the face of the
record, which errors either go
to jurisdiction or are so plain
as to make the impugned decision
a complete nullity. It stands to
reason then, that the error(s)
of law alleged must be
fundamental, substantial,
material, grave or so serious as
to go to the root of the matter.
The error of law must be one on
which the decision depends. A
minor, trifling, inconsequential
or unimportant error, or for
that matter an error which does
not go to the core or root of
the decision complained of; or
stated differently, on which the
decision does not turn, would
not attract the court’s
supervisory jurisdiction.’’
The learned
jurist continued on the same
page as follows:
‘’ The
combined effect of these two
authorities, it seems to me, is
that even where a High Court
makes a non- jurisdictional
error which is patent on the
face of the record, it will not
be a ground for the exercise of
the supervisory jurisdiction of
this court unless the error is
fundamental. Only fundamental
non-jurisdictional error can
find the exercise of this
court’s supervisory
jurisdiction. The issue which
arises, on the facts of this
case then, is whether the trial
High Court either committed a
jurisdictional error which is so
fundamental as to attract the
supervisory jurisdiction of this
court.’’
The record in
this case is clear that the
trial High Court had
jurisdiction to hear the
application that was brought
before it, which resulted in the
ruling of the 7th July 2020.
From the re-statement of the
law, we can only exercise our
supervisory jurisdiction as
invoked by the applicant herein,
if we find that the High Court,
Wa, committed error of law
patent on the record. The other
condition is that the said error
should be fundamental or
substantial going to root of the
matter. In this case no error
was committed by the High Court,
Wa and for that reason our
supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 132 of the 1992
Constitution was not properly
invoked, hence our decision to
dismiss the application by the
Official Liquidator on the 25th
of November 2020.
S. K.
MARFUL-SAU
(JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT)
V. J.
M. DOTSE
(JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT)
N. A. AMEGATCHER
(JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT)
AVRIL
LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS)
(JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT)
PROF. H. J.
A. N. MENSA-BONSU (MRS)
(JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
GEORGE KOFI
BEKAI FOR THE APPLICANT.
ISAAC BORRIDO
FOR THE INTERESTED
PARTIES/RESPONDENTS. |