Practice and
Procedure - Registrar’s
Certificate - Whether or not
Audi alteram partem rule has
been breached - Certiorari to
quash the order – Jurisdiction -
Rule 20(1) of the Court of
Appeal Rules (CI 19) -
HEADNOTES
The plaintiff
brought action against the
defendant (the applicant in this
case) in the High Court, Accra,
on 20th January
2006. After a full trial,
judgment was given against the
defendant on 14th
September, 2008. On 12th
October, 2008, the defendant
filed a Notice of Appeal against
the judgment. The record of
proceedings was settled and all
the appropriate fees duly paid
by the appellants. a copy of
the record of proceedings was
served on the solicitors to the
appellants. These solicitors
discovered that the record
served was not certified. The
said solicitors sent back the
record to the Registry for due
certification. This
certification was completed
within 18 days of the record
being certified, the appellant’s
Statement of Case had been
prepared and filed. Some 3
months after the filing of the
appellant’s Statement of Case,
there was no response from the
respondent. Accordingly, the
appellant conducted a search on
12th March, 2010 in
the Registry of the Court of
Appeal. The search disclosed
that the appellant’s Statement
of Case had not been served
because there was insufficient
address on it for service. The
respondent’s Written Submission
was eventually filed. Although
it was out of time, the
appellants did not complain, The
appellant/applicant contends
that its efforts to get the
uncertified record certified
have been exploited by the
respondent to generate confusion
in all the subsequent process
filed by the appellant. When the
appeal was heard, the Court of
Appeal struck out the
appellant’s Statement of Case,
when it accepted the
respondent’s claim that the
appellant’s Statement of Case
had been filed out of time. The
matter of extension of time then
came up for further hearing It
was the Court of Appeal before
whom this matter was placed
which made the ruling that :
based the on Registrars
Certification the appellant has
not complied with the
requirement of Rule 20(1) of CI
19 and proceeded to strike out
the appeal The
appellant/applicant contends
that there was no basis for the
Registrar’s Certificate and that
the notice issued by him was
false. The appeal had not been
listed for hearing, as the
motion for extension of time to
file the Statement of Case had
not yet been taken. The appeal
was thus not ready to be heard.
HELD
Accordingly,
the preliminary objection based
on an alleged violation of Rule
62 of the Supreme Court Rules
fails.
However, in
this case the applicant has a
plethora of causes to show as to
why his appeal ought not to be
struck out upon the Registrar’s
summons. Therefore the failure
to hear him out on it is prima
facie an infraction of the
audi alteram partem rule as
embraced by article 296 and can
void the peremptory striking out
of his appeal and time under the
Rules of this court cannot shut
him out from pursuing his motion
herein. For these reasons I
would also overrule the
preliminary objection. Motion to
proceed.
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Court of
Appeal Rules 1997 (CI 19)
Supreme
[High] Court (Civil Procedure)
LN 140A),
Courts Act
1960,(C.A.4)
Court of
Appeal Rules, 1962 (LI 218)
CASES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Vasquez v
Quarshie [1968] 2 GLR 62
The Republic
v High Court, Accra; ex parte
Salloum & Ors (Coker, Interested
Party), Suit No. J5/4/2011, 16th
March 2011
In re Kumi
(Dec’d); Kumi v Nartey
[2007-2008] SCGLR 623,
Republic v
High Court, Accra; ex parte
Allgate Co. Ltd. (Amalgamated
Bank Ltd., Interested Party)
[2007-2008] SCGLR 1041
Amoakoh v
Hansen [1987-88] 2 GLR 26 at
43-44
Republic v
High Court (Fast Track
Division) Accra; ex parte
Speedline Stevedoring Co. Ltd.
(Dolphyne Interested Party)
[2007-2008] SCGLR 102
Mosi v
Bagyina
[1963] 1GLR 337, SC
Aidoo v
Commissioner of Police (No. 3)
(1964) GLR 354 at 359 S.C
Republic v.
High Court(Fast Track Division)
Accra Ex parte State Housing Co.
Ltd. (No. 1) (Barnor Interested
Party) (2009) SCGLR 177
University of
Ceylon v Fernando (1960)I WLR
223 P.C
Asor II v
Amegboe (1978) GLR 153 C.A.
F. Hoffman-La
Roche & Co v. Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry [1974]3
WLR 104
Amuzu v
Oklikah (1998-99)SC GLR 141
Essilfie v
Ghana Ports Authority (1980) GLR
469,
Hanna Assi
(No. 2) v. Gihoc Refrigeration
& Household Products Ltd
(2007-2008)1 SCGLR 16
BOOKS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING
THE LEADING JUDGMENT
DR. DATE-BAH
JSC:
COUNSEL
MISS AUDREY
TWUM FOR THE APPLICANT.
GODFRED
YEBOAH-DAME FOR THE 2ND
RESPONDENT.
R U L I N G
DR. DATE-BAH
JSC:
The core of
the complaint in this
application is that when the
applicant’s appeal came up for
hearing before the Court of
Appeal, the court, relying
exclusively on the
Registrar’s Certificate that
the applicant/appellant had not
complied with the requirement of
Rule
20(1) of the Court of Appeal
Rules (CI 19), struck out
its appeal, without giving any
opportunity for representations
to be made on its behalf by its
counsel who were present in
court. It claims, therefore,
that the
audi alteram partem rule has
been breached. It has
accordingly applied to this
court for an order of
certiorari to quash the order
of the Court of Appeal
dated 1st November,
2010 striking out the
applicant’s appeal.
I would like
to begin my analysis of the law
governing this main issue in
this application by referring to
the words of one of the Ghanaian
judges whom I admire the most,
namely Justice A.N.E. Amissah.
Amissah JA, sitting in the High
Court in 1968, expressed a
clear view to the effect that
non-compliance with the audi
alteram partem rule results in
nullity of the subsequent
proceedings. He said in Vasquez
v Quarshie [1968] 2 GLR 62 at p.
63 that:
“But no court
is, to my mind, entitled to call
upon a plaintiff to proceed with
the proof of his claim if it is
aware that the defendant has not
been notified of the hearing.
Similarly rule 17 speaks of the
defendant having the action
against him dismissed and
proving his counterclaim, if
any, should the plaintiff not
appear. Here again a court
which allows this to happen with
full knowledge that the
plaintiff does not appear only
because he is not aware of the
proceeding will be offending
against the elementary principle
of justice which obliges it to
hear both parties, or at least
give them an opportunity to have
their say, before its decision.
A court is only entitled to give
a judgment in default if the
party fails to appear after
notice of the proceedings has
been given to him. For then it
would be justifiable to assume
that he does not wish to be
heard. It is this party with
notice who defaults in
appearance who is privileged to
come before the court within
fourteen days to have the
judgment set aside, if he has
some substantial reason for
failing to appear when he should
have. To hold that his brother
without notice is also obliged
to come before the court within
the same time limit would lead
to some inequitable results. It
is not impossible that he would
get to know about the judgment
against him long after the
fourteen-day period has
elapsed. What should he do
then? Should he come to the
court and ask for an extension
of time within which to apply?
I think not. His entitlement to
have the judgment set aside in
such circumstances is as of
right and should not be made
dependent on the discretion of
the court. A court making a
decision in a case where a party
does not appear because he has
not been notified is doing an
act which is a nullity on the
ground of absence of
jurisdiction. A person who is
condemned in his absence in
proceedings of which he has no
knowledge cannot be limited as
to the time within which he may
repudiate the decision. Learned
counsel attempted to equate a
notice served on the first
defendant to produce documents
at the trial with notice of the
trial. But a cursory
examination of the notice shows
that this cannot be. It
contains no notice of the
hearing date. A request that
you should produce a document
when the trial is on is no
notice of the time when the
trial is to begin or to
continue.”
Though
Amissah JA made his
pronouncement in the High Court,
this Supreme Court has held
several times recently that
non-compliance with the audi
alteram partem rule results in
nullity. In The Republic v High
Court, Accra; ex parte Salloum &
Ors (Coker, Interested Party),
Suit No. J5/4/2011, unreported
judgment of the Supreme Court,
delivered on 16th
March 2011, Anin Yeboah JSC,
delivering the majority opinion
of the court, said:
“The courts
in Ghana and elsewhere seriously
frown upon breaches of the audi
alteram partem rule to the
extent that no matter the merits
of the case, its denial is seen
as a basic fundamental error
which should nullify proceedings
made pursuant to the denial.
… It is our
opinion that as this court has
in several cases held that a
breach of the rules of natural
justice renders proceedings a
nullity, we will declare that
the applicants have sufficiently
made a case to warrant our
supervisory intervention.”
He cited,
with approval, the earlier case
of In re Kumi (Dec’d); Kumi v
Nartey [2007-2008] SCGLR 623,
where Sophia Adinyira JSC had
said at pp. 632-3 that:
“In
consonance with the above
principles of law, both civil
and criminal procedure rules
allow a party to have a judgment
or order made in any proceedings
that took place without notice
and in his absence to be set
aside. This elementary
principle of justice, which
obliges a court to hear both
parties, or at least give them
an opportunity to have their
say, before its decision, is of
such essence that even where a
person has notice of the trial
but fails to attend court, he
may apply to the court to have a
judgment or order made against
him set aside. He may do so
under Order 36, r. 2 of CI 47
which provides:
“2(1) A
judge may set aside or vary, on
such terms as are just, a
judgment obtained against a
party who fails to attend at the
trial.
(2) An
application made under this rule
shall be made within fourteen
days after the trial.”
However, as
explained by Amissah JA in
Vasquez v Quarshie (supra) in
relation to the analogous
provision under Order 36, r 18
of the Supreme [High] Court
(Civil Procedure) LN 140A), the
above rule of a time limit of
fourteen days only applies to a
party who had notice of the
trial. But where in the case of
a party who had no notice of the
trial he has as of right to
apply to have the judgment set
aside as the proceedings was
without jurisdiction.”
Similarly, in
Republic v High Court, Accra; ex
parte Allgate Co. Ltd.
(Amalgamated Bank Ltd.,
Interested Party) [2007-2008]
SCGLR 1041, I held that breach
of the principle of audi alteram
partem resulted in loss of
jurisdiction. I said at pp.
1052-3 that:
“For the
reasons eloquently articulated
by Taylor JSC in Amoakoh v
Hansen [1987-88] 2 GLR 26 at
43-44, non-service of a process
where service of same is
required, in my view goes to
jurisdiction. Non-service
implies that audi alteram
partem, the rule of natural
justice is breached. This is
fundamental and goes to
jurisdiction.”
The
authorities cited above point to
the likelihood that this court
will nullify the order made by
the Court of Appeal after
failing to listen to the
applicant’s counsel before
acting on the basis of the
Registrar’s Certificate. The
Court of Appeal had a discretion
under Rule 20(2) of CI 19 to
strike out the applicant’s
appeal or not. The discretion
given to the court in Rule 20(2)
is only properly exercised when
an opportunity is given to an
appellant to make
representations challenging the
Registrar’s Certificate, if he
or she wishes to do so. Rules
20(1) and (2) read as follows:
“(1) An
appellant shall within three
weeks of being notified in Form
6 set out in Part I of the
Schedule, that the record is
ready, or within the time that
the Court may on terms direct,
file with the Registrar a
written submission of the
appellant’s case based on the
grounds of appeal as set out in
the notice of appeal and any
other ground that the appellant
may file.
(2) Where the
appellant does not file the
written submission of his case
in accordance with sub-rule (1),
the Registrar shall certify the
failure to the Court by a
certificate in the Form 11A set
out in Part One of the Schedule
and the Court may then order the
appeal to be struck out.”
The
Registrar’s certification to the
court under Rule 20(2) cannot,
in fairness, be considered as
irrebutable, since the Registrar
can get his facts wrong and the
appellant should be given the
opportunity to draw the Court of
Appeal’s attention to facts, if
any, which negate the validity
of the certificate issued under
Rule 20(2).
The applicant
has applied for several orders
consequential on the quashing of
the Court of Appeal’s order. A
more detailed narration of the
facts of this case is needed in
order to understand why these
consequential orders are sought.
The
uncontroverted affidavit
evidence of Dr. Seth Twum, a
legal consultant of the
solicitors to the
defendant/appellant is to the
following effect: the
plaintiff brought action against
the defendant (the applicant in
this case) in the High Court,
Accra, on 20th
January 2006. After a full
trial, judgment was given
against the defendant on 14th
September, 2008. On 12th
October, 2008, the defendant
filed a Notice of Appeal against
the judgment. The record of
proceedings was settled and all
the appropriate fees duly paid
by the appellants. On 11th
November 2009, one Prosper who
claimed to work in the Docket
Section of the High Court served
a copy of the record of
proceedings on the solicitors
to the appellants. These
solicitors discovered that the
record served by Prosper was not
certified. The said solicitors
sent back the record to the
Registry for due certification.
This certification was completed
on 1st December,
2009. Within 18 days of the
record being certified, the
appellant’s Statement of Case
had been prepared and filed.
Some 3 months after the filing
of the appellant’s Statement of
Case, there was no response from
the respondent. Accordingly,
the appellant conducted a search
on 12th March, 2010
in the Registry of the Court of
Appeal. The search disclosed
that the appellant’s Statement
of Case had not been served
because there was insufficient
address on it for service. The
respondent’s Written Submission
was eventually filed on 10th
May, 2010. Although it was out
of time, the appellants did not
complain, in the interest of the
merits of the appeal being
adjudicated upon.
The
appellant/applicant contends
that its efforts to get the
uncertified record certified
have been exploited by the
respondent to generate confusion
in all the subsequent process
filed by the appellant.
When the
appeal was heard on 14th
June, 2010, the Court of Appeal
struck out the appellant’s
Statement of Case, when it
accepted the respondent’s claim
that the appellant’s Statement
of Case had been filed out of
time. The appellant contends
that this was an error and makes
submissions in support of this
contention which it is
unnecessary to consider in
detail here. In any case, the
appellant filed an application
for extension of time within
which to file its Written
Submission of Case. The
application contained a prayer
that the additional grounds
filed subsequent to the delivery
of the authenticated record of
proceedings be admitted into the
record. While the Court of
Appeal expressed its willingness
to grant the application for
extension of time, it said that
a copy of the additional grounds
of appeal should be annexed to
the application and advised
counsel to go back and put her
house in order. On 20th
August 2010, counsel filed the
supplementary affidavit
exhibiting the additional
grounds of appeal. The matter
of extension of time then came
up for further hearing on 1st
November, 2010. It was the
Court of Appeal before whom this
matter was placed which made the
ruling that:
“On the basis
of the Registrars Certification
that the appellant has not
complied with the requirement of
Rule 20(1) of CI 19 we proceed
to strike out the appeal which
is accordingly struck out. We
award costs assessed at GHc
300.00 against the
Plaintiff/Appellant costs to be
paid before fresh or further
steps be taken.”
The
appellant/applicant contends
that there was no basis for the
Registrar’s Certificate and that
the notice issued by him was
false. The appeal had not been
listed for hearing, as the
motion for extension of time to
file the Statement of Case had
not yet been taken. The appeal
was thus not ready to be heard.
Without going
into the full details of the
appellant/applicant’s
dissatisfaction with the conduct
of the Registrar, I would like
to stress that what is
significant, for the purposes of
the present application, is that
had the Court of Appeal allowed
counsel for the appellant to be
heard on the 1st
November 2010, they could have
brought to the attention of the
court matters that could have
affected the exercise of their
discretion. This reinforces the
correctness of insisting on the
application of the audi alteram
partem rule and its legal
consequences.
Regarding the
Notice of Intention to Rely on
Preliminary Objection filed by
counsel for the second
respondent, the notice relies on
Rule 62 of CI 16 which
stipulates that applications for
the exercise of the supervisory
jurisdiction of this court shall
be filed within 90 days of the
date when the grounds for the
application first arose, unless
the time is extended by this
Court. This Rule however has
been held not to apply where the
subject-matter of the
application is a decision which
is a nullity. The passage from
Amissah JA’s judgment in Vasquez
v Quarshie (supra) says as
much. My brother Atuguba JSC
also comes to the same
conclusion in Republic v High
Court (Fast Track Division)
Accra; ex parte Speedline
Stevedoring Co. Ltd. (Dolphyne
Interested Party) [2007-2008]
SCGLR 102, where, delivering the
judgment of the court, he stated
that (at p. 106):
“But we do
not think that even if the
certiorari decision by this
court was founded on an
application brought out of time
the same was thereby vitiated as
a nullity. This is because time
limits cannot apply to cases or
judgments or orders which are a
nullity. The celebrated case of
Mosi v Bagyina [1963]
1GLR 337, SC so decided.”
Accordingly,
the preliminary objection based
on an alleged violation of Rule
62 of the Supreme Court Rules
fails.
[SGD] DR. S. K.
DATE-BAH
[JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT]
ATUGUBA,
J.S.C:
I have had
the advantage of reading the
masterly Ruling of my brother
Dr. Date-Bah JSC and I agree
that the preliminary objection
fails. It is fairly well
settled that time limits do not
affect the courts’ inherent
jurisdiction to vacate orders
that are a nullity.
The question
that arises therefore is whether
a breach of the rules of audi
alteram partem sounds in
nullity. It is trite law that
these rules are regarded as
fundamental and jurisdictional
and that the courts will read
them into statutes though they
be silent as to them. Thus in
Aidoo v Commissioner of Police
(No. 3) (1964) GLR 354 at 359
S.C Ollennu JSC delivering the
Judgment of the court concerning
the wide revisionary powers of
the High Court under sections
59-60 of the Courts Act
1960,(C.A.4) over sentences
passed by district courts, said:
“Every
discretion given to a court or
judge must be judicially
exercised, that is, exercised in
such a manner, to use the oft
repeated expression, so that
justice must not only be done
thereby, but that it must
manifestly be seen to have been
done. This is particularly so
where the exercise of the
discretion may produce a penal
effect upon a party against whom
it is exercised.
It is a well
settled rule of procedure of the
common law as well as of our
customary law,that no person
shall be condemned without being
given the opportunity to answer
any complaints made against
him. The customary law
principle in this regard is
embodied in the Akan adage,
Tieni mienu, meaning hear both
sides; the Ga affirmation ke
anuu mo gbeianshishi le agbee
le, meaning, never condemn any
one to death whose explanation
you have not heard; and the Ewe
adage, Ela manotsia awede
menuneo, meaning literally, an
animal is never killed without
being offered water to drink.
The principle laid down in each
of those sayings in short is,
that it is unjust to decide a
matter against a person without
first hearing what that person
has to say in explanation to
allegations made against
him.”(e.s)
Continuing at
p. 360 he said”
“Now the
affidavit of the respondent
disclosed that in making the
order appealed from, his
lordship he Chief Justice acted
upon certain representations
made to him by the Director of
Public Prosecutions; yet before
the penal order was made against
him, the appellant was not given
the opportunity of knowing what
those representations were, and
was not heard in reply to them.
This violates the fundamental
principle of justice which is
jealously guarded both by the
common law and the customary
law. In those circumstances
justice cannot appear to have
been done. In other words the
discretion was not exercised
judicially. The order therefore
cannot stand.”
I am myself a
shareholder of this reasoning in
Republic v. High Court(Fast
Track Division) Accra Ex parte
State Housing Co. Ltd. (No. 1)
(Barnor Interested Party) (2009)
SCGLR 177 though in a subsequent
case I watered it down in view
of O.81 of C.1.47.
See also
University of Ceylon v Fernando
(1960)I WLR 223 P.C. But in the
common law world generally the
position is not uniform as to
the effect of a breach of the
rules of audi alteram partem.
Thus in Asor II v Amegboe
(1978) GLR 153 C.A at 157 Azu
Crabbe C.J quoted Lord Denning
M. R (the initial champion of
the nullity principle) in F.
Hoffman-La Roche & Co v.
Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry [1974]3 WLR 104 H.L, as
saying at the Court of Appeal
level of the case,..“failure to
observe the rules of natural
justice does not render a
decision or order or report
absolutely void in the sense
that it is a nullity...”
However, in
my view, in Ghana what clinches
this issue is article 296 of the
1992 Constitution. It is a
follows:
“296.
Exercise of discretionary power
Where in this
Constitution or in any other law
discretionary power is vested in
any person or authority,
(a)
that discretionary power shall
be deemed to imply a duty to be
fair and candid;
(b) the
exercise of the discretionary
power shall not be arbitrary,
capricious or biased either by
resentment, prejudice or
personal dislike and shall be in
accordance with due process of
law; and
(c)
where the person or authority is
not a Justice or other judicial
officer, there shall be
published by constitutional
instrument or statutory
instrument, Regulations that are
not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Constitution
or that other law to govern the
exercise of the discretionary
power.”
The terms of
this provision are mandatory and
obviously require observance of
the rules of natural justice,
especially the audi alteram
partem rule involved here.
The rule has
therefore been elevated to
constitutional pedestal and its
breach has the constitutional
consequences laid down in
articles 1 and 2 of the
Constiutiton, namely such breach
voids the act in question.
But it is
not all over. The courts are
anxious that no unfair advantage
should be taken of any law. See
Amuzu v Oklikah (1998-99)SC GLR
141. Accordingly even in
relation to the audi alteram
partem rule this court was
constrained to hold in
Akuffo-Addo v Catheline (1992)1
GLR 377 S.C as per headnote (2)
as follows:
“(2) The
proviso not rule 8(6) of the
Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (LI
218) which required the Court of
Appeal not to rest a decision on
a ground not canvassed by the
appellant unless the respondent
had been given sufficient
opportunity to controvert that
ground, should not be given an
interpretation which would
inhibit or stultify the rule
that an appeal “shall be by way
of rehearing.” The proviso
could not be said to imply an
absolute prohibition; in certain
special or exceptional
circumstances, it would not
apply. Accordingly, it could be
said that the Court of Appeal
should not decide in favour of
an appellant on a ground not put
forward by him unless the court
was satisfied beyond doubt,
first, that it had before it all
the facts or materials bearing
upon the contention being taken
by it suo motu; and
secondly, that the point was
such that no satisfactory or
meaningful explanation or legal
contention could be advanced by
the party against whom the point
was being taken even if an
opportunity was given him to
present an explanation or legal
argument. Accordingly, even
though in the instant case there
was indeed no ground filed by
the defendants which could be
said to be a complaint against
the trial court’s decision to
decree title to the Kaneshie
house in the plaintiff when
there had been no claim to such
relief, since on the evidence
the claim had never been before
the trial court, the judge had
no jurisdiction to pronounce on
same. Accordingly, since the
decree was a nullity, the Court
of Appeal’s hands could not be
stayed, when it decided to act
suo motu in the matter,
by the invocation of the proviso
to rule 8(6) of LI 218 to
inhibit its inherent
jurisdiction.”(e.s)
It is
interesting that Osei-Hwere JSC
who when a Justice of the High
Court took a similar view in
Essilfie v Ghana Ports Authority
(1980) GLR 469, radically
disagreed with this holding.
In view of
this court’s decision in Hanna
Assi (No. 2) v. Gihoc
Refrigeration & Household
Products Ltd (2007-2008)1 SCGLR
16 the reasoning in the holding
(2) quoted above may not hold
now with regard to the omission
to make a particular claim, but
it could be relevant to other
situations.
Conclusion
I would
conclude by holding that since
under the common law the
purposive rule of applying the
common law is observed and
conveyed by the maxim
cessante ratione cessat
lex ipsa and the same
principle has been adopted by
this court with regard to
statutory and constitutional
interpretation and the 1992
Constitution itself expressly
requires (see for example
article 17(4)(d), that its
spirit should be observed),
where there is clearly no
defence against an order made by
a court, that situation does not
evoke unfairness against the
person to whom it relates even
if he was not heard before the
same was made. In such a case
the court should not be bound to
set it aside, ex debito
justitiae. However, in this
case the applicant has a
plethora of causes to show as to
why his appeal ought not to be
struck out upon the Registrar’s
summons. Therefore the failure
to hear him out on it is prima
facie an infraction of the
audi alteram partem rule as
embraced by article 296 and can
void the peremptory striking out
of his appeal and time under the
Rules of this court cannot shut
him out from pursuing his motion
herein.
For these
reasons I would also overrule
the preliminary objection.
Motion to
proceed.
[SGD]
W.
A. ATUGUBA
[JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT]
[SGD]
J. ANSAH
[JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT]
[SGD]
P. BAFFOE-BONNIE
[JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT]
[SGD]
B. T. ARYEETEY
[JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT]
COUNSEL;
MISS AUDREY
TWUM FOR THE APPLICANT.
GODFRED
YEBOAH-DAME FOR THE 2ND
RESPONDENT. |