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Practice and Procedure -
Interpretation - Certiorari -
Wrongful arrest - Assault and
battery – Damages – Transfer of
case – Functus officio -
Audi alteram partem -
Corrective machinery to a wrong
decision - Whether or
not the Chief Justice’s power to
transfer cases as outlined in
the Courts Act 1993, Act 459, is
not an unfettered one but
subject to the constitution -
Article 157(3) of the 1992
Constitution -
HEADNOTES
The interested party herein,
David Ametefe, brought an action
in tort against ‘ROSE BIO ATINGA’
and 5 other named persons
claiming among other reliefs,
damages for wrongful arrest and
damages for assault and battery.
This writ was issued on
27/1/2011 for some unexplained
reasons, travelled through to
October 2016. On 26th
October,2016 when 2nd
defendant, who was then in the
box for continuation of
cross-examination, failed to
appear, the trial judge
ruled that the defendants have
continuously been absent to
prosecute. I would expunge the
evidence of the 2nd
defendant from the record and
deem the evidence of the
defendants to have been closed
and further direct the plaintiff
to file their written addresses
on or before 11th day
of November, 2016 with the
defendants reacting to same 21
days after being served and
adjourned the case to 15th
December, 2016 for judgment
Feeling aggrieved, the
Applicants herein, brought an
application to vacate the order
made on 26/10/2016 but same was
dismissed on 07/02/ 2017 The
applicants herein, filed an
interlocutory appeal against
this decision, further holding
up the trial. This application
for stay of proceedings was
refused and both parties filed
their respective addresses, and
a day for judgment was fixed. On
the scheduled day for the
delivery of judgment, the trial
judge intimated to the court
that his attention had been
drawn to an order signed by the
Chief Justice,
transferring the entire
case, the applicant questioned
the genuineness of the transfer
order based on the, and harped
on the fact that the Chief
Justice’s power to transfer
cases as outlined in the Courts
Act 1993, Act 459, is not an
unfettered one but subject to
the constitution
HELD
It is our view that the
application for certiorari
before the court is
misconceived. Having dismissed
the application on procedural
grounds, that ordinarily should
be the end but because, we
allowed counsel to make
submissions beyond the
preliminary point of law, we
felt it necessary to deal with
it substantively. It can be seen
that both in his motion paper
and supplementary affidavit, the
applicant questioned the
genuineness of the transfer
order and harped on the fact
that the Chief Justice’s power
to transfer cases as outlined in
the Courts Act 1993, Act 459, is
not an unfettered one but
subject to the constitution.
That the constitution mandates
persons granted power to do
anything, not to do so
arbitrarily or capriciously and
must conform to the dictates of
the constitution. This is the
gravamen of the respondents’
application before the High
Court and before us. The trial
judge found that the respondent
has never questioned the Chief
Justices power to transfer cases
from one judge to another but
that such power should not be
exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously. She found no
conflicting interpretation of
article 157(3) to warrant the
transfer to the Supreme Court,
and we agree with her.
The application for
certiorari fails and same is
dismissed.
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459), as
amended
Courts (Amendment) Act, 2002
(Act 620).
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Republic v High Court, Accra; Ex
parte Commission on Human Rights
and Administrative Justice (Addo
Interested Party) [2003-2004] 1
SCGLR 312,
Republic v High Court, Accra; Ex
parte Industrialization Fund for
Developing Countries [2003-2004]
1 SCGLR 348
Republic v High Court, Kumasi,
Ex Parte Fosuhene [1989-90] 2GLR
315
Republic v Court of Appeal; Ex
parte Tsatsu Tsikata [2005-2006]
SCGLR 612
Ex Parte Electoral Commission
[2005-2006] SCGLR 514
Bimpong-Buta v General Legal
Council [2003-2004] 2 SCGLR 1200
Aduamoa II v Adu Twum [2000]
SCGLR 165;
Gbedemah v Awoonor Williams SC
30 October 1969 digested in
(1970) CC 12 SC
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC:-
COUNSEL
DAVID AMETEPE APPEARS IN PERSON
FOR THE INTERESTED PARTY.
WILLIAM POBI, CHIEF STATE
ATTORNEY WITH NICHOLAS NBEAH FOR
THE APPLICANTS.
BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC:-
For a fuller appreciation of
this ruling I will set out in
material detail the facts and
series of events that have
culminated in this application.
The interested party herein,
David Ametefe, brought an action
in tort against ‘ROSE BIO
ATINGA’ and 5 other named
persons claiming among other
reliefs, damages for wrongful
arrest and damages for assault
and battery. This writ was
issued on 27/1/2011.
The trial which started in 2012,
for some
unexplained reasons, travelled
through to October 2016. On 26th
October,2016 when 2nd
defendant, who was then in the
box for continuation of
cross-examination, failed to
appear,
the trial
judge ruled thus,
“The
defendants have continuously
been absent to prosecute. I
would expunge the evidence of
the 2nd defendant
from the record and deem the
evidence of the defendants to
have been closed and further
direct the plaintiff to file
their written addresses on or
before 11th day of
November, 2016 with the
defendants reacting to same 21
days after being served.
Case
adjourned to 15th
December, 2016 for judgment.
Order as well as hearing notice
be served on the defendants for
their necessary compliance with
costs of GHc1000.00 in favour of
plaintiff.”
Feeling aggrieved, the
Applicants herein, brought an
application to vacate the order
made on 26/10/2016 but same was
dismissed on 07/02/ 2017.
The applicants herein, filed an
interlocutory appeal against
this decision, further holding
up the trial. This application
for stay of proceedings was
refused and both parties filed
their respective addresses, and
a day for judgment was fixed. On
the scheduled day for the
delivery of judgment, the trial
judge intimated to the court
that his attention had been
drawn to an order signed by the
Chief Justice, transferring the
entire case
to His Lordship Justice Kwaku
Ackaah Boafo, so he was
precluded from delivering his
judgment and the matter was
adjourned sine die.
When the
Interested Party herein, finally
procured a copy of the transfer
order he felt suspicious and
therefore filed an application
before the High Court praying
for an order of Certiorari to
bring the Chief Justices Order
of Transfer to be quashed on a
number of grounds.
His suspicions were based on the
fact that
1.
The transfer order quoted a
wrong title describing the
parties as
Daniel Ametepe vrs The IGP and
ors, instead of DAVID AMETEFE v
ROSE BIO-ATINGA and 5 ors
2.
Even though the transfer order
was as a result of certain
allegations made against the
trial judge in the course of the
trial, neither the interested
party herein nor the trial judge
had been asked to make an input.
3.
The petition which was dated 27th
January, 2017, was received at,
and worked on, by the Chief
Justices secretariat, and a
transfer order signed by Her
Ladyship the Chief Justice on 2nd
February 2017, yet this response
was not put on the court’s
docket or brought to the
attention of the trial judge
until 8 months later, in
October, when the case was
slated for judgment.
He couched his application for
certiorari as follows.
“MOTION ON NOTICE FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW (ORDER 55 OF C.I, 47
TAKE NOTICE THAT EKOW EGYIR
DADSON, ESQ, counsel for and on
behalf of the Applicant herein
will move the honourable Court
for an order of certiorari
directed at the respondents to
bring before this court to be
quashed his documents purporting
to be transfer order dated 2nd
February, 2017 and conveyed to
the applicants counsel by a
letter dated 4th
December, 2017 but delivered in
March, 2018”
Both in his affidavit and
supplementary affidavit,
the
applicant questioned the
genuineness of the transfer
order based on the suspicions
outlined above, and harped on
the fact that the Chief
Justice’s power to transfer
cases as outlined in the Courts
Act 1993, Act 459, is not an
unfettered one but subject to
the constitution. That the
constitution mandates persons
granted power to do anything,
not to do so arbitrarily or
capriciously and must conform to
the dictates of the
constitution.
In his supplementary affidavit
he said this
9, That, in terms of
Article
157(3) of the 1992 Constitution
of the Republic of Ghana a judge
who has heard a matter to its
conclusion cannot recuse himself
or become
functus officio
unless he gives judgment and a
statutory power or function
seeking to derogate from same
should be devoid of any
impropriety
10. That in this particular case
where a matter is ripe for
judgment, a date fixed for the
judgment and just for a transfer
letter to be placed on the
docket on the day of judgment is
most unfair and same amount to
arbitrary and capricious use of
such administrative powers.
11. That the power of transfer
of a matter must be exercised
with due caution and fairness,
most especially when the Chief
Justice did not act suo motu but
upon some purported petition by
a party against a judge.
12. That when a person applies
to the Chief Justice for a
transfer, it is just fair and
proper that the judge and the
person affected by that transfer
must be heard on the grounds of
audi
alteram partem rule so as to
test the veracity or otherwise
of the allegations so made.
13 That the transfer order is
apparently defective as it is
not properly set out or make the
correct reference to the parties
or title of the case and to that
extent does not affect the
applicant.
The application has been moved
and awaiting a ruling. In the
interim the applicant herein
brought an application pursuant
to Article 130(2) praying for an
order referring some issues
arising from the application, to
the Supreme Court for
interpretation.
Article 130(2) of the
constitution 1992, reads,
Where an issue that relates to a
matter or question referred to
in clause (1) of this article
arises in any proceedings in a
court other than the Supreme
Court, that Court shall stay the
proceedings and refer the
question of law involved to the
Supreme Court for determination:
and the court in which the
question arose shall dispose of
the case in accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court.
In his application before the
High Court, the applicant
counsel referred specifically to
paragraph 9 of the supplementary
affidavit of the respondent and
submitted that the respondent’s
interpretation of this
constitutional provision is
adverse to the interpretation
being put on by the applicants.
It is his case therefore that
this Article 157(3) should be
referred to the Supreme Court
for interpretation. Paragraph 9
of the respondent’s
supplementary affidavit in
opposition read,
9. That, in terms of Article
157(3) of the 1992 Constitution
of the Republic of Ghana a judge
who has heard a matter to its
conclusion cannot recuse himself
or become functus officio
unless he gives judgment and a
statutory power or function
seeking to derogate from same
should be devoid of any
impropriety.
When this motion was argued
before the High Court for the
issue to be transferred, the
Judge, after hearing both
counsel and reviewing the
processes filed, and authorities
on the subject, concluded as
follows,
“……upon a reading of the
relevant provisions of the
Constitution and decided
authorities, it is clear to me
that the Constitutional
provision(the subject matter for
the application for referral),
must be one upon which the Court
will rely to determine the suit
and must be in controversy
between the parties.
I have considered the arguments
by both parties and it seems to
me that there is no controversy
concerning Article 157(3) of the
1992 constitution. The argument
of the applicant from my
understanding, is not that the
Honourable Chief Justice cannot
transfer a case from one judge
to another when the suit has
reached the stage of judgment,
but that considering the stage
of proceedings same must be done
in accordance with law and
principles of natural justice”.
Upon the foregoing, I have come
to the conclusion that the
Application for referral of
Articles 157(3) and 296 of the
1992 Constitution of the
Republic of Ghana, to the
Supreme Court for interpretation
is unmeritorious. In the
circumstances, the application
is dismissed.
It is this ruling that the
applicant is seeking to quash by
an order of judicial review.
Before us the applicant’s motion
reads as follows;
“PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that this
Honourable Court will be moved
by the Lawyer for the applicants
herein invoking the supervisory
jurisdiction of this honourable
court for the orders of
certiorari and prohibition
directed to the high Court,
Accra presided over by Her
Ladyship Hafisata Amaleboba
(Mrs) to bring to this court the
ruling on the application to
refer a matter to the Supreme
Court for interpretation in case
No……. Delivered on 27th
June, 2019, for same to be
quashed for lack of jurisdiction
and to prohibit the said High
Court from interpreting the
constitution on grounds as per
the accompanying affidavit.”
Both in his affidavit and
statement of case, the applicant
has sought to portray that the
respondent’s application for
judicial review raises the issue
of interpretation since the
interpretation of article 157(3)
is at the heart of the problem
and therefore has to be resolved
first. Counsel relied heavily on
paragraph 9 of the supplementary
affidavit as quoted above in
support of the application.
The applicant
concluded that the
interpretation being put on
Article 157(3) of the
constitution was adverse to the
interpretation by the Applicant
and therefore there is the need
to refer the matter to the
Supreme Court which has the
exclusive jurisdiction to
interpret the constitution. The
High Court’s refusal to refer
the issue to the Supreme Court,
was an error of law and has
opened the High Court to a
situation where a High Court
will assume jurisdiction to
interpret the constitution,
which jurisdiction it does not
have. The application before us
is therefore praying for an
order of certiorari to quash the
ruling of the High Court and
prohibit her from going ahead to
deal with the application for
judicial review before it.
For reasons which we will
articulate presently we wish to
state from the very outset that
this application is flawed
procedurally and unmeritorious
substantively.
We find it very difficult to
appreciate why counsel has come
before us to ask for certiorari
to quash a ruling which was
given in an application that was
brought by him before the High
Court judge. Is he aggrieved
because the ruling did not go
his way? In simple terms, the
applicants’ submissions before
the High Court was, “Transfer
the case to the Supreme Court
because it involves
interpretation.” Then the judge
says “No the issue does not call
for interpretation”.
So why the application for
certiorari? The High Court judge
had jurisdiction to rule on the
application seeking the
transfer, and he did rule. At no
one point in time did the judge
lose, or go beyond, her
jurisdiction. If the applicant
is aggrieved by the ruling, his
remedy lies in an appeal and not
certiorari.
There is abundant case law on
the subject as to when and how
the supervisory jurisdiction of
this court in the form of
certiorari can be invoked.
In the case of
Republic v High
Court, Accra; Ex parte
Commission on Human Rights and
Administrative Justice (Addo
Interested Party)
[2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 312,
our brother Dr. Date-Bah
JSC said,(as stated holding (4)
of the headnote at page 316)
that:
“Where the High Court… has made
a non-jurisdictional error of
law, which was not patent on the
face of the record…the avenue
for redress open to an aggrieved
party was an appeal, not
judicial review. Therefore,
certiorari would not lie to
quash errors of law which were
not patent… An error of law made
by the High Court…would not be
taken as taking the judge
outside the court’s
jurisdiction, unless the court
had acted ultra vires the
Constitution or an express
statutory restriction validly
imposed on it.”
On the same-subject-matter, the
Supreme Court in
Republic v High Court,
Accra; Ex parte
Industrialization Fund for
Developing Countries [2003-2004]
1 SCGLR 348
held (as stated in holding
(1) of the headnote) that:
“Certiorari is a discretionary
remedy which wold issue to
correct a clear error of law on
the face of the ruling of the
court; or an error which amounts
to lack of jurisdiction in the
court as to make a decision a
nullity. In the case of errors
of law or fact not apparent on
the face of the ruling, the
avenue for redress is by way of
an appeal.”
In this case, the applicant is
praying for an order of
certiorari not because the
trial judge did not have
jurisdiction to give a ruling on
the matter but that he is
dissatisfied with the ruling.
This may be a ground of appeal
but definitely not a ground for
certiorari. The judge
might have erred in his
appreciation of the facts and
the conclusions drawn from
them. If that is the case, it
would be a matter of appeal. It
would not be an egregious error
on the face of the record to be
cured by certiorari.
Where a judge has jurisdiction,
he has jurisdiction to be wrong
as well as to be right and the
corrective machinery to a wrong
decision in the opinion of a
party is an appeal: see
Republic v High
Court, Kumasi, Ex Parte Fosuhene
[1989-90] 2GLR 315
Before I conclude I wish to note
that this special jurisdiction
inserted in the 1992
Constitution by the framers is
being abused by legal
practitioners as they inundate
the court with applications
which clearly they should pursue
on appeal. I would therefore
reiterate the words our sister
Wood JSC(as she then was) said
in the case of
Republic v Court of Appeal;
Ex parte Tsatsu Tsikata
[2005-2006] SCGLR 612 at 619
that:
“The clear thinking
of this court is that, our
supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 132 of the 1992
Constitution, should be
exercised only in those
manifestly plain and obvious
cases, where there are patent
errors of law on the face of the
record, which error either go to
the jurisdiction or are so plain
as to make the impugned decision
a complete nullity. It stands
to reason then, that the
error(s) of law alleged must be
fundamental, substantial,
material, grave or so serious as
to go to the root of the
matter.”
If practitioners were to
appreciate the obvious sense in
this statement, I am sure many
of the applications inundating
this court and invoking our
supervisory jurisdiction will
not be brought. As Justice
Date-Bah admonished in the case
of Republic v High
Court, Accra; Ex parte CHRAJ
Addo Interested Party)
(supra) at 316:
If such conduct is not checked
“…judicial review
would supplant the system
of appeals, which has carefully
been laid down in the 1992
Constitution and the
Courts
Act, 1993 (Act 459), as amended
by the Courts (Amendment) Act,
2002 (Act 620).”
It is our view that the
application for certiorari
before the court is
misconceived.
Having dismissed the application
on procedural grounds, that
ordinarily should be the end but
because, we allowed counsel to
make submissions beyond the
preliminary point of law, we
felt it necessary to deal with
it substantively.
In his submissions on the
substance , the applicant
referred to two paragraphs in
the affidavit of the respondent
where he said;
9, That in terms of Article
157(3) of the 1992 Constitution
of the Republic of Ghana a judge
who has heard a matter to its
conclusion cannot recuse himself
or become functus officio
unless he gives judgment and a
statutory power or function
seeking to derogate from same
should be devoid of any
impropriety
10. That in this particular case
where a matter is ripe for
judgment, a date fixed for the
judgment and just for a transfer
letter to be placed on the
docket on the day of judgment is
most unfair and same amount to
arbitrary and capricious use of
such administrative powers.
From these 2 paragraphs the
applicant concludes that, an
issue of
interpretation arises. It is
his submission that what the
respondent means is that per
article 157(3) of the
constitution the chief justice
cannot transfer a case that is
ripe for judgment. This
interpretation is adverse to his
because in his view the article
157(3) is referable only to a
judge being precluded from
recusing himself when a matter
has reached the stage of
judgment. These 2
interpretations are adverse to
each other therefore there is
the need to refer the issue to
the Supreme Court for
interpretation.
The respondent naturally opposed
this application and submitted
that nothing in his application
calls for interpretation by the
Supreme Court. He has not sought
to interpret the constitution
and that merely referring to
some articles of the
constitution, without more, does
not entitle the High Court to
refer same to the Supreme Court
for interpretation.
We must say that from the
processes before us it is clear
that the arguments canvassed
before us, are the same as those
canvassed before the High Court
when applicant sought to have
the matter transferred for
interpretation.
It is provided by Article 130(1)
and (2) of the 1992 Constitution
as follows;
(1)
Subject to the jurisdiction of
the High Court in the
enforcement of the Fundamental
Human Rights and Freedoms as
provided in article 33 of this
Constitution, the Supreme Court
shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction in-
(a)
All matters relating to the
enforcement or interpretation of
this Constitution; and
(b)
All matters arising as to
whether an enactment was made in
excess of the powers conferred
on Parliament or any other
authority or person by law or
under this Constitution.
(2)
Where an issue that relates to a
matter or question referred to
in clause (1) of this article
arises in any proceedings in a
court other than the Supreme
Court, that court shall stay the
proceedings and refer the
question, of law involved to the
Supreme Court for determination;
and the court in which the
question arose shall dispose of
the case in accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court.
This article has received
judicial interpretation in a
number of cases and from eminent
jurists. In the case of Ex parte
Akosah which was decided on the
1979 constitution which had
similar provisions, this court
enunciated a well thought out
scheme for determining an issue
of enforcement or interpretation
as follows;
“An issue of enforcement or
interpretation…. arises in any
of the following eventualities;
(a)where the words of the
provision are imprecise or
unclear or ambiguous.
(b) where rival meanings have
been placed by the litigants on
the words of any provision of
the Constitution
© where there is a conflict in
the meaning and effect of two or
more articles of the
Constitution, and the question
is raised as to which provision
shall prevail
(d)Where on the face
of the provision, there is a
conflict between the operations
of particular institutions set
up under the Constitution, and
thereby raising problems of
enforcement and of
interpretation"
See the case of
Ex
Parte Electoral Commission
[2005-2006] SCGLR 514
pg 559, where
Prof Ocran admonished trial
judges as follows;
“In dealing with constitutional
provisions which have received
little or no prior judicial
interpretation, it will be a
safer course of action for the
trial court to refer the matter
to the Supreme Court rather than
to assume that there is no real
issue of interpretation, or that
his or her view of the
constitutional provision is more
likely to be more correct than
that of five or seven Supreme
Court Justices put together”
See also the case of
Republic v Fast Track High Court
1, Ex parte CHRAJ, DR
Anane, Interested Party in which
the trial High court judge was
chastised by the Supreme Court
for purporting to interpret the
word “Complaint” as found in
article 290 of the constitution.
It must however be said that
there is also a long list of
cases that caution trial judges
in the hasty referral of issues
to the Supreme Court. It is not
every issue dressed up
beautifully as an issue of
constitutional interpretation
that has to be referred. In
other words, an action must
raise a genuine issue of
interpretation or enforcement of
the constitution before the
original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court can be invoked
under Article 130(1). As a
corollary, where an action or
issue involves no more than the
application of a clear and
unambiguous provision of the
constitution, and raises no
issue of enforcement or
interpretation, that action will
remain with the lower courts
rather than come before the
Supreme Court.
See the cases of
Bimpong-Buta v General Legal
Council [2003-2004] 2 SCGLR
1200;
Aduamoa II v Adu Twum [2000]
SCGLR 165;
Gbedemah v Awoonor Williams SC
30 October 1969 digested in
(1970) CC 12 SC.
Further if the provision of the
constitution has received
judicial interpretation earlier,
then no issue of referral for
interpretation arises. A trial
judge will only be called upon
to apply the interpretation as
given earlier.
Having established the legal
framework within which a trial
judge has to operate to decide
whether or not to refer an issue
for interpretation to the
Supreme Court, we will now deal
with the case at hand.
The applicant believes that by
referring to article 157(3) of
the constitution in paragraph 9
of his supplementary affidavit,
the respondent had sought to
interpret the said article, and
since the meaning the respondent
put on that article is adverse
to what the applicant puts on
that self-same provision, an
issue of interpretation arises.
This argument did not find
favour with the trial High Court
Judge, and it does not find
favour with us.
It is obvious that the applicant
selected just two paragraphs
from an otherwise lengthy
affidavit and commented on them.
If he had read the whole
document and the other processes
like the motion paper, he would
have had a better appreciation
of the words in paragraphs 9 and
10 of supplementary affidavit.
The application for certiorari
was couched as follows
“MOTION ON NOTICE FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW (ORDER 55 OF C.I, 47
TAKE NOTICE THAT EKOW EGYIR
DADSON, ESQ, counsel for and on
behalf of the Applicant herein
will move the honourable Court
for an order of certiorari
directed at the respondents to
bring before this court to be
quashed his documents purporting
to be transfer order dated 2nd
February, 2017 and conveyed to
the applicants counsel by a
letter dated 4th
December, 2017 but delivered in
March, 2018”
Then this is what he said in his
supplementary affidavit
9, That in terms of Article
157(3) of the 1992 Constitution
of the Republic of Ghana a judge
who has heard a matter to its
conclusion cannot recuse himself
or become functus officio
unless he gives judgment and a
statutory power or function
seeking to derogate from same
should be devoid of any
impropriety
10. That in this particular case
where a matter is ripe for
judgment, a date fixed for the
judgment and just for a transfer
letter to be placed on the
docket on the day of judgment is
most unfair and same amount to
arbitrary and capricious use of
such administrative powers.
11. That the power of transfer
of a matter must be exercised
with due caution and fairness,
most especially when the Chief
Justice did not act suo motu but
upon some purported petition by
a party against a judge.
12. That when a person applies
to the Chief Justice for a
transfer, it is just fair and
proper that the judge and the
person affected by that transfer
must be heard on the grounds of
audi alteram partem rule so as
to test the veracity or
otherwise of the allegations so
made.
13 That the transfer order is
apparently defective as it is
not properly set out or make the
correct reference to the parties
or title of the case and to that
extent does not affect the
applicant.
It can be seen that both in his
motion paper and supplementary
affidavit, the applicant
questioned the genuineness of
the transfer order and harped on
the fact that the Chief
Justice’s power to transfer
cases as outlined in the Courts
Act 1993, Act 459, is not an
unfettered one but subject to
the constitution. That the
constitution mandates persons
granted power to do anything,
not to do so arbitrarily or
capriciously and must conform to
the dictates of the
constitution. This is the
gravamen of the respondents’
application before the High
Court and before us. The trial
judge found that the respondent
has never questioned the Chief
Justices power to transfer cases
from one judge to another but
that such power should not be
exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously. She found no
conflicting interpretation of
article 157(3) to warrant the
transfer to the Supreme Court,
and we agree with her.
The application for certiorari
fails and same is dismissed.
P. BAFFOE-BONNIE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
Y. APPAU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
S. K. MARFUL-SAU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
A. M. A. DORDZIE (MRS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
PROF. N. A. KOTEY
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
DAVID AMETEPE APPEARS IN PERSON
FOR THE INTERESTED PARTY.
WILLIAM POBI, CHIEF STATE
ATTORNEY WITH NICHOLAS NBEAH FOR
THE APPLICANTS. |
